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I must say with regard to the American people, that the idea never entered my head to 
consider as identical the characteristics of two peoples so different as the Anglo- 
American and the Spanish-American. Would it not be very difficult to apply to Spain 
the English system ofpolitical, civil, and religious liberty? It is even more difficult to 
adopt the laws of the United States in Venezuela. Does not l'Esprit des lois say that 
the laws should suit the people who make them? That it is a mere chance if the laws 
of one nation suit another nation? The law should be adapted to the physiography of 
the country, to the climate, to the soil, to the situation of the country, to its extent, and 
to the manner of life of his inhabitants? That laws should be adapted to the degree of 
liberty which the constitution can sanction, to the religion of the inhabitants, to their 
inclinations, riches, numbers, commerce, and manners? 77ds is the code which we 
ought to consult and not the code of Washington ( William Spence Robertson 1965, 
Rise o the Spanish-American Republics. As told in the lives of theirs Liberators: 
p. 222). 
SiMOn Bolivar 
ABSTRACT 
This thesis explores the relations between democracy and decentralization in 
Venezuela during the period from 1989 to 2000. In particular it explores the 
emergence of political decentralization as the spatial distribution of power and its 
links with the process of democratization within political spaces. The spatial 
distribution of power has impacts upon both political institutions and civil society. 
This is where its central importance lies. Because of this, the framework of ideas 
underlying the thesis is followed within a methodological focus that emphasizes both 
the potency of the spatial, as a guiding element of politics and the political, and the 
local scale and the political practice of individuals. 
The background to the study is established through an exploration of territoriality and 
the spatiality of power in Venezuela during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. 
This is followed by an analysis of the centralist form of the state and the state reforms 
which were promoted at the end of the 1980s and which gave rise to the political 
decentralization of 1989 at the level of states and municipalities. The main period of 
study (1989-2000) is divided into three stages according to the dynamics of the 
process of democratization itself. Finally, the changes occurring at the local level 
through the application of decentralization are analyzed through a case study at the 
level of the municipality and of the parish: the Libertador municipality of the state of 
Mdrida and the parish of J. J. Osuna Rodriguez. 
The most important findings of the thesis are: 
* Conceptually, the thesis show that in order to understand the process of 
democratization in Latin America and specifically in Venezuela, it is necessary to 
move beyond a binary model of power, characterized by dominance and resistance, 
and emphasize the spatialities of power. An image of the distribution of relationships 
of power and resistance as an infinity of points, allows us to understand the 
articulations of power and space from a double perspective. On the one hand, it 
suggests that power is de-centrally distributed and this implies a new manner of 
understanding the dynamics of the process of democratisation. On the other hand, it 
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suggests that power is practiced and, as a consequence, is all around and between us, 
rather than being located in a centre, or 'enclosed' within the individual. 
* More specifically, the thesis demonstrates that Venezuelan democracy has been 
strengthened by political decentralization which has permitted the overcoming of 
difficult moments in the continuity of the democratic system and the reinforcement of 
institutionality. It also, however, contributed towards a disarticulation of the control 
that the political parties had exerted over civil society. The fragmentation of the 
parties and the ensuing atornization of the party system fed the diversity of the 
political system and encouraged diverse opinions and wide political discussion. This 
lead to the elaboration of a new Constitution in 1999. 
*Furthermore, civil society has played a very important role within the framework of 
the recent struggles for hegemony in Venezuela. Inevitable civil society found itself 
subject to pressures and resistances from above and below, but also at the same time 
in an arena of discussion and dialogue. In this sense, the presence of a pluralist 
diverse civil society has also been a great support for the continuity of the democratic 
system, and its contribution to the democratic process has enriched the participatory 
nature of the new Constitution. One of the most important contributions of the new 
hegemony established under Chdvez has been to give knowledge to civil society of an 
alternative which has begun to challenge the representative democracy of elites that 
had previously dominated the political system and, in its place to promote a more 
dynamic and more participatory democracy at national and local levels. 
* The specific local examples explored in the thesis allow highlighted the ways in 
which clientelism can be associated with the vertical structures of power that have 
predominated in Latin America. Nevertheless, whilst its importance has been 
highlighted here through an understanding of the process of democratisation on the 
South American continent, it is interesting to note that it is not often explicitly 
considered as another mode of power in western political theory. 
Key words: Democracy, Venezuela, Decentralization, Spatiality of Power, Civil 
Society, Process of Democratization, political clientelism. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This research is directed at studying the relations between democracy and political 
decentralization. It deals with various aspects related to this problematic and their 
implications for the process of democratization which began in Venezuela in the 
period 1989-2000. The process of democratisation that characterised this period is 
marked by a series of political events woven together within a context of 
decentralized power. Political decentralization was proposed initially as part of the 
state reforms (1984-1989), which accompanied the application of the structural 
adjustment measures recommended by the multilateral organisations. 
However, the popular uprising against these measures on the 27 th of February 1989 
modified the political panorama and the initial proposals for administrative 
decentralization were diverted towards a more political decentralization. Later, the 
military uprising of 1992 (amongst other events) was another issue which was related 
to political decentralization. This acted to generate changes in the democracy of 
conciliation of the elites that had been installed in 1961 and, as a consequence, in the 
direction that the current process of dernocratisation would take. 
During the period of the study, the hegemonic parties of Venezuela have undergone 
important transformations, and their leadership has for all intents and purposes been 
completely renovated. The appearance of new political organizations and new 
movements of civil society, some of these linked to liberal democracy, has also been 
clearly evident. This re-composition of the political system has given rise to a new 
hegemony, which sought the approval of a new Constitution in 1999. Participation has 
been given considerable importance and democracy has been made more integral 
through the incorporation of the referendum and the assembly in place of the senate. 
Nevertheless, what is important to underline now, is that this new Constitution, in 
combination with the measures relating to political decentralization, have favoured the 
process of change in the political context through the opening of new democratic spaces 
at the local level. 
These events have had great importance in the process of Venezuelan democratisation. 
The two main Venezuelan political parties, AD and COPEI, had controlled political 
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participation and local civil organizations through a variety of clientelistic practices for 
some 30 years. The clientelism of these parties had contributed to the extension of 
central power over space, as well as to the instrumentalization of practices directed at 
controlling and de-mobilizing the organizations of civil society at the local level. This, 
without doubt, favoured determinate groups and semi-corporative organisms that, 
together with the elites of the parties, progressively accentuated the verticality of power 
until control was exerted over all orders of national life. 
Leading on from the above, the thesis argues that the dynamic of the democratic system 
since 1989 has mainly had to do with political decentralization, in conjunction with 
other relationships, events, activities and practices. Therefore, the interest of this work 
is directed towards understanding how the relationships of democratic power have been 
modified in Venezuela, how decentralization has intervened in the process of 
democratisation and, lastly, how these changes been lived by the community? 
The adoption of this perspective has orientated the research towards a focus on 
political decentralization, as linked to the spatiality of powerwhilst the technical 
aspects of decentralization have been considered at the informative level only. The 
proposal to understand the relationships of power in an infinity of points, before 
arriving at a centre, permits the assimilation of the articulations of power and space 
from a double perspective: that power is decentralized and also, that power is 
practiced and in consequence, is everywhere around and between us. Modem politics 
has woven a tight link with space through the role that civil society has come to play 
in the process of democratisation on the march, and the opening of new spaces for 
democracy. 
Such a framework of ideas permits the formation of a vision that puts the socio- 
historical process by the side of the experiences of individuals. This is achieved 
through the elaboration of the antecedents of territoriality and the state in Venezuela, 
the formation of the political context of the democracy of conciliation, the period of 
decentralized democracy of 1989-2000, as well as through a case study which shows 
the experiences of the individuals and leaders of the community of the Libertador 
municipality in the state of Wrida and the parish of LL Osuna Rodriguez. 
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In the Venezuelan case, the interpretation of the distribution of power and its effects 
upon the predominant centralist practices, have been subject as much to the violence 
of their dynamic as to the immaturity of their results. Nevertheless, these 
transformations are beginning to be evaluated within the country, and this study has 
as its objective to contribute to a deepening of knowledge in this direction, given the 
privileged place occupied by the theme in Venezuela today. 
Stnicture of the Chapters 
This work consists of seven chapters. Chapters I and II deal with the conceptual and 
methodological aspects of the study respectively. Chapter III refers to the territoriality 
of power in the 18'h and 19th centuries, whilst Chapter IV considers the emergence of 
centralized democracy and the constitution of the modem Venezuelan state. Chapter 
V then analyses the process of political decentralization since 1989 at state the level. 
Chapter VI, presents the results and analysis of a detailed case study, and the last 
chapter, Chapter VII, summarizes the major findings of the theoretical and analytical 
chapters and offers some concluding remarks. 
Chapter I 
This chapter constructs a theoretical framework in relation to democracy and 
decentralization. It attempts to design a guiding thread in order to promote the 
understanding of, and outline the emergence of, decentralization as a spatial 
distribution of power, and to trace its links with the process of democratization in 
political spaces. 
Chapter 11 
This chapter considers the methodological framework and the specific 
methodological techniques necessary for exploring the problematic relationship 
between democracy and decentralization. The methodological focus emphasizes both 
the potency of the spatial, as a guiding element of politics and the political, and the 
local scale and the political practice of individuals. 
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CHAPTERI 
DEMOCRACYAND DECENTRALIZATION 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Introduction 
This chapter will construct a theoretical framework in relation to democracy and 
decentralization. It will be concerned with the design of a guiding thread, to promote 
the understanding of, and outline the emergence of, decentralization as a spatial 
distribution of power, and to trace its links with the process of democratization in 
political spaces. These links acquire a central importance, once the assumption is 
made that the distribution of power has influence upon political institutions and the 
conducting of the political. 
Pursuing this theme within the pages that follow, firstly the idea of democracy and the 
process of democratization are used as key points in laying out a notion of the 
spatiality of power. This is followed closely by a description of the different 
viewpoints on decentralization. This allows us to situate decentralization in the 
changing context of state reform. Most important at this point is an examination of the 
discourse on decentralization, its ideological burden and its relationship to the idea of 
power. Clearly this discourse is related to the "western viewpoint" of 
decentralization; as a consequence of this, one aspect that is highlighted is the 
importance of outlining what the view of decentralization is from Latin America. 
Of course, all of the aforementioned is closely related to the role which civil society 
plays in the current process of democratization, and the opening of new spaces for 
democracy. Thus, having set out all of these aspects of a framework for the spatiality 
of power, all that remains is to open the analysis of the various connections of my 
problematic of democracy and decentralization. 
Ll Democracy, the process of democratization and the 
spatiality of power 
According to Parekh, liberal democracy represents a meticulously constructed and 
complex political theory, based on an ingenious combination of liberalism and 
democracy. Liberalism constitutes its theory of the State, and democracy its theory of 
government. The first determines the structure of the state as separate from civil 
society which is seen as autonomous. It also proposes a clear delimitation between 
public functions and private ones. The protection of the basic rights of citizens is the 
basis of its rationale, and individuals rather than groups or communities. Democracy, 
for its part, specifies that elected representatives constitute the legitimate government 
and are those who exercise the authority inherent in the state. This authority they 
acquire through free elections between political parties and they exercise this 
authority in harmonious agreement with public opinion (Parekh 1992, p. 167). 
In the new context of economic openness, the states of Latin America have been 
reformed and their democracies reoriented along liberal lines. Nevertheless, Parekh 
indicates that, since liberal democracy defines itself and is structured inside the limits 
established by liberalism, by being specified in this cultural context, it cannot have 
universal applicability. In contemporary democracy, therefore, liberalism is the 
dominant part, whilst democracy has its own independent traditions and internal 
logic. This explains the ways in which democracy has from time to time been in 
conflict with the limitations of liberalism (Parekh 1992, pp 160-170). 
In relation to these limitations Bobbio has noted that the supporters of the minimal 
state suggest that the greatest well-being that individuals can achieve for themselves, 
occurs when they are free to pursue their own interests. They criticize the beneficent 
state because it reduces the free citizen to a protected subject. However, the pursuit of 
social unity demands the introduction of some criterion of distributive justice. Bobbio 
establishes here the limits between the advocates of the liberal state and those of the 
social state (Bobbio 1986, pp. 88-96). In spite of this difference in relation to what is 
signified by equality, he signals that liberalism is compatible with democracy from 
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the point-of-view of its political formula or of 'popular sovereignty'I(Bobbio 
1997(b), pp. 45-46). 
Pickvance indicates that the concept of 'democracy of the people' is directed at the 
question of the appropriate form of government which, can vary from direct 
participation in decision-making processes, down to the simple satisfaction of 
personal necessities. He also argues that the degree of participation is a matter for 
debate, because democracy is seen as a system which creates political equality as well 
(Pickvance 1997, p. 13 1). 
The position of Parekh that liberal democracy cannot have universal applicability is 
very important because it limits the field of action of liberal democracy, giving an 
opening to new ways of understanding democracy. Following this sentiment, 
Pickvance sees as a solution the restriction of the term democracy to an ideal, an 
unreachable state, and introduces a new idea. The idea that democracy should be 
understood as a process. 
Bobbio also gives us an idea of this ideal and unreachable democracy, when he puts a 
bridge between representative democracy and direct democracy. This connection is 
seen as "a continuity of intermediary forms". an integral system of democracy which 
can embrace both forms, according to diverse situations and different necessities. 
However, in the aforementioned system both forms of democracy are necessary, but 
are not considered sufficient (Bobbio 1986, pp. 40-41); for this, he gives prominence 
to the principle of democratization (or the broadening of democracy). This process 
I Universal suffrage in principle does not run contrary to a state of rights nor to the minimal state. A 
liberal state that was not democratic would be inconceivable, as would a democratic state that was not 
liberal, for the reasons given: 1) the democratic method is necessary to safeguard the fundamental 
rights of people, which are the basis for the liberal state, and 2) the safeguarding of these rights is 
necessary for the correct functioning of the democratic method. The best guarantee that rights to liberty 
are protected against the tendency of governments to limit them is the direct or indirect participation of 
citizens in the formulation of laws. Equally, participation in the vote can be considered as the correct 
and efficacious exercise of political power, or at least the power of influence in the collective taking of 
decisions, but only if acted on freely. 
3 
consists not so much of the step from representative democracy to direct democracy, 
but rather from political democracy to social democracy, which is identified with the 
extent of ascending power. The reference to ascending power is inscribed within a 
framework of the flow of power, which has two directions: descending, which moves 
from above to below and is characterized as bureaucratic power, or ascending, which 
moves from below to above and is characterized as political power in the name of the 
individual as citizen. Ascending power is political power because it is exercised at all 
levels, local, regional and national. 
Political power acquires all of its relevance from the sphere of social relations, where 
the individual is taken into consideration through the diversity of his/her status and 
roles: as father/mother, as son/daughter, as producer and as consumer, as provider of 
services and user. There are no greater possibilities for broadening democracy than in 
the sphere of political relations, in that which the individual is determined by his/her 
role as citizen. If one wanted to take an indication of the development of democracy, 
it could no longer be from the number of persons that have the right to vote, but rather 
the numbers of places where it is possible to exercise the right to vote (Bobbio 1986, 
pp. 42-45). This reflects the spatial expression of the political. 
In this way, the problematic of the broadening of democracy forces us to prdcis the 
connections between democracy and democratization, which can be considered as 
reflecting those which are established between system and process. Democratization, 
seen as renovation in the forms of participation, the development of autonomy or the 
capacity for self-determination, is a process that extends the starting-motor of 
ascending power to various spheres of civil society. The dynamic of this process 
seeks to penetrate those spaces dominated by hierarchical bureaucratic practices, in 
order to democratize the state and broaden the rights of citizens (Slater 1998(a), p-2). 
This perspective in the literature is currently being discussed in relation to the global, 
and Taylor indicates that in political terms two forms of globalization can be 
identified: the familiar type of globalization from above based on the collaboration of 
leading states and transnational capital, and the globalization from below which 
defends and protests against neglect of ecology, liberty and human rights (Taylor 
2000, p. 66). 
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This notwithstanding, it is most important to underline that a political phase is now 
being entered which is characterized by the dissemination of spaces and types of 
political interchange. The spatiality of power acts by configuring the presence of 
multiple locations where the political takes place. At the same time, this 
dissemination of spaces acts to configure polyphonic scenarios whose characteristics 
are the diversity of voices capable of speaking politically, and the potential grouping 
of some voices, spaces and practices. These polyphonic stages are able to open up a 
multidimensional political field; there is a series of simultaneous stages for the 
exercise of citizenship, local, regional, national and international. They are also able 
to have a supranational character, the result of the political exchange outside the 
geopolitical frontiers of the nation state. It is possible to determine at least three 
spaces and forms of political exchange: 
i) The expansion of politics outside the frontiers of the nation state. 
ii) The development of popular political initiatives and neo-corporate outlines which 
establish mechanisms and channels of political negotiation with the state, at the 
boundaries of territorial representations. 
iii) The politicization of themes of class, gender or environment with the 
multiplication of new social movements (Arditi 1997, pp. 13-15). 
Following Munck these new social movements contrast with the old workers or 
nationalist movements and include women movements and peace or human rights 
movements, as well in a few variants a diversity of regional, local and communal 
movements. Sometimes however there is an absolute conflict between new 
movements and "old" movements, which can be deceptive when making reference to 
Latin America. Nevertheless, for Munck the new social movements are seen as 
representatives of a qualitatively different form of making politics, and a new social 
paradigm in an embryonic state. These movements underline their autonomy with 
respect to political parties and they give priority to civil society over and above the 
state. In the politics of social movements, their own power is redefted as a pluralistic 
texture shared in within the social fabric. Consequently these movements help to 
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create a new political space with new identities, where new demands are articulated 
(Munck 1997, pp. 163-169). 
Thus, the idea of the spatiality of power is matched with the notion of spatial 
distribution of the social, and its derivative relationships of power. The distribution of 
the political is at the base of this open field of relationships, and the social is a field of 
relationships which composes itself around the different positions of the diverse 
identities which form it. These related positions are always different and mobile, and 
this favours the articulated dynamic of the spatiality of power; openness comes to be 
a condition for the joining of different social practices and dialogues. This does not 
signify, however, that there is an absence of tendencies towards sedimentation, or 
attempts towards the formation of positions of fixed identities, but these never arrive 
at a state of total fixity (Laclau and Mouffe 2000, pp. 114-134). 
It follows from all of the previously discussed, that a focus on relationships of power 
cannot ignore that which is signified by space, simply because the social and the 
political are becoming more and more related to the spatial. In other words the 
relationship of politics to the political, in the field of the spatiality of the social, is 
making itself more and more transparent. John Allen (1999) distinguishes what he 
refers to as three diagrams of spatiality or vocabularies of power: centered power 
linked to the distribution of capacities, the mobilizing power of resources, and 
immanent power, or the generator of practices. The first two diagrams of power are 
inscribed in the binary relationships of domination-resistance. 
The first kind of power, centered, is conceived as a possession or as something which 
can be retained by an institution, group or person, whether it is used or not. It can also 
be the capacity to influence and control the actions of others (as distinct from the 
exercise of this capacity). The relationships between the center and its areas of power 
are equivalent to a joining of the whole and its parts; once power is localized it may 
be extended, distributed or resisted through the social environment of space. That 
which characterizes this type of power cannot be transmitted intact through a 
hierarchy of decisions - in whatever linking of actors, the power is modified and 
transformed when it passes from one level to another. 
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The second type of power, as mobilizer of resources, is generated through the 
combined mobilization of individual or collective resources to ensure certain results. 
It is contained in the individual and produced through networks of social action, and 
in as much, is difficult to localize and can expand or shrink within the network (for 
example social solidarity movements etc. ). Nevertheless, this type of power can also 
be related to the presence of disedimentation identities linked to transnational firms 
and their skills in linking local practices with global relations. It is in cities or in 
nation states where resources tend to concentrate, and this is a type of power that can 
be administered "at a distance". The power generated in one location, very distant 
from another, is transmitted intact and seems to suffer little change or transformation 
by displacement. 
In a binary model of power where the powerful are confronted by the impotent, 
separated by a line of resistance, it is usual to find the terms power and domination as 
synonyms. Both notions are interpreted as the capacity to impose ones' will on the 
actions of another, despite resistance. In this asymmetric distribution of power, the 
product of antagonism or competition, the powerful are considered as being in the 
best position to dominate the impotent. Once the conflict is extended over space, the 
inequality of power shows itself in the submission of the weakest to the 
instrumentalised will of the other. 
In order for this power to be effective and able to reach into spaces, the creation of 
authoritarian forms of organization is required, where the power of supervision and 
control is distributed in a hierarchical manner. These forms are founded on legality. 
This makes it necessary that authority (in contrast to domination) be recognized as 
something formally asked for by the individual, and in this way authority becomes a 
means to assure approval inside structures of domination. Moreover authority is an 
instrumental mode of power that can be used in combination with other forms of 
power such as coercion, manipulation and seduction. This permits domination, as a 
form of coercion and imposition, to be established from one place to another inside a 
territorial space, even across vast distances. 
The third type of power, immanent power, as power as generator of practices, by way 
of contrast, is practiced before being a possession or reservoir of resources. By being 
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immanent it is not an external force and can be actively constituted through space 
and, more than the area which it shapes, it is valued for the efficiency with which the 
individual internalises its effects - the power is not over, but rather around and 
between individuals. This power is the technique which governs to the point where it 
is possible to realize action. As such it is key to the organization of space 
(distribution, zonification) because the individual assemblies of space which form 
part of the institutional complex are essential to ensure individual types of behavior 
(Allen 1999, pp. 194-209). 
Discussing this framework of reference opens the debate over the spatiality of power, 
and it has already led to the proposal of a re-theorizing of the binary relationship of 
dominance and resistance. As has been shown, in this binary relationship domination 
has been favoured by making it synonymous with relationships of power and 
resistance, as distinct from the effects of power. But if, to the contrary, a distinction is 
established between relationships of domination and relationships of power, this 
permits a more appropriate focus. Relationships of power then come to be the effect 
of the inequalities and differences which are found in the social, the resistances are an 
effect of power. This is shown in the contrast between centered power and power as 
generator of practices. 
In such a way, the alternative route of non-derivative relationships of power is related 
to the vision of the immanent power of social relationships, more than being 
identified with a specific institution or agency - which is to say, that social 
relationships and the constitution of identities form the same terrain. Apart from this 
condition, identities are constructed in a conjuncture with relationships of power, and 
derived from these same (Slater 1998(b), pp. 1-7). Following this line of thought the 
theme of the relationships between politics and the political can be seen more clearly, 
as well as their links with domination and resistance. Politics passes from being 
considered as an assembly of institutions, discourses and practices that seek to 
establish order and organize life in conditions which are always subject to conflict, by 
being influenced by the political. Here, the political can be taken to be an antagonistic 
dimension that is immanent to all of human society. It is an antagonism that can take 
many different forms, and can be localized in diverse social relationships; politics can 
8 
be understood as an attempt to pacify the political, or to guarantee the maintenance of 
order (Slater 1997, p. 59). 
Another aspect that has to do with connections between power and democratization is 
its internal and external relationships, and the implications that they have in the 
encounter between the Western and Non-Western. In this case, where relationships of 
control are expressed in a system of rules that violate the sovereignty of the people 
and the constitution of political and social autonomy, the demarcation of spaces 
follows an external logic and the imposition of hierarchical domination. Sovereignty 
can be defined as the union of security, legitimacy and authority in specific relation to 
the demarcation and defense of a particular territory; the dynamic of governmentality 
can be examined in terms of these discourses, and the combination of programmes 
and techniques for the deployment of discourses of rule (Slater 1998(b), p. 5). 
This last is tightly connected with the process of democratization through the 
programmes implemented by multilateral financial entities such as the World Bank 
(WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). These programmes and their 
reforms, associated with global-local spatial integration, have effects over different 
spatial ambits and their power relationships. Slater, in response to the emphasis 
placed on the global-local connections of these programmes, has suggested extending 
the analysis to five spheres, interconnected and differentiated. The global, the supra- 
national region, the national, the regional (intranational) and the local level - the last 
two levels are related in their turn to the urban/rural and the community. In this 
diagram the community is understood as a category of social interaction independent 
of the urbanlrural, and distinct from the local and regional (Slater 1998(a), p. 24). 
This point can be use to connect the spatiality of power with questions evoked by the' 
discussion of decentralization and the process of democratization. The implications 
are evident every time political decentralization influences the distribution of political 
power, which establishes clear connections to the internal. Meanwhile, political 
decentralization is also framed inside politics linked to the external; another aspect is 
the direct impact that decentralization has on participation. 
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This is a characteristic which connect to the autonomous character of the new 
political initiatives and the new social movements. These social and political 
movements now act without mediation and enter directly into negotiations with the 
state. In such a manner autonomy and political participation come to constitute 
themselves as the central rotating point around which revolve the demands of civil 
society. As a continuation of this, the next section deals with the different ways in 
which relationships between decentralization and democracy establish themselves. 
1.2 Decentralization and its perspectives 
Reviewing the literature the difficulties in determining the limits of the concept of 
decentralization become clear. Some authors say that it includes discussions on the 
theory of the state (Smith 1985), whereas others define it in relation to popular 
participation and local democracy (Boda 1987) Decentralization is at once politics, 
power and space (Slater 1989). Without a doubt, all of these aspects have something 
to do with the decentralization which is sweeping through the countries of Latin 
America. As it is plain to see, the dominant proposal is that of Przeworski (1997), that 
decentralization is a complex and controversial topic 
Castells argues that the new ideology of the minimal state underlines the politics of 
decentralization. He states that, with economic decentralization, the state restores 
legitimacy and at the same time reinforces the centrifugal tendencies given to the 
citizens closest to the government, but also says at the same time that it increases the 
distance of citizens from the minimal, centralized state. He suggests that this occurs 
because of the reduction of the role of the state in the economy and in society, 
through the privatization of enterpýises and public services, and the reduction of 
taxation and the costs of social welfare (Castells 1997, p. 243). 
On the other hand, Giddens (2000, p. 122) notes that decentralization appears to be 
"the sign of new global times", notwithstanding which the nation-state still remains 
the most important agent on the international scene. This is through the manner in 
which the process of democratization, which brings ready-made reforms of the state, 
is linked on the one hand to economic globalization, the corporatization of firms, the 
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transnationalisation of capital and technological advance, and on the other hand to the 
territorial decentralization of power. The spatial distribution of power on the inside of 
the national space is directed at strengthening democratic institutionality and also 
local forms of participation. 
It is precisely within this context of ideas that this thesis places the discussion on 
decentralization. Samoff (1990) affirms that for some authors the principal problem 
on tackling political decentralization is whether or not it gives or brings a greater 
effectiveness in the transference of decisions of power towards grassroots groups and 
organizations that were not represented in government. Although Samoff (1990, 
p. 521) says that neither centralization or decentralization of themselves will 
necessarily benefit the most disadvantaged groups, for others decentralization is 
primordially an administrative deconcentration, as a means to improve the 
functioning of government in bringing to completion programmes of development. 
Sch6nwalder (1997) separates theoretical tendencies on decentralization into two 
different groups: one he calls the political focus, and the other the pragmatic focus. 
He shows, for example, how Smith (1985) defines decentralization as political, i. e. 
that he is concerned with the distribution of power and the effect of this model of 
power upon different groups and social classes. The focus upon decentralization 
sustained by Boisier (1987,1991), Castells (1988) and Boda (1988) also move in the 
same direction; the political is a key element of their analysis. Essentially they 
suggest that decentralization is a vehicle for political reform, means of democratizing 
the state apparatus which is seen as the principal objective to achieving total 
democratization. 
Such authors also consider that the decentralization of the state apparatus opens new 
channels of popular participation within the politics of the system. This opening can 
be seen as one route towards democratization for the social movements which operate 
at a local and regional level which, moreover, can be integrated into the 
decentralization process. Decentralization can be taken, therefore, not only as greater 
equality between regions, also a mechanism for achieving a greater participation for 
the up-to-now excluded popular masses. 
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By contrast, Sch6nwdlder signals that the pragmatic focus of Rondinelli (1983,1989, 
1990), Cheema (1983,1989) and Wilson (1987) principally emphasizes the technical 
and economic aspect of decentralization. They outline how decentralization 
contributes to the development of the local and the regional and more specifically, 
how decentralization can improve the supply and maintenance of public services and 
infrastructure in underdeveloped countries. Essentially decentralization is seen in this 
focus as a political instrument which can be used by the state, frequently assisted in 
this endeavor by international organizations. 
The relationship between decentralization and popular participation within the 
pragmatic focus is suggested through the participation of civil society in local 
government. The level of popular participation determines the degree to which 
decentralization achieves its ends, and the participation of local voluntary 
organizations is necessary to ensure the success of programmes. Whatever the case, 
the role of decentralization is to a great extent instrumental -a facilitating instrument 
for the planning and execution of projects from above. Essentially this means that it is 
proposed as a meta-focus, in the sense of a universal model which can be used in the 
design and implementation of decentralization independent of political, social and 
economic context. It also signifies that political participation can be easily limited and 
controlled (Sch6nwalder 1997, pp. 757-759). 
Manor (1995) also identifies two tendencies, but he calls them decentralization by 
deconcentration and fiscal control and decentralization as devolution. 
The first tendency is related to efficiency, and to political processes conducive for 
dispersion or dilution of administrative decisions from above to below. It is 
characterized by, the evaluation and discussion of decentralization programmes in 
terms of optimal areas, administrative efficiency and executive implementation. 
Manor criticizes this tendency as not taking into consideration the actions of political 
forces which participate in regional and local systems of government, in analyzing the 
results of decentralization. 
Moreover, he signals that if deconcentration and fiscal control are chosen 
democratically this will have effects on governability, and on the contrary, they can 
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be used to penetrate to the lowest levels of decision-making and civil society. This 
implies that decentralization also contains a strong political influence, as well as a 
level of control, over the inferior levels of direction and over civil society. 
Decentralization not only facilitates implementation of changes in inter-governmental 
relationships, but can also provoke reactions against processes which promote 
centralization, or which favour the deepening of these same processes of 
decentralization. 
The second tendency is decentralization as devolution, which Manor considers as all 
but accepted as a democratic decentralization, in the sense of a total political 
decentralization. This is related to the transference of resources, duties and decision- 
making powers to the lowest levels of authority, when these are chosen in a 
democratic form and totally independent of the central power. This is a process of 
reaction that can stimulate demands for elections or increase political participation, 
and thus considerably improve the responsibility of government institutions. 
This total political decentralization could increase the speed of response from those 
functionaries at the lowest levels who need no longer obtain the approval of higher- 
ups, and in cases where approval was required this would tend to arrive more rapidly. 
The quantity and quality of responses (usually related to development projects on a 
grand scale) also increase partially, because decentralization tends strongly to produce 
a change of resources from small-scale projects to project initiatives on the micro- 
level (Manor 1995, p. 82). 
Following this flow of ideas, it can be noted that decentralization allows for at least 
two interpretations linked to the context of relationships of power. A conventional 
political view can justify its implementation, meanwhile the political would appeal to 
the resistant of the political instrumentality which it could potentially. Both points are 
reviewed as of prime importance in the framework of these ideas, because they 
contribute to knowing what is thought, what are the interconnections and critiques, 
and which roads indicate the opinions and tendencies, in non-Westem countries; in 
addition they help to pr6cis some key conceptual interconnections for the study in 
progress. The suggestion comes from the proposal of Slater concerning the urgent 
necessity of interrogating about "western ethnocentric formulation of the regimens of 
13 
truth and power", and of constructing a thematic horizon which gives sufficient 
autonomy to the non-West. The discussion here lends itself to the introduction of 
elements around this thematic (Slater 1998(b), p. 2). 
Following on from these broad conceptual discussions, the specific context of the 
Neoliberal reform process that has been implemented in Latin America will be 
explored. This allows us to contextualize the views that the multilateral institutions 
have developed about decentralization and the visions that they have for it in Latin 
America. Neoliberal reform in this context refers to those political programmes 
instituted across the region in the process of adjustment to the changes in the global 
economy. The responsibility for guaranteeing that the process of adjustment known as 
the Washington Consensus will be fulfilled in the region has been assumed by the 
IMF, the WB and the IDB (Pctras-Velmeyer 1995, p. 168). The importance that this 
point of view has come to have, comes itself from its close relationship with the 
processes of democratization occurring in the non-West. Schuurman (1997) indicates 
that the transition to democracy in the Third World can be attributed as much to the 
increasing loss of legitimacy of non-democratic regimes, as to external pressure from 
the introduction of structural ad ustment programmes connected to the creation of j 
stable political environments for capital investment (Schuurman 1997, p. 160). 
Sonntag (1999) observes that these changes and transformations in the global 
economy show two elements: one, that the socio-institutional framework is every day 
less capable of resolving the dilemmas that the system produces, and two that they are 
opening ways towards the construction or creation of a new social system (Sonntag 
1999, p. 23). 
L3 The Context of Decentralization 
Stephen Gill indicates the importance of the global in the countries of the Third 
World as an increasingly evident fact, even when it is considered that political and 
social life continue to be primordially national and local. These constitute the precise 
spaces where the majority of political and economic activities develop (Gill 1996, 
p. 210). Reform implemented in Latin America has placed emphasis on local spaces, 
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whereas the role assigned to the state continues to be important in defining the 
insertion of the country into regional blocks and the global economy. 
Reform has been intended to promote the reduction of the functions of the state in 
order to minimize its impact on the economy, and moreover to promote political and 
administrative decentralization. Nevertheless, from the Summit of the Americas in 
Santiago onwards it can be seen that the presence of strong central governments has 
also been sought; Kent Eaton (2001) indicates (for example) that there is a process of 
recentralization of the state in Latin America. This process seems to be connected, 
ultimately, with the growth in responsibility of local governments to the financial 
entities. 
On the other hand, Neoliberal reform also has to do with the specificity of social 
relationships within national spaces and the power of their effects. The recomposition 
of the reform of the state reflects, to a certain extent, a response to the continent 
socio- political instability. The process of democratization is situated, on one side 
over a struggle against the deepening of social inequality and unequal distribution of 
wealth, and on the other it is framed by social disintegration and the re-vindication of 
identities. It is understood that all of these subjects constitute the field of differences 
of social relationships, and as a consequence separation of them, even if desirable, is 
not possible. 
To begin the theme, there is the Washington Consensus, the agreement of 
development by the multilateral institutions and the presidents of America: the 
Summit of the Americas in Santiago de Chile in 1998, and more recently the Summit 
of the United Nations Organization of Monterrey in Mexico, in 2002. Nevertheless in 
relation to the theme stated here, the Consensus shows a marked difference between 
summits; from the Summit of Santiago the aspect which leaps out is the theme of 
poverty. It could be thought that the slant of the Summit tried not only to create 
conditions to recompose the power of politics, but also to avoid or control resistances. 
According to Petras and Veltmeyer, in the context of Latin America the 
implementation of the Consensus, as well as increasing the deterioration of conditions 
of existence, has increased the potential for association, co-operation and 
mobilization of networks of power (Petras and Veltmeyer 1995, pp. 174-178). 
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Whilst the original Washington Consensus laid much emphasis on economic 
problems, in the two recent summits, Santiago and Monterrey, the economic content 
has been conflated with the social content. These later accords accentuate that "the 
mobilization of financial resources is the first step towards development, but 
nevertheless the aim is the eradication of poverty". In this mood, the Summit of 
Santiago introduces the suggestion of social capital, the inclusion of which it seems is 
intended to give a character of a social nature to future reforms. Social capital 
constituted as a new element of debate of economic reforms seeks to restate social 
values and promote co-operation at the level of civil society. As was shown before, 
this is also related to the theme of decentralization. 
Moreover, from economic growth springs the necessity to achieve social 
development, improve equity, strengthen democracy and preserve environmental 
equilibria. The consensus of the presidents of America in Santiago (1998) reflects this 
order of priorities, by including in its plan of action points which exceed the limits of 
the conventional, such as (among others): the emphasis on the promotion of 
education, the preservation and deepening of democracy, justice and human rights, 
the struggle against poverty and discrimination, the strengthening of financial 
markets, and regional co-operation in environmental affairs (Kilksberg 1999, p. 5). 
In general terms, the policies recommended by the Washington Consensus were 
linked to the financial and commercial liberalization of national markets and their 
insertion into a globalized economy. With such decisions, it was sought to create 
sustained economic growth around an intermediate form of democracy, with the aim 
of overcoming the most important problems of the region. Nevertheless, it was 
impossible to create the desired conditions of sustainable development, and inequality 
grew significantly (Fleury 1992(b), p. 2). In this respect Chomsky recounts that the 
Washington Consensus represents those policies which tend to do the opposite of that 
which they set out, ruining national economies through the use of strict adjustment 
programmes instead of solving their problems. The result of these adjustments has 
been the impoverishment of hundreds of thousands of people in underdeveloped 
countries (Fox 2001, pp. 42-58). 
16 
The annual Human Development Report of 1998 prepared by the UNDP observes 
that global consumption has increased at a rate unprecedented in the 20'h Century, 
which is to say that more people eat and live better than before. Nevertheless, the 
report stresses that current consumption affects the environmental base of resources, 
exacerbates inequality and accelerates the link between consumption, poverty 
inequality and the environment. There exists a great inequality of opportunity 
between the inhabitants of rich and poor countries in the acquisition of products - 
additionally, from day to day there is an intangible accumulation of tension in global 
society concerning social exclusion and other more tangible forces, such as pressure 
on the environment (SOCSAL 1998, p. 5). 
According to the IBD, the situation in Latin America is no more supportive. Recent 
figures indicate that the region presents multiple challenges, which are ethical as well 
as economic and social; for instance 36% of children under 2 years of age are 
suffering from malnutrition. 17 % of births throughout the region occur without 
medical assistance, maternal mortality is five times that of developed countries, and 
juvenile unemployment is twice that of general unemployment. Many families are 
being destroyed by poverty, and the gap of inequality is the greatest on the planet - 
the richest 5% of the population have 26% of average regional income, whereas the 
poorest 30% have only 7.5%. Criminality is on the increase, and is directly linked to 
juvenile unemployment and the deterioration of family structures (Kliksberg 2001, El 
Nacional). 
One of the truths derived from the application of the Washington Consensus, is that 
the mere fact of economic growth is not necessarily conducive to resolving the 
problem of inequality. To the contrary, the search for increased rates of return on 
investment and the expansion of markets would appear to deepen the above 
inequalities in contexts such as that of Latin America. The adoption of proposals of 
liberalization, stabilization and privatization have not prompted improvements in 
social development, and perhaps this has influenced the reappraisal of aspects not 
included in conventional economic thought. The regional problematic seems to be 
much more complicated, and requires the congruence of dimensions whose 
precedence is not of an entirely economic character. 
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The break-up of the Washington Consensus promotes, to the international 
organizations, the urgency of the Summit of the Americas of Santiago and the 
widening of the agenda to include improving equity, strengthening democracy and the 
preservation of environmental balances. Raising gross production is an important and 
desirable objective, but should only be viewed as a means at the service of greater 
ends such as health, nutrition, education, liberty and values. According to Amartya 
Sen (1998) this has contributed to softening and humanizing the concept of 
development, and organizations such as the IDB consider social capital as an 
expression of development or backwardness. Development is concerned with the 
widening of real opportunity for citizens, and the realization of their potential (Sen 
1998, pp. 600-601). 
In the ensuing re-think of the Washington Consensus, particular emphasis has been 
assigned to the skills and productive capacity of the whole population. On the one 
hand, these permit the stimulation of productivity, increase economic growth and 
contribute to the moderation of demographic change. On the other hand they have 
practical connotations in the terrain of state policy, wherever this affects the ambit of 
human liberties, social welfare and the quality of life (Sen 2001, pp. 600-601). 
Another aspect of these reforms is that institutions must be taken into account, as well 
as the junctures between their formal rules. The variables of political and institutional 
order carry a heavy weight in reality, and a strong influence in the conformation of 
unforeseen scenarios. Informal and less tangible institutions also have to be 
considered, such as ethics, trust, religious precepts and other codes (Kliksberg 1999, 
p. 5-6). 
In relation to this last, a summary suffices to re-examine the links between social 
capital and culture. Ignorance of individual potential under-uses capacity that can be 
applied to development, and unleashes powerful resistance. On the other hand, 
recognition can generate virtuous circles with other dimensions of development; this 
focus accentuates at base the level of trust that exists between social actors, as well as 
stores of potential conflict, such as norms of practiced civic behaviour which 
contribute to the general welfare (payment of taxes and care of public spaces, for 
instance). It also accentuates the levels of association that characterize the 
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community, which can contribute to conforming and stimulating the development of 
co-operatives, as well as other concentrations and networks. 
For Rabotnikof (2001) the concept of social capital appears in the context of 
strategies of sustainable development, and alludes to the institutional and cultural 
dimension; it refers specifically to the way in which economic actors interact and 
organize themselves to generate growth and development. Nevertheless, in the 
political and sociological literature it is also linked with the joining-up of norms, 
organizations and mediating networks through which individuals accede to power and 
resources (Rabotnikof 200 1, p. I 10). This observation by Rabotnikof connects the 
diagram of the spatiality of power as mobilizer of resources (discussed above) with 
the notion of social capital. Mobilizing power, as a more finished elaboration of the 
vocabulary of dominant power, fits in better (in the actual circumstances) with the 
proposed post-authoritarian government, or 'good governance', which to be 
legitimate has to be efficient 
According to Slater (1998) this type of deployment of the neoliberal strategy of 
structural adjustment of the minimal state and good government, constitutes a 
transgression of economic and fmancial sovereignty, as well as the external induction 
of new rationalities and technologies of governance. This type of conditioning tries to 
re-affmn the neoliberal perspective in a way which makes it possible and sustainable, 
in order to dominate at a distance, as much spatially as institutionally. At the same 
time it marginalizes other possible alternative focuses which give great importance to 
the state in economic development (Slater 1998(b), p. 5). 
Something of this can be seen in statements from the recent Summit of the Americas 
in Monterrey, where "greater transparency and responsibility is required from the 
poor countries in exchange for the resources for development". The proposal was 
made to finance "the fight against poverty through better international commerce, an 
increase in financial aid on the part of the first world, the relief of debt service and 
fighting against corruption". As a result, "the hard criticism underlines that the 
document makes no clear promises, does not reflect the needs of the poor countries, 
does not convince some of the rich ones and does not deserve the confidence of civil 
organizations"(El Nacional, 26-3-2002) 
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Another way to illustrate the subtle ideological and political burden of these focuses 
would be to make a comparison between the publications of the joint evaluation 
programmes of decentralization in Latin America, and the ideas now promoted by 
social democracy in Europe about equality. In these programmes, when attention is 
called to the subject of poverty they speak of exclusion, and the World Bank defines 
exclusion as a process by which individuals or groups remain totally or partially 
outside economic, social and political participation in society. Individuals have to 
overcome a barrier of attributes which limit the possibility of insertion into the market 
(low educational levels and professional skills, etc. ), or which would give them access 
to certain civil, political or social rights. In both cases exclusion consigns the seeker 
to an individual condition and remains identified with the possession or lack of 
something, and in consequence also the lack of capacity to achieve it (Fleury 1997, 
pp. 7-8). 
According to Giddens political conflict and competition for leadership always make 
power unequal and business always makes the economy unequal. Giddens himself 
indicates that the modernization of social democracy has sought a focus to reconcile 
equality, pluralism and diversity of styles of life, to recognize the difference between 
the liberty and equality of classic liberalism as real. This conceptual line moves the 
concept of social capital closer to a liberal ethic: economic competition is desirable 
but on an ethical basis. The line also approximates a notion of power: that 
governments must not help their citizens with food, housing and clothes, without 
ensuring the conditions through which citizens can earn by their own efforts 
everything necessary for complete civil efficiency. The relationship between the 
public and the private has to be in equilibrium (Giddens 2000, p. 85). 
The idea of social capital would put the accent on equality of opportunity, especially 
in the area of education - education is the principal instrument through which to 
cultivate initiatives and responsibilities. Giddens refers to the concepts of Amartya 
Sen concerning social capacities as appropriate departure points to deepen this ethic, 
for the concepts of equality and inequality not only refer to the disposition of social 
and material goods, the individual must have the capacity to make their use effective. 
This signifies that policies designed to promote equality would focus around the 
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capacity for achievement and the capacity for failure of each individual (Giddens 
2000, pp. 85-89). 
In this way, through the development of the composition of policies which bind 
reforms and decentralization, it is possible to see: 
1) That the reforms are presented, as a justification for their precedence, as a 
4sustantial package' of universal measures, irrespective of the subjects of the process 
of decentralization being submitted to different situations in each country, where the 
emphasis changes according to place and circumstances. 
2) That at the base of these programmes is the notion of power, in terms not only of 
the relationship of dominance of one over the will of the other, but also of power as a 
resource that resides in the individual. 
3) That at heart these reforms are based on the theoretical formulation of liberal 
equality and the notion of social capital. In respect of this ethic Bobbio signals that it 
has nothing to do with democratic egalitarianism, which extends to the pursuit of a 
true economic equivalence outside of the tradition liberal thought. "Liberal 
democracy has arrived at an acceptance, other than ofjuridical equality, of an equality 
Of Opportunity that presupposes the equalization of the points of departure, if not the 
points of arrival. " (Bobbio 1997(b), p. 45) 
A fourth point to underline is that the reforms are written in a proposal of the 
spatiality of power and knowledge. Souza indicates, for example, that the theoretical, 
analytical design of reform moves around a double international/local dominance and 
under the slogan "think globally and act locally" (Souza 1996, p. 534). Insertion into 
regional and supranational markets, as well as decentralization, have been constituted 
into essential points in the design of these policies, closely tied to reforms. This 
underlines the association between local development projects, institutions for 
international co-operation and the role of decentralization and its links with local 
powers. 
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The reforms contemplate the strengthening of relationships with institutes of fmance 
and co-operation, as well as the relationships derived from the establishment of 
international commercial treaties which insure the interests of regional economic 
blocks (Fleury 1999(b), p. 9). As well, the institutional arrangements which guarantee 
that economies become more competitive through being integrated into the 
supranational, have internal repercussions. The measures of structural adjustment are 
also directed at minimizing the functions of the state, in order to favour its 
intervention in the public realm, but in tandem with decentralization. Both policies 
have effects on governability as well as sovereignty. 
L4 The Reformist View of Decentralization 
The focus of the World Bank is without a doubt a good point of departure to illustrate 
how decentralization is seen from the viewpoint of reform. The following section 
gathers some of the original ideas presented in two reports of the World Bank with 
reference to decentralization in Latin America and the Caribbean; the proposals of 
both reports present no noticeable differences. 
Peterson (1999, p. 1) indicates that governments of the countries of Latin America 
which have traditionally been centralist, have now transferred much of their 
responsibilities for services and financial resources to local, state or provincial 
government. He says that behind this transfer of authority are underlined two 
fundamental propositions which imply a criticism of the pattern of centralist 
governments, and at the same time a conjoining of priorities for reform. 
The first proposition is that decentralization can strengthen democratic participation 
in government. Decentralization has been accompanied by popular elections of 
mayors and at other levels, in order to expand the participation of citizens in local 
government. Nevertheless Peterson indicates that the proponents of political 
decentralization state with frequency that they want to put the authority of the 
government "close to the people", and this expression presents ambiguities. The 
proposition that local government is automatically closer to the people is impossible 
to verify (Peterson 1997, p. 13) 
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For these reasons, for Peterson decentralization only provides a mark of reference for 
government. The implementation of decentralization alone cannot guarantee effective 
citizen participation in civil life, high standards of Public responsibility and 
incorporate the voices of citizens. Decentralization creates an opportunity to expand 
citizen control of government, "but if it is desired to take precise advantage of this 
opportunity, decentralization has to be simultaneously supplemented by other types of 
institutional reforms". Following this direction, Peterson notes as a second 
proposition that decentralization can improve the quality and coverage of local public 
services (the fiscal dimension is nothing new in the focus on this institution, to the 
contrary it had been covered in the World Bank report of 198 8 (Slater 1989, p. 1). 
The potential of decentralization to improve public services comes in a large measure 
from the efficiency of incorporating the local demands of citizens inside budgeting 
decisions. The potential efficiency of decentralization does not come through its' own 
execution, but rather from the links between democracy and decentralization. It is 
understood that democracy refers to participation, whereas decentralization signifies 
through it a mechanism which exactly captures the demand for public services, and 
makes clear the connection between services received and taxes paid. 
It is in such a manner that the link between democracy and decentralization is 
established, from the information which local residents possess in order to determine 
their own priorities for services and public works; they are more informed than 
anyone else about these affairs. If they participate with part of the resources needed to 
pay for improved services, they will surely have opinions on how these public funds 
should be raised. A system which permits the residents to participate in the choosing 
of local budget priorities will satisfy the demand for public services more effectively 
than a system which prescribes the levels of local services from the ministries of a 
central government. 
in the opinion of Peterson, national institutions supply services well below the local 
demand for them, whilst at the same time there exists a desire on the part of users to 
be more effectively served by the public sector. This not only gives a decisive 
impulse to the practical dimension of the initiative towards decentralization, but also 
distinguishes from previous decentralizing efforts, as much those established around 
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an ideological opposition to central government to increase municipal authority, as 
those that promote the desire to maintain regional life separate from the rest of the 
nation. As may be seen in this focus, political decentralization remains conditioned by 
economic reform. 
Nevertheless, there are supposed key in this themes on decentralization that are not 
universal. An example of this is seen, for example, in the argument that fiscal 
decentralization improves the general macroeconomic yield of the public sector, by 
forcing a closer participation of the contributor in budgeting decisions. According to 
Burki, Perry and Dillinger (1999, p. 40) this frequently does not happen. In Latin 
America sub-national costs are financed principally through transfers from central 
government, and this causes sub-national governments to spend more if they hope to 
obtain more resources from the communal fund of national resources. Moreover, 
banks will only be fiscally conservative if they believe that the central government 
will not rescue local governments that go bankrupt, but again this almost never 
happens. 
In reply to these contestations, Burki, Perry and Dillinger (1999, p. 5) indicate that the 
impact of decentralization on the efficiency of public services, equality and 
macroeconomic stability depends to a large extent on the characteristics of each case. 
It is necessary to look much further than the mere fact of local elections in a country, 
to see if there has been a purely nominal transfer of functional responsibility, or if 
there has been an increase in inter-governmental transferences. This view also tackles 
the microeconomic impacts of decentralization, given that impacts in the efficiency 
and capacity for response of services depends not only on the decisions that are taken 
at the levels of provincial or municipal governments, but also on the decisions at the- 
level of each school, health center or department of public works. 
On the other hand, views on centralized power also seem to be changing. Mayors and 
governors are not the only important politicians, but also politicians at the national 
level, as well as the relevance of the laws which they draw up and the effects that 
these have on the behaviour of politicians at the local government levels. These 
aspects link in with the points noted above concerning the secondary reforms or the 
proposals of the Santiago Summit; how to elaborate and apply laws implies an 
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understanding of how national and local politics are affected by decentralization. The 
crucial point resides in an underlined importance of the settling of accounts of local 
governments, and the budgetary restrictions which now have to be imposed by central 
governments. The necessity of dernarking clearly who is responsible for what, alludes 
not only to the responsibility for supervision but also the authority to ensure the 
results. That is to say, not only the juridical authority to take decisions but also the 
fmancial resources to execute them. 
The preceding framework shows that there has arisen a change in the discourse 
concerning decentralization from the multilateral institutions. Manor (1998) has 
indicated: "both the World Bank and the US Agency for International Development 
(USAID) have launched major investigations of decentralization in both its 
democratic and purely fiscal and administrative forms. Perhaps because of the 
collapse of Communism, however, the potential contributions of decentralization to 
the enhancement of participation, good governance and democratization have 
received most emphasis, pushing the more long-standing concerns with its economic 
role in economic development into second place" (Manor 1998, p. 2). 
The inclusion of the notion of social capital acts to renovate the economic perspective 
of decentralization. On the other hand, the musings of Peterson show that there exists 
a complete divorce from political decentralization, objecting to it as a notion of power 
closer to the people as untrue. Political decentralization has as one of its' firmest 
postulations that power is close to social identities, organizations and social 
movements. This is to say that it is localized between and around people, and as a 
consequence the distribution and co-operation of powers is directed towards the 
achievement of more democratic spaces. 
As a counterpart to this point of view, that of the multilateral organizations 
subordinates distribution of power to economic decentralization. The discourse 
continues to be set out in the language of efficiency, effectiveness and control of 
services, and to show that centralized states are not efficient or effective even though 
strongly harmonized. There is also a requirement for recentralization, in order that the 
locally distributed powers should be efficient and responsible; all of this signifies that 
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decentralization continues to be conceived of as a policy of central government, with 
preferential attention to the relationships from above to below. 
Nevertheless, when we look towards Latin America we find an evident contrast in 
relation to these positions over the role played by the state diffused by the multilateral 
organizations. The principal organizations that define the economic and development 
strategy for the Latin American countries, the Economic Commission for the 
Development of Latin America and the Caribbean (CEPAL, from its initials in 
Spanish), the Latin American Association for Integration (ALADI, from the Spanish 
initials) and the Latin American Development Council (CLAD, as above) consider 
that the intervention of the state is fundamental to moderate the tendencies towards 
concentration which are generated by the free market. Moreover they accentuate the 
search for a productivity transformation and a sustainable growth with equity 
(Armando C6rdova 1995, p. 68, cited in Freitez and Wgiiez 2000, p. 89). 
As a counterpart, these reports in referring to Latin America observe a marked 
importance given to the relationships between decentralization and local scenarios; 
however the central premises of their theory they continue to correspond to the reality 
of the developed countries. The minimal or non-existent relationship that they have 
with the socio-historic context of particular realities, puts in evidence the presence of 
the verticality of power in the implementation of the decentralization reforms. This 
also explains the absence in the debate on decentralization of a series of policy 
objectives and values which are of marked importance; the following section 
therefore looks at decentralization in Latin America. 
1.5 The Vision of Decentralization in Latin America 
When the situation in Latin America is examined, the emergence of new social 
movements and their relationship to the opening of new spaces for democracy 
introduce elements which act to reinforce the sense of political change that surrounds 
the debate on decentralization and democracy. 
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Quijano (2000) indicates that all possible democratization of society in Latin America 
must occur as a decolonization and as a redistribution of power; this is the only way 
to construct the modern nation-state, including the citizenry and political 
representation (Quijano 2000, p. 35). This aspect is connected to the orientating role 
played by political decentralization in the political thinking linked to the new 
municipal left in Latin America. 
Munck (2000) signals that the new localism is emerging in response to the effects of 
globalization and as part of a wider ferment, which involves social movements and 
the radical church. He notes that this is leading to an appreciation of democracy and 
an increase in popular participation, but also that some consider the discourse on 
decentralization not to represent a progressive political project in which the masses 
can overcome their inequalities. To this argument he counter-proposes something 
very important about Latin America - "The reality in Latin America is likely to be 
more prosaic, however, as political in terms of 'empowerment' are offset by the 
difficulty of extending these local advances to the national terrain, on which the 
media-based personality contests tend to prevail (Munck 2000, p. 195)". 
Taking a balance of the tendencies concerning the economic perspective signaled in 
the previous point would contribute towards a more profound understanding of this 
scenario. Rodrfguez (1994) considers that there are four principle tendencies that are 
driving decentralization in Latin America. 
*One of these is that which considers decentralization as a way in which the 
responsibilities and size of the state can be reduced, as much as its capacity for 
coercion of capital; it is related to the problem of bureaucratization and inefficiency 
of centralized institutions. This focus is associated with the privatization and the de- 
politicization of the relationships of citizens to the state. 
*In the second place Rodriguez observes the presence of another tendency which also 
criticizes the concentration and sectorization of public administration as being 
expensive, inefficient and bureaucratic. This notwithstanding, in this case 
decentralization remains linked to the capacity to incorporate with agility new social 
and cultural demands and interests. 
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One proposal that rotates around these previously-mentioned tendencies is 
decentralization from the viewpoint of fiscal federalism (De la Cruz 1998). This 
emphasizes the intergovernmental fiscal structure, the analysis of income and costs of 
state and municipal administrations, and the behaviour of the social sector. According 
to De la Cruz, fiscal expansion constitutes a major co-responsibility between central, 
regional and local government, and the political strengthening of these last. Moreover 
he depicts a new organization of the state where fiscal decentralization is important 
because it increases the control of citizens over government and generates new forms 
of participation (De la Cruz 1998, pp. 1-2). 
* Amongst other ways in which to view decentralization, following Rodriguez, is that 
which pursues it through its implementation to maintain political stability, derived 
from the crisis of representation and legitimization. In this scenario, governments see 
themselves obliged to promote decentralization as a strategy to re-legitimize the state 
and as a means to guarantee governability. Again according to Rodriguez, legitimacy 
of representation does not only come from elections, if not also from the form in 
which the different levels of government respond to the expectations and demands of 
their electors. This brings with it the point that, in order to achieve legitimacy, local 
governments or administrations must be efficient. 
* Lastly, he notes the presence of a democratizing viewpoint; this comes to signify a 
response to the tensions and social conflicts generated by the economic crisis, and the 
incapacity of the state to satisfy the demands of society. Rodriguez also criticizes in 
general excessive centrality and lack of adequate channels for political participation 
and citizenship. In this case, decentralization would bring with it regulating 
mechanisms of the state to achieve a greater insertion of citizens into the decision- 
making system (Rodriguez 1994, pp. 4-8). 
Souza (1996) has corroborated some of the findings of Rodriguez. For her, 
decentralization is in general presented in the technical language of administrative 
efficiency, effectiveness and control to continue showing that centralized states are 
not efficient or effective; it is also a required means by which governments maintain 
political stability. Levels of fragility and instability, owing to the crisis of 
representation and legitimization, oblige powerful groups to promote decentralization 
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as a strategy to legitimize the state, with the aim of guaranteeing governability and 
stability (Souza 1996, pp. 533-535). 
Veldsquez (1997) sees things similarly, when he gathers tendencies from their 
different significances and (according to him) proposals and intentionality, which 
have been given to decentralization by various actors, He distinguishes three 
meanings of decentralization. The first of these is when it is constituted in a form to 
ensure greater efficacy and efficiency in public administration, and its proposal is to 
reduce the centralization which obstructs capacity for rapid response to the growing 
demands of the population. It is also when participating actors see decentralization as 
the possibility to regain lost legitimacy and guarantee a determined political 
hegemony. In this sense, decentralization would be dealing with an identification of 
public policy with the interests of the citizen. The drawing closer of the citizen to 
instances of local power promotes a recognition of the systems of political 
representation, which would contribute to the stability of the regime in the symbolic 
and real planes (Veldsquez 1997, p. 77). 
According to Lechner (1996) decentralization is seen as a political instrument which 
gives opportunities for a redistribution of the power of decision from the central 
apparatus (above), in the direction of other levels of government or civil society 
(below). This makes decentralization create opportunities for deepening social re- 
organization, by favouring a greater citizen autonomy. Nevertheless, this can also 
create a threat to social integration to a greater or lesser degree, by the over-emphasis 
in the framework of neo-liberal strategy of the economic impact in all policy 
decisions (Lechner 1996(a), pp. 107-108). 
In a similar direction to this last, Brewer Carias (1997) indicates that a true 
decentralization is the process that implies the territorial distribution of public power 
between autonomous entities - distribution of political power implies the distribution 
of competencies and resources. Distributing tributary power, moreover, as a means of 
generating own income at state level, leads necessarily to new protagonists and 
leaderships in the state (Brewer Carias 1997(a), p. 159) 
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In the framework of these descriptions it is possible to see a primary differentiation 
between the tendency towards economic decentralization, and the tendency towards 
political decentralization Moreover, a second differentiation inside each of these 
tendencies is notable. These differentiations have been mounted in a diagram of the 
spatiality of power by Cabrero (1996), which signals some significant points as much 
for politics as for the political. Cabrero views the tendencies of decentralization as a 
double dimension; on the one hand there is the direction and the sense of origin of the 
decentralizing impulse, that refers to decentralization by deconcentration and 
delegation, and this case deals with an inducing politics from above to below. On the 
other hand, there are degrees of depth which refer to decentralization by devolution or 
by civil society. This last case deals with reactive politics from below to above, 
revolving around demands for autonomy of decision and participation as concerning 
civil society or local and regional governments. 
From above to below, there will be administrative deconcentration as a means 
through which the action of government can be improved in bringing development 
programmes to a head. This deals with the assigning of specific functions to sub- 
national units, ministries or other instances of specific national sectors, but where the 
central government maintains total responsibility for the taking of decisions over 
execution or maintenance of investments, fiscal transfers, control over budgets and 
financial decisions at the sectorial level. 
From below to above, there will be decentralization as devolution or towards civil 
society, referring to the manner in which civil society conquers powers of decision 
and autonomy. This deals with the effective transference of decisions of power in 
response to pressure from groups and organization at the base; it is pursued in order to 
make local governments responsible for the taking of decisions about projects or the 
maintenance of operations, supported through self-sustainability, as well as the 
cession of decision-making spaces to NGOs (Non-Governmental Organizations) or 
other civil society groupings such as unions and associations (Cabrero 1996, p. 87). 
Without doubt this vocabulary of power, which connects decentralization and the 
process of democratization, is linked to the orientation which the actors can give to 
the process of democratization; this point is detailed here. Meanwhile, these different 
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appreciations concerning the tendencies towards decentralization in Latin America 
are not sufficiently explicit, even though earlier Samoff had warned that these 
tendencies were advanced by enthusiastic followers in the direction of absolute 
values, declaring nevertheless that neither of the two tendencies, not the centralist nor 
the local autonomy version actually had absolute values and that both tendencies must 
co-exist (Samoff 1990, p. 521). The tendencies do not achieve clarity in the difference 
between economic decentralization and political decentralization, and thus they run 
the risk of confusion. Manor (1998) has indicated that the results of decentralization 
do not depend uniquely on the relative weight of devolution and deconcentration in 
institutional and fiscal structures; they also depend on the class of legitimization and 
accountability adopted (participatory, electoral, religious or monarchic), and the 
principles agreed to determine the area of decentralized authority (Manor 1998, p. 2). 
In this sense an attempt to make a comparative balance between both tendencies 
would contribute to clarifying some questions. 
Political decentralization from above to below is presented inside a diagram of power 
of dominance, where political decentralization remains subordinated to economic 
decentralization. As Eaton (2001) indicates, decisions to de-concentrate the authority 
of central ministries, as much as decisions to devolve power to sub-national actors are 
both prerogatives of the politics of the market (Eaton 2001, p. 103). This tendency is 
removed from the political by not taking into consideration the actions of the 
relationships of power, which participate in regional and local systems of 
government, in order to evaluate their results. The efficiency and effectiveness of 
decentralization in public administration is associated with the achievement of 
governability and political stability. Their representations, as such, lose importance 
because legitimacy appears to be associated to the way in which the regime responds 
to the expectations and demands of its electors; if the regime is efficient it achieves 
both legitimacy and is more democratic. Another way to look at the link 
decentralization/efficiency is by way of the inefficiency of centralized institutions and 
bureaucratization, irrespective of which decentralization from above to below is been 
used to penetrate and control the lowest levels of decision-making and civil society. 
Political decentralization from below to above shows itself within a diagram of 
democratic power, and refers to the manner in which civil society conquers autonomy 
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and the power of decision in co-operation with other levels of national power; it 
carries within it the regulatory mechanisms to achieve a greater insertion of citizens 
into the political system. It can act to increase elections and political participation, as 
well as the responsibility (for which read accountability) of the representatives of the 
citizenry; equally, it can increase the capacity for response related to development 
projects. Decentralization can also be seen as a political escape from social tensions 
and conflict, and can impact on the democratization of the party political system and 
the controls that it has had on civil society through clientelism and disinformation. 
Another aspect that has to be taken into account is the correspondence which can be 
established between a concept of decentralization which is open to different 
interpretations, and the diversity of political situations and values which are present in 
civil society in Latin America; a discourse as dynamic as decentralization could be 
used by actors to unite many opposing forces. The relationships between the process 
of democratization, participation and the autonomy of civil society are well-known, 
and are conditioned by the pre-eminence of one or the other of the above-mentioned 
tendencies. The question of how these notions should be related to civil society is one 
of the outstanding points of the debate on decentralization and democracy (in the 
following section some of the other aspects of civil society will be dealt with); this is 
also concerned with the change operated in the manner of thinking and making 
politics, where decentralization and the development of social movements are tied 
together. 
1.6 Civil Society and Decentralization 
The exposition of civil society is key, and it is therefore convenient for this section to 
make a brief pause to establish some basic connections which are at the base of 
liberalism. Not only is the notion of civil society composed around these ideas, but 
also specific forms of relationships of power. The starting point is the individual, and 
according to Parekh (1992) liberalism considers the individual to be conceptually and 
existentially primary and independent of society, which it tries to explain as apart. 
Individuality and the idea of property of itself model the political, legal, moral, 
economic and all other aspects of liberalism. 
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Individuality remains defined in terms of its separation from others, and it feels itself 
existentially menaced when the limit of its individuality becomes blurred; its constant 
worry is to preserve this separation and its complete isolation. The idea of property of 
itself appears by being defined by the individual, in relation to their capacity to 
choose and to be separated from their elections or choices, including their values, 
aims and forms of life. This is to say that individuals must be separated from 
themselves, in order for these values not to be considered as the most profound inner 
structure, if not only as their primary or secondary properties. Other than this, 
individuals are moral beings because they are beings of choice, it being their choosing 
which distinguishes moral conduct from mere custom, whether able or not to reach an 
agreement as to the class of life that the individual or community desires (Parekh 
1992, p. 162). 
From this, just as different individuals value things in different ways and pursue 
distinct life-styles, the liberal thinks that individuals share different interests which 
are derived from a common nature; these interests include security, liberty, property 
and the autonomous expression of will. Since these interests are considered inherent 
to humanity and demanded by its nature they are also considered basic and 
fundamental, as a consequence of which concept of interest bridges are constructed 
between individuals who are not related, overcoming the distance that the liberal puts 
between him/herself and the other. Civil society, the great invention of the liberals, is 
the sphere of interest and choice par excellence; civil society is ruled by the totality of 
agreed relationships of a voluntary nature, by self-determining individuals in the 
Pursuit Of their chosen goals (Parekh 1992, p. 163). 
Even though the state shares some of the characteristics of civil society, it is basically 
different. Civil society is founded on interest and has an enormous instrumental value, 
whereas by contrast the state is coercive and obligatory. The state is also an abstract, 
formal institution, whereas in civil society human beings encounter each other as 
bearers of multiple, changing identities; in the state, individuals lose their identities 
and find themselves mere citizens. For the liberal, the primary duty of government is 
to create and maintain a system of rights and to accomplish the activities required for 
this; under no circumstances, according to Parekh, is there the justification for 
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pursuing economic, social or political ends such as the creation of a more equal 
society. In the consumer society, each individual appraises and calculates in a 
different way the time, affective energies and the financial costs which they are 
prepared to invest in public activities. 
Rabotnikof (2001) indicates that for some years the discourses and practices of the 
multilateral banks (the IDB and VvrB) have been trying to design policy based on civil 
society through three routes: participation, a focus on social capital2 and the theme of 
good government. These three analytical approximations lead to the identification of 
civil society as the destination of many of the initiatives of the financial organisms. 
But they also lead, above all in the case of compensatory programmes and poverty 
relief, to the identification of civil society exclusively with the networks of NGOs. 
Nevertheless, in the debate on civil society there are found two opposing views - 
according to Rabotnikof civil society appears in both types of critiques as the place 
for the regeneration of trust, as a key to social integration and as the terrain for 
democracy. 
2 The notion of social capital has shot to prominence in the research of the World Bank with the 
opening up in 1998 of a dedicate website, hiip: //worldbank. or&! R2vea/sggpýitaI It is organized around 
two themes. One is to specify sources of social capital - families, communities, civil society, public 
sector, ethnicity, and gender; the other topic is identifying influences upon the formation of social 
capital - crime and violence, economic, trade and migration, poverty and economic development, 
among others. Social capital is integrated into the work of the World Bank in three areas: participation, 
policies and partnership. 
The website has a simplistic and reductionist view of society. For instance, the family is seen as "first 
building block in the generation of social capital for the larger society". Ethnicity is seen in terms of 
diversity and difference for which inner organization and bridging spin-offs have to be set against the 
potential for conflict. The point is that both themes have long, contested, and rich intellectual tradition. 
It is important to notice in this website that the notion of civil society and decentralization do not 
appear as a theme or as the influences for the formation of social capital. The public sector is about 
good governance based on collaboration with, and decentralization to, the private sector and civil 
society. Otherwise politics, trade unions, big business organizations, etc, might just as well no exist 
(Fine 2001 pp. 156-157). 
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In the reformist version of the multilateral organisms, civil society is placed in front 
of the state and policy is identified with the market, de-politicized and culturally 
integrated. Additionally there is an emphasis on a certain return to civic traditions and 
the substitution of the re-distributive powers of the welfare state by local voluntary 
enlistment. The critical tendency, on the contrary, affirms that civil society must be 
re-politicized as an intermediary sphere between private ends, and institutional modes 
and those sanctioned by the state for the conduct of policy (social movements and 
citizen initiatives); the necessity for developing autonomous public spheres of debate 
on themes of general interest and the expression of pluralism is also underlined. 
Lastly, the reformist (neo-communitarian) vision proposes a just civil society, 
integrated and vital without the necessity of evoking egalitarian principles guaranteed 
by the state. Nevertheless, there continues to be a strong tension between 
institutionalized public spaces and a re-evaluation of the role of a state of rights 
(Rabotnikof 2001, pp. 102-106). 
Bobbio (1997) is of the opinion that it is impossible to determine what is signified by, 
and what are the limits of, civil society other than by referring to and de-limiting the 
term 'state' at the same time. Civil society is the sphere of social relationships which 
are not regulated by the state, understood restrictively as the conjoining of 
apparatuses that in an organized social system exercise compulsive power (Bobbio 
1997, p. 39). Nevertheless, elsewhere he notes that it is also possible to say that civil 
society is the place where economic, social, ideological and religious conflicts arise 
and develop, which state organizations have the obligation to resolve by mediating, 
preventing or repressing them (Bobbio 1997, p. 43). That is to say that there exists or 
there is able to exist a political relationship between civil society and state. 
Brown (2000) discusses just this point when he indicates that there are different ways 
of understanding what civil society is, if reference is made to an economic or to a 
political activity, and if civil society is autonomous from the state or is organically 
linked to it. One reflects a process from above to below (top-down) in which the 
forces of capital form an intellectual and cultural hegemony which guarantees 
conformity between the population. This vision is contradicted by a process from 
below to above (bottom-up) propelled by the levels of the population being privatized 
and disadvantaged. These last seek to construct a counter-hegemony which aspires to 
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achieve acceptance amongst the population, and to displace the old hegemonic order 
(Brown 2000, pp. 172-173) 
There are nevertheless other focuses linked to systemic theory or with public opinion; 
in the first case, civil society occupies the place reserved for the formation of 
demands (input) which are directed at the political system, to which responses must 
be given. Here the contrast between civil society and state presents itself as the 
contrast between quality and quantity of demands, and the capacity of institutions to 
give adequate and rapid responses to them. The other sphere is in the phenomenon of 
public opinion located in civil society, understood as the public expression of 
consensus and dissent (Bobbio 1997(a), pp. 3945). 
It is maintained in much of the literature that there is a low level of development in 
Latin America. According to Lechner (1996), the invocation of civil society in Latin 
America arose in the middle of the 1970s, linked to military dictatorships; it had a 
clear anti-authoritarian connotation which sought to counterpoint civic power to 
military power, and in this way appeal to a spectrum of the citizenry. It acquired 
political renown for its insertion into the re-orientation of the left, and in revising the 
notion of the popular and seeking another relationship between the political and the 
social - the Gramscian focus amplified its vision rather than Marx. Gramsci also gave 
civil society a distinct and separate role from the state and market, although his vision 
preserved the possibility of an anticapitalist resistance. 
Gramsci's interpretation of civil society was a Marxist approach but one that was 
Profound innovative. He departed not only from Hegelian usage of the term but also 
from Marx's basically economic interpretation. For Grarnsci, civil society was to be 
found neither within the state per se nor within the economic sphere of production. 
Rather, he identified civil society as existing between the coercive relations of the 
state and the sphere of economic organization. Thus, the formula most commonly 
found in Gramsci is that the state consists of civil society and political society. 
Political society refers to the coercive apparatus, the arena of domination, whilst civil 
society is that of consent and direction exercised through private organizations 
(Judson 1999, p. 32). Civil society is principally a sphere of indirect domination. 
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In the more recent uses of the term it calls attention to changes in society, offering a 
critical reading of the new social structures which are emerging on the continent as a 
product of the adjustment of economic structures: the drastic reorganization of social 
life, the accentuated process of segmentation of the interior of society, the de- 
aggregation of affective bonds and the symbolic forms of the community. When civil 
society signifies an interpellation to new social actors, two perspectives are 
distinguishable: 
The liberal, which identifies civil society and the market, proposes the liberation of 
private initiative from state tutelage and offers every creative opportunity to 
individual liberty, including informalization of economic activity; it is seen as a 
potential for entrepreneurial development. In the political it is supported by pluralism, 
which focuses on social activities as an analogy for market interchanges, where social 
actors can establish an harmonic equilibrium of sales-purchase interests. It proposes 
the strengthening of civil society to recover effective, participatory and transparent 
democracy, in extending itself to the arranged calculation of interests and preferences 
between individuals whilst avoiding the discretional expropriation of collective 
decisions on the part of goverment insistence. 
Community of action is noted in the new social movements and in the reorganization 
of society, in the fimctioning of growth in renewed forms of collective action. It is 
identified with solidarity networks which counter market forces, and is postulated as 
a strengthening of society to ensure the full exercise of the rights of citizenship. The 
subjects of these conflicts, and by extension of civil society, are interest groups, 
indirectly political associations of diverse types with social aims, ethnic emancipation 
movements and movements for the defense of civil rights, for the liberation of women 
and various youth movements. Political parties have one foot in civil society and 
another in institutions, and they fulfill the function of selecting, aggregating and 
transmitting the demands of civil society which will become objects of policy 
decisions. 
For Lechner, more than conserving old customs and collective identities, that which is 
called civil society guides the strengthening of the creation of civic association and 
the construction of a public space, which permits the re-evaluation of the new 
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expectations and demands of youth and women's movements, associations of human 
rights, ecological groups and a vast range of NGOs, which seek instances of 
expression (Lechner 1996(b), pp. 24-33). 
In the framework of the constitution of this public space it is necessary to take into 
account some questions which are at the root of the relationship between 
decentralization and civil society. Social movements and other organized expressions 
of civil society are flexible and differing identities, and as a consequence occupy 
different positions in the social space of relationships. This spatiality of civil society 
suggests a starting-point for dealing with the particular spatial context where its 
practices and dialogues are developed more narrowly. 
Virtuoso (1996) refers to this aspect when he outlines the change which is operating 
in the political mentality of Latin America and its close articulation with 
decentralization. The new political reasoning must be constructed from the necessities 
of the particular person and from their immediate world of references and 
relationships. Both of these express themselves in distinct forms of civil organization 
which seek to self-manage precisely this close environment. This is the origin of the 
civil society which progressively diversifies itself. 
This new political reasoning is linked with investment in the conceptions and 
understanding of the design of social projects. Central planning from above to below 
has given place to localized planning from below to above, and civil society and 
decentralization are articulated around this framework, fundamentally through the 
organization of local and regional space. Apart from the process of decentralization, 
the principle channels for the aggregation of interests are local municipal spaces and 
their organs of government; the municipality is the primary instance of the state 
immediately next to individuals, their problems and aspirations and thus, to all their 
organized expressions (Virtuoso 1996 pp. 146-149). 
For Boisier (1998) as well, the central relevance of emergent democracy is recast on 
civil society which is constituted as the principal agent of change; it passes to being 
the principle intermediary between the citizen and the state, rather than the party. The 
actual tendency is to give more recognition to civil society conformed by actors who 
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are to be found on the same horizontal plane, instead of any other individual or co- 
operative entity confonned in hierarchical organizations. 
The interest of this section is in what approximates these notions in the life of the city. 
Boisier indicates that with the distinction between civil society and groups specialized 
in the managing of powers (the military, religious, economic and political bodies) 
there occurs on the one hand a segmentation of the social and, on the other, an 
opening left for the possibility of the civil when this refers to life in the city (Boisier 
1998, pp. 82-85). The relationship of the notion of spatiality of the city and civil 
society is a way of accessing relationships of local specificity, in neighbourhood. and 
community environments. Nevertheless, this is conditioned by what accent must be 
put on individual practices, and their different interpretations and forms of 
participation, so that the city could refer to a context of relationships of power which 
is never closed. 
The neighbourhood is thus a context of social relationships where different forms of 
relationships of power cross. The neghbourhood can be understood as the smallest 
unit of conjoining of neighbours to municipality, in their relationships of power with 
the administrative political regime, for the services of the same. FlyvbJ erg (200 1) says 
that in order for relationships of power to exist there have to exist resistances as well 
(Flyvberg 2001, p. 121). Virtuoso (1996) indicates that the municipal regime should 
be understood as a structure of government and a juncture of competences and 
functions. (Virtuoso 1996, p. 150). 
Resistances have their place in civil society. In the last two decades it is perceivable 
that in Latin America there has been a loss of social rights; these have become goods 
that have to be acquired in the market or, in the case of extreme poverty, by means of 
focalized social programmes (Waterman 200 1, p. 120). The resistance of neighbours is 
derived as well from the requirement for greater municipal autonomy; by autonomy is 
understood the particular power that municipalities possess to govern themselves 
according to their own laws, without the interference of higher laws. The type of 
municipal regime consecrates the class of recognition of local power of the 
neighbours with respect to the central power, and it is the mediating mechanism 
which attempts to balance the interests of local neighbourhood power with more 
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general interests. In pursuit of this equilibrium neighbourhood power intervenes, so 
that the municipal regime takes into account the autonomy demanded by 
neighbourhood reality, as well as the subordination required by the vertical structure 
of the state (Mazzei 1984, pp-3-32). 
The boundary between civil society and local government entities is also made less 
rigid and more open, by the intervention of neighbourhood movements or other 
political initiatives. The co-responsibility of the state and civil society for national 
security is reflected at this level, which is an aspect concerned with governability and 
is related to participation and decentralization. Governability must not be an 
identification solely with efficiency and efficacy, but also with the requirement of 
democracy for a responsible legitimacy, in a manner through which different 
identities recognize each others' authority (Przeworski 1997, pp. 34-35). 
Decentralization plays a role in relation to this aspect because, as has been said 
before, it increases governability by favouring the possibilities of dialogue. 
But if relating' decentralization and civil society is desired there is another important 
aspect which can be observed, located in Parekh's framework of liberalism. The 
socio-cultural reality of Latin America defers the progress of many of these ideas, 
even when capitalism has achieved conformity to a market society in this century. 
Lechner (1996) has indicated that Latin American countries have moved rapidly 
towards a market society, and the mercantilization of the most diverse social 
relationships has molded a new type of socialization, which imprints social 
relationships with an individualist-egoist stamp. Such a displacement can be seen as 
cause and effect of the neo-liberal interpellation of individual interests, breaking with 
the communitarian tradition created around the public environment and public goods 
(Lechner 1996(a), pp. 106-107). 
Existing forms of sociability in Latin America differ in many respects from the social 
weave and value of association proposed by liberalism. It is true, as Oropeza (1988) 
has indicated, that many Latin American social organizations have in their most 
distant cultural traditions an Iberian socio-political order, which transferred social 
behaviour that is essentially authoritarian, elitist, hierarchical, catholic and 
corporative (Oropeza 1988, pp. 23-24). Most notable of all is the tenacity and 
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persistence with which these structures have succeeded in perpetuating themselves 
throughout Latin American history, with their markedly centralist and clientelistic 
character. No less true is that there still subsist many forms of organization and 
political practices rooted in the first culture of this continent, side-by-side with these 
forms of organization transplanted from Europe. This should be an observation of 
equal or greater importance to be underlined in relationship to decentralization and 
power, and in actuality many indigenous leaders promote their cultural values and the 
defense of their practices of political organization, whilst confronted by the influences 
of "Western modemizatiorf'(Korovkin 2001, p. 41). 
The space of action of civil society finds itself surrounded by the transformations 
which the private has undergone; Liberal economic reforms not only minimize action 
by the state but, as has been stated previously, they privatize social conduct. 
Nevertheless the political reforms could make viable the integration of civil society, 
just as the decentralization of power could contribute to renewing tendencies towards 
de-aggregation and fragmentation of values, beliefs, interests and everything else 
which is considered fundamental to liberalism. This brings some substantiation to the 
previously-expounded considerations on the close links between the diversity of civil 
society and the state, in which the liberal vision of civil society was developed. In the 
framework defined by the fight against centralism a re-politicization of civil society 
was previewed, and as a consequence a redistribution of political power to the local. 
This re-politicization can manifest itself in distinctive ways and amongst these, in the 
Latin American context, could be indigenous communality. 
One case of interest to be studied can be seen in the actuality of hegemonic 
articulation for controlling the apparatus of the state, where civil society, as 
Constituent or Sovereign, intervenes in the interior of institutionality. From there it 
can impel important reforms to legislation in favour of a greater distribution of power, 
of participation and the strengthening of civil society. The new constitutional reforms 
gather together in many of their articles the suggestions of indigenous and 
environmental movements, neighbourhood associations and NGOs among others, and 
this also facilitates an appreciation of what citizens think about these changes. 
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Conclusions 
One aspect that has been detached from the connections established in this chapter, is 
the importance of being able to count on an adequate diagram or vocabulary of the 
spatiality of power. In this framework of identification of the connections between 
democracy and the process of democratization, disposing of an adequate diagram of 
the spatiality of power of domination-resistance has been vital, and this diagram 
refers specifically to domination as separated from relationships of power, and not a 
binary, domination-resistance relationship. The contributions in this sense are 
orientating, on every occasion that the initial model of the spatiality of power does not 
make these differences completely explicit. The central point is that power is 
practiced, and as a consequence is around and between us, before being in a centre or 
"contained" in the individual. 
This also has been key to encountering and understanding the interrelationships 
between democracy and decentralization. One of the aspects that has been opened up 
has been the interrelationships which are hidden in the Western view of 
decentralization, with the view of social capital. The "new" social reforms and 
decentralization are clearly developed in an overlapping of relationships of power 
centered on and about a diagram of power-as-mobilizer-of resources of the individual. 
The superposition of diagrams of power, however, creates difficulties in 
distinguishing the pre-eminence of the binary relationships of centered power in these 
reforms. The political and ideological proposals of the reforms are discharged and 
extended over a wide space of relationships of power, without raising the least 
suspicions. 
The operations of the multilateral entities are supported in the diagram of 
relationships of resource-mobilizing power and social capital, and they prefer NGOs 
to realize their operations; for these institutions NGOs are synonymous with civil 
society. On the other hand, in the case of non-Western visions of decentralization the 
new social movements and others are generally included as part of civil society, as 
well as other political initiatives and NGOs. This is one aspect which stands out in the 
comparison of visions on decentralization. 
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Another aspect which arises from the Western vision of decentralization is that this 
does not conceive of the possibility of the development of political decentralization as 
independent of fiscal or administrative decentralization, but rather as its result. This 
critique is directed explicitly against the diagram generator-of-practices, and the 
notion of political decentralization. Nevertheless, in the non-Westem vision of the 
political decentralization tendency, even when this is seated in the formulation of a 
diagram of relationships of power, its conceptual elaboration is still weak and has to 
be more explicit. 
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CHAPTER 11 
METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK 
Introduction 
In the preceding chapter the general outlines and most important interconnections in 
the thematic development of the thesis were dealt with, from which it is now possible 
to make a specific pursuit of the problematic relationship between democracy and 
decentralization. To this end, a connection can be made with Pickvance's proposal 
(1997, p. 131), about the necessity of understanding democracy as an ideal. Such an 
understanding also permits us to make links to Bobbio's proposals (1986, pp. 42-45), 
which allow an understanding of how the opening of new spaces has been to the 
concept of democracy. The analysis contained in the thesis thus also allows the 
inclusion of ideas favoured by Slater (1997, p. 61), concerning the relationship 
between democracy and democratization, the spatial as a potential delineator of the 
political and politics, and relationships inside the territory of the nation state. 
On the other hand, the visions of decentralization in different spheres have revealed 
the basis for the re-composition of a perspective in which, if decentralization appears 
as a response to the effects of globalization (Munck 2000, p. 195) it also comes 
accompanied by the re-vindication of subjectivities and identities, as well as the 
growth of inequalities. In this manner, the subjects of decentralization face to 
different situations in each country and the emphasis changes according to place and 
circumstances. The explanatory fabric woven in the previous chapter gives us a basis 
for understanding the relationship between democracy and decentralization but, 
should be clear that, these visions will necessitate the deployment of a methodological 
framework which is clearly distanced from the schemes of more closed 
investigations. 
A methodological proposal which moves in this direction is that of Flyvbjerg (2001). 
His major concern is that Natural Science approach must be abandoned because it 
simply does not work in the Social Sciences. The principal components for opening a 
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specifically social scientific pathway are consideration of the dependent context, 
along side of practice or political action. Both practice and political action refer to 
processes and in consequence are closely connected; one alludes to the process of the 
conformation of socio-history, whilst the other refers to the experience of the 
individual and their own faculties for appreciating, driving and powering this process. 
1/. 1 The Theoretical Methodological Framework 
The particular character of the relationship between democracy and decentralization 
has been revealed by Parekh (1997, p. 160) as underlining the non-universality of 
liberal democracy. But at the same time, this connects with Pickvance's proposal 
which, as was stated above could be interpreted as suggesting the assimilation of 
democracy as a value and through its immediate consequences, also as a process. In 
the opinion of Flyvbjerg (2001, p. 143) this interpretation stands in opposition to the 
unsustainable separation of fact and value typical of conventional political and social 
thinking - he indicates that the constitution of modem democracy prescribes a 
separation of rationality and power. 
The linking of particularity and process allows for at least in principle consideration 
of the relationships between democracy and decentralisation as being more dependent 
on the characteristics present in each national, regional and local environment and 
moreover, establishes their interconnections by criteria more closely linked to human 
activities. In this way, the process of democratization can be seen as an occurrence 
whose constitution depends on socio-historical context and relationships of power 
which is at the same time constantly modified by the experience and the practice of 
individuals. To set out from this starting point implies two methodological concerns. 
On the one hand, the importance of diversity and the dynamic of particulars and, on 
the other, a form of investigation that is not limited by closed theoretical frameworks 
or universal models, and the predictions of consequence. 
Following this line of thinking, to locate oneself in the ambit of the particular does 
not signify detaching oneself from the dynamic of the external, or the international or 
supranational environment, but rather it means treating the study of a process of 
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decentralization of the internal or national, regional or local levels as a special space 
of development, and examining the surprises of the external upon that specific space. 
This point finds supported by the potentiality of the 'geopolitical', in dealing with 
issues related to the territoriality of politics within national frontiers, as well the 
examination of penetrations and flows of different transnational modalities of power 
(the term territoriality has here been adapted to refer to the spaces inside nation-states, 
whilst the term spatial environment denotes the multiple contexts inside and between 
nation-states). The process of decentralizing politics can be considered as a case of 
the geopolitical directed towards the interior of a national space (Slater 1997, p. 55) 
Within territoriality, the potential relevance of the spatial for the delimitation of 
politics comes up against the decentralization which begins inside the broadening of 
the process of democracy. Decentralization appears at first as a political decision, as a 
measure that has been impelled from above towards the redistribution of power, and it 
situated within a context of the re-composition of an eroded govemability, and 
legitimacy of representative democracy of the welfare state (Bobbio 1997(b), pp. 103- 
109). Nevertheless, this does not signify the absence of a context of relationships of 
power, but rather the implementation of decentralization in a scenario of opposition 
from those exercising control over politics, the pressures from below deployed by 
civil society also can no be ignored. 
All of this accentuates the natural interactions between politics and the political - 
stressing their differences but also their essential interconnections. This idea of the 
interdependence between politics and the political reflects the current debate 
concerning the relationships between the state and civil society. Politics has its own 
public space in the interchange between political parties, in the parliamentary exercise 
and in other areas, whereas the political can develop in any sphere of the social, 
independent of institutional rules and limitations. These interdependencies are 
interwoven around the idea of relationships of power and resistance (Flyvbjerg 2001, 
p. 121). 
Decentralization affects traditional politics through the manner in which it carries 
within itself a redistribution of the power which had previously been the exclusive 
domain of political decision and action. This contributes to the disarticulation and 
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fragmentation of the institutions of representation, as well as to the emergence of new 
leaderships. Nevertheless, formal politics maintains a public space, and to a certain 
degree, decentralization has contributed towards the preservation of that space for 
politics. On the other hand the political, in bringing democratic openness to the spaces 
of regional and local power which had been controlled by political parties and the 
state bureaucracy, has moved the taking of decisions towards the social initiatives and 
policies of civil society. In this manner political decentralization contributes towards 
the creation of linking corridors in the frontiers where politics and the political are to 
be found. 
It is therefore observable that politics, the political and political decentralization are 
articulated in the process of the democratisation. This context of the relationships of 
power and resistance is where the organisations of civil society play their most 
important role. Bobbio points out that once established, political democracy shows up 
that the political sphere is much wider than the formal political system (it is in reality 
the whole of society) and there is not political decision that is not conditioned by what 
occurs in civil society (Bobbio 1997(a), p. 43). 
On the other hand, it was shown in the preceding chapter, that in Sh6nwAlder's 
differentiation of decentralization (1997, p. 757-759) the pragmatic model considers 
decentralization as a meta-focus, in the sense of being a universal model. 
Nevertheless, if we re-visit the proposal of Samoff (1990, p. 521) concerning the co- 
existence of different tendencies in decentralization, and the observations of Manor 
(1995, p. 82) about the strong power exerted by decentralization over local powers and 
civil society, it is possible to see that some aspects of decentralization as an institution 
for the distribution of financial resources, as well as a receptor for flows of 
international finance, could have important consequences for the distribution of 
power. 
This study, however, will follow the political focus through exploring the links 
between decentralization and relationships of power. This is precisely the motive 
behind emphasizing the study of the connections and delimitations derived from the 
distribution of power, rather than the more technical aspects of decentralization. 
According to Slater (1997, p. 6 1) these connections and delimitations can also include, 
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the potentialities of the spatial as an element of the delimitation between politics and 
the political. A clear expression of the spatial as an element in delimiting politics and 
the political can be seen in Bobbio's idea of ascending and descending power (1986, 
pp. 42-45). 
We can also note that Slater's proposal finds strong support in the methodology of 
Flyvbjerg, every time that he gives prominence to the spatial, and even the particular 
and to political practice. In this perspective, the observation that modem politics are 
spatial politics acquires a form that is much more closely integrated into the field of 
social sciences. With this in mind, this section will outline three points of the 
proposed methodology of Flyvbj erg which are of particular interest to the aims of this 
investigation. 
In the first place, Flyvbjerg indicates that social practices are more important than 
discourse, and that social phenomena must be investigated in relation to processes. As 
was indicated at the beginning of this chapter, a notion linked to this proposal is that 
of the so-called 'dependent context'; he distinguishes between the dependent context, 
and the independent context (rules and laws) of the natural sciences. Natural sciences 
explain and predict in terms of elements which are abstracted from an independent 
context. By contrast in the social sciences this is not possible. The Social sciences are 
unable to abstract, at least in terms of formal relationships, the rules and laws of the 
elements of dependent context as a way of explaining and predicting human activity 
(Flyvbjerg 2001, pp. 134-136). 
More concretely, the problem is that if an attempt is made to define one action of 
human activity from an independent context, the definition of that action will not 
necessarily coincide with how the action is pragmatically defined by an actor within a 
given, concrete social situation. Social scientists do not have rules and laws like the 
natural sciences that they can use in order to determine how the people studied by 
them determine what counts as an action. On the contrary, the determination of an 
action derived from the dependent context is defined situationally, that is from the 
mix of socio-historical relationships in which that social practice is inscribed. That is 
to say, the social sciences adjust themselves to processes (Flyvbjerg 2001, p. 42). 
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In the second place, Flyvbjerg suggests that we have to address those problems that 
are important to the local, national and global communities in which we live and 
moreover, most importantly, there must be an emphasis upon issues of power and 
values. The notion of decentralised power of Foucault (Flyvbjerg 200 1, p. 116-117) 
touches upon the framework of reference being developed here. In this perspective, 
relationships of power have to be understood as a multiplicity of relationships of force 
which are not external to other forms of relationships, such as for instance economic, 
knowledge-based or sexual relationships. On the contrary, relationships of power are 
the immediate effect of the division, inequality and ambivalence present in all these 
relationships, which in turn are pre-conditions for these differentiations. 
In this way relationships of power can be seen; on the one hand, as produced in all 
points of space in fluid and unequal interactions, without negating that within this 
fragmentation of power one can have find in certain moments, convergent effects, 
such is the case of hegemony according to Flyvbjerg. On the other hand, relationships 
of power can be seen as resistance. Resistance is a part of power, and consequently 
relationships of power are also dependent on multiple points of resistance. The image 
of a distribution of relationships of power and resistance amongst an infinity of 
points, contrasts with ideas such as the 'centre of power', or a system of domination 
which one group exercises over another. The idea of a multiplicity of points of power 
and resistance, on the contrary, owes more to an understanding of power as coming 
from below. 
Nevertheless these images are only forms which power may assume. Multiplicity 
does not signify that there may not occur a bipolar fragmentation, such as for example 
massive class conflict. Flyvbjerg says that, according to Foucault, this is at the very 
least a case of points of mobile and fleeting points of resistance which produce 
fragmentations and re-groupings of variables, where some groups disintegrate and 
others are created. In a similar vein, he notes that fragmentation can also include the 
penetration of individualities, dividing their points of reference and reconstructing 
their identities; in the same sense in which a network of relationships of power creates 
innumerable points of resistance which diagonally cross social divisions -- a system 
of close nexuses which penetrate apparatuses and institutions without being localized 
in them (Flyvbjerg 2001, pp. 121-122). 
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11.2 Outlining the Case Study 
In the preceding framework we have considered the more general aspects of a 
theoretical methodology in order to give direction to the more specific discussion of 
this research project concerning the relationships between democracy and 
decentralization in Venezuela. The next theme to be developed refers specifically to 
the connections established between these two narratives in the period between 1989 
and 2000. The initiation of this period was marked by the promulgation of political 
decentralization and its closure by a new concept of participatory democracy. This 
new concept was introduced through the new Constitution of 1999 and the 'mega- 
elections' of 2000, and involved a significant change of actors in the structure of the 
political system and a new political hegemony. 
The first proper employment of the term decentralization appears in combination with 
the transition from centralist democratic representation to decentralized democratic 
representation. The implementation of decentralization in 1989 serves to establish 
precisely this difference. The forms of decentralization in the centralist period were 
more related to the de-concentration of public administration and the creation of 
semi-autonomous institutions that were still dependent on executive power. The 
decentralization which began in 1989, by contrast, was directed at the distribution of 
power and more latterly the transfer of competencies or services independent of the 
executive power. This permits the visualization of an overview of each period, in 
terms of significant decentralization policies. 
After a democratic experiment in the period 1945-1948, representative democracy in 
Venezuela re-appeared in a more permanent form in 1961- as a democracy of elite 
conciliation, and as such was controlled from then on by the Social Democrat and 
Social Christian political parties. This democracy was able to sustain itself thanks to 
the oil-rentier economic model which began in 1920, through which the parties 
mediated political participation and civil organizations through clientelistic practices. 
The fall of oil prices in 1979 marked the decline of this period of fiscal bonanza, by 
limiting the distribution of these profits in the face of an overburden of demand. 
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The situation presented by the state of public finances, the progressive deterioration 
of legitimacy as well as the difficulties of governing and the pressure exerted by 
neighbourhood organisations, economic and intellectual groups, in the end overcame 
the resistance of the hegemonic political parties and the government commenced a 
reform of the state in 1984, leading to the introduction of partial reforms in 1989. 
From then on, changes began to operate within the system of democratic 
representation which acted to influence the process of democratization itself. In the 
ten years from 1989 to 1999, the hegemonic parties of the pact of 1961 fragmented, 
and new forms of leaderships emerged. New parties linked to new currents of opinion 
including new movements of civil society, as well as of the church, appeared on the 
political scene as new powers at both local and national levels. 
The broadening of democracy for the twenty-first century is delineated by the 
constitution promulgated in 1999. In this constitution, participation is given greater 
importance, and democracy is made more integral in the sense indicated by Bobbio 
(1986, p. 40). The use of the referendum has also been incorporated, and the Senate 
has been substituted by the institutionalization of the Assembly. However, the most 
outstanding feature of this political decentralization is that it has initiated the opening 
of new democratic spaces at the local level. Municipal governments which had 
hitherto served the dominant political parties merely as a conduit for their clientelistic 
Political practices now face more limits, and pressure from civil society and 
individuals has obliged a greater responsibility on the part of political representatives. 
11.3 Questions and Objectives 
The previous section presented an outline of the dependent context most immediate to 
the subject of the reform of the state in order to tackle the central theme of this 
investigation and its more general questions and objectives. Concretely, the aim is to 
explore the connection between decentralization and the process of democratisation, 
their antecedents and political contexts, as well as presenting a case study to 
demonstrate the experiences of individuals and community leaders in a local 
municipality. The process of democratization has been defined previously in the sense 
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of a broadening of democracy that is also connected with the development of local 
powers, the emergence of civil society groups and other political initiatives. 
The questions to be formulated are directed at interrogating the basis of the 
supposition that decentralization plays a very important role in the dynamic of the 
democratic system. This supposition is connected to the premise which establishes 
that the relationship which exists between democracy and the process of 
democratization is the same as the relationship established between system and 
process (Slater 1998(a), p. 22). The premise, in direct consequence, presupposes that 
there exist relationships, events, activities and practices within the context which 
dynamize the process. In this sense decentralization could be an event that energizes 
the representative democratic system. How, then have relationships of democratic 
power in Venezuela been modified and how has decentralization intervened in the 
process of broadening dernocracy?. These questions lead to us to the following 
general objectives: 
As a first objective, an analysis of the links between political decentralization and the 
process of democratization, in the period 1989-2000 at state level within the 
Republic. To accomplish this analysis the period has been broken into three parts: 
a) The stage of institutional struggle between the social democratic and neo-liberal 
tendencies in the context of a crisis of governability and political decentralization 
between 1989 and 1993. 
b) The stage of attenuated neo-liberal domination and the deepening of 
decentralization between 1993 and 1998. 
c) The stage of changing party-political hegemony and institutional changes between 
1999 and 2000 (a new constitutional text, new public powers, the widening of 
citizens' rights and changes in the conformation of civil society, amongst other 
aspects). 
As a second objective, a case study at municipal and parochial levels, in the city of 
Wrida and in the parish of J. J. Osuna Rodriguez. The motives for taking this city as a 
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case study are derived from the revealing character of its functioning within the 
context of Venezuelan democracy. On the one hand it is a city that is highly 
dependent on the state but on the other hand it has a strong civil society and highly 
developed cultural traditions, although the presence of the business sector is low. All 
of this contrasts with the strong presence of the Catholic Church. 
The specific conformation of the Parish of J. J. Osuna Rodriguez was also an 
important factor in its selection. The author of this thesis has been involved in 
research here for several years and can access detailed information to complement the 
perspective that is developed here. Unfortunately this work was not oriented towards 
evaluating changing values but rather towards an evaluation of the built environment. 
The focus now being pursued here will give a new orientation to future research here. 
The parish in question is one of the largest, population-wise, in the city of M6rida and 
is a recently-developed neighbourhood. The first properties were only delivered in 
1974. The greater part constructed during the democratic centralist epoch with a 
smaller part during that of democratic decentralisation. The brief period of the Chivez 
government has also seen the adjudication of some property ownership. During the 
period of democratic centralism, the adjudication of these land units was marked by a 
strongly clientelistic relationship, and one the purposes of this case study is to show 
the effects of this as part of the local dependent context. 
11.3.1 Specific Questions 
- How has the process of democratization been linked with the process of 
decentralization in Venezuela? 
- What form do the articulations between decentralization and civil society take in the 
context of hegemonic struggle? 
- How has political decentralization contributed to the process of fragmentation and 
re-composition of the democratic system? 
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- How do the local leaders and members of the community view the process of 
decentralization, and what is their appreciation or valuation of the democratic 
change? 
11.3.2 Specific Objectives 
- To set out a point of departure for studying Venezuelan political decentralization. 
- To set out the dependent context for the period of decentralized democracy in 
Venezuela, starting from the most important aspects of the process of democratization 
initiated in 1989. 
- To set out the linkages between political decentralization and civil society within the 
process of transition from representative democracy to participatory democracy, and 
in the context of hegemonic struggle within Venezuela. 
To set out the dependent context for the case study of the Libertador Municipality and 
the parish of J. J. Osuna Rodriguez. 
- To set out the process of the broadening of democracy at a municipal and parochial 
level during the period of decentralization. 
11.4 Methodological Techniques 
The choice of methodological techniques depends on what it is that one wants to 
know, as well as the type of information which is to be generated. Flyvbjerg (2001, 
p. 166) says that the social sciences must be understood as an activity carry out in 
public and for the public. In this sense if the intention is to communicate the results in 
an effective manner to fellow citizens, at least two preconditions must exist. The first 
of these is a close relationship between the investigator and the investigated, 
sometimes in order to clarify and sometimes to intervene, as much as to generate new 
perspectives. The second is a clear and well-defined guiding thread to the exposition. 
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In the case of this study, pursuing a research path that will generate a clear exposition 
suggests returning in detail to the previous section and reformulating our basic 
question in order to adjust it to these demands - How does decentralization energize 
democratization, and how are these changes lived by people? In this reformulated 
question, connected to the general question formulated before, there is a double 
perspective. On the one hand, there is the relationship between decentralization and 
democracy in the period 1989-2000, and on the other how this has been played out in 
our case study of municipal and parochial communities. To respond to this question 
requires different sources of information and as a consequence the use of different 
methods. 
Following this theme, the unfolding of the question inevitably leads to a combination 
of methodological techniques in order to generate the desired information. Silverman 
(2000, p. 98) has indicated that when there are a variety of questions to be investigated 
and a desire to corroborate some with others, different methods should be used. He 
utilizes the image of trigonometric triangulation in order to illustrate how to deal with 
the intersection of different sources of information. With this combination, known as 
triangulation or the mixed method, an attempt is made to maximize understanding of 
the matter under investigation. This method permits the alternate utilization of 
quantitative and qualitative information, despite their differences. The most important 
aspect in combining the two is to see the context as something as changeable and 
dynamic (Valentine 2001, p. 45) 
According to this proposal, this study has utilized the following methodological 
techniques applied to the two spatial levels of analysis: the federal state level of the 
republic and the municipal level. 
11-4.1 Federal states spatial level 
At this level the analysis was carried out mainly through quantitative data to establish 
the empirical aspects of political decentralization. Two elements were explored. First, 
the spatiality of centralization and decentralization in terms of the distribution of 
resources from central government to local government through the 'Situado 
Constitucional' during the centralism period (chapter IV) and thorough the 
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'Consolidation of Resources' during the decentralized period ( chapter V). Second, 
the electoral dimension to represent the results of the governorships elections from 
1989 to 1998. The quantitative information was complemented by an exhaustive 
review of academic treatments of the period, newspaper coverage and a range of 
thematic commentaries. For this spatial level, it is considered appropriate to use this 
combination of techniques because it shows directly the process of democratization 
and its historical context. 
The original sources of data from both elements came from a) the National Electoral 
Court (CNE by the initials in Spanish), this institution is in charge of preparing the 
electoral process as a Constitution mandate and dealing with the results and 
publication of the electoral statistics. The website of CNE is: http: //www. cne. gov. ve 
b) the memoirs and accounts of the Ministry of Interior Affairs (FIDES: 
Intergovernmental Fund for Decentralization), these memoirs were used to collect the 
information referring the accounts of transferences of resources from the central 
government to the local government; the memories are published annually. The 
website of FIDES is: http: //www. fides. gov. ve c) Population and housing census is 
held every ten years by the Central Office of information and Statistics (OCEI by the 
initials in Spanish). The OCEI website is: http: //www. ocei. Rov. ve. d) Media archives 
covering the national dailies El Nacional (http: //www. el-nacional. com) and El 
Universal (http: //www. el-universal. com). 
Some limitations with the data sources were experienced at this level. In relation to 
the electoral information, there were changes in the laws governing the electoral 
system in 1974,1979,1989,1992,1995 and 1998. These changes are reflected in the 
boundaries of the electoral constituencies, the establishment of new municipalities 
and parishes and the utilization of different electoral system at different times 
(uninominal, closed list, or a combination of closed list and uninominal); all of which 
make the comparison between years more difficult. But these changes were 
themselves also part of the decentralization process which was broadening democracy 
at all spatial levels. In relation to the census and memoirs and accounts of the 
ministries, the difficulties were caused by the fact that information was collected in 
different ways and at different times by the various institutions, which made the 
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comparison of variables much, more complex. In addition, the very definition of the 
variables thematic also changed (for example, the definition of extreme poverty). 
11.4.2 Municipal and Parish Level 
For the Municipal and parish level, qualitative techniques were primarily employed to 
deepen the case study in Chapter VI. These included questionnaires, in-depth 
interviews and participant observation (Valentine 200 1, pp. 4445). 
* Questionnaire was carried out in the municipality of Libertador in the state of 
Mdrida. The questionnaire was designed with yes/no answers and open questions and 
concerned participation in elections, interest in NGOs as well as views on the process 
of decentralization at the local level (see the questionnaire in Appendix one). The 
questionnaire was undertaken during the so-called 'mega-elections' of 2000. Forty 
members of the community were interviewed from different parishes in the 
municipality on the same day as the elections; that is during the lived experience of a 
political event. 
The questionnaire was divided into two blocks of questions, one concerning 
participation in political parties and participation in social/community movements and 
NGOs, and the other concerning the impact of decentralization at the local level. To 
these blocks were added at the beginning some general questions about the 
interviewee (age, location and activities) and, as a conclusion, some evaluations about 
decentralization and democracy. More open questions were formulated such as: "Do 
you consider that we are in a true decentralized democracy? - Why? - What would be 
required so that the country could move forward to a true decentralized democracy? " 
* The technique of in-depth interviewing can be carried out individually or in groups. 
In these interviews, participants narrated their experiences of their own world, as well 
as the significance that they gave to them. Three interviews were carried out with 
members of the communities of the Parish of J. J. Osuna Rodriguez during December 
and January of 2001-2002. These interviews were conducted with integrated groups 
of three people. The first was with members of the parish council, the second with a 
city councilor who represented the parish of J. J. Osuna Rodriguez in the municipal 
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chamber and two members of the community, and the third interview was with three 
members of the community (two of them ex-leaders). These interviews were carried 
out in a pleasent environment without any problems. The questions dealt with the 
effects of political decentralization upon the local community. 
* Participatory observation is a technique that involves living, working and spending 
long periods of time in a particular community, in such a way that it is possible to 
gain knowledge and comprehension of the experiences of the local people, in the 
context of their daily lives. The researcher in this thesis has lived, worked and 
undertaken previous research in the municipality of Libcrtador and in Osuna 
Rodriguez Parish, which allowed for an enrichment of the research by permitting 
closeness to the reality of the dependent context. 
* Other methods used, such as the study of maps, photos and newspaper archives 
permitted a different vision of the experiences of people in ways that were not so 
influenced by the questioning of a researcher, and which would not rely on possible 
confusions of language or culture, or the perhaps limited ability of the researcher to 
communicate effectively with local inhabitants. In this investigation aerial 
photographs and photo mosaic of the area were used, maps that showed the spatial 
differences, and an extensive media archive covering the national and local dailies El 
Nacional, El Universal, Frontera, and Diario Los Andes, together with an analysis of 
the debates of the Congress of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. 
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Chapter I// 
Territoriality of Power in 18th and 19th Century Venezuela 
Introduction 
This chapter deals with Venezuelan territoriality and the spatiality of power; the 
connection between territory and power is proposed as a fundamental point in the 
analysis advanced, concerning decentralization and democracy in Venezuela. The 
elements for the analysis of territoriality, decentralized and centralized forms of the 
state have been established in the previous chapters, and this chapter will specifically 
discuss the colonial antecedents of the structure of territoriality in the 18'h century, as 
well as the de-centered form which the state assumed in the 19th century. The 
presentation of the text takes the form of an account of events over time, which is 
intended to act only as an explanatory resource, all of the aspects of which are the 
result of the historical evolution of the state in Latin America. Gonzdlez Casanova 
(1992) has indicated that crises of the state in Latin America occurred principally 
around the years 1800,1850,1880,1930,1945,1959 and lastly around the peak of 
Neoliberalism and the reforms of the state in 1980 (Gonzdfez Casanova 1992, pp. 34- 
35). 
As has been indicated in the previous chapter, in the discussion of the connection 
between the internal and the external, territoriality has been identified with internal or 
national spaces. The interventions of the external in territoriality, in a diagram of the 
spatiality of power, would be expressed in relationships of domination, for instance in 
the imposition of hierarchical forms of power - this is concerned with a system of 
rules which violates sovereignty of the people. By contradistinction, the internal can 
be linked with the combination of governmentality2 and sovereignty which encloses 
2 According to Foucault, 'governmentality' is the power which is exercised over a complex of men 
and their 'relation to things'. Modern societies are characterized by a triangular power complex: 
sovereignty-discipline-govemment or 'governmental ity'. The notion of 'governmental ity' refers to a 
series of regulatory strategies that are heterogeneous and indirect (McNay 1996, pp. 1 15-118). 
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the interconnections between the political, and resistances. There are also observable, 
in the process of democratization, contradictions between a power which imposes 
subjugation and subordination, and a power which is constituted through resistance in 
order to construct forms of political and social autonomy (Slater 1998(b), p. 1). A key 
point in this chapter will be a description of some of the elements that give a view of 
how this particular process is woven in particular combinations in Venezuela, and 
starting from this reference, the development of the chapter is constituted by two 
elements: 
In the first part the spatiality of colonial power and the structure of Venezuelan power 
in the 18 th century is touched on, underlining the spatial fragmentation and 
decentralization of power shown by the provinces. This impeded both effective 
political and economic control by sub-metropolitan dominant tendencies, and for this 
reason the Compaftia Guipuzcoana was created, a politically economic enterprise 
acting as an agent of domination. Producers refused this form of monopoly, however, 
and protests against its presence would lead to the creation of the General Captaincy 
of Venezuela in 1777, which would be a more direct and centralized form of colonial 
power. 
The Captaincy General of Venezuela, among other institutions, was part of the liberal 
reforms which had been imposed by political and economic conditions on the crown 
of Spain. This step towards colonial metropolitan centralization occasioned the loss of 
much of the provincial autonomy previously concentrated in the town councils or 
municipalities, and initiated the process towards independence which recovered local 
powers again. What is noticeable is that both centralism and decentralization 
combined in this colonial epoch, and that furthermore with the disappearance of the 
externally dominant force, once again power became concentrated in the town 
councils. 
The second part of the chapter concerns the period of the republic from 1830 up to 
1899, including the Federal Wars between 1859 and 1863. The result of these wars 
was the establishment of the Federation, which came to signify the high-point in the 
process of democratization which took place in the I 9th Century, and which is also the 
reason for distinguishing two distinct periods. The first covers the period from 1830 
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to 1864, when leadership was exercised by the military caudillos of the independence 
struggle, and the state formed a federalist center. The political struggle was to be 
strongly linked to the Conservative Party - this party was based on caudillismo, the 
commercial houses and the conservative oligarchy, and maintained control of power 
from 1864 until 1948, whereas the liberal oligarchy kept power up to 1858. 
The Liberal Party was formed in 1840, and went on to represent the democratic 
tendency related to the federal wars, and to the process which began in 1864. The 
identifying characteristic of this period, from the point-of-view of this thesis, is the 
form of decentralization which was adopted by the state through the formation of 
pacts between regional caudillos, which from 1870 onwards would be accompanied 
by centralized forms of administration. The political struggle freed the interior of the 
political party, and moreover around 1897 there appeared new demands for a greater 
democratization. At the end of the century, however, the seizing of power by 
caudillos throughout the Andean region re-organized the state and definitively 
imposed a state centralism which ended movement towards forms of decentralized 
power. 
/I/. I Elements for the Study of Territoriality in the 18th Century 
The colonial era shows the beginnings of dominance in Latin America, as well as the 
imposition of schemes of hierarchical power, but this dominance did not show the 
same characteristics in all regions, and neither was it confronted by the same 
responses. This section is concerned with connecting some of the relationships of 
dominance that were established between the provinces comprised by Venezuela and 
the Spanish metropolis, and the elements of centralization and decentralization around 
which were woven these particular relationships of dominance. The theme will 
contribute 
- 
to a further understanding of the process leading to the spatiality of power 
in I 9th Century Venezuela. 
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111.1.1 Spatiality and Colonial Power in the 18th Centufy 
Many of the features of the state as constituted in the I 9th century were derived from 
the territorial structure as defined during the colonial period; one of the more relevant 
aspects is the territorial disaggregation which persisted up to the first decades of the 
20th century. Another important aspect is the impact of the external on the political 
dynamics and the economy of these provinces, and both of these aspects are related. 
This was to become important in the organization of Venezuelan society, and also 
influenced the development of territoriality. 
During the whole of the period of Spanish dominance and up until the middle of the 
I 9th century, the province was the basic territorial unit; the Federal Constitution of 
1864 renamed them states, which they have remained to date. In the colonial era the 
provinces were divided into greater or lesser according to relationships of 
subordination, and as distinct units of political administration they were organized 
under the authority of a governor who exercised military, governmental, 
administrative and judicial functions. The city/town council was the organ of 
municipal autonomy (Gil Fortoul 1953, Volume 1, p. 113), and the provinces were 
grouped under the authority of royal audiences whose principle function was the 
administration of justice, but which furthermore (specifically in America) were 
transformed into instruments of government. They were entrusted with watching over 
the public order and good government of the cities. 
In Latin America three types of royal audiences are distinguishable; those in the 
capital of the viceroy, those of the greater provinces and those of the lesser. In 
relation to the viceroYs, Spanish America was initially divided amongst two viceroYs, 
the Viceroy of New Spain (1535) and the Viceroy of Per6 (1543). The royal 
audiences of Santo Domingo, Mexico, Guatemala and Guadalajara belonged to the 
first, and the audiences of Panama, Lima, Santa Fe de Bogotd and Charcas to the 
second. The Viceroy of Nueva Granada was created at a much later date, in 1718 
(Brewer-Carias 1997(b), p. 25). 
It can be elicited from the preceding exposition, therefore, that in the colonial period 
there were three levels of power and spatial organization, and the cities constituted 
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the central axis of this organization. These elements introduce the theme of 
territoriality and its relationship with the external, which becomes one of the key 
points underlined here. According to Malavd Mata, these "relationships of 
subordination of an economic, political and administrative nature with respect to the 
metropolis come to constitute the most relevant aspect of colonial Venezuela, so far 
as social organization without autonomous life and being built in a top-down manner, 
are concerned" (Malavd Mata 1974, p. 46). 
These different environments of spatiality and government demonstrate the presence 
of common denominators for the study of territoriality in the context of Latin 
America; nevertheless, they also bring into view the differences. Whilst the Viceroys 
of New Spain (present-day Mexico), New Granada (present-day Colombia) and Peru 
(present-day Peru) had achieved the formation of their territorial integrity and their 
metropolitan centers by the 16'h century, Venezuela in its current geographic 
dimensions arose in the 18 th century. Before 1777, the provinces which would come 
to form Venezuelan territory were not even integrated into a single royal audience; on 
one side the provinces of Venezuela and Cabo de la Vela, Nueva Andalucia (or 
Cumand and Margarita) belonged to the audience of Santo Domingo, and on the other 
the provinces of Mdrida-La Grita and Guyana-Trinidad were incorporated into the 
audience of Santa Fe de Bogotd, after 1718 passing to the Viceroy of New Granada 
(Veldsquez 1998, p. 3, Gil Fortoul 1953 Volume 1, pp. 116-117). 
This decentralization of provincial powers created problems for the Spanish crown for 
various reasons. Firstly, it feared the expansionist presence of the Portuguese 
imperium around Guyana, and the threat of invasion by Holland and Britain in the 
Caribbean. Secondly, the Spanish empire was organized in America as a closed 
system (Chdves Vargas 1992, p. 89), which is to say as an integrated and polarized 
economy directed towards the metropolis and 'sub-polarized' towards the capitals of 
the viceroys, where the production of precious metals was to be found. Nevertheless 
in the above-mentioned provinces, on the one hand the absence of abundant mining 
resources acted to make an important difference with respect to interest in these 
regions, and on the other hand those provinces maintained political and economic 
relationships with other metropolises alongside those with the Spanish metropolis, by 
means of a commercial network extending throughout the Caribbean. These last 
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points are relevant in particular to the moment when the Crown of Spain decided to 
centralize the economy and the power of the city-ports, through the creation of a 
company devoted to a commercial monopoly and the control of contraband. 
Additionally, these provinces realized their political and economic functions in a 
manner entirely distinct from the others. The economy was organized regionally and 
around city-ports on the Caribbean littoral, or on the edges of the principle rivers, and 
these were cities whose councils had acquired major political importance, although 
without a central apparatus to articulate them. This particularity was also a 
consequence of the presence of great physical-geographic and military obstacles, 
which represented difficulties for territorial integration. Chdves Vargas has 
represented the spatial functionality of the 17 th and I 9th centuries in a diagrammatic 
mode (see maps: 3.1 and 3.2). In both of these diagrams it is observable that each 
province has a city-port for the commercialization of production. In the west, towards 
Coro and Maracaibo Lake, and in the east there are the city-ports of Carupano, 
Porlarnar Guanta, as well as others on the Orinoco (Chdves Vargas 1992, pp. 104 
-107). 
This spatial disaggregation had an impact on the "obligatory decentralization" of 
powers; Lieuwen has mentioned that factionalism and decentralization also 
characterized the colonial government and administration of Venezuela (Lieuwen 
1965, p. 23). In 1728 the Compahla Guipuzcuana was created, controlled by 200 
shares for the crown and 100 shares for the Company, and whilst the initial contract 
assured the Company of a commercial monopoly with the province of Caracas, its 
political influence would also come to have relevance for the conformation of 
territoriality. From the very beginning of its implementation, the Company generated 
a fierce opposition on the part of municipal councils that represented the political 
interests of the producers, and this situation acted to modify the spatial distribution of 
colonial power as well as the decentralization of power in the provinces. 
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The Venezuelan economy of the time was characterized by a very weak agro-farming 
base, but from this time on it began to be of great importance to the Empire. 3 
Agricultural activity based on the Encomienda went into decline4, and the Company 
promoted plantation agriculture as an alternative. The monoculture of Cocoa was 
developed extensively, and the use of slaves reached an apogee. By contrast to the 
hacienda, the plantation was a unit of exploitation which directed a substantial part of 
its production to the external market. 
Nevertheless, to strengthen the monopoly in the province it was also necessary to 
control contraband, and this implied the isolation of the province from the contraband 
trafficking effected by other European countries in pursuit of expanding their 
markets. Holland, for example, had initiated an active contraband traffic (in 1643) in 
the Caribbean which had the islands of Curacao and Bonaire as its centre of activities; 
Britain and France also involved themselves in this 'commerce'. The control of 
contraband would thus affect producers, merchants, and individuals accustomed to 
these illegal relationships with the Dutch. As a direct consequence, commercial 
monopoly also implied being able to control the 'strings' of society. 
33 Gil Fortoul (1953) notes that: "In the 15 years from 1706 to 1721, not a single boat arrived from 
Spain to La Guaira, Puerto Cabello or Maracaibo. Such was the neglect of the peninsular, that the 
Dutch of Curazao and Bonaire monopolized commerce with their dry-land ports. " (Gil Fortoul 1953 
Vol. 1, p. 13 1) 
4 Miranda (1980), referring to Guill6n Martinez, suggests that studies of the encomienda have 
emphasized its economic and juridical aspects, but from a political point-of-view it is a structure of 
forced association for the obtaining of power, prestige and wealth. In a more detailed analysis two 
important points are observable: 1) The role of the cacique as an intermediary between indigenous 
society and the nascent colonial society, and 2) the roles of the prestige and power generated in a 
society dominated by the encomienda. Concerning the first point, Miranda asserts that the encomienda 
was a process of ethnic assimilation where the cacique played the role of mediator between the 
ethnicities. In this way he became an effective instrument of domination by being fictitiously 
integrated into the superior social strata through his title of Don. With respect to the second point, even 
though the encomienda was a system for the articulation of production, the values which it impelled 
were not economic; it functioned fundamentally as a framework for social advancement and mobility 
(Miranda 1980, pp. 9-12). 
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The Company took charge of the unilateral establishment of prices, the control of 
cocoa cultivation and the monopoly of any other crops assured of a position in the 
European markets. At the same time it maintained exclusive control of the import of 
manufactures using commercial agents in each city, supported by armed guards to 
ensure obedience to orders, thus achieving absolute control of the province. Control 
was not exclusively economic, but also political - the arrival of the Company 
accentuated the centralizing tendencies of the Spanish colonial dominion (Malav6 
Mata 1974, pp. 50-51). 
This led to a situation whereby the monopolistic management of the Basque company 
and the interests of the landowners constituted by town/city councils came into direct 
conflict. In 1733 the Council of Caracas initiated proceedings for damage caused by 
the Company, and in 1734 the Bishop of Coro condemned the infractions of company 
officers. In 1741 a riot broke out which necessitated the intervention of the governor, 
and in 1749 another, in which Juan Francisco de Ldon incited more than 800 people. 
This became the most important resistance movement, directed at 
obtaining/recovering greater freedom of action for proprietors, especially in the 
commercialization of products. The massive demonstration was supported by the 
territorial nobility, small and medium harvesters, indigenous merchants and the 
population in general. According to Irazibal, the territorial nobility fostered the 
discontent against the Guipuzcoana which was encroaching on their privileges5, and 
it was also a demonstration of the economic and political cohesion that this social 
sector had achieved. Finally, an assembly of interested parties determined 
unanimously that the Company was prejudicial to the interests of the province and the 
royal treasury; the most important thing for the Creole cultivators was the creation of 
5 According to Gil Foutoul (1953, p. 134), the general progress promoted by the Company damaged the 
interests and the prerogatives of the oligarchic class constituted by the great landowners, descendants 
of the Conquistadores and Encomenderos. Accustomed to routine systems of cultivation and 
commerce, they thought that the Company threatened the monopoly that they had enjoyed for 
centuries, and they took advantage of this first alliance of interests to involve the Company in a civil 
war. 
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a committee for the representation of councils, charged with setting prices of produce 
each year (IrazAbal 1974, pp. 35-37). 
The wide dissatisfaction with and resistance to the Company acted progressively to 
limit its monopoly, despite this having as its central purpose the maintaining of the 
status quo of domination and the re-establishment of political stability for the colony. 
By 1759 the Crown had to introduce measures which represented concessions to the 
white criollos, such as for instance that with each new offering of shares in the 
Company they would be allowed to participate. The Crown also propitiated actions 
favouring free commerce, exonerating from taxation a few crops such as coffee, as 
well as encouraging the cultivation and merchandising of Indigo and permitting its 
sale in other countries. In such a manner the way was prepared for the issuing of royal 
warrants in 1776, which authorized the creation of other commercial companies and 
halted dejacto the monopoly of the Guipuzcoana Company, which wound up in 1781 
(Gil Fortoul 1953, p. 140). 
/it. 1.2 The Configuration of Venezuelan Territoriality in 1777 
The weakening of the dominion that the monarchy had been exercising through the 
Company brought about the application of a political reformism with certain liberal 
characteristics, thus diminishing the political instability reigning in the province 
(Malavd Mata 1974, p. 56). In 1776 the Intendencia General of the army and the royal 
household (Real Hacienda) was created, which institution had as its principle 
attributes the control of economic and administrative activity, and which signified a 
measure of centralization and fiscal integration of the provinces of Venzuela, 
Cumand, Guayana, Maracaibo, Maragarita and Trinidad6. A year later (1777) the 
6 Uslar-Pietri (1970, p. 45) records that on February 17th 1797 Britain took control of Trinidad in order 
to have a base closer to the mainland, having flooded Venezuela with subversive propaganda to 
prepare emancipatory movements that would suit its purposes - it also took advantage of this action to 
intensify British commerce. The whole of the eastern province of the country, especially Cumand, 
traded almost solely with the British Antilles and this recommended it to the attention of the British 
Secretary of State Lord Neville, up to the point at which the British installed their governor (Thomas 
Picton) on the island. This latter directed a proclamation to "All of the councils and inhabitants of the 
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General Captaincy of Venezuela was created, to integrate all the provinces under a 
single government; this change came to represent the first attempts at political 
centralization and military control over the territory of the provinces. As can be seen, 
different action had to be taken if more direct control over the dominion was to be 
exercised, and following the issue of the Royal Warrant in 1777 the creation of the 
Captaincy General became linked to the problems that the Viceroy of New Granada 
already had in taking suitable steps related to the government of these provinces, and 
the control of the territories in case of invasion. As a consequence, it was decided to 
annex them politically and militarily to the Captaincy of Venezuela (Brewer-Carias 
1997(b), p. 3 I). 
In Addition, the Captaincy General came to concentrate central-local power in the 
Council of Caracas (Freitez-YdgUez 2000, p. 20), which weakened appreciably the 
long tradition of autonomy that the other provinces and municipalities had maintained 
(Lieuwen 1965, p. 24). It prompted the formation of a stronger territorial political 
hierarchy revolving around the city of Caracas, involving the ten principle cities that 
belonged to the province of Venezuela and the five remaining city-ports of the other 
provinces (Chdves Vargas 1992, p. 105). This was to be a precondition for the 
political control of the criollo oligarchy of Caracas over the other cities of the 
Captaincy General of Venezuela, which became fact (as well as a point of discord) 
after the declaration of independence. 
The process of promoting the province of Caracas to the Captaincy General also 
imposed modifications and innovation in the juridical, political and ecclesiastical 
spheres. The Royal Audience of Caracas established itself as the supreme authority in 
the administration of justice ten years later (1786), and following the setting up in 
1793 of the Royal Consulate of Caracas, the Archbishopric of Caracas was created in 
1804. 
mainland" assuring them of the support of Britain "be it through physical force, arms or munitions" in 
the case that they resolved "to resist the oppressive authority of their government". 
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The Audience of Caracas came to favour juridical equality, by offering greater 
accessibility to the obtaining of justice and the defence of rights; above all the 
measure strengthened the position of the pardos (mixed races) who represented half 
the population of the Captaincy General at the end of the 18 Ih century. On the other 
hand this weakened the position of the white population (Gil Fortoul, Op. Cit., pp. 102- 
105), but in exchange the commercial consulate/tribunal signified a major concession 
of political and economic power to white criollos, similar to that represented by the 
intendent or governor. The consulate was elected by the criollos in a public act and 
had extensive powers of government throughout the entire territory, whereas up to 
that moment the only organisms through which the criollos could exercise authority 
had been the municipalities, which had very limited faculties and which were anyway 
circumscribed by the city and its immediate surroundings (IrazAbal 1974, p. 47). 
The white criollos had been segregated up to this time from the bureaucratic 
apparatus, which remained concentrated in the hands of the peninsular Spanish. 
Palacio Fajardo (cited by Bravo-Franceschi (1976)) asserts that "up to 1810, among 
the 166 viceroys and 558 captains general, governors and presidents named in 
Spanish America there had been only 18 criollos, and these only because they had 
been educated in Spain. " (Bravo-Franceschi 1976, p. 81). The criollos had converted 
the councils of the cities and municipalities into closed and exclusive organs of power 
for the assertion of their political and economic claims, above all during the second 
half of the 18'h century. 
The initial relevance that the municipality had acquired during the Spanish colonial 
period was tied to certain privileges conceded to the Alcaldes (roughly equivalent to 
mayors, but with more extensive powers). Gil Fortoul (1953) indicates that since 
1560 vacancies in the government could be filled by the Alcaldes, and that from 1676 
the Alcaldes could also govern on an interim basis over political, juridical, military 
and exchequer matters. This prerogative was present throughout the colonial era, 
although diminishing progressively in the 17 th century (Gil Fortoul 1953 Vol. 1, 
pp. 114-115 and 254). Meanwhile, even though the members of the councils abrogated 
to themselves the representation of the provinces towards the end of the 18th century, 
they took no active part in the resistance movements that were organized against the 
Spanish crown, but acted to the contrary during the revolutionary attempts in the 
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Andean region, following the watchword "Long live the king! Down with taxes! " in 
1781, and during the uprising of the negroes and mestizos of Coro in 1795. In the 
most significant of these uprisings, that of Gual and Espafia which was a popular 
movement, the uprising of Maracaibo in 1799 and the invasion of Miranda in 1806, 
the criollo nobility always adhered to the side of the royal authorities, simply because 
these uprisings pursued proposals that were distinct from their own (IrazAbal 1974, 
p. 4 1). 
By direct contrast, during the definitive revolution that commenced with the political 
representations of the council of Caracas and its neighbors in 1808, the nobility took 
the lead. Here there were two distinct bands: the radicals who advocated immediate, 
violent revolution, and the moderates who preferred using legal means towards a 
peaceful revolution, depending on the route to be followed by events in the 
metropolis motivated by the French invasion. This brought about the Act of 1810, 
which opened the council to representation from the clergy, the pardos associations 
and the people at large. According to the Act this representation had a voice and a 
vote in all affairs, the proposal being to "erect in the bosom of these same countries a 
system of government to make up for this pronounced lack, thereby exercising the 
rights of sovereignty that by this same Act have relapsed to the people"(Gil Fortoul 
1953, pp. 199-209). 
Within this perspective, the first point to observe is the particular form of 
metropolitan domination 'mediated' by a Company founded for this very end, with 
the capital of the Crown of Spain and Basque merchants. This specific form of 
colonial domination was superimposed in the context of the sub-metropolitan 
domination of the 17 th century and the beginning of the 18'h century; sub-metropolitan 
domination, however, was not a form of government, and nor was it an effective 
means of control. Secondly, it is notable how the Company became debilitated to the 
point of disappearance, from which point the reforms responsible for the 
conformation of territoriality and the centralization of the province of Caracas begin, 
and the initiation of metropolitan domination proper at the end of the 18'h century. 
This form of domination, then, weakened in the American context, whilst the 
municipal power-centres of the provinces continued to strengthen themselves. In 
parallel, resistance movements began against Spanish domination which concluded 
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with the declaration of the new republic. The proceeding exposition has shown, 
therefore, a perspective that will help in the comprehension of the spatiality of power 
in the 19th century. 
111.2 Elements for the Analysis of Govemmentality in the 19th 
Centuty 
The primary element during this period is military caudiffismo linked to the tenancy 
of land, which would become the principal source of social mobility; this political 
phenomenon came to have a direct influence on governmentality. In the first half of 
the century central power would be controlled by the military caudillos participating 
in the heroic deeds of liberation, by the great landowners of which they formed a part, 
and by foreign merchant houses. In the second half of the century the provincial 
powers functioned by means of the "Pact of Regional Caudillos", which would 
become the principal form of political consensus. 
A second element is the persistence throughout the 19'h century of the social 
relationships constructed during the colonial period, and their specific effects on the 
process of democratization. The social inequalities occasioned by the presence of 
slavery (associated with agro-export activities) imposed a limited, censured 
participation. This acted to stimulate the development of a political opposition which 
materialized in the Liberal party, and the constant seeking of a balance between the 
central power and local powers, through the delegation or restriction of power in the 
province. This imbrications of power is most evidently expressed in the series of 
constitutional reforms, and in the characteristics of the pacts which were established 
between tendencies or political groups. 
III-Z1 The Formation of the Venezuelan State 
An important aspect of this section is the debate over the formation of the nascent 
Venezuelan state. This developed in a period lasting from the Council of 1808 up to 
the Convocation of Bolivar in 1929, the description of which is key to looking at the 
debate from the results of this process. The finished form of the state adopted in 1830 
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would be centro-federal, and moreover this co-existence of a federal and centralist 
form would become a defining characteristic up to the present. 
Furthermore, these debates came to form the antecedents from which grew the 
Venezuelan political parties; Veldsquez (1979) indicates that the political parties 
appeared on the national scene after the separation of Gran Colombia, and the 
declaration of republican sovereignty. Nevertheless, the division of Venezuelans for 
political reasons was not a new occurrence, given that it had been occurring since the 
separation of patriotic groupings and loyalists of the king or Godos, and within the 
patriotic groupings between federalists and centralists, when dealing with the 
organization of the Republic. After 1830, the political groups were to divide 
themselves into pro-dictatorial, civil law and militarist factions, among others 
(Veldsquez 1979, p-135). 
In the congress of 18117, the discussion revolved around the form of government that 
would be most suitable for the new republic. Some proposed a unitarian or centralized 
regime, whilst others wanted a federal compromise to be recognized before a 
declaration of independence was made, similar to that adopted by the United States of 
America. This last was related to the demands for autonomy maintained provinces 
confronted with the centralism exercised by the province of Caracas, which through 
its geographical extent and population and through being the capital dominated 
political, social and economic power (Veldsquez 1997, p. 154). The Congress would 
end by proclaiming the Federal Constitution of the State, adjusting it from the 
Convention of Philadelphia of 1787 (Brewer-Carias 1996), although the analogy 
could not be perfect. In North America the colonies already had governments when 
7 This debate was repeated in 1826 and again in 1829, due to Bolivar's manifesto o letter which 
encouraged the people to show openly their opinions on the form of government or constitution, as well 
as the election of head of state, that should be adopted by the Congress; it once again opened up the 
debate between Unitarians and Federalists. The Unitarians proposed a life-presidency for Bolivar, but 
among the Federalists opinion was by no means unanimous. Some proposed a popular, representative 
Republic with a federal system throughout the territory, whilst others criticized those who they saw as 
proposing the extinguishing of central government, only to duplicate this same unitary system in diverse 
places throughout the Republic (Gil Fortoul 1953 Vol. 1, pp. 678-679). 
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they formed their confederation, whereas in the Spanish colony the provincial 
governments had not enjoyed wide political freedom. On the other hand, in the North 
the federal government depended from the beginning on a segmented governance, 
and its attributions could more properly be described as a delegation of power (Gil 
Fortoul 1953, pp. 251-253). 
Whilst the Congress debated centralism or federation, elsewhere Patriotic Society was 
involved in discussions over the problem of independence8. Nevertheless the 
opinions of Bolivar about the Constitution of 1811, collected in the Discurso de 
Angostura of 1819, is an important document for the appreciation of similar situations 
reflecting the conformation of state organization, and their relevance to the process of 
Venezuelan dernocratizatiod. 
8 In the Patriotic Society Sim6n Bolivar summarized general opinion: "What should be decided is 
being discussed in the Congress - And what do they say? That we must start with a Confederation, as 
if we were not already confederated against foreign tyranny. That we must attend to the results of 
Spanish policy - What does it matter to us, that Spain sells her slaves to Bonaparte, or keeps them, if 
we are resolved to be free? These doubts are the sad effects of ancient chains. Must great projects 
always prepare themselves through the exercise of calm? And is not three hundred years of calm 
enough? A commission from the bosom of this body must carry these sentiments to the sovereign 
Congress. " 
9 Amongst the models of dominion which occurred with the step from colony to republic, one of the 
most important has to do with the Monroe Doctrine. From 1816 to 1820, the Chamber of 
Representatives would vote in favour of establishing delegations towards the new governments of 
America. This was achieved in 1822 when President Monroe executed the decree on legations; on the 
2 nd of December 1823 President Monroe sent his famous message to Congress: "We owe it, therefore, 
to candor and to the amicable relations existing between the United States and those Powers, to 
declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their rule to any portion of this 
hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety. With the existing colonies or dependencies of any 
European power we have not interfered, and shall not interfere. But with the governments who have 
declared their independence and maintained it, and whose independence we have, on great 
consideration and on just principles acknowledged, we could not view any interposition for the 
purpose of oppressing them, or controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any European Power, 
in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States". 
Following this declaration Great Britain also recognised the independence of the new republics, and 
demanded that the great powers allied in Verona desist from all interventions in America. (Gil Foutoul 
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Bolivar argued that "the more I admire the excellence of the Federal Constitution of 
Venezuela, the more I am persuaded of the impossibility of its application to our 
state. And according to my way of seeing it, it is prodigious that its North American 
model is able to subsist in such prosperity, and without torment at the first signs of 
embarrassment or danger ..... But be that as it may, it had not entered into my 
remotest thoughts to assimilate the condition and nature of two states so distinct as 
the English American and the Spanish American. Does not the Spirit of the Laws say 
that these must be proper to the people that make them? That it is only by great 
coincidence that those of one nation may be suitable for others? That the new laws 
must be relative to the aspect of a country, to its climate, to the quality of the terrain, 
to its condition, to its area, to the way of life of the people? Does the Constitution 
itself refer to the degree of liberty that it can tolerate, to the religion of its inhabitants, 
to their inclinations, to their riches, to their numbers, to their business, to their 
customs, to their manners? For here is the code that we should consult, and not that of 
Washington (Franceschi 2001, pp. 76-77)". 
The Constitution of 1819 has the importance of having institutionalized the state of 
rights by delegating power to the people; under the necessity of concentrating power, 
however, it would adopt, in a provisional and transitory attitude towards federalism, a 
highly centralized government (M6mer 1993, p. 33). A unique and indivisible republic 
was created, whose territory was divided into 10 political administrative units, 
dependent on the central power. In the Constitution of 1821 the same territory that 
corresponded to the Viceroy of New Granada and the Captaincy General of 
Venezuela was established as the territory of Greater Colombia; this charter 
consecrated a type of confederation of states. As a direct consequence, during the war 
1953, p. 538); at various opportunities the governments of Venezuela would seek to take advantage of 
the game of power balances that this signified. In the case of Guzmin Blanco and other presidents and 
ministers, the support of the United States was sought in the light of perceived menaces from Europe, 
whereas afterwards the Doctrine was interpreted in more conventional terms as danger receded. At the 
beginning of the 201h century the Doctrine would serve the United States to impose its dominion over 
American territory when confronted by the pretensions of Great Britain and Germany. 
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of independence power would be centralized without substantially affecting the 
autonomy of the provinces. 
Ill. Z2 Venezuelan Caudillismo and Power 
During the whole of the I 91h century, an important theme of reference for its later 
implications is that the struggle for emancipation modified the evaluative attitude of 
the Venezuelan. As Velisquez (1998) indicates of those who fought in Boyaci, 
Carabobo, Pichincha, Junin and Ayacucho, from the humblest soldier upwards when 
they returned to their homeland they had a different evaluation of their personality. 
They felt themselves to be creators of a fatherland, heroes of an extraordinary stage of 
continental development, and as such had the right to be masters of the republic. This 
climate of collective, affirmative attitudes would stimulate the tendency towards 
militarism and caudiffismo (Velisquez, 1998 p. 7). 
To this last phenomenon must be added the re-concentration of agricultural land in 
the territory which began after 1830, and which had been altered by the war. 
According to Article 4 of the Ley de Repartici6n de Bienes Nacionales of the 10th of 
October 1817, as compensation to the officers and soldiers "The government offered 
to make up the difference (in the debt owed to soldiers) with whatever other national 
goods, and principally with the concession of wastelands (Bravo-Franceschi 1976, pp. 
91-92). This measure converted into an important element for the military of access to 
social mobility and power; the most favored under this law were the military of high 
rank, who would come to form part of the land-owning class. The military caudillos 
would be able to integrate themselves into the national oligarchy through this re- 
division of lands, and the agreements between these men and the local caudillos was 
what allowed social organization in the I 91h century. 
Another aspect related to caudiffismo was the constitutional legislation elaborated 
during the war of independence. The Constitution of 1819 assigned to the 
municipalities their own powers; amongst these was the authority to propose the 
naming of a governor who would contribute to consolidating the regional and local 
power of military caudiffismo, by substituting the colonial criollo aristocracy in local 
organizations. The opposition on the part of the municipalities to the projected 
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Greater Colombia in 1830 also contributed to strengthening the leadership of the 
military caudillos, as well as that of the civil municipal authorities, until the achieving 
of separation in 1921. 
This political phenomenon of America would have a direct influence on 
governmentality. Caudillismo in its simplest form constitutes a relationship of 
subordinating power, founded on personal loyalty to a local caudillo and in a society 
organized at its base on caudillismo, power rests in the agreements of a national 
caudillo integrated to an oligarchy, with local caudillos (Chdves Vargas 1992, p. 115). 
The pact of caudillos indicated respect for the leadership of the most qualified 
military and political figures on the part of local leaders; power was not based on the 
existence of a powerful national army, but rather martial force for the defense of the 
government was constituted by the personal armies that local leaders recruited from 
amongst the peasants and tenant farmers who worked on their haciendas. Neither was 
this kind of government based on a true bureaucratic apparatus at the national level, if 
not from the fulfillment of the pact of power which united the landowners and 
Hacendados to the merchants, soldiers and politicians; it was an alliance which 
dispensed privilege to all as equals. 
In the first half of the century central power would be controlled by the military 
caudiffismo which took part in the liberation struggle, the great landowners of which 
they formed a part, and the foreign merchant houses. In the second half of the century 
the provincial powers functioned through the medium of pacts of regional caudillos, 
and moreover there existed a closed relationship between the Liberal party and 
caudillismo (Oropeza 1988, p. 30). This agreement between chief, party and army 
lasted until 1899, when the national army was founded by Cipriano Castro. 
IlI. Z3 The Liberal State of the 19th Century 
The year 1830 marked the rupture with the original Bolivarian project of Greater 
Colombia, and Venezuela was created as an independent republic. The political 
relationships within the new republic established themselves around the principal 
caudillos who arose during the war of independence, and the oligarchy. The process 
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was lead by Josd Antonio Pdez, who had been controlling the destiny of the nation 
since 1821 by acting as a guarantee of govemability, and who would have influence 
in Venezuelan politics until his last exile in 1863. The results of his work would be 
the Constitution of 1830, a document which reflected his political and social 
philosophy (Lieuwen 1965, pp. 33-34). 
Ill. Z3.1 The Centro-Federal State (1830-1858) 
At this point, and in order to guarantee a minimum of goverrunentality the Centro- 
Federal Pact model of government was adopted (Guer6n 1996, p. 357). This pact 
recognized a unique sovereignty in the power of the nation (Angulo 1997, p. 45) and a 
number of autonomous prerogatives of the provinces. It conceded to provincial 
deputations the right to present to the president of the republic a list of three 
candidates from amongst which to choose the governor (Villalba 1996, p. 13); this 
would come to represent the federal component of the pact. The caudillos of the 
centre with Pa6z as leader represented the so-called Conservative Oligarchy (1830- 
1848), and the caudillos of the east, the Monagas, represented the so-called Liberal 
Oligarchy (1848-1857). Up until 1846 the province of Oriente or Cumand fought to 
convert itself into and independent nation, and only the intermediation of Padz put an 
end to these aspirations, by ceding central power to the Liberal Oligarchy (Veldsquez 
1997, p. 155). 
But the new state conserved the same forms of inequality which had predominated in 
the period of Spanish colonization - slavery and servitude continued to be the 
dominant forms of exploitation. In order to maintain this form of exploitation, the 
conservatives sanctioned reforms and legal measures which continually raised the age 
of manumission of slaves from the 18 years declared in the Constitution of 1821, to 
21 years in the Constitution of 1830, and later still to 25 years as promulgated in the 
Ley de Patronato of 1839 (Malav6 Mata 1974, pp. 116-118). They also maintained 
the censorious form of the participatory system; to be elected or to elect one must be 
older than 21, as well as being an owner of property with a profit of greater than 50 
pesos, or in a position with an annual salary of at least 100 pesos, and in addition be 
able to read and write. The presence of this social differentiation went to the centre of 
the political debate promoted by the Liberal Party, after its creation in 1840, and the 
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party would thus be integrated by many different factions covering a great deal of 
political activity. Perez (1996) indicates that if there are any ties that still link the 
historical parties of Venezuela with those of the 20th century, they must be with the 
Liberal party (Perez 1996(a), p. 49). 
Coronil (1997) signals that after the war of independence, liberalism became the 
public language of the political elite of Venezuela; liberalism is therefore associated 
not only with the origins of the nation, but also with the Bolivarian project of social 
emancipation and republicanism which the criollo elites lead. For this reason 
liberalism had been converted into an essential component in the legitimization of 
criollo government since independence, and the Liberal party and the Conservative 
party (the principle parties of the first half of the I 9th century) shared the liberal 
discourse. In the heart-breaking wars of the century, marked by changes in the 
alliances of the elites and a succession of military governments, "The liberals were 
conservatives and the conservatives were also liberals" (Coronil 1997, pp. 85-86, cited 
by Veldsquez). Nevertheless, the important point is to indicate that political liberalism 
was one thing, and liberal Venezuelans quite another, as Rangel (1980, pp. 35-36) 
says, when attempts were made to establish the differences between doctrinaire 
liberalism and ideology in Colombia, and what exactly the Great Liberal Party was. 
The "opposition were not able to rest on solid principles or political ideals, but only 
simply on the exchange of one group of men for another, of the 'in' for the 'out'; that 
is why the Liberal party was founded" (Uslar-Pietri 1970, pp. 130-13 1). 
The Liberals, through the foundation of the newspaper 'The Venezuelan', took 
advantage of the tensions between producers and lenders of money occasioned by the 
fall of prices of coffee in 1840. Through this medium of opinion they opposed 
themselves to the continuity of Pdez and his power elite, and demanded principles of 
alternation. The party strengthened itself throughout the urban centers and in all of the 
parishes of Caracas, as well as other centers of population of the interior, and in 1844 
it took control of the municipal council of Caracas. Following this success liberal 
societies were consolidated in many other towns and villages, generating a true 
mobilization of opinion. In 1846 the Liberal Party launched the candidature of its 
leader Antonio Leocadio Guzmdn in the presidential elections, with the slogan 
"Liberty, Popular Sovereignty, Progress, Equality, Alternation and Constitution". 
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Veldsquez (1997, pp. 156-157) suggests that these were the only elections before 1947 
that were protagonized by groups distinct from the dominant party of Pdez. 
In 1848 Jos6 Tadeo Monagas inaugurated a decade of reforms; some of the laws 
established by the conservatives were modified, for which reason his government 
would be called the Liberal Oligarchy. In this same year were initiated the reform of 
the Ley de Libertad de Contrato, as well as the modification of the Ley of 184 1, as the 
product of an alliance with the liberals. The next year the death penalty was 
eliminated for political crimes and Monagas broke relationships with the 
conservatives, leading to the jailing of Pdez (who would be exiled in 1850), as well as 
mounting a persecution of the liberals of Antonio Leocadio Guzman. In 1851 the 
brother of Monagas, Jos6 Gregorio Monagas, occupied the presidency and decreed 
the abolition of slavery in 1854, allocating three millionpesos for the indemnification 
of the owners (Bravo-Fransceschi 1976, pp. 25-26). In 1855 Jos6 Tadeo Monagas 
once again became president of the republic, without any opposition, and began 
discussions on the reform of the Constitution of 1830. 
This event has been linked with the pretensions of President Monagas to guarantee his 
re-election, but he was unable to count on the support of more than a fifth of the 
members of both Chambers of the government. To get around these constitutional 
obstacles, the Congress of 1856 ruled that this majority was only required for partial 
reforms, and did not establish limits for general reform. As a consequence, President 
Monagas decreed that future congresses would have the faculties to effect general 
reforms without introducing alterations in the form of government; moreover, the 
reform would take place when the people asked for it, and when the two Chambers 
that had sanctioned the present decree had been reformed in their totality 
Gil Fortoul indicates that "in order to accelerate the total renovation of the two 
Chambers, Congress made use of a subterfuge to expedite a new law of territorial 
division". The faculty of Congress to multiply the number of provinces and fix their 
limits had as its objective the amplification of the federal component of the 
constitution, but in the end this was converted into a pretext for the centralization of 
power in the president. In 1830 the republic was comprised of eleven provinces; the 
conservative oligarchy augmented this number to thirteen, and the liberal oligarchy to 
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twenty, and according to this law that altered all the provinces, the executive power 
would proceed to name new governors whilst at the same time decreeing that the 
pen-nanent army should increase from 3,000 men to 10,000 (Gil Fortoul 1953 VoLl, 
pp. 75-77). This point in particular illustrates the relationship between the territoriality 
of power and governmentality in the I 91h century, and how through the use of 
constitutional reform, federalism was employed to strengthen the central powers. 
At the end of 27 years of vigilance by the Centro-Federal pact, the Constitution of 
1857 came to modify the Constitution of 1830, with the intention of adopting a 
unitarian, centralist regimen as a substitute for the previous centro-federal system. In 
order to achieve this end the provincial deputations, who had had the faculty to elect 
the list from which governors were chosen, were eliminated, and this selection 
became dependent on, and chosen freely by, the executive power. In place of the 
deputations, the municipal authorities were given limited political and administrative 
attributes, but with these modifications the federalist component of the constitution 
disappeared. 
Nevertheless, an alliance of conservatives and liberals achieved the overthrow of 
Monagas and the convocation of a Constituent in 1858, in which the federal 
component re-appeared again. Veldsquez has detailed the representation of the federal 
position of 1811 in the Consitutional Assembly of 1858, and in this constitution the 
decentralization of public power was achieved through the widening of municipal 
power (Veldsquez 1998, pp. 9-10). 
In the Constituent of 1858 the qualification of conservative was applied to the greater 
quantity of deputies, but in reality they were nearly all advanced or radical liberals. 
The presence of this 'conservative' majority was a consequence of the dissidence 
arising from the liberal oligarchy as a consequence of the overthrow of Josd Tadeo 
Monagas. They formed three factions: those who had been part of the government 
presented no candidates. Those who had been on the side of Antonio Leocadio 
Guzmdn were allied with those who were organizing armed action, and the 
representatives of the militarist tendency such as Falc6n and Zamora who preferred 
civil war. 
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From the viewpoint of the democratic results of the Constitution of 1858 "It could be 
said that that all of the deputies were partisans of civil power, of laws more 
democratic than the previous ones, and unquestionably of political decentralization. 
But by the means through which it was formulated, the majority adjusted themselves 
to the Centro-Federalist compromise of 1830 (Gil Fortoul 1953 Vol. III, pp. 1 14-115)". 
The dissident faction of the Liberal party would enforce its presence above all in 
triumphing over the name of FederationlO. Municipal power would be exercised 
through a legislature and a governor in the province, through a council and a 
municipal leader in the cantons and through such other functionaries and bodies as the 
provincial legislature established. There was thus a return to a tri-partite power 
structure, as well as the restitution to the provinces of their political autonomy, given 
that they would now elect governors by a majority of the voters through a direct, 
universal and secret vote. The people would exercise direct sovereignty in the 
elections, and indirectly through public powers; the deputies and the president of the 
republic would be chosen through a direct and secret vote (Brewer Carias 1997(b), 
pp. 487-501). 
The response came in the form of the Federal War (1859 and 1863), which can be 
classified as a guerilla war whose theatre of operations covered principally the 
territories of the plains states known as Barinas, Portuguesa, Cojedes, Apure and 
Gudrico (Sanoja Herndndez 1998, p. 7). According to Chdves Vargas (1992) the 
demographic structure of the region of the plains had begun to acquire great 
10 Even though the Constitution of 1858 was more democratic because "the people would exercise 
sovereignty directly in the elections, and indirectly through the public powers established by this 
Constitution", this did not detain the imminent federal revolution. The military leader was Juan 
Cris6stomo Falc6n, but its soul was Ezequiel Zamora, who achieved the developing in the federation of 
truly popular roots. The word federation was understood by only a few people at this time, but the 
yearning for social vindication ran throughout the people. A sincere and patriotic person such as 
Zamora was a sure guarantee of triumph, and on the 20th of February 1859 he disembarked in Coro, 
from which date up to the 20th of December of the same year there were some 130 military actions. It 
was not only the oligarchies and the landowners who feared the torch lit by Zamora, but also the 
nominal leaders of the federation , General Falc6n and Antonio Leocadio GuzmSn, who saw in Zamora 
the defacto leadership; Zamora died in 1860, and the federation lost its most popular character of the 
early years (Uslar-Pietri 1970, pp. 146-150. 
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importance; between 1839 and 1873 it had accumulated some 25% of the entire 
population of the country. The base of this growth was the development of cattle- 
raising on an open range and pasture basis, and by 1855 the greater part (90%) of the 
exportation of hides, which represented some 20% of the total exports of the country, 
left through the gates of Ciudad Bolivar to the United States. 
Over time a regional antagonism had developed between the economic groupings 
constituted by the agro-commercial complex of the centre and the plains producers 11, 
and these latter, in alliance with other rural caudillos, gave their support to the federal 
tendencies which confronted the nascent centralist tendency incarnate in the new 
concept of the state. This federalist tendency developed a relationship with demands 
for "social justice against the exactions of the usurersl2, against the hacendados 
II In 1834 the Ley de Libertad, Igualdady Seguridad de los Contratos was decreed. This so-called 
"Law of Usury" gave absolute liberty for the arrangement of contracts, in areas such as the fixing of 
interest rates and other conditions desired by the contracting parties. For Maza Zabala (cited in 
Franceschi-Dominguez 1974) the liberating of contracts marked the influence of the commcrcial/usury 
houses in the social life of the epoch, because this law was effectively converted into an instrument for 
the concentration of wealth and for the despoliation of small landowners. Furthermore, in 1841 the Ley 
de Quita y Espera was promulgated as a complement to the previous law; according to this, the 
consent of all creditors was necessary before the concession of a prorogation of the debt, or a 
suspension of the auctioning of the goods of debtors (Franceschi-Dominguez 1974, p. 120). 
12 Up until 1934 the politics of the Conservative governments were very close to those of the 
commercial houses and the conservative oligarchy. In 1834 (mentioned above) the Law of Liberty, 
Equality and Security of Contracts, also known as the "Law of Usury" was decreed, and in 1841 the 
Ley de Quita y Espera was promulgated as a complement. Both laws constituted a big factor in the 
social and economic discontent which lead to the coming of the revolts which occupied the life of the 
nation in the second half of the I 9th century. Equally, many of the naval interventions by European 
countries in the Venezuelan city-ports in the first half of the 19th century were related to these 
problems. Indebtedness was also a cause of important conflicts in the national order (Diaz-Rodriguez- 
Villegas 1996, p. 19), and in 1848 one product of the alliance of Josd Tadeo Monagas and the liberals 
was the initiation of the reform of the Law of Usury, as well as the modification of the law of 1841. It 
was proposed that a stay of debts for debtors was a legal advantage, but the management of foreign 
national businesses protested against the measure. In 1856 the United States and Holland claimed 
prejudice against their nationals and at the same time their property rights on the island of Aves, and 
Holland sent an ultimatum, sitting its' fleet in La Guiara. The question of dominion and sovereignty in 
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eager to exploit manual labour and the sack of uncultivated lands by the landowners, 
and demands for equality and improvements promised by the liberals and not 
fulfilled, which had given rise to the movements of social agitation and the rebellions 
of 1844,1846 and 1847. Both struggles, the social and the regional, would find 
expression in the war which began in 185 8 (Chdves Vargas 1992, pp. 115-117). " 
The Federal War culminated with the Constitution of 1864, which took from the 
Constitution of 1858 what it in turn had taken from the Constitution of 1830, which is 
to say the autonomy of the provinces. In terms of the form of the state, it would take a 
political administrative division of territory similar to the Constitution of 1857 and 
moreover it would amplify greatly the federal component, to the extent that it could 
be mistaken for absolute federalism. These aspects would be what came to 
characterize spatiality of power after the Federal War, which was a multiplication of 
centralism at all levels (Gil Fortoul 1953, p. 679). The Constitution of 1864 
consecrated the principles proclaimed by Venezuelan liberalism since 1841, and 
which continued to be enunciated in the federal programme of Barinas in 1959: the 
abolition of the death penalty, freedom of the press, permanent prohibition of slavery, 
the inviolability of the domestic household, of property, of correspondence, freedom 
of worship, the absolute independence of the electoral power and universal, direct and 
secret elections of the president (Veldsquez 1979, p. 15 0). 
111. Z3.2 The Federal - Centralist State (1863-1899) 
Federation is a phenomenon that has confronted other Latin American countries. But 
in contradistinction to countries such as Colombia or Peru, where the social and 
economic groups that had dominated since the colonial era were able to consolidate 
their dominion and control of political, social and economic life, in Venezuela the 
Federation pursued the elimination of all social exclusiveness, caste divisions, and 
reserved spaces in political life, an occurrence responding to the continuity of the 
the island of Aves was submitted to Spanish arbitration, which decided in favour of Venezuela in 1865. 
Previously Venezuela had been in conflict with Spain, which claimed payment for damages caused to 
its' nationals during the civil war of the federation between 1859 and 1864 (Gil Fortoul 1953 Vol. 111, 
pp. 246-249,257 & 278). 
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social structure and the economy of the colony, the maintenance of slavery and the 
predominance of the landowners in government. Veldsquez (1979) considers that the 
Federation constitutes the culminating moment in the Venezuelan democratic process 
of the 19'h century (Velisquez 1979, p. 149). Irazdbal (1974) is moreover of the 
opinion that the Federation is part of the process of democratic struggles which were 
manifested so clearly during the war of independence, and found the solution to their 
continuity in the liberal movement which began in 1840 (IrazAbal 1974, p. 173). 
The Federation created the "United States of Venezuela", whose states were declared 
independent and equal as political entities. In a form similar to the Constitution of 
1858, it was proposed that governors should be elected by direct and secret suffrage, 
the new states also reserving to themselves political and administrative government, 
the administration of justice and of natural resources, as well as the administration of 
the municipalities (Angulo 1997, p. 47). In this way each federal entity would have its 
own government and the national power would be confined to a federal district, as a 
neutral territory (Brewer-Carfas 1997(b), p. 149). The basis of the new state rested on 
the regimen of "pacts", which came to signify the reciprocal recognition of political 
and administrative autonomy, of equality as political entities and the full conservation 
of non-delegated authority. The states had to have as a form of political organization 
popular, elective, federal, representative, alternative and responsible government, and 
as much as the 'Federal Pact' facilitated the states in their unification of two or more 
to form a whole, it also always conserved their individual character (Veldsquez 1988, 
P. 10). 
Moreover, the pact gave support to the nation state and central power through the 
organization of armed forces, which were formed by citizen militias or contingents of 
individuals contributed by each one of the states in accordance with its laws of 
military service. The national government was unable to situate any military chiefs 
and troops/forces in any state that were not from that same state, without the 
permission of the government of the state where they were desired to be located. 
Owing to the absence of a national army, the creation of these militias directed by 
regional caudillos gave support to the national power (Brewer-Carias 1997(b), p. 15 0), 
and it was necessary to strengthen provincial power to guarantee governability to the 
central power (Veldsquez 1997, p. 154). The main proposition of the federal alliance 
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sought to sustain Venezuelan unity, in other words it dealt with an agreement which 
attempted to strengthen centralism by strengthening the province. Even with the 
inevitable differences, in the future this type of agreement of incongruous appearance 
but effective results, where the local must be strengthened to be able to save the state, 
would be repeated; something similar would be presented at the end of the 201h 
century. 
Regional caudiffismo and coercion, under the formula of governments co-ordinated 
from Caracas, guaranteed governability during the first fifteen years. In 1870 Antonio 
Guzmdn Blanco, the son of Antonio Leocaido Guzmdn the Liberal leader in 1846, 
reorganized the Liberal (Yellow) Party and established a federal regimen with a 
centralist tendency which lasted until 1888. In his speech of 26 1h February 1879 he 
signaled that "the Septennium was a government of war: its primordial duty was to 
establish peace ...... for this reason it had always to be repressive" (Brewer-Carias 
1997(b), p. 565). In effect, even though the elements of liberalism related to the 
economy were maintained as part of the federal pact, the discourse on liberal 
democracy began to be erased very quickly. The constitutional reform of 1874 
established in the Federation (Constitution of 1874, Title II, Articles 13 & 23 
(Brewer-Carias 1997(b), pp. 551-563) that voting should be direct, public, written and 
signed, and reduced the period of governance of senators, deputies and presidents to 
two years. This left intermingled on one hand greater control of the elections, and on 
the other hand an intention to force a greater mobility in the alternation of power, 
which in the case of Guzmdn Blanco permitted him to come and go on multiple 
occasions in order to exercise his form of "autocratic power". 
According to the agreements achieved in 1879 between Guzmdn Blanco and the 
regional caudillos (Brewer-Carias 1997(bO, pp. 567-585), a congress of presidents of 
the states was to be called in order to create the institutions which would rule the 
country provisionally, and which would elect the president. The proposal of the 
centralist reform was "to re-organize the national administration and modify the 
institutions according to the public rights of the United States of America in the north, 
which until now has served us as a norm. " The measure created the Council of 
Administration and the Federal Council, which were charged with electing the 
presidents of the states. The twenty states which comprised the Venezuelan Union 
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were reduced to seven great states which were called sections13, but non-delegated 
sovereignty continued to be held in the states; the secret vote was also restored in 
elections. 
These agreements dealt with a special regionalization of power, and the beginnings of 
the centralization of federalism. The states ceded to the central government control 
over environmental resources, as well as the rights that they had maintained over 
transport profits, in exchange for each section receiving a quota of the general profits 
for every 16,000 inhabitants in the state. These modifications to economic autonomy, 
the institutionalization of the Situado Constitucional, the creation of the Federal 
Council and the designation of the governors of states, progressively limited the 
political autonomy of the regional leaderships at the same time as they strengthened 
the central powers (Brewer-Carias 1993, p. 16). 
Throughout the period from 1870 to 1888 a more stable political order was created, 
which completely re-orientated the politics and the economy of the country. Between 
1870 and 1877 obligatory public education was decreed, the raising, codification and 
systematization of statistics and censuses on a national basis, and the installation of 
telephone and telegraph lines; the establishment of civil marriage and the 
establishment of the civil registry, moreover, brought Guzmdn Blanco into conflict 
with the Catholic Church (Uslar-Pietri 1970, pp. 155-158). 
In its second government (1879-1884) the country became open to penetration by 
imperialism; by means of the 'politics of the railways', the first direct international 
capital investment was effected by Great Britain and Germany. The construction of 
railways had been a preoccupation of Venezuelan governments since 1853, but had to 
13 According to the Law of 1856 the following sectional demarcation was established: the eastern 
states (Cumani, Maturin and Barcelona); the central states (Bolivar, Guzmin Blanco, Gudrico, Apure 
and Nueve Esparta); the south-western states (Carabobo, Cojedes, Portuguesa, Zamora); the north- 
western states (Barquisimeto, Falc6n and Yaracuy); the Andean states (GuzmAn, Trujillo and Tdchira), 
the state of Guayana and the state of Zulia (Agreement of the 30th of April 1879, cited by Brewer- 
Carias 1997, p. 575). In 1881 the political divisions were reconstructed again into nine great political 
entities (Constitution of 1881, Title 1, first section, Article 4, cited in Brewer-Carias 1997b, p. 589). 
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be suspended because of political instability; it was part of the political economy 
strategy of orientating growth "towards the outside" (Chav6s Vargas 1992, pp. 130- 
13 1). A concession to J. R. Lesew for the exploitation of the mines of Naricual was 
granted, and to the Boulton company a concession for commercial traffic from the 
ports of Venezuela to the United States. A contract was signed with Dr Polli and Co. 
for the exploitation of guano and phosphate, and another with the British company, 
Guayana Co. for the establishment of agricultural and mining colonies in Guayana. 
Between 1884 and 1886, during the first government of Joaquin Crespo (who 
continued the policies of Guzmdn), a concession was arranged with Horatio Hamilton 
for the exploitation of the natural resources of the State of Bermfidez and over the 
whole of the Asphalt Lake of Guanaco. 
Antonio Guzmdn Blanco returned between 1886 and 1888 and governed for only 6 
months, after which period his political stature began to decline (Bravo-Franceschi 
1976, pp. 227-230). From the above, however, can be elicited the beginnings of the 
process of modernizing the state which was planned in the second half of the 19'h 
century. As has been indicated, in order to achieve these proposed ends Antonio 
Guzmin Blanco decreed a conjoining of means framed within two principal 
objectives: the control and appropriation of the power of the regional caudillos, and 
the consolidation of an alliance with the commercial financiers. In order to achieve 
these objectives, in the first place he implemented a policy of implacable repression 
against the conservative caudillos, at the same time as a policy of moving closer to 
the liberal caudillos, on the condition that they accepted his hegemonic power. Those 
who did not accept this agreement were frightened by the shooting of Matias Salazar 
in 1872, and Guzmdn allocated the presidencies of the states to his allies. As has been 
suggested above, he also assured the dependency of the states on the central power 
through the implementation of the Situado and the centralization of taxes, a situation 
similar to that which occurred later in 1947. 
In this sense it is considered that there was never an effective administrative 
decentralization in Venezuela (Brewer-Carfas 1975) but, first and foremost because 
the caudillos in power developed an administrative policy of a centralist character, 
colourcd by political/military decentralization. The reverse occurred, in consideration 
of the P-OLlit_ical decentralization of the Federation, which was a reality with lengthy 
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historical roots linked to caudiffismo (Brewer-Carias 1975). This explains why with 
the passing of caudiffismo in the 201h century, federalism became merely a 
constitutional formality. 
Secondly, an alliance was established with the financial groups of Caracas, which 
were the results of the fusion of commercial and banking capital, giving them 
concessions for some of the branches of public finance (Chavds Vargas 1992, pp. 132- 
134). Thirdly, as has already been discussed above, there was the advent of 
international conflicts over the game of the balance of power, between the 
expansionist policies of the European countries and the external policies of the United 
States, defined since the beginning of the century by the Monroe Doctrine. This 
policy of the "protectorate of liberty and democracy on the continent" would play a 
big part in the period 1881-82, or at least a renovated version, Manifest Destiny, the 
"Big Stick" and the I took Panamd" attitude of the US Secretary of State Chester 
Alan (Bravo-Franceschi 1976, p. 241, Betancourt 1967, p. 28). Border disputes with 
Great Britain were to continue, in the sphere of external affairs, for some time to 
comel4. 
14 One question which occupied the attention of the governments of the Venezuelan Republic were the 
incursions of colonists of British Guayana in territory that Venezuela considered its own (under treaties 
between Holland and Spain), urged on by the local authorities and by the metropolis. This is a problem 
of border disputes which is still unresolved today; in 2000, when the government of Guyana tried to 
sign a contract with the business Beal Aerospace Technologies for the installation of a base in the area 
in dispute, the Venezuelan government raised its protests at an international level (El Nacional 
20/8/00). According to Schultz (1999) the dispute has its origin in the failure of the European powers 
to identify with precisions their colonial limits in the New World. The British took possession of their 
part of Guyana because the Dutch had been losing parts of their side during the Napoleonic Wars, and 
were therefore obliged to transfer the property of "the emplacements of Demerara, Esquibo and 
Berbice" to Great Britain (Schoultz 1999, p. 107). The antecedents of this dispute raised themselves 
again in 1822, when the Venezuelan Minister of the Exterior warned the British cabinet about the 
occupation of the left bank of the River Esequibo. In 1834 the Royal Geographic Society of London 
sent Schomburg to plot the borders, with the results that Venezuela was deprived of more than half of 
the territory that she considered to be hers. In 1842 Great Britain recognized that these plotted 
borderlines, rather than being the signs of dominion, were in reality a tangible means for future 
discussions, and in 1844 formal negotiations were opened. Venezuela proposed the River Esequibo as 
the dividing line, whilst the British Minister, Lord Aberdeen, proposed other divisions - the 
negotiations remained deadlocked, with neither party able to agree (Gil Fortoul 1953 Chapter 1, 
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In the years that followed there was developed a strong current of feeling against 
Guzmdn Blanco and the 'caudillist' struggle for power, but the centralist tendencies 
of the state were maintained. The national assembly sanctioned the Constitution of 
1894, where the law of political divisions was modified and the name of Guzmdn 
Blanco was eliminated from the names of the sections. Despite its centralizing 
tendencies, the government of Crespo established for the first time the autonomy of 
the municipalities and its political independence with reference to the economic and 
administrative regimen (Brewer-Carias 19979(b), p. 164). 
For the period 1898-1902 Joaquin Crespo had guaranteed free presidential elections; 
five candidates presented themselves amongst, whom was Josd Manuel Hernindez, 
the candidate of the opposition, who proposed regrouping liberalism anew with the 
National Liberal Party. For the first time Herndndez developed an electoral campaign 
with electoral techniques and methods perfected in the United States, and he traveled 
the country, creating national societies. At the beginning of 1897 he could rely on 
some 60 newspapers, whose leaders proclaimed his position as head of a new party 
which would rescue the principles proclaimed in 1841. Confronted by evidence that 
his triumph had provoked an electoral fraud on the part of the government, Herndndez 
revolted and later was captured and sent to prison; meanwhile, Crespo imposed his 
candidate, Ignacio Andrade, who fled abroad before the arrival of the Andinos 
(Veldsquez 1997, pp. 156-157). 
Despite all of the forces deployed in the 19'h century to control the 'caudillist' 
fragmentation of territory which made the Venezuelan state fragile, in the opinion of 
pp. ] 15-12 1). Discussion were re-opened in 1876, and a treaty of arbitration was signed in Washington 
in 1897; the first discussions of the tribunal of arbitration began in Paris in 1899. The results of these 
meetings were detailed in a letter by Severo Mallet-Prevost, and once they became known permitted 
the re-opening of negotiations. He said that "if it is true that Venezuela, from a strategic point-of-view, 
had been given the most important sector of that under litigation (the mouth of the Orinoco river and 
around 5,000 square miles in the surrounds), it was still unjust to Venezuela and deprived it of a very 
important and extensive territory, over which Great Britain had not, in my opinion the least shadow of 
a right. " (Cited in Dominguez-Franceschi 1984, p. 366). 
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Coronil (1997) this would only be possible when the state transformed itself into a 
mediator between the nation and the foreign petrol companies at the beginning of the 
201h century. From then on, the state acquired the political capacity and the financial 
resources which permitted it to appear as an agent capable of imposing its dominion 
over society (Coronil 1997, p. 4). 
Conclusions 
In the first part of the chapter it was observed that the spatial fragmentation and 
decentralization of power represented by the provinces impeded effective economic 
and political control through sub-metropolitan domination. For this reason the 
Compaftia Guipuzcoana was created, an enterprise of the political economy as an 
agent of dominion. But the producers of Venezuela refused this form of monopoly 
and protested its presence, and this le d to the creation of the Captaincy General of 
Venezuela in 1777, which would be a more direct and centralized from of colonial 
power. 
The creation of the Captaincy General of Venezuela, along with other institutions, 
was part of the liberal reforms that had been imposed on the Spanish Crown by 
political and economic conditions of that period. The step towards colonial 
metropolitan centralization occasioned the loss of much of the provincial autonomy 
concentrated in city/town councils and municipalities, and in this context the process 
of independence began, which regained a new local powers. It has similarly been 
observed in this chapter that centralism and decentralization were combined in the 
colonial epoch, and moreover it was observed that with the disappearance of the 
external force that imposed dominion, power was once again concentrated in the 
councils. 
By the time of the declaration of independence at the beginning of the I 9th century, it 
is possible to say that the organization of the state was completely decentralized; in 
1811 the federal pact was formed, and liberalism passed into being the political 
discourse of the Venezuelan political elite. The War of Independence created the 
power of the regional and local caudillos, and at the same time consolidated the 
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provinces with their aggregated militia. In the period which began from 1830 up to 
1864, the state assumed a centro-federal form, and from 1840 onwards after the 
Liberal Party was formed, the liberals would lead the process of democratization in 
the I 9th century. After the Federal Wars between 1859 and 1863, the Federation came 
to signify the high point in this process, through the institutionalizing universal 
suffrage and the direct and secret vote, amongst other demands. 
The Liberal Party came to represent the democratic tendency after its birth in 1840, 
which tendency was closely associated with the Federal War and with the 
democratization process initiated in 1864. The political decentralization adopted by 
the state through a concertation of pacts between the regional caudillos is 
characteristic of this period, and from 1870 onwards this would be accompanied by 
centralized forms of administration. The political struggle liberated the interior of the 
Liberal Party, but notwithstanding this new demands for greater democratization 
appeared around 1897. Towards the end of the century, however, the taking of power 
by the caudillos of the Andean region reorganized the state and definitively imposed a 
centralism that would put an end to this form of decentralized power. 
The first comment to be made in relation to the theme of territoriality and the 
spatiality of power, over and above the presence of Spanish colonization, is related to 
the economic reforms. The presence of the West, as much in the 17'h as the l9th 
century, is not only linked to the ideas of political liberalism but also to the reforms of 
economic liberalism. This is particularly useful in showing that the manner in which 
global politics impacted on the territory of Non-Western countries is nothing new, 
and that the reforms of the 201h century appear in context to be no more than a 
continuation. The other aspect of this theme is the relationship between economic 
reforms during the I 9th century and the strengthening of centralism, and consequently 
of goverrimentality. It is understood as a relationship of subordination from above to 
below, at the same time as it would appear that political liberalism is at the base of 
sovereignty. It is understood as a relationship of articulation with democratic rights. 
In every case this had been the reason of dispute up until the Federal War. 
The second and last comment is related to the particular Venezuelan characteristics 
revisited by governmentality in the I 9th century. At the highest level this is linked to 
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the Gran Caudillo (great leader) and central power, and below to the small caudillos 
and to territory; the lack of infrastructure, the geographic conditions, the agro-farming 
economy and history acted to favour the control of these leaders over local spaces. In 
contrast, the global economy requires a centralized state with which to negotiate 
directly, and this is a process in Venezuela which found its high point in 1879, when 
Antonio Guzmdn Blanco found a political method of subduing the caudillos. This was 
in the first instance through a combination of coercion, terror and astuteness, and 
more latterly through the legal means available with the centralizing of the state. The 
lesson that we can derive from these situations for the situation today, where the state 
is centralized and seeks to decentralize itself, is linked to the autonomy of the local 
powers. In the historical context these were stolen by the caudillos, and since that 
time the central government through the use of its Situado Constitucional or through 
other mechanisms has controlled the local. 
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Chapter IV 
Centralism and Democracy in Venezuela 1899-1988 
Introduction 
The previous chapter emphasized the liberal, federal character of the Venezuelan state 
at the constitutional level, which was accompanied by a regional fragmentation of 
centralist political power, based on a system of pacts with local leaders. The political 
phenomenon of caudiffismo arose as a response to this form of local government. The 
result of the pacts was to diminish conflict and encourage co-operation between 
regional powers - nevertheless, there was no guarantee that the combining of powers 
would bring political stability to constitutional government. In fact, political 
instability was predominant, a state of affairs that reflected the provisionality, 
continuismo and alternation of these same caudillos, as well as the autocratic 
character of these governments. 
The last chapter also described how the territories forming Venezuela had been 
integrated (in a particular combination) into the capitalist economy of Europe since 
the 18th century, resulting in a continuous interference by the capitalist powers in 
national politics. This interference brought about the previously mentioned displays 
of force. Nevertheless, the government of the "Central Pact" of Venezuela was also 
forced to respond to further violations of national sovereignty. Both of these aspects 
(as well as other forms of subordination to the external) continue to be closely linked 
to Venezuelan territoriality right up to the present date especially after the liberal- 
federal form of the state became established as the economy of Venezuela remained 
tied to the global capitalist market, even though the terms of its external insertion 
changed. 
This chapter examines how the form of the Venezuelan state changed in the political 
context of the 20th century, owing to the manner in which successive dictatorial and 
democratic governments gave centralism its definitive form. At the beginning of this 
period, the dictatorship of G6mez created the basis for the modem state by unifying 
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the country geographically and politically in the process taking the caudillos and their 
traditional political parties out of the game. The particular form of decentralisation 
(federalism) that had characterised the exercise of political power in the 19th century 
disappeared, and state power saw itself reinforced by the fiscal revenues that the new 
petrol economy brought with it from 1920 onwards. This permitted the organisation 
of public finances and also the professionalisation of the army, begun initially by 
Cipriano Castro. 
The period from 1936 to 1945, considered as transitional in the development of the 
process of democratization, coincided with a series of conditions conducive to 
political mobilization, and it is for this reason that Rey (1991) has called it a period of 
66populist systems of mobilization". Venezuelan society in general began to demand a 
wider participation in electoral suffrage, and to demand universal individual rights, as 
well as rights for women; the political parties reclaimed their legal status, and 
workers their rights of association and resistance. The end result of this mobilization 
was the Junta Ovico Militar (Civil-Military Junta) led by the Acci6n Democrdtica 
(Democratic Action, AD by its initials in Spanish) party, which took over government 
in 1945 and saw the triumph of its programme for government in 1948. The intentions 
of AD in re-establishing democracy were subsequently frustrated by the dictatorship 
commanded by Pdrez Jimdnez in overthrowing the government presided over by 
R6mulo Gallegos, who thereafter organised resistance to the dictatorship until 1958. 
The political and social considerations enacted by the provisional government of the 
"Trienio Adeco" (1945-1948) would have an important impact on the conciliatory 
democracy that was installed in 1958, as well as in the manner of implementing the 
federal component of the state, through the decentralization of state and municipal 
government. One important aspect of this was the desire of the leaders of AD not to 
repeat its former hegemonic arrogance of power towards other political actors. This 
change of attitude of the leaders would come to be a key determinant in achieving a 
pact of consensus between political parties, and later still the semi-corporative pact 
between the state and other social actors. Moreover, there existed in the bosom of the 
AD different ideological tendencies within the leadership, which provoked divisions 
inside the party in 1960,1962 and 1968, and from which fractures a great part of the 
resistance arose that the AD governments had to face between 1958 and 1968. 
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From the decade of the 1970s, the political scene was controlled by the AD party and 
COPEI (Partido Social Cristiano), leading to a bipartite alternation of government that 
lasted until 1988. The bipartite hegemony was accompanied by a socialist party 
(MAS) and by a heterogeneous structure of smaller parties of various ideological and 
political tendencies, which represented electoral minorities and formed part of the 
opinion-generating organizations. These decision-forming groups would acquire their 
importance in the decade of the 1990s, when the process of the decomposition of 
bipartisanship coincided with the fragmentation of the political system. The strength 
of bipartisanship rested on a consensus of political and social actors, as well as form 
of political clientalism supported by the oil-rentier economy that served to stabilize 
democracy by acting as a "utility mechanism". The governments of this period of 
conciliatory democracy did not contemplate putting into action any form of 
decentralization before 1989, and the discussion of this theme would take place in the 
debates on the reform of the state between 1984 and 1989. 
The AD-COPEI hegemony achieved the centrality of the state without the necessity 
to articulate political decentralization. This political decentralization, contemplated in 
theory in the Constitution since 1947 and expressed in the opening of suffrage for the 
elections of governors and mayors, constituted a demand by democratic political 
groups and organizations of civil society that tried to resist to the verticality of 
political power. Instead of supporting this democratic resolve, the leaders of the 
popular conciliatory democracy jointly imposed a form of administrative 
deconcentration and the Situado Constitucional'J on the states and municipalities, and 
after 1970 a form of regionalisation on the economic groups. With this strategy, the 
presidential executive took direct control of state and municipal levels of power and, 
through the political parties, of the organizations of civil society. From 1983 onwards, 
the mechanisms which guaranteed the governability and stability of conciliatory 
15 The Situado Constilucional is a non-conditional intergovernmental transfer of resources, designed 
to transfer a part of the ordinary income of the national purse towards the states. The formula for the 
distribution of these resources is stablished in the Constitution of the Republic, and consists of dividing 
30% of the Situado into equal parts, with the remaining 70% allocated according to the size of 
population in each state. 
95 
populist democracy changed moved against the old political system, imposing the 
design of a new pact between the various political actors, along with new rules for the 
sustaining of democracy. This would come to constitute the central political aspect of 
the critique formulated by the reform of the state and, additionally, one of the 
principal points dealt with in this chapter. 
In the context of this study of the relationship between democracy and 
decentralization in Venezuela, as well as the question of the role of decentralization in 
the process of democratic change, this chapter re-visits four aspects including: 
1) The modem state and its centralist formation in the 20'h century (1935-1988). 
2) The populist system of mobilization (1936-1945) and its relationship with the 
democratic experience of the Trienio of 1945-1948, as well as the resistance to 
the dictatorship of Pdrez Jirndnez (1948-1958). 
3) The conciliatory democracy (1958-1988) and its most significant 
characteristics: the form of decentralization (deconcentration) introduced by 
political leaders, the mechanisms introduced to contain resistance, the reasons 
behind the minimal development of civil society and bipartisanship among 
others. 
4) The reform of the state (1984-1989) and its most important aspects: the 
characteristics of the Presidential Reform Commission and the proposals for 
political reform and decentralization. 
IM The Centralism of the Gomecista Dictatorship 
Centralism in 20th century Venezuela was to be imposed in the name of the political 
restoration of the provinces; Andean caudiffismoM through the use of the 
16 Andean Caudillismo is a Venezuelan expression that refers to the caudillos that originated from the 
West of the country, specifically the Andean states of TAchira, Mdrida y Trujillo. 
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constitutional reforms of 1901 and 1904, eliminated the presidential election through 
the universal, direct secret vote. It shifted the powers of the Councils of Government 
created by the Constitution of 1893 to the municipal assemblies, and later to an 
electoral council. In 1904 a new reform was introduced which reduced the number of 
states to 13, and established the autonomy of the districts into which the states were 
divided, whose municipalities now also enjoyed a degree of autonomy (Angulo 1997, 
p. 49). This was to be the initiating of a new model of the state, completely centralized 
and strongly influenced by North American monopolies, as well as by the exclusivity 
widely proclaimed by the USA concerning intervention in Latin America. 
From 1900 onwards, the economic and social base of the countryside began to 
disintegrate; this was closely connected to the control of and reduction in the power 
of the regional caudillos, as well as the new exploitation of petrol. Caudillismo 
("Amarillo" Liberalism and nationalism), by its disaggregation and low degree of 
institutionality, did not appear to be the necessary guarantee of stability for the new 
platforrn required for the oil exploitation business. Nevertheless it did contribute, in 
an indirect manner, to the regime of concessions17 that would convert petrol 
monopolies into the new proprietors of large latifundiae. 
For Cipriano Castro and the Andeans who took power in 1989, the army was the most important factor 
in the exercise of power. The cabinet is not important, the army is what counts. Only there will one 
find those of the greatest worth", commented Castro (Rangel 1975, p. 98). The Andeans arrived in 
Caracas in order to take power, which had been controlled by the Caudillos of the centre. From their 
taking of power, General Castro directed public spending towards the cost of war, which represented 
40% of the national budget between 1899 and 1900. One of the first measures taken to generate funds 
to purchase armaments was a reduction in the numbers working in public administration. By 1900 the 
army already had 5000 soldiers, 40,000 rifles and 50 million bullets, together with various Schneider 
and Krupp mountain artillery trains. In 1901 Creusot cannons and Hotchkiss machine guns were 
purchased from France and by May of that year the size of the army had grown to 9000 and by 
December 18000. All of these men came from the Venezuelan Andes. (Range] 1975, p. 101). 
17 During this period the major source of oil profits was the sale of concessions to foreign oil 
companies. A quotation made by R6mulo Betancourt from Ludwell Denny (We right for oil, 
ob. cit., p. 114), shows the exorbitant profits made by the oil companies operating in the country: "The 
profits grow, although the transportation costs, commented this author. The Venezuela Oil 
Concessions, subsidiary of Dutch Shell, paid 55.5 in dividends to more than 15% of the company 
bonus in 1927. It got profits of $3,4 million over $10 million of capital investment. The General 
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Brito Figueroa points out that the development of oil exploration did not destroy the 
system of land holdings, but rather strengthened it. The system of agrarian 
landholdings that had existed in the last decades of the XlXth century was readily 
convertible to the required use, because it allowed the oil companies to gain legal 
domain over large extensions of Venezuelan territory. Although, the manner in which 
the land was owned and exploited was not the same as in the agrarian concept of land 
holding, in reality the companies controlled large extensions of the best agricultural 
and productive lands, thus transforming the latter into areas of oil exploration and 
reserve areas (Brito Figueroa, 1974, p. 379). 
As dictator, G6mez provided the oil companies with what was widely regarded as an 
exceptionally advantageous investment environment and, in return, the oil companies 
established political and economic conditions that helped to consolidate his dictatorial 
rule. The result of G6mez's benevolent attitude and the presence of vast oil deposits 
in the Maracaibo Lake transformed Venezuela from an insignificant oil producer at 
the end of the First World War into the world's second biggest producer and leading 
exporter by 1928 (Lieuwen 1965, p. 48). Thus, during this period the G6mez regime 
and the domiciled foreign oil industry drew strength from each other, and together 
they defined the political and social scene through which Venezuelans began to 
recognize the importance of oil, and to fashion their political identity as citizens of an 
oil nation. 
This transformation of Venezuela from an indebted agricultural nation into a wealthy 
oil exporter is an historical turning point that still holds the national imagination, as 
the point at which (according to the official historiography) Venezuela emerged as a 
modem nation. With this shift in political power, once fragmented and contending 
Asphalt, one company from Trinidad, selling its Venezuelan production to the Dutch Shell, got profits 
of $2 million over $6.5 million of capital investment in the year 1926-1927. Apex Trinidad Oilfield 
paid 80% of dividend in 1927-1928. The Lago Petroleum Corporation subsidiary of the Standard Oil 
got profit of nearly $8 million over a work capital of $3.5 million. The shareholders of the companies 
operating -American and English- have been increasing their values around 600% from 1924 to 1927" 
(Betancourt 1967, p. 81). 
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regional caudillos, became centralised in the state. The more the state expanded 
institutionally and tightened its control over the body politic, the more G6mez 
appeared to be the source of its growth and the physical embodiment of state power 
(Coronil 1997, p. 68-83). By contrast, Venezuelan society outside the state had a low 
level of organised development and little social differentiation. G6mezs dictatorship 
greatly limited citizen participation in political life; for instance, political parties and 
political organisations were outlawed and any illegal political organisations opposing 
the regime were strongly repressed. 
By intervening in caudillismo, moreover, Gomecismo eliminated at a stroke the civil 
wars that had terrorized the country, as well as the leadership of the traditional 
political parties. This in its turn facilitated the construction of a national army as a 
support to the central power (Brewer Carias 1994, p. 155). The majority of scholars 
(e. g. Lieuwen) argue that the army was a key element in G6mez's power structure, 
which he so thoroughly reorganised, modernised, and expanded it, that would-be 
domestic revolutionaries dared not challenge him (Lieuwen 1965, p. 46). Through 
such means, a process of territorial integration was also started, which was by no 
means the least of the Gomecista achievements. Ddvila highlights some of the more 
important achievements of G6mez's regime, as being the: "consolidation of a 
centralised liberal state; the pacification of the country after the end of 19th century 
caudillismo, the creation of modern state institutions which allowed further 
modemising policies; the modernisation of the internal power structure through the 
creation of a professional army and the channelling of basic social conflicts. " (Ddvila 
2000, p. 225-226). 
The government of G6mez modified the constitution on five separate occasions 
between 1914 and 193 1; these alterations were fundamentally orientated towards the 
consolidation of centralism, as well as the favouring of monopoly interests. In the 
constitutions of 1922 and 1925, the loss of financial autonomy of the states was 
complete through the centralisation of public finances, and in consequence the co- 
participation of the states in fiscal collection was eliminated (Guer6n 1996, p. 358). 
The constitutional reform of 1925 also established the possibility that the President of 
the Republic could name the governors of each state, and it prohibited the states from 
having their own armed forces. Equally, the reform eliminated the need for gaining 
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legislative approval of concessions for hydrocarbon exploitation (Brewer Carias 
1975, p. 158). 
The way in which the regime was forced to confront the little surviving caudillista 
guerrilla activity, the land invasions of the dispossessed and the student uprisings of 
1920,1921 and 1928, in such a way that the opposition in exile was able to gain 
strength from the oppression of these movements. This opposition was essentially 
composed of two political and ideological projects: the one Marxist and the other 
Social Democrat. In 193 6 the Unidad Nacional Estudiantil (National Student Unity - 
UNE) arose, which was Christian Socialist in orientation; the UNE constituted the 
ideological counterpart to the Venezuelan Students Federation (FEV), which was 
Marxist in orientation. The largest popular party was the ORVE, directed by the 
members of the 'generation of 28' who had returned from exile. 
The uprising of 1928 against the dictatorship is one of the most transcendental 
occurrences in contemporary Venezuelan history, and it was an insurrection that came 
to demonstrate the depth of democratic reserves still maintained by Venezuelan 
society, over and above the tyranny of oppression. The movement, limited and partial 
in its inception, was transformed by the support that it received from every social 
sector, in a spontaneous act of protest by the majority of Venezuelan society. 
The members of the the 'Generation of the 28' proposed a coalition of political and 
ideological aspirations, which awoke in the opposition to the regime the possibility of 
a more effective struggle; from this initiation onwards, the coalition fulfilled the role 
of public leadership in the process of democratisation. According to Betancourt 
(1967), the movement proclaimed the defence of the national economy, of agrarian 
democracy and of social justice, rigorously debating by every possible means that the 
country should recover and affirm a regime of public liberties (Betancourt 1967, 
p. 91). Moreover, the movement contributed to the development of a series of 
iniciatives that included organization in exile, the formation of political groups 
outside and inside the country, and the growth of armed movements against the 
dictatorship. 
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This "Group of 28" constituted a liberal, social democratic organisation, who owing 
to their expulsion from the country by G6mez to Colombia and other countries, 
formed in exile an organisation called the Revolutionary Association of the Left 
(ARDI by its initials in Spanish), which after a few years transformed itself firstly 
into the ORVE, later on into the PDN and finally into the Democratic Action group. 
In 1931 the ARDI group drew up a democratic action programme for Venezuela 
called the Plan de Barranquilla, a document that constituted a first attempt at the 
production of a minimum plan of action, with the intention of proposing a political 
programme for the country using an analysis of the situation in Venezuela and its 
causes. The Plan outlined the nucleus of what would become the organization of the 
state in the period beginning in 1936. 
The oil industry, through the distribution of massive profits, was to modify 
completely the economic, social and political reality of Venezuela; it would convert 
the Venezuelan state into the largest employer and the largest investor within the 
economic apparatus, and it would also contribute to the transformation of the spatial 
structures of the periphery by breaking up the economic and political structures which 
had evolved in the countryside'8. In the centre, it would put in march a process of 
urbanization, which in a short time would completely change the basis of socio- 
political organization in Venezuela. These actions would have important effects on 
the formation of spatial and political centralism, and on the mobilization of 
demonstrations in support of representative democracy between 1945 and 1948, as 
well as the development of the conciliatory democracy during the period after 1958 
(Rey 1991, pp. 536-543). 
18 The results of the transformations of the bases of economic power were the fixing of the centre- 
periphery relations of spatial organization in Venezuela. This model of spatial integration was adjusted 
without major conflicts with the model that had existed during the agricu Itu ral-exportat ion phase. The 
major proportion of profits were invested, by and large, in the area of the capital: Caracas-La Guaira 
and Valencia-Puerto Cabello (which had been the centre in the previous model). The central-northern 
region, the central-eastern region and the rest of the territory were organised around it (Chivez Vargas 
1973, pp. 20-3 1). 
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IV. 1.1 Antecedents of the Populist System of Mobilisation (1936-1945) 
According to Rey, who bases his conception of the analysis of mobilization on that of 
Deutsch (1961), a populist system of mobilization "refers to those Latin American 
parties or political movements formed by a coalition of heterogeneous social groups 
arising with the proposition of restructuring the existing social order, through the 
organization and mobilization of the masses (up to then passive), and their integration 
into the nation not merely from the point of view of their political participation, but 
also economically and socially. " (Rey 199 1, p. 536). 
The year following G6meZs death was marked by significant popular mobilisations 
and an active political debate. The political organization of resistance to G6mez and 
the accelerating process of oil exploitation had acted to create suitable conditions for 
the development of a populist system of mobilization, and whilst it was true that only 
from 1936 had the political debate reached the public stage, the process had been 
developing for a long time before that, during the heat of the struggle against 
Gomecismo. It was during these years, following the dictatorship, that the creation of 
political parties of the masses under a system of populist mobilization began. 
By the end of the Gomecista regime, therefore, the conditions for the development of 
a populist system of mobilization had already been established: firstly, an intense and 
extensive process of social mobilization which had generated a mass of individuals 
ready to join new organizations and to contract new loyalties; secondly, a situation of 
exclusion from political, economic and social participation through the enforcement 
of a restricted suffrage, and thirdly, the appearance of a new political elite'9(Rey 
1991, p. 535). 
G6mez died in 1935, and on his passing the regime gave way to the establishment of 
a more moderate military government, owing mainly to popular pressure. The 
19 This new political elite was constituted by groups of the urban middle classes who suffered from an 
incongruency of status, finding themselves alienated from a socio-political order that blocked their 
participation and allowed them none of the recognition that they believed they deserved. 
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successors to G6mez were General Eleazar L6pez Contreras (1936-41) who had 
previously been minister of war, and General Isaias Angarita (1941-45). The new 
goverrunent subsequently created a new political organisation, the Bolivarian Civic 
Group (ACB) with the intention of confronting the nascent communist organisations, 
which were very strong in the oil industry unions. Opposition to the military regime 
was organised around the ORVE, led by members of the'generation of 1928', the PRP 
(Republican Progressive Party), the FEV (Student Federation of Venezuela), 
reoriented after the exile as a consequence of 1928's demonstrations, and the Social 
Christian-orientated UNE. Furthermore, the opposition could rely on strong support 
from a multiplicity of trades unions and education leagues. 
L6pez Contreras G6mez's, minister of war, distanced himself from 'Gomecismo'and 
carried out some reforms that moved the country towards a process of 
democratisation. Notwithstanding this attempted appeasement, the government faced 
two strikes in 1936. The first one was at the beginning of 1936, when leaders of the 
"28" organised a mass demonstration in Caracas against the government. As a 
response, a week later L6pez Contreras presented the government's February 
Programme, which outlined the nation's major problems and presented a plan of 
national development. By incorporating criticism from the opposition into the plan, 
the military regime attempted to neutralise them, but at the same time it legitimated a 
reformist discourse, thus intensifying the very social pressure towards 
democratisation that it had hoped to avoid (Coronil 1997, p. 94). 
In April 1936 a new Constitution was adopted, with the adoption of which congress 
promulgated a very advanced labour law, giving workers the right to organise and to 
affiliate with international bodies, the establishment of rights to social insurance, and 
a number of other placatory measures. Irrespective of this, there was a second strike 
at the end of 1936, when the companies failed to meet the demands (particularly 
salary increases) demanded by petroleum union leaders. After this strike, government 
policy became less tolerant of the demands for reform, and repression against the 
social struggles directed by leftist leaders began to be more systematic and effective. 
L6pez Contreras took advantage of the broad powers allocated to the regime under 
the new Constitution to act against the communist and anarchist parties, branding 
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forty-seven leftist politicians as 'Communists'. Some of them were exiled and others 
imprisoned. In February 1937, the political parties ORVE, PRV and FEV were 
outlawed. So that by the end of L6pez Contreras's term of office, only the ABC (the 
President's political party) remained as a legal political organisation. 
The most important social change called for in the opposition's political struggle was 
that of direct participation by the people in the election of their representatives. By 
adopting such a populist stance, the opposition won various seats in the election of 
municipal councils and in the state legislatures in 1937. In 1941 there were indirect 
presidential elections, the result of which was a continuation of the military regime. 
This government, however, was more moderate than the previous one and its support 
came mainly from the urban middle-classes - in addition, it had substantial support 
from the Communists. The new government set up an official party named the 
Venezuelan Democratic party (PDV), however from a political point of view the 
ascendance of General Medina Angarita to office produced a rapprochement with the 
groupings of the left, forcing the opening of a more democratic pathway, including 
the growth of workers unions and the legalisation of political parties. 
In the institutional area, Medina enacted some radical changes, firstly by 
promulgating new laws on taxation, and secondly in 1942 by initiating a reform of the 
oil sector "which unified a whole network of previous legislation, requiring the 
companies to increase their oil-refining capacities in Venezuela, and increasing taxes 
and royalties to the point where the treasury's oil revenues were expected to equal the 
profits of the industry" (Lieuwen, 1965: 58)20. Medina continued with this programme 
of change by producing a new social security labour law, and perhaps as importantly 
the 1945 Constitution, which in spite of widening the power of central government 
retained at least in name a federal form of state. 
Just before the Presidential elections of 1941, the PDN leaders organised the 
Democratic Action (AD) party and R6mulo Betancourt returned from exile to direct 
20 This law was particularly contentious, acting as it did directly against the interests of foreign oil 
concerns. 
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the AD campaign under the presidential candidacy of the novelist R6mulo Gallegos. 
The Social Christian organisation and the Communists consolidated their efforts, with 
the Communists proposing a formal democracy according to their global socialist 
strategy. In the municipal elections of 1944 the Communists, following their 
internationalist line, supported Medina's government and thus in 1945 the PCV 
(Venezuelan Communist Party) was officially constituted, achieving legal status. 
At the end of the presidential period the issue of Medina! s succession arose, an issue 
that rapidly disappeared with the coup detat undertaken against him in October 
194521. The coup was led by the UMP-AD alliance, which was a group of middle- 
ranking officers led by Marcos Pdrez Jimdnez, a high-ranking graduate of military 
academies in Venezuela and Peru. Its stated objective was to take over the 
government in order to bring a return to 'decency' and 'patriotism' in the state: "This 
coup, orchestrated in secret at the top, was soon glorified by the AD as Venezuela! s 
"October Revolution" (Coronil, 1997, p. 13 1). 
In spite of Medina! s democratic efforts, a series of political fractures and disputes 
within and outside his government had lead to the Coyuntura (the "historical 
conjuction") of 18th October. Firstly, there had been a breakdown between the 
followers of Medina and those of L6pez Contreras, who rallied around the rightist 
opposition formed by the traditional 'gomecistas' and the oligarchy; secondly, there 
were ideological and programmatic differences amongst the various political parties 
and organisations on whom Medina relied for support; thirdly, the radical reforms 
imposed by Medina had created a tendency towards opposition in the military sector; 
and finally, there were the interests of the oil companies. 
21 The event marked the end of an era: that of the ascendancy of the army generals and the landed 
aristocracy who had ruled the country ever since independence. On the l9th October, R6mulo 
Betancourt selected a seven-man junta: two military officers, Carlos Delgado Chalbaud and Mario 
Vargas, and the AD leaders: RAul Leoni, Luis Beltran Prieto, Edmundo FcrnAndez, Gonzalo Barrios 
and R6mulo Betancourt himself, auto-selected as President. 
105 
IV. 1.2 The democratic experience of 1945-1948 
The government of the Civic-Military Junta immediately received cross-sector 
support, from student unions, the Church, the Communists, the private sector, the 
diplomatic corps and the State Department of the United StateS22. Once in power, the 
AD government started to carry out a political programme that affected multiple areas 
of society, through changes in the electoral law and in labour policy, through the 
promotion of industry, the development of an agrarian policy, to the promotion of 
education, public health, administrative reform, banking reform and military policy. 
According to Stambouli (1980) this national project was used by the government to 
promote the political mobilization of civil society, and indeed the project certainly 
seemed more radical compared to the liberal democratic reforms undertaken by the 
oligarchy and the military from the death of G6mez onwards (Stambouli 1980, p. 67). 
On the question of political democratization, the Junta promised to establish universal 
elections as soon as possible, to draw up a new Constitution, and to transfer power to 
a duly elected government. In order to accomplish this, the first step taken was to 
organize the election of a new congress by universal vote, in 1946. After the 
elections, congress wrote a new Constitution and electoral law that came into effect 
immediately. This electoral law was the most democratic in the republic's history - the 
Constitution granted suffrage to every Venezuelan over eighteen years of age, 
eliminated the literacy requirement and the exclusion of women and set up the direct 
popular election of the president, congress, and municipal representatives. The Junta 
also reformed the labour laws, allowing again the unionisation of workers and 
creating the right of Habeas Corpus and other basic rights of citizenship. In the area 
of the economy, the National Economic Council and the Corporation for the 
Promotion of Venezuela (CVF, Corporaci6n Venezolana de Fornento) were created. 
22 On the 3oth of October, the state department of the USA sent out a declaration recognizing 0 
the new Venezuelan government A notice appeared the same day in the Herald saying that: "The 
North American oil interests believe that the regime of Betancourt is more democratic than the 
old regime of Medina, and they assure us that there will be no serious difficulties between the 
USA and Venezuela concerning either the production of petroleum, or the properties of the 
Petroleum concessions in Venezuela" (Starnbouli 1980, p. 61). 
106 
In this way, and through these actions, it can be seen why the government that 
emerged from this civic-military-reformist junta came to be characterised as 
governing a social state or, following the nomenclature of Latin American political 
literature, a democratic populist state. 
In the new environment of free speech, free press and freedom of assembly, new 
political parties were soon able to participate in the elections of the constituent 
assembly of 194623 and in the presidential and congressional elections celebrated in 
1947, which were the first elections with universal, direct and secret suffrage. The 
Constitution of 1947 also consolidated the fundamental basis of a pluralist structure, 
as well as the idea of the centrality of the state and its social character (Komblith 
1998, pp. 162-163). Nevertheless, Betancourt (1979) considers that the Constitution 
of 1947 was flawed in not having faced up to the ultimate consequences of the 
question of the political organization of the state. Even though the constitution, in 
imposing on the executive power the obligation of elaborating a national five-year 
plan, did not expound in any explicit form a tendency towards centralisation, 
Betancourt argues that it is not possible to plan at a national level if the regional 
governors can not be appointed and removed by the head of the state (Betancourt 
23 AD's leading competitor was COPEI (independent Committee For Political and Electoral 
Organisation), which was Christian socialist oriented. A third party of importance was the URD 
(Republican Democratic Union), which was of a similar ideological and programmatic 
orientation to the AD; the only other faction of importance was the Communist Party. According 
to Andrds Stambouli (1980, p. 68) the results of the elections of 1946 for the constituent national 
assembly which sanctioned the constitution of 1947 were as follows: 
Parties Votes % Seats 
AD 1.100-000 78.4 137 
COPEI 185.000 13.2 19 
URD 59.000 4.2 2 
PCV 51.000 3.6 2 
In December 1947 the elections for President and Congress were held. The AD candidate R6mulo 
Gallegos was elected with 74.7% of the votes, COPEI got 22: 4% and the URD/PCV 3: 2% (Stambouli 
1980, p. 68). 
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1967, p. 261). Accordingly, as much as the Constitution establishes this obligation, it 
is implicitly based upon the principle of political centralism. 
In contrast, Betancourt considered it a good decision that the Constitution consecrated 
directly the principles of administrative decentralization, in those areas that would not 
affect collective national plans. The national executive was obliged to distribute 25% 
of the ordinary income of the treasury, and in the opinion of Betancourt this measure 
acted to dismantle the federalism of the constitution of 1811. Nevertheless, the 
Constitution maintained the bicameral system and the state legislative assemblies that 
belonged to the federal system. 24 
In the Constitution of 1947 centralism would be legitimised and purified of its more 
authoritarian elements by administrative decentralisation, in the same sense of 
political regipnalisation that would be introduced in the seventies, a policy of which it 
could be said that it had its origins in the government of 1945. Towards such ends the 
practice of the annual conventions of the president, his cabinet and the governors of 
the 20 states and the two federal territories were established. Nevertheless, The Junta 
subsequently imposed a co-ordination of administrative activities under the guidance 
of the central government as a response to the dispersion of administrative forces, and 
none of the constitutional aspects acted to strengthen the regional and local 
governments politically, any more than they modified the concentration of decision- 
making in the czýpula of the state. 
24 Additionally "as a concession to the small groups of opposition inside congress, the parliamentary 
majority of the AD effected a transitory article in the Constitution, that there should be a plebiscite 
concerning the form by which the governors of the states should be designated" (Betancourt 1967, 
p. 262)". This plebiscite was to be realized within the first two years counting from the date of the 
promulgation of the constitution and at an opportunity to be fixed by congress, which would decide if 
the elections of state governors and the removal of the president should be by free elections in the 
council of ministers, or if they should be decided by a universal, direct and secret vote. In the 
meantime until this plebiscite was realized, the governors would be named and removed by the head of 
the state. 
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In February of 1948 President Gallegos took office, but 10 months later he was to be 
overthrown by the same military group that had defeated Medina in 1945. According 
to Caballero the civil population offered some resistance to the military coup 
(Caballero 1999, p. 92) so that, following Derham, years later the AD party was able 
to paint the military coup of 1948 as essentially anti-democratic and anti-patriotic. 
This ignores the circumstances in which it occurred and in particular the 
incompetence that the civilian government had demonstrated in the previous three 
years. When the overthrow of the government of the 'trienio' (1945-1948) did come, 
the rifts previously created by this incompetence ensured a lack of support for the 
politicians (Derham 2002, p. 278). 
There were three principal reasons to which the fall of representative democracy in 
1948 is attributed. Firstly there was the sectarianism of theAD, which led to a lack of 
astuteness and a failure to recognise the significance of the political moment, and in 
particular in interpreting the re-composition of politico-economic forces in an oil- 
producing country. Secondly, there was the populist tendency that characterised its 
ideological framework, to the extent that the measures taken by the government found 
little or no welcome amongst those sectors fearful of the preponderance acquired by 
the popular sector. 
Thirdly,. the oil companies lost faith in the government following the announcement 
that there would be no more oil concessions and that there would be changes in the 
taxation of the oil industry. Furthermore, the decisions of the Civil and 
Administrative Tribunal and the confiscation of around 120 million hectares of 
property, in combination with the agitated climate that already existed in the 
countryside, provoked strong reactions from the oligarchy and the land-owning 
sector. The Church was worried by the government's advocation of private education 
(in particular Decree 321) and, together with the parties of opposition (COPEI and 
URD) was also concerned about the sectarian measures of the government. Only the 
emergent bourgeois sectors seem to have benefited during the 1945-1948 period of 
government. 
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IV. 1.3 The P6rez Xm6nez Regime of 1948-1958 and mobilization against 
it. 
The new military Junta deten-nined that it would rule under the banner of legitimator 
of order and progress. This was to be accompanied by a discourse that emphasized 
material progress and efficient transformation of the physical infractructure, in direct 
contradistinction to the disorder of the party political system. Coronil (1997) 
emphasizes that this ideological framework was closer to the interpretation of 
Venezuelan positivism of the beginning of the 20th century, than to any interpretation 
of the theory of modernization dominant since the Second World War, where the state 
was assigned the central role as the agent responsible for planning and the promotion 
of development. The discourse of the Junta emphasized the technical simplicity of 
development in the absence of party conflict, rather than the complexity of this same 
(Coronil 1997, p. 174). Nonetheless, within this idea all parties were made illegal, and 
at the same time an ambitious plan of public works was initiated, as well as the 
development of great industrial complexes by the state. 
This doctrinal principle, brandished as a guide for governmental action under the 
Pdrez Jimdnez dictatorship, was made explicit in the daily newspaper 'The Herald', in 
an editorial called "Under The Bulldozer", written by the minister for interior 
relations, Laureano Vallenilla Lanz, under the pseudonym 'R. H. '; "If anything 
characterized the actual political regime of Venezuela at that time, it was the 
tractor25"(Stambouli 1980, p. 94). 
Once installed, the government of the military Junta proceeded to decree the 
dissolution of congress, the legislative assemblies, the municipal councils and all of 
the departmental and community juntas, substituting for them juntas of municipal 
25 "The tractor is the best collaborator of the government, the most exact interpreter of the 
elevated and noble proposition to transform the physical environment.... The tractor, this symbol 
of fatherland and government, destroys many things. Even those political clubs, so-called parties, 
and their representatives have suffered its impact. It is closing a chapter of our history 
(Stambouli 1980, p. 94). " 
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administration named by the state governors, with the consent of the government of 
the military Junta. At the same time the government decreed the dissolution of the 
Supreme Electoral Council and all of the electoral councils, declaring illegal the 
Democratic Action party. The Junta named the magistrates of the Federal Court and 
the Supreme Court, promulgating a decree for the regulation of the functioning of the 
judicial power. A short while later, the Workers' Confederation of Venezuela, the 
CTV, was dissolved and the Communist Party of Venezuela, the PCV, was outlawed 
the 22 nd of January of 1949 the USA recognised the military Junta as the legitimate 
government of Venezuela26. 
A short time after the installation of the military junta a process of political 
demobilatization was initiated which was consolidated in 1952, when the government 
refuse to recognise the results obtained by the URD party in the elections called to 
elect a constitutional assembly (Stambouli 1980, p. 88). In December the military high 
command dissolved thejunta, and named as provisional president Colonel Marcos 
P6rez Jim6nez. Sanoja (1998) says that through the pressure caused by being unable 
to legitimise the action of 1948, the military faction resorted to an 'auto-coup' 
(Sanoja 1998, p. 98). In 1953 a constituent national assembly was installed with a few 
dissident deputies of the URD and COPEI, which would promulgate the new 
Constitution and designate Colonel Marcos P6rez Jim6nez as 'constitutional' 
president of the republic. The government would affirm its project for national 
greatness, supported by a substantial increase in fiscal income derived from the oil 
boom caused by the nationalisation of oil in Iran, the reconstruction of Europe and the 
Korean war. The greater part of public expenditure was oriented towards 
infrastructural projects (motorways, decorative touristic ornamentation, and complex 
26 Coronil says that the U. S ambassador had privately expressed his support for Pdrez Jimdnez: " 
It is likely that, without this support, the coup would not have taken place or that it would not 
have taken the form it did. As the New York times reported on l2th October 1955, "It is an open 
secret that if the United States had expressed its displeasure at the robbery of the Venezuelan 
election by partisans of Col. P6rez Jimdnez in November 1952, the latter would have retreated, or 
at least would have come to an agreement with the opposition. By keeping ourselves strictly 
outside the conflict, and quickly recognizing the Pdrez Jim6nez regime, we, in a certain sense, 
intervened" (Coronil 1997, p. p. 156-157). 
architectural monuments, amongst other things), concentrated in their majority in the 
central zone of the country. At the same time, the state began to convert itself into a 
major investor in large petro-chemical and steel iron - producing industrial complexes 
(Stambouli 1980, p. 96). 
In 1958 the resistance of civil society and the political parties achieved the overthrow 
of the dictatorship. AD and the Communist Party had been able to maintain a 
clandestine organization during the ten years of the military dictatorship, and of the 
other two parties neither the URD or COPS had been made illegal. The resistance 
had been able to count on the sympathies of army and air force officers, as well as the 
Catholic Church, (the deterioration in the relationship between the Church and the 
government in particular was a product of the imprisonment of Rafael Caldera and his 
later exile in the Papal Nunciature in 1957). Finally, in the streets the most active 
militants were the lycee students and those of the university. The students of the 
Central University of Venezuela had protested in the streets against the electoral farce 
and their movement had been harshly repressed, notwithstanding this it played the 
most important role in the street actions which preceded the overthrow of the 
dictatorship (Caballero 1999, pp. 102-105). 
IV. 2 The Conciliatory Democracy between 1958-1988 
The AD government in 1945 re-framed the role of an alternating, representative 
democracy that functioned through the institutionalization of rules governing the 
functioning of the party system, as well as through the development of a system of 
free and universal elections. This project was linked to a model of development in 
which the state assumed the central role as driving force behind the process, as well 
as redistributor of the profits of the oil industry. The project of the state in 1958, 
defended by the AD party, COPS and URD, was founded on this proposal. But from 
1958 onwards, as a contrast to the problems of 1945 that had rotated around the 
institutionalization of suffrage and the establishment of democracy, the problem 
would be how to achieve the legitimation of representative democracy. 
112 
A first step was to direct the consolidation of democracy along a route of pacts 
between parties. This led to an alliance which established a number of agreements 
which came to be known as the Pacto de Punto Fyo. This implied a non-aggression 
pact between the parties in order to avoid what had happened over the last decade 
and, as a consequence, the promotion of co-operation as a norm in order to drive 
forward the establishment of representative democracy. It also implied the recognition 
of the existence of a plurality of social, economic and political interests, which led to 
the establishment of agreements permitting non-party sectors of society to access 
power. 
In this way an alliance was established between the state (under the control of the 
political parties) and the most important of the non-party sectors. The basis for the 
coalition of all sectors of Venezuelan society had been constructed during the 
prolonged struggle against the P6rez Jimdnez dictatorship, and it expanded to include 
the military sectors in exchange for their support for democratic structures, as much 
as it included (for instance) agreements between unions and concentrations of 
workers. In 1964 a convention was signed that regularized relationships with the 
church, and finally the business sector was included in the planning mechanism for 
public policies, by means of institutional fora for consultation (G6mez and L6pez 
1990, p. 43). 
The strategy was that during the process of democratisation discrete actors, on 
perceiving the satisfaction of their material interests, would also develop a sense of 
legitimacy with respect to the regime. Rey (199 1) has defined this system as a popular 
conciliatory system; a conjoining through negotiation and accommodation of 
heterogeneous interests, woven together through "mechanisms" of a utilitarian type 
which would act to fulfil a central role in the generation of support for the regime and, 
as a consequence, in the maintenance of that same (Rey 199 1, pp. 542-543). 
As can be seen, the stability and legitimacy of this representative democracy would 
not be founded on a territorial distribution of power, nor on a system of social values - 
rather, these alternatives were proposed at an institutional level. The adopted option, 
in a purely transient manner, was for the concentration of political and administrative 
power at national administrative levels; this 'transience', however, would last until 
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1989. The national executive became the decision-maker of last resort concerning all 
important decisions at state and municipal levels, whilst in the meantime the 
municipal legislative entities showed increasing dependence on the president, as well 
as an extreme political weakness. 
Moreover, the 'presidentialism' of this centralisation would be strengthened by 
partisanship. The president, who generally speaking would be a member of the 
leading circle of his party or the party leader, was head of state, leader of the 
government and commander-in-chief of the armed forces. In the president was 
therefore concentrated such a quantity of power that it would be impossible that any 
administrative or organizational decision of the state could escape his participation, or 
could be taken without his consent. On the other hand, the party leaderships also 
accumulated a great quantity of power and decision-making capacity concerning the 
direction of the state, the government and the country (Mdrquez 1996, pp. 108-109). 
From 1958 onwards, therefore, the political weakness of local power would continue 
to be critical. Centralization was seen by political society as an instrument capable of 
propitiating institutional stability and the viability of the nation - nevertheless, article 
2 of the Constitution of 1961 established that the political organization of the state 
was federal. The national territory was divided into 22 states and a federal district 
which had the capital of the republic as its seat, and where the national organs of 
supreme power operated, as well as in the islands constituted by the federal 
dependencies in the territorial sea. Both the federal district and all of the states were 
divided into municipalities. According to Brewer Carias (1997b), the Constitution 
dealt with "a system of political decentralization in which the states, as much as the 
municipalities, enjoy political autonomy" (Art. s 16 and 25,1961 Constitution) and 
had assigned to them a series of exclusive competences which they exercised, and for 
which there existed no supervisory controls from one level to the other (Brewer 
Carias 1997(b), p. 218). Irrespective of this, however, the practices of the political 
parties which controlled the legislative bodies and which were subsequently able to 
delay or promote the promulgation of corresponding laws, maintained a system of 
distribution of power from top to bottom. 
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Furthemore, Article 22 of the Constitution of 1961 established the form of election 
and removal of state governors according to a law that would be issued later on, in 
accordance with the principles consecrated in Article 3 that referred to the 
democratic, representative, responsible and alternating form of the government. With 
respect to the form of election and removal of state governors, such applications had 
to be admitted by both houses in session conjointly, and with the vote of two-thirds of 
the members. This law would not be subject to the veto of the president; although, so 
long as this law was not promulgated, governors would continue to be freely 
nominated and removed by the president. 
Overall, the Constitution of 1961 was permeated by centralism; this was not a 
Constitution that thought in terms of autonomous states. Centralism remained 
reflected, for example, in the subordination of governors to the agents of the national 
executive, and also in the apparent loss of state autonomy. The attributes of the states 
were subject to constitutional norms. In terms of generation of their own incomes, for 
example, the Constitution distributed taxation powers only at the national and 
municipal level. Article 18 also imposed a series of prohibitions on the states - they 
cannot levy their own import, export or transit taxes on foreign or national goods or 
anything else, and neither can they raise customs (Martin, 1988, p. 65). 
Furthemore, the presence of this form of exertion of national public power over the 
member states and municipalities of the federation can also be seen in the imbalances 
within the distribution of competencies in favour of the central. The federation was 
not designed to have an effective decentralization of competencies, and in effect a 
long list of competencies were reserved to the national power by Article 36 of the 
Constitution, over and above those which corresponded to it by its very nature. 
Brewer Carias (1997(b), p. 220) thus indicates that the national congress, following 
the centralist legislative tradition, continued the centralizing process by preserving 
central control over the majority of combined competencies, amongst which he puts 
those of planning, social protection, education, culture, sports, health, the promotion 
of agriculture, the protection of the environment, public works and housing, as well as 
the arrangement of national territory. 
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The above goes to show how the positions of the centralists and the federalists have 
been a constant in the Venezuelan political context. The struggle continues between 
those who think that politics must carry on being conducted from above, from the 
central apparatus of the state, and those who propose that power stem from civil 
society. In the period from 1961, political leaders thought mainly about strengthening 
representative democracy from a centralist posture. These two positions would 
continue to frame the characteristics of debate in the discussions over the reform of 
the state that began in 1984. 
These positions were rooted in the fact that the contrasting state forms were presented 
as been mutually exclusive. Velisquez (1998) says that one is dealing with two 
cultures in conflict, the centralizing and the decentralizing, but as the country acquires 
political consciousness there are more and more possibilities through which achieving 
change to a more decentralized society can be possible (Velisquez 1998, p. 35). The 
problem is essentially that of political equilibrium, of the balance of powers in their 
combination, but the party leaders, however, gave more importance to ensuring 
subordination to the central power, albeit legitimated by the putting into motion of 
policies of decentralization through deconcentration. 
Policies for promoting decentralization by deconcentration were proposed for the first 
time in 1945 and would be maintained and deepened, by the political parties that 
controlled power from 1958 onwards. The argument used to justify favouring and 
strengthening decentralization by deconcentration was the necessity of combating the 
perils of the possible derailing of political decentralization towards regional or local 
centralism. There were no plans made by either of the groups (centralists and no 
centralists) to allow the possibility of generating vectors of legitimacy through the 
combination of political decentralization and centralism, in the way tried in the 19'h 
century. 
These antecedents allow us to shape a vision of the Venezuelan political system in 
which both forms of state appear combined: firstly the centro-federal, and later the 
federal. These schemes of power show that "political and administrative 
decentralization" both together legitimate the central power. This appears to be the 
key by which the legitimising role of decentralization finds full expression; although 
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it was because of the presence of other factors that the party democracy was able to 
impose for so long a scheme of centralised subordination - (amongst these factors 
petrol played a very important role). 
Kornblith (1998) points out that AD' Proposal was viable because of the interaction 
of a relative abundance of economic resources arising from oil profits, with which the 
state was able to satisfy the demands of different groups, with the relatively low and 
simple levels of such demands (such that their satisfaction was achievable with the 
resources available). But Kornblith adds that the capacity of the political party 
leadership to aggregate, channel and represent these demands, thus assuring the 
confidence of those represented, also played a relevant role. This permitted a 
conciliation between the elites and the mediation of conflict, as well as a "pragmatic" 
approach to that taking of political decisions (Kornblith 1998, p. 164). 
It would be difficult to overvalue the role of the economy as a factor of change. It 
must be understood that the relationships that centralism had with the particular form 
of oil economy of Venezuela, also contributed to the consolidation of the centralist 
tendency of the political administrative apparatus of the state. It was not only in the 
concentration at a national level of income coming from hydrocarbon profits on 
which the central administration rested; the state also controlled other lines of the 
economy such as iron and steelworks, aluminium, electricity, gas and gold, as well as 
imposing profit taxes, import tariffs, and taxing and controlling the use of fiscal 
stamps and other administrative tools. 
Since 1925 oil had been the principal export product, and by 1929 the country had 
reached first place in the world in the exportation of oil. The industry stagnated in the 
decade from 1930, coinciding with the Great Depression, but in 1943 the sector 
regained high rates of growth (9% in that year). It was to maintain this growth until 
1957. Owing to the strong global demand for oil and the promulgation of a new Ley 
de Hidrocarburos (Hydrocarbon Law) that in exchange for a more significant state 
participation in the income generated, notably increased access for petrol companies 
to oil exploitation. 
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The first oil-price shock at the end of 1973, which took the price of oil to US$14 a 
barrel, materialized in the form of an enormous growth in aggregate internal demand. 
Venezuelan society was under the perception that it had entered into a phase of 
endless prosperity. Nevertheless, in 1979 a prolonged and persistent period of 
stagnation commenced that not even the second price-rise shock in 1979 could 
alleviate (Aranda 1984, p. 301). The period between 1974 and 1978 represented the 
peak of the Venezuelan oil boom, and the stagnation after 1979 would culminate in 
the epoch-making crisis of the 'Black Friday' of 1983, and the devaluation of the 
bolivar. 
In Venezuela during the period from 1979-1982, for the first time in contemporary 
history the production of non-oil products stagnated. At the same time inflation, 
which had attained an average of 1.7% between 1950 and 1973, and which between 
1974 and 1977 remained at 8.5%, exceeded an average of 16% during the three years 
of the stagnation between 1979 and 1981, making it impossible to maintain the value 
of the bolivar at the same time as freely floating exchange rates (Hausmann and 
Mdrquez 1983, pp-41-43). 
There are various reasons behind this economic behaviour, one of which was the 
global economic crisis that was in full flow that time. Internally, however, there had 
also been an uncontrolled growth in fiscal expenditure and consumption, and a 
governmental and social incapacity to propose and put into practice a dynamic and 
self-sustainable model of growth. 
Nevertheless, the dynamic factor was the oil industry. In strengthening the financial 
capacity of state power, profits from oil had permitted the state to position itself as the 
major initiator of processes of transformation in all ambits of social and political life, 
whilst at the same time distancing itself from the levels and rhythms of internal social 
forces. Moreover in the oil-boom phase, the discursive framework of the dominant 
groups in the centre had definitively been closed against regional groupings. Control 
by the state and oil businesses over the national territory had led to the disarticulation 
of economic and social bases in the regional interior, with the result that these bases 
lost their capacity to exert political pressure (Urdaneta, Martinez and L6pez 1990, 
pp. 14-15). As a consequence, this exclusionary centralization of resources also 
118 
signified the gradual and progressive elimination of both the financial structure and 
the autonomy of the states. 
IV. 2.1 Centralism and The I'Situado Constitucional" 
To counter the centralising tendency, the Situado Constitucional had been created 
following the Constitution of 1947. The Situado is equal to at least 25% at least of 
total national income, to be distributed proportionally amongst the federal entities, 
and it is in this manner that the central government distributes, amongst the other 
levels of power, quotas of profits derived from the oil business. In this way oil profits 
are used to satisfy the demands of the regional groups, as well as to alleviate the 
tensions that might be provoked by the concentration of national resources at the 
centre. Up to the end of the 1980s, the assignation of the Situado Constitucional had 
been established at a minimum of 15% of the ordinary income of the annual budget, 
which in its distribution to each federal entity corresponded to 30% of the total 
divided into equal parts, and 70% according to the number of inhabitants. 
In 1974 at the beginning of the oil boom, the Ley de Coordinaci6n de Inversiones 
(Law of Co-ordination of Investments) was initiated, which obliged the states direct 
50% of the Situado towards programmes co-ordinating the creation of infrastructure 
and services. To accomplish this co-ordinating agreements were signed during the 
conventions of governors, at which the commitments of all parties were inscribed. 
Generally speaking these agreements were signed on the basis of programmes pre- 
established by central offices. This law effectively accentuated the process of 
economic and financial centralization of the state, in demanding the prior approval of 
the central government for the execution of these programmes. Of the remaining 50% 
of the Situado, 10-15% was designated for the Municipal Situado Nevertheless, both 
the municipalities and the states saw a reduction in their income. Public services that 
had previously been controlled on a local basis were progressively absorbed by 
central government, even though the local powers still controlled income derived 
from urban expansion and from businesses (Urdaneta, Martfnez and L6pez 1990, 
pp. 18-20). 
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In this way, the governors increased their dependence on the centre, remaining 
without their own resources fundamentally doing little more than administering assets 
loaned by the central government. Moreover, in not having their own taxation powers, 
the actions of governors remained completely subject to the decisions of national 
government in fiscal matters. This dependence was completed by the control 
exercised by the Ministry of Internal Relations (MRI) over the governorships. In this 
relationship the governors had to give periodic accounts of project execution, whilst, 
at the same time, the MRI reserved the right of approval over contracts, as well as 
signing for payments for works (Mascarefto 1996, pp. 27-28). 
lV. Z2 The Spatiality of Centralization 
As may be seen from the above, the centralization of power had a direct impact upon 
the distribution of resources and population over the national territory. Since the 
dictatorship of Pdrez Jimdnez centralism had acted to accentuate demographic 
concentration. Absolute and relative figures for the distribution of the Situado 
Constitucional during the period 1978-1987 show a tendency towards major increases 
in the geographical concentration of the Situado; this is clearly observable in tables 
4.1 and in map 4.1, which shows the distribution on a percentage basis for 1987. 
In table 4.1 it can be seen that the Central and Capital regions captured 33.3% of the 
total assignation in 1986 and 1987, a total 1.5 times greater than the quantity assigned 
to the Andean and North-Eastern regions nearby, despite these regions being 4.1 
times larger in terms of land area. On the other hand, the Federal District got an 
assigm-nent of 11.3% of the total of the Situado, which in relative terms is greater than 
that for regions such as of Los Llanos, Zuliana and Guayana. In so far as the decision- 
making power resides at the national level, the Situado has been transformed into a 
virtual subsidy from the rest of the territory, in support of the Central and Capital 
Regions, thereby distorting the original intentions of the mechanism (Urdaneta, 
Martinez and L6pez 1990, p. 23) by imposing an unequal socio-economic pattern of 
distribution on resources (centre-periphery). 
120 
(0 zr aý 't ci (, i t'ý r-- OD (-) r- e4 U) vý e 
C» (0 ci C-) Co (0 (C) (0 CD 
Co 2 zi Co 2 w) 0- u) ) C, 4 2 "' 0'" <» c, :i4'enZ: 't ) i ri ri r- t--2 2 
.r c-4 r- oc) co r- 0) Lo (. 0 vj C-) 00 - 
r) ýD Lo - C-4 (n In - ("I r- 11 
) tý "t C-) -, t (14 (n - 00 00 (') r- 
"t "" CO - -T - ý- 10 (Ij - C14 04 00 U-) (D r-- CN - T-ý. 
.-iIIr 11 .1 11 04 
ý! - "I "I 'I I ;: 'It 1) 'It CII 04 r- 'It - ID 
'G :; ý - -. r cg cq Co oo ------e- ýn ee "> OD -e - (, ) ---" ci ci ci e (0 C, c) 
Co 4 ýn nA4n -e e cla 
LLJ 
cn C, 4 
Ir 
LU 
r- cn r-- r- r- 131 m ýo r-- 0) 11 (0 rq u-) -- cn Co e (D 0 c) 91 Co "t 00 r-- (» (D e uý 
0 00 02 ýo v! e u-) - C') oý 
',! ci (') ;r C-) ý2 ;r C-) t cm " (0 (-i cq 
LLI 
ýo Co 0) (3) 00 -e -e a) (0 ci P- O> oý co co (0 ýo (0 r ýo 
Co C:, 2 (D e 'n - L'n n cj n r) c, ) cN c; cý "ne (-) e c) e"" c-) -- Co a) C, 4 C) 5 
N 2- 10 za m 
0e cl) (M e ýo LD ýl> 
CO (L) 
(» j3 w 
: 
r- 0) CO "t 00 r- oý r- (1) e ID (3) r- (N 00 r- t- 
r-- G) Lf) (D co o (0 r4 co - ýIt le ýT (D (D 
Co cy; oý c, 4 n r4 ne r4 r- c> 
N 
z 
r-- cý co c0 rý Lo a) r, 
ID r-- ce) Lo t- e c, ) ýo (v 
r, - (D 
e Lo ý ti) c-j ;1c, ) Lo " cm c-) e c, ) 
v! e (n u-) r- 
> 
c) 
m 
ý 11 
2 
Co u-) ým (D c, ý c-) u-, 0) ýD c4 0 r, - r- 
Pý Co u-) (c) r- ", (0 -4 ýo e. (01 e-,, 20 CO 
q ý2 n L. e 
a- 
,F in- 
Z U) (n Ln 
12- 
-(3 -0 
ý- (L) Z. uj (1) ZZ0ýmT u) c3) (U -J d) -13 ,'W< (0 22j, <mcm 
Z i- L- (1) r_ f00 
'9 -C- t5 U '0 ýi D (-) :5, Z -12 2ý<2 111 .-0->0E0<cý - 
0) 
-5 < -- ýb , zýý 
Lii M (U m 
o 0- LL ZT -m _D 
>N<Z 0 P. -j m CL Z C) Cý < -J Z< Lu < (n LLi 
LL it-, Z) cn 0 U) U) 0: 
LLI ri 0 F- 0- << 
--i (f) 0 wZ 
Z9 (D C\i 
cj 
o 00 LJO 
C\j 
(D 
ZD 
(0 
z 
(i 0 () "Z zz ,c OLLIM 
Z N 
:5 
0 
0 
0- LLJ 
X 
(D 
N E 2 . 
cc 
Lu 
CO 
CC 
, CC 
Q) 
0- 
cr ir M 
0 
as 
W 
N 
0) 
ý. o 
ca 
J: 
I= 0 0 U) . 9) 
0 :ýc i= c Z z ... 0 C80 1ES :3 cc -0 t! >10 0 
=. a cu 
= 
, '7 64 c 
N (1) 0; w, 
Cl 
'D CO 
(D 
c 0) 
LL 0 CC - 
004) 
It is important to underline that the Situado Conslitucional favours the most populous 
states, because 70% of its distribution is calculated on the basis of relative population 
levels. According to the statistics of the population census for the year 1990 (tablc 
4.2) the regions of greatest population concentration are in first place the Capital 
Region with 3,974,754 inhabitants, in second place the Central Region (Aragua, 
Carabobo and Cojedes) with 2,755,430 inhabitants, in close third the Western Central 
Region with 2,75-3,3317 inhabitants in 1990, and in fourth place the Zuliana Region, 
composed of a single state, Zulia, which had 2,235,305 inhabitants. Looking at the 
figures for the Situado Constilucional, the greatest transfer of resources in 1987 
(between 4 and 12%) was to six out of the ten states that formed these four regions 
(Map 4.1). 
Table 4. 2 PoUtilation and aflThJal vro%Ntli ratc: 1990 - 1981 
REGIONS AND % Growth per 
19 81 STATES 
CAPITAL 
1990 
3974754 
annu2 
1.65 3492184 
Dto. Federal 2103661 0,2 2070742 
Miranda 1871093 3.1 1421442 
CENTRAL 2755430 3.2 2087882 
Aragua 1120132 2.6 891623 
Carabobo 1453232 3.5 1062268 
CoJedcs 182066 15 133991 
LOSLLANOS 774035 3.55 581654 
Guarico 488623 2.4 393467 
Apure 285412 4.7 188187 
WESTERN 
CENTRAL 2753317 2.7 2174541 
Falcon 599185 1.9 5,03896 
Lara 1193161 2.6 945064 
Portuguesa 576435 3.4 424984 
Yaracuy 384536 2.8 300597 
ZULIANA 2235305 3.3 1674252 
Zulia 2235305 3.3 1674252 
LOS ANDES 2296330 2.3 1879586 
Barinas 424491 3 326166 
Merida 570215 2.4 459361 
Tachira 807712 2.3 660324 
Trujillo 493912 1.5 43373S 
NORTH 
EASTERN 2009510 2.1 1657951 
Anzoategui 859758 2.6 683717 
Monagas 470157 2.1 389ý36 
Sucre 679595 1.7 58%98 
INSULAR 263748 3.3 197198 
Nueva Esparta 20749 3.3 197198 
G UA VANA 1040591 3.4 770727 
Bolivar (Ah I; H) 3,4 668340 
Amazonas SS717 2,2 45667 
Delta Amacuro 84564 4.5 S6720 
Total 18103020 2.5 14515975 
Sourcei 0CF1 Vene,, tiel a. lkinographic S ituation 
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For 1990 (Map 4.2) the less populated states found in the Central Western region, in 
Guayana (with the exception of the state of Bolivar) and in the North-Eastern region 
of the country demonstrated the highest levels ofextreme poverty (between 20% and 
30% - and above) in the case of Apure and Delta Arnacuro. It is important, therefore, 
to make clear that whilst it is obvious that the relative population criteria is important, 
since one can suppose that the concentration of resources upon the Capital and 
Central regions reflects the concentration of population, on the other hand, it has 
contributed to the deepening of regional inequalities in those states with smaller 
population which are far from the centre of the country. The Siluado Constilucional 
when it is defined in this way does not establish any criteria for territorial 
compensation and as such in no way reflects any sense of territorial justice. 
Also in this period the growing and preponderant role of the Situado Constitucional in 
the composition of governorship resources, with respect to other sources of income 
can be seen. The internal incomes of the states had been diminishing in importance; 
for 1984 they constituted 11.3% of the resources, but by 1987 they were only 1.4%, 
confirming that, little by little, fiscal dependency on the centre acted to disincentivize 
the willingness of states to generating their own incomes (Table: 4.3). 
FýIhic \") , R, ý, -, il I nits 11)84-11)87 4., mit cc,, t)t' the Fcdcl 
1994 198S 1986 34-87 Rate of growth 
17, ) ;77 74ý)71 o 
Situado Constitucional 11015 3 15510.9 163544 63117.7 22.5 
Other 1335,7 985.0 1351.4 63309.4 25.5 
Contributions 
Own I ncome 17113 1441.8 1610.2 5144.6 -39.4 
(Source: Urdancla A, Martinez 0. L. and I, ope/ M "Venezuela Central izac ion v descentralizacion del Fsaado- p 29) 
IV. 2.3 Deconcentration of the National Public Administration 
Another point of importance within Venezuclan centralism is the form of' 
deconcentration operating in the national pLiblic administration, \vhich has given raise 
to the creation of a system of participation and representation of a scini-corporate 
character, that exists distinct and parallel to the strictly democratic. This carne to be a 
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counterpart to the social distribution of oil profits, which was the objective pursued 
by the state. According to Rey (1988) it was an attempt to remove a particular sector 
of decision-making from the area of centralised political control. This constituted a 
guarantee for various special interest groups. These were not only commercial sectors 
but more generally any group with sufficient power to provide support for the regime; 
this gave space to the proliferation of decentralized entities and enterprises of the state 
(Rey 1988, pp. 33-34). 
Since 1930, therefore, there had been an increase in ministerial schemes, autonomous 
institutes and decentralized entities. The autonomous institutes substituted for the 
ministry in functions that those bodies were unable to execute, such as the 
apportioning of credit and the promotion of development, or the improvement of 
public services. For their part, the decentralized entities fulfilled financial or 
productive functions, in the form of state companies or companies of the mixed 
economy. In this latter case the result was a 'centralized' national administrative 
deconcentration, which reinforced the concentration of the political power of the 
national executive, and specifically that of the president (Urdaneta, Martinez and 
L6pez 1990, pp. 31-35). 
'Presidentialism' came to be greatly reinforced by administrative deconcentration The 
importance of the public sector, as much in economic as in political terms and above 
all after 1970, produced a concentration of power in the executive which placed it far 
above the other powers. The direct subordination of these organisms to the president 
increased politico-administrative centralism and reinforced the concentration of 
power. Moreover, 'presidentialism' came to be further reinforced by the insignificant 
level of sanction that the legislative power was able to exercise over it. The 
concentration of power in the presidency increased its potency through the weak 
capacity for intervention possessed by the legislative power or congress in the affairs 
of the decentralized entities and organisms, and above all in the state businesses 
which functioned as private businesses. To these centralising tendencies must be 
added the partisan practice of "liberating from party discipline" the person who had 
been elected president. 
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IV. Z4 Bipartisanship and Clientelism 
Levine (1998) has called Venezuelan democracy "party democracy". This signifies 
that the political parties have effectively penetrated, controlled and organized social 
life, monopolizing resources and channelling political action. The parties grew 
together and were present at the creation of modem Venezuela. The parties also 
constituted important networks of identity and communication in a fragmented and, 
for the most part, illiterate society. Accepting the legitimacy of this system signified 
working within structures dominated by the parties, or working within a state 
apparatus also controlled by them (Levine 1998, p. 32); there could be no escaping 
their penetration. 
At the beginning of the period under study (1958) the pact was maintained by three 
parties: AD, COPEI and the URD, and the party of government was AD. The 
government had to confront attempts at military coups from both the left and the 
right, in particular the armed insurrection of the Communist Party and the MIR 
(Revolutionary Left Movement), a radical-led tendency of AD. After 1960 the pact 
broke up, followed by a coalition government of AD and COPEI. In 1962 another 
moderate tendency appeared called the AD-Opposition, which had an important 
following in the elite of the party, but which had little support in the bases. In 1968 
the AD suffered a third rupture that impeded its continuation in the presidency, and 
the subsequent elections were won by COPEI, the government of which lasted from 
1968 to 1973. Seven candidates in all were presented for the elections, which were 
marked by a strong fragmentation of the vote and fierce party competition. 
The multi-polar electoral map of the 1960s disappeared with the elections of 1973, 
and up to 1988 the dominant phenomenon was the polarization between AD and 
COPEI, and between their respective candidates. The bi-polarization during these 
fifteen years was much greater between the presidential candidates than between the 
legislators. Polarization grew at a pace with cross-voting, and the overall percentages 
obtained by the AD and COPEI grew impressively: 84.7% in 1973,89.9% in 1978, 
91.2% in 1983 and 96.3% in 1988. Despite representing the greatest presidential 
polarization of the era of representative democracy, the result of 1988 was, at the 
same time, the pre-announcement of the break-up of bi-partisanship (Sanpja 
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Herndndez 1998, p. 133). Moreover, a new modality appeared in the form of a third 
party, the Movement to Socialism (MAS), which converted itself from that time into 
the third political force in the country, a position which it would retain until the 
elections of 1993. 
Another point worth noting about this period concerns the municipal elections. The 
first of these were celebrated in 1948 by direct, universal and secret vote and were 
separated from the presidential elections. They would not, however, be held again 
until 1979. The parties requested the holding of new elections in 1963 and 1968, 
including the elections of governors, but congress always blocked it. The importance 
of the 1979 elections was that they produced a dramatic modification in the political 
map of the country. The electoral understanding reached between all of the parties of 
the left, as well as regional electoral grouping, to adopt with distinctive slates and an 
electoral platform that recognised the aspirations of the communities, gained them a 
significant representation. 
Between 1979 and 1989, according to Maingon-Sonntag (cited in Sanoja Hemdndez 
1998), the general political tendencies were: 
* The strengthening of regional leaderships, with the simultaneous consolidation of 
minority organizations that favoured the strategy of local and regional power, and the 
tendency towards the rupture of bi-partisanship. 
* The building of opposition alliances to the party of government, which were of a 
pragmatic, tactical character for obtaining the vote. 
* The increase of abstention. The loss of votes in all of the parties started to exert a 
pressure on the Venezuelan political framework. Abstention went from 30% in 1979 
to 47% in 1984 and 55% in 1989 (Sanoja Hemdndez 1998, p. 108). 
This situation occurred as a result of distortions that the political parties had 
introduced into the Venezuelan political system, through the tutelary relationship that 
they had imposed on civil society. The social organizations depended on the parties 
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and the state, which kept civil society in a marginalized and dependent condition. 
Revindication was only accessible through the informal systems of privilege, which 
left everyone who wasn't 'connected' with the parties outside the political process 
(Sanoja Hemdndez 199, p. 106). 
The parties made a deliberate and continued effort to penetrate social organizations 
(and all areas of potential organization) in order to incorporate leaders and members 
of the networks into the party structure, and submit them to the authority of the party 
leaders. This manner of articulation between political parties and civil society is 
referred to as 'clientelism'. Community organizations had no resources with which to 
remain autonomous, and thus became dependent on the parties. The measure of a 
leader within this system was judged according to a greater or lesser capacity to 
lobby, and navigate the advantages and inequalities that accumulated within the 
political system, a requirement that deepened the institutional deficiencies in the 
framing of demands. According to Levine and Crisp, political space was monopolized 
by the political parties: "Given the penetration of the parties into other groups of civil 
society and the highly disciplined form in which it was expected that political parties 
behave themselves, there existed a general idea that Venezuela was governed by the 
parties, a partidocracia, and not for the people who had elected them" (Levine and 
Crisp 1999, p. 12). 
IV. 2.5 Civil Society and the Conciliatory Democracy 
The initial processes of contemporary civil participation and organization were linked 
to the development of the political parties in this period of the democracy of 
mobilization. The citizenry formed themselves into unions, guilds, barrio committees, 
peasant leagues and student centres, that subsequently moved towards playing the 
role of intermediator between the citizens and the government they confronted. 
In the period of conciliatory democracy from 1961 up to the end of the 1980s, the 
formation of organizations began to intensify, leading to the emergence of the most 
important neighbourhood movements, environmental groups, co-operative 
movements and cultural organizations (in many cases closely linked to the Church); 
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as social movements they maintained a reclamatory, confrontational character, 
sometimes even welfarist. 
Socsal indicates that up to the middle of the 1970s, whatever their origins and initial 
aims and values, the development of civil society organizations increasingly came to 
be influenced by the interests of party politics. At this point, however, the co- 
operative movement, for instance, promoted initially by the state and international 
organisms in the context of middle-class values and as adjuncts to state plans of 
control, achieved the strengthening of its autonomy with the reform of the Ley de 
Cooperativos (Law of Co-operatives) in 1975. A similar situation arose at the end of 
the 1970s, after the promulgation of the Ley Orgdnica del Ambiente y del Reglamento 
sobre las Juntas Ambientales (Organic Law of the Environment and Governance of 
Environmental Groups), when local and neighbourhood organizations and ecological 
organizations were founded, both of an institutional and non-governmental character 
(Socsal 1997, p. 22). 
In the 1970s ecclesiastical base groups were also consolidated to support the Medellin 
and Pueblas Episcopal conferences of 1968 and 1978. These new organizations were 
influenced by sectors of the Catholic Church sympathetic to the poor, to Liberation 
Theology, and to the new currents of thought in the areas of illiteracy and popular 
education of Pablo Freire, which created a new paradigm in non-govemmental co- 
operation. At the same time there arose associations with intellectuals and 
professionals that had been formed in the revolutionary currents sweeping through 
Latin America, which opened spaces of encounter and discussion in the universities 
as much as in the public meeting areas (Ortega 1994, p. 126). 
In relation to the neighbourhood organizations, the first of these dated from 1936 
when they were formed in all of the barrios then existing in the country, and were 
called Communal Juntas. In 1961 the first neighbourhood organizations arose in the 
middle-class and upper-middle-class urbanizations to promote the control of urban 
growth, whereas in the poorer urban areas service centres were created to facilitate 
the public action substituting for the Communal Juntas (Rivero 1995, pp. 4-6). This 
differentiation of spatial contexts forced the community organizations of Venezuela 
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to present two faces in relation to their forms of struggle and their demands, and their 
dependency on the political parties. Whilst the urbanization organizations were 
formed to resolve problems of urban deterioration, the poverty-focused groups 
directed their demands towards basic necessities such as property and land titles, 
housing and public services, making these organizations particularly susceptible to 
the intervention of the parties, given the control that these same had over the 
resources necessary to satisfy such demands. 
In 1971 the Federation of Urban Community Associations (FACUR) was created, 
which from 1975 until 1980 increased the level of neighbourhood action and the 
demands for institutional reform at the local level. As an indication of the growth and 
importance of the struggle of these associations, in 1978 congress approved the Ley 
Orgdnica de Rigimen Municipal, the Organic Law of Municipal Governance 
(LORM), to legalize their status. The political parties felt themselves threatened by 
these emergent alternatives, and in 1979 congress established a party-biased 
regulation to determine mechanisms controlling the creation and action of such 
associations. The party hegemonies also responded by forming parallel associations 
and federations, such as the Communal Integration movement (IC) of the AD party, 
and the Federation of Neighbour Associations of COPS, constructed to win control 
of the neighbourhood movement (Riverol995, pp. 7-8). The pressure from 
neighbourhood groups for greater democracy continued, however, and in 1989 the 
Municipal Law of 1979 was modified to include the election of mayors; the party-bias 
of the regulatory regime was also modified to take into account local participation. 
From 1980 onwards, new neo-liberal organizations appeared that were orientated 
towards alternative projects for the economic and political organization of society. 
The Roraima Group became the first organization of this type in Venezuela, followed 
by the Centre for the Spreading of Economic Knowledge (CEDICE) in 1984. Both of 
these were integrated by the business sector, but the first of them included 
intellectuals, academics and social leaders. To these organizations must also be added 
the Neighbourhood Schools, considered by Garcia and Roa to be very much liberal in 
type. As objectives, such schools proposed the definition of a neighbourhood identity 
and ideology, the strengthening of neighbourhood organization and the opening of 
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channels of communication between neighbourhoods and the public sectors, as well 
as citizen education. 
The Roraima Group presented its political and economic proposals, framed in a 
liberal tradition, in two principal documents, one in 1983 entitled "Proposition to the 
Country: The Roraima Project - Plan of Action" that contained the economic 
lineaments, and another in 1987 called "More and Better Democracy", which was 
focused on the political proposals. 
In the economic field the group proposed a strategy denominated "Productive 
Venezuela", centred on economic liberty and responsibility and on a minimal state. In 
the second document a framework was set out for the modification of the political 
system; in this the democratisation of the electoral system had priority, the moving of 
government closer to administration, determining responsibilities, demanding the 
accountability and assessment of those in power and assigning rewards and 
punishments. This, it was proposed, would 'normalize' government in permitting the 
autonomous development of civil society through the opening of new spaces for 
dialogue, which would interrupt clientelism and the excessive power of the state. 
In the proposals of the Roraima Group the principles that characterize a liberal 
democratic model can be seen: representative democracy, a strong state of rights, an 
effective and efficient bureaucratic apparatus, social pluralism and the stimulation of 
private initiative, over and above the dichotomous model of liberalism for 
conceptualising the state. According to Garcia and Roa, this model loses specificity in 
being confused with the market, in which are included social organizations as much 
as economic ones; moreover, it obviates the public dimension of civil society (Garcia 
and Roa 1997, pp. 10- 14). 
For its part, CEDICE is a non-prof it organization orientated towards the teaching and 
spreading of economic knowledge, with special emphasis on assistance to young 
people. It is a group for the diffusion of liberal thought that seeks to influence public 
opinion in the political decision-making process, in other organisations and in the 
formation of national leadership; the organization seeks to model the cultural and 
ideological bases of Venezuelan society. 
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Freitez and WgUez (2000) signal that the most incisive critique of the state and the 
political parties had been coming from the business sector and the neighbourhood 
movements of the highly urbanized middle-classes. These latter had emphasized the 
necessity of strengthening civil society, as well as demanding participation in the 
organs of political representation and promoting new spaces of representation. 
Nevertheless, in the opinion of Freitez and Ydgilez the critique at heart concerned 
deconstructing the collective dimension that had played a fundamental role in the 
configuration of the state, and the organizations of social and political actors (Freitez 
and Ydgilez 2000, p. 133). 
Those organizations and movements closely linked to the church, the business sector 
and the communities continued to exercise pressure in search of greater democracy 
and decentralization of power, as fundamental elements for the rescuing of political 
spaces controlled by the parties. In 1989, as the result of pressure on the state, the 
implementation of a formal process of decentralization began; the struggle would 
commence with an insistence on political reform of the electoral process, by 
envisioning it as an area that must be appropriated for the achievement of consensus. 
By way of examining the synthesis, it is possible to divide the period of centralist 
democracy (1958-1988) into two stages as regards the evolution of social 
organization: 
a) In the first stage after 1961 the processes of community participation and 
organization became linked to the developments of the political parties, which 
translated this participation into unions, guilds, barrio committees, peasant leagues 
and student centres. Such institutions later passed to playing an intermediatory role on 
behalf of citizens facing the government. 
b) In the second stage, with the consolidation of representative democracy and up 
until the end of the 1980s, the formation of organizations began to intensify, and at 
this point the most important neighbourhood movements, environmental groups, co- 
operative movements and cultural organizations arose. 
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IV. 3 Antecedents of the State Reform 
The discussion on democracy and decentralization reviewed in the introductory 
chapter shows that the reform of the state was a part of the new economic 
implantation of neo-liberalism in Latin America, and came accompanied by the 
measures of structural adjustment. Even though this is a phenomenon extending 
throughout the American continent, the Venezuelan situation differs in some aspects 
from the other countries of the area. The Venezuelan state played an important 
protagonizing role in the modernization of the economy, as well as in the advance of 
the process of democratisation, even though from the beginnings of the 1980s this 
role began to be questioned. 
The collapse of the economy from 1983 onwards produced the destabilization of the 
political system that had been one of the central pillars of Venezuelan democratic 
centralism. The subsequent, massive capital flight to the exterior and the drop in 
hydrocarbon prices in 1979 forced the devaluation of the national currency (De la 
Cruz 1992, p. 17); all of this (added to the commitment to pay the external debt) 
generated the exhaustion of the country's international reserves, a fiscal crisis, 
recession (Komblith 1998, pp. 22-23) and the rapid deterioration of public services. 
The devaluation increased the rate of inflation and caused hoarding and speculation; 
the purchasing power of the bolivar deteriorated, and with this came a concomitant 
deterioration in the living conditions of the lower and middle classes. By contrast, the 
situation strengthened the exaggerated enrichment of those sectors linked to foreign 
exchange. 
Confronted with such a situation, it was not difficult for the ruling classes to foresee 
the approach of a period of political instability; the reduction in the quantity of 
resources available to the government presaged an increment in the conflicting 
complexity of Venezuelan society. Such a loss of economic support acted 
progressively to deepen the crisis, culminating in the weakening of the entire socio- 
economic model and the possibility of satisfying wider social demands. This in turn 
would impact on the deterioration of the legitimacy and, finally, the obstruction of the 
mechanisms for consensus and control of conflict. 
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The preoccupation of the leadership that had again taken up the reins of the 
democratic project of 1947 was centred on the viability of democracy and at the same 
time, on the control of areas of potential conflict. Both of these points were related to 
the pact of consensus between the political actors designed to guarantee 
governability, with the dominant role given to the parties to channel the demands of 
society using the mechanisms of 'decentralization' through the Situado 
Constilucional, deconcentration and regionalization. These, however, instead of 
contributing to the distribution of power, acted to reinforce its concentration in the 
executive. Nevertheless Brewer Carias (1988) has commented that it was the 
centralist form adopted by the state and the presence of a democracy of parties that 
made possible the establishment of democracy in the country (Brewer Carias 1988, 
p. 94). 
These mechanisms all showed signs of exhaustion as the reasons motivating their 
implementation ceased to be effective, and many actors began to demand the Political 
decentralization of the state as a base from which to achieve greater participation and 
representativity. The political actors felt worried by the increase in electoral 
abstention during the 1980s, which motivated the proposal to embark on electoral 
reform in order to improve and diversify the channels and mechanisms of political 
participation and representation, which had been shown to be too narrow and too 
scarce in the new environment. Stambouli (1993) has indicated that one of the 
proposals to confront dissent was the growth in the autonomy of action of the distinct 
components of the system, which would have been a possibility, liberating new forms 
of expression that had been repressed in the institutional bipartisan system (Stambouli 
1993, p. 32). 
In a different direction, the neo-liberal denunciations of the public administration 
began to be more frequent in Venezuela, placing the responsibility for all individual 
and social ills on the state. This anti-state discourse was championed by the powerful 
international financial organisms, whose support was necessary to confront the grave 
problems of the external debt, and which also permitted relief to the state from its 
fiscal burden, as well as the renovation of support from internal power groups, e. g. 
the enterprise sector and the unions, who would also be the beneficiaries of the 
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privatisation of many of the state enterprise sector. On the other hand, the neo-liberal 
discourse also meant the abandonment of regulating private economic activity so as to 
benefit the business sector, as well as abandoning the social and welfare policies in 
which could be seen the manifestations of populism. Generally speaking the planning 
of reform was seen as necessary to reduce the dimensions of the state. Moreover, 
given the incapacity of the state to bring about concialiation between the diverse 
interests of society and to assume responsibility for their conduct, it was proposed to 
substitute it for a form of semi-corporatism (a regime in which decisions would be 
made by the interests of the various actors, in place of those elected by the people), 
called 'the Social Pact' (Brewer Carias 1988, p. 168). 
According to Rey (1991), for these political actors the realization of true democracy 
would consist in the introduction of a system of privileges of a current, semi- 
corporate character for certain social groups that still had not benefited from the 
system. Nevertheless he argues that a corporate system is based on an unequal 
distribution of power and privileges in a manner that is incompatible with the basic 
values of democracy. This was even more the case in Venezuela, where broad sectors 
of society lacked other organizations that were not party-affiliated or affiliated to the 
unions controlled by them. Moreover, a widening of the system of privileges would 
encounter obstacles in the current situation of relative scarcity, and would only be 
viable in an economy with steady growth from oil profits, which is not something that 
could be reliably foreseen (Rey 1991, p. 569). 
On the contrary, to the extent to which the economy of the country is less dependent 
on external oil-based resources, conflicts of allocation are transformed into 
redistributive conflicts, and the problem does not consist of an increase in privileges, 
but rather which of the actual beneficiaries must be excluded from them. For the 
realization of true democracy it would have been better to eliminate the mechanisms 
of semi-corporate representation and participation, and reinforce democratic control 
over public decisions; for this, in addition, the distributive activities and the social 
policies of the state should be reinforced, as well as increasing its capacity for 
response to the demands of the majority. 
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IVAI The 1984 Commission for the Reform of the State 
In all of the governments of Venezuela of the 2 Oth century, including the 
dictatorships, a continuity of institutional actualisation is clearly visible, expressed in 
the first instance in the growth of decentralized administration begun in 1928. 
Nevertheless, the creation of the Commission of Public Administration (CAP) in 
response to the recommendations of a United Nations mission in 1958 would be the 
formal start of the reforms of public administration. In the period 1962-1968 the 
programme of administrative reform lost all governmental support, but in 1969, 
seeking to articulate administrative reform with the process of economic and social 
development, a process of regionalization was decreed. 
The national division of territory into 8 administrative regions, in addition to the 
implementation of mechanisms for planning and promoting development, attempted 
the progressive deconcentration of the decision-making power of the national 
authorities towards regional administration. It also pursued the achieving of a suitable 
form of participation for politico-territorial entities in regional decision-making. 
Without a doubt, this regional opening up contributed to the process of participation 
and dialogue in themes of national interest for many sectors of the provinces. In 1976 
the Commission of Public Administration was ended, and CORDIPLAN (The Central 
Off ice of Co-ordination and Planning) took its place. One year later the Ley Orginica 
de la Administraciýn Central (Organic Law of Central Administration) was passed, 
which re-formulated the ministerial structure, and subsequently the Ley Org6nica 
Municipal (Organic Municipal Law) of 1978 linked the municipalities to the process 
of regionalization. 
In this context of administrative reforms, the Confederation of Venezuelan Workers 
(the CTV) proposed the political reform of the state in 198 1. This is the first time that 
an important political actor had set out the necessity for a reform of the state that was 
to be understood as a re-definition of the global model of development, as well as a 
redistribution of political and social power (Rey 1988, pp. 23-24). At the end of 1984, 
through the implementation of Decree 430, the Presidential Commission for the 
Reform of the State was created (COPRE), as part of the supporting project of the 
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"Social Democracy Pact" and one of the indispensable pre-requisites for the strategic 
viability of the 7 th national plan. 
The first activities of COPRE consisted of defining its priorities and form of internal 
organization. The plan of action gave priority to the processes of democratisation and 
decentralization, as fundamental nuclei of the modernization of the state. The 
organization - was formed to begin with by three sub-commissions, and later by 
various working groups, arranged around the following topics: political reforms, 
public administration, decentralization, economic strategy, social policy, the 
administration of justice, education, science and technology and culture. The total 
membership of COPRE was 35 and the political orientation was inclined towards the 
party hegemonies of the AD and COPEI27 (G6mez y L6pez 1990, p. 86). Given the 
thematic broadness under consideration by the state reform project it must be 
considered as the most complete since that of 1958, given that it was not limited 
exclusively to examining the area of public administration so much as embarking on 
the conjoining of public powers, and it did not propose purely technical objectives for 
the improvement of the efficiency and effectiveness of public powers, if not that they 
should achieve political objectives. 
This corresponded with the ideas relating efficiency and democracy to the political 
strategy of the discourse of the President of the Republic, at the inauguration of the 
COPRE: 
"The Venezuelan state is recognizably inefficient. On the one hand it is about habits 
refined at distinct levels, where inertia is perceived to be the mechanism for 
excellence; on the other hand it is about a type ofgrowth belonging to a rentier, oil- 
addicted society which tries to achieve results on the basis of an expenditure that is 
every time bigger and less productive. Even so, democracy has attained undoubtedly 
important objectives in the last quarter of a century, but the truth is that the manner 
27 Gomez Calcaflo-Lopez Maya has elaborated an outline of the political orientation of the members 
of COPRE: for the AD party 9 members, and independent but pro-AD 6; for COPE[ 5 members, MAS 
I and pro-MAS independents 1, MEP 1, URD 1, independent left-inclined 2, and independent others 6 
(Gomez Calcafio-Lopez Maya 1990, p. 9 1). 
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in which these important objectives have been reached has not opened the most ideal 
paths to participation (COPRE 1990, p. 87). " 
The reform was conceived of within a political perspective, which takes into account 
the fact that the whole reform process implies altering the relationships of power in 
society. Rey (1988) points out that COPRE took as a basic principle the re- 
articulation of relationships between the different branches of public power and civil 
society. The commission considered all public powers at all levels of decision in 
terms of how their technical and political objectives contributed towards the 
establishment of a modern, essentially democratic state, as well as where the 
postulates of the Constitution in terms of citizen participation came into force as an 
effective element in the taking of decisions by public powers (Rey 1988, p. 24). 
Moreover, the process of reform had to propitiate the advance of decentralization, the 
perfecting of a state of rights, the professional ization of public administration, the 
modernization of state action and the transformation of the legislative power, within a 
framework of an audacious fight against corruption and an effort to give the greatest 
lift to ethical values and the cultural transformation of society (COPRE 1989, p. 5). 
IV. 3.2 Tendencies of the proposed reform 
From the beginning of the 1980s, a consciousness of the necessity of introducing 
changes into the conduct of the process of democratisation, as well as the redefinition 
of its objectives, made itself evident. Equally, documents were produced by a variety 
of some political and social actors within an effort to outline an exit to the so-called 
political crisis, without the existence of any prior consensus about the character and 
specific forms that the redefinition of the relationship between state and society must 
adopt. 
The institutional space that opened for the discussion of the reform of the state would 
be dominated essentially by two groups. On the one hand, those who wanted to apply 
measures of Neoliberal adjustment (which had already been initiated between 1978 
and 1983 by the government of Herrera Campis) reflecting the perspective of the 
business sectors (Fedecdmaras) and related intellectuals. On the other side, there were 
those who believed that the roots of the problems lay not in the size of the state, nor in 
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its interference in social life, but rather in the weakness of a state confronted by 
established economic groups and the control which the political parties exercised over 
the organizations of the sectors subordinated to them. 
The first group saw the democracy of conciliation as a form of welfare state which, 
they saw as incompatible with the development of initiative and private commerce, 
and they sought to modify the text of the constitution of 1961 substantially. In their 
vision, the reform should consist of a reduction in the intervention of the state in 
society and in the economy, whilst the major ideological obstacle to overcome would 
be populism. The second group proposed the re-organization of political space and 
the creation of innovative forms of social control, through agreements of 
understanding and openness between social actors. This would be something similar 
to the model of conciliation, but incorporating new rules that would diminish the 
centralizing tendencies, and allow the political parties to play a protagonistic role, but 
without suffocating civil society. Moreover, this latter group proposed 
decentralization at all levels, seeking to guarantee governability and political stability 
for the regime by increasing the efficiency of the state in the provision of services to 
communities (G6mez and L6pez 1990, pp. 53-55). 
According to Blanco (1993), the executive secretary of COPRE, the strength of the 
pressure for change would finally submit the state apparatus to changes without 
precedent in the 20'h century. These forces had emerged from a society seeking to 
deepen the 'horizontal ization' of relationships, in sharp antagonism to the dominant 
concentrating and centralizing tendencies, in order that the state might achieve a more 
responsible form of political representation. Blanco indicates that in reality these were 
forces that from new bases prompted a double movement of both decomposing and 
recomposing the state, that is not simple substitution, but rather the elaboration of 
new functions which would substantially alter the relationships between the state and 
civil society (Blanco 1993, p. 72). 
According to Herndndez (1993) the process began at the regional level. In civil 
society regional elites had been formed as a product of provincial economic activity, 
and the efforts to educate the population. These sectors, together with the groups 
formed in ecological, neighbourhood, and sporting struggles began pressuring 
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towards a reform of the electoral system and the political system, so that ultimately 
they converted themselves into opinion-forming movements, thanks to the role played 
by the communications media (Hernandez 1993, p. I 10). For his part, De La Cruz 
(1992) argues that the interests and demands of civil society at that moment were 
formulated through sectoral politics, specifically through themes such as the 
autonomy of parties with respect to the state, political activism and the capacity to 
generate political opinion. In addition, the majority of public opinion simply opposed 
bureaucracy and united with the proponents of decentralization (De La Cruz 1992, 
p. 25). 
One can also clearly distinguish the contrasting positions. In the documents and 
actions of the political parties, unions and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). 
The partisan neo-liberal tendency sought to orientate the reform of the state towards a 
reduction in what was presented as the excessive intervention of the state society and, 
in particular, economic life. They demanded a decentralization of Venezuelan 
political administration, centred on the privatisation of state businesses and a 
rationalization of the administrative structure in order to reduce public expenditure. 
This view accepted the democratisation of the political system at heart because it 
would contribute to diminishing party political influence in all spheres of national 
life. 
The other tendency was of the centre-left, which attributed the limitations of 
development to the elitist character of the political system in favouring the most 
organized groups and those of the greatest power, all to the detriment of the majority. 
This posture underlined the weakness of the state in the face of the pressure of the 
strongest economic groups and the relationships of power and manipulation that the 
party apparatuses exercised over the state and civil society. The leftist groups 
proposed the achieving of greater control by the electors over the elected, by 
democratising the internal structure of the political parties and institutionalising the 
channels of participation, which is to say the democratisation and decentralization of 
all levels of the political system (Urdaneta, Martinez y L6pezI 990, p. 57). 
In this context of tendencies and ideas, the results of debates on proposals for political 
reform proposed the deepening of democracy within political parties themselves, 
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reforms to the suffrage laws, popular, direct and secret elections of governors of the 
federal entities, reforms to the laws governing municipal government, as well as those 
governing the financing of political parties. The presentation of these conclusions to 
the public generated a wide polemic in which many different sectors of the country 
participated, and in spite of strong resistance on the part of the governing AD party to 
their approbation, reforms to the suffrage laws, the laws for direct election of 
governors, and laws governing the reform of the municipalities were all discussed by 
the Venezuelan congress in 1988. As can be seen, all of the proposals relating to the 
decentralization of power that were discussed in the original (COPRE) document had 
acquired a major place in Venezuelan political debate and would act to promote far 
greater participation by civil society in political representation, and at the same time, 
gave great support to the political and administrative decentralization of the state. 
Conclusions 
A key theme in the development of this chapter is the change that has come about in 
the diagram of power that had dominated at the end of the I 9th century. The form of 
the state that had its beginnings with Castro and G6mez would have a marked 
difference from the preceding forms, and this change would express itself in the 
predominance of the centralist form, without its federal component. In this diagram, 
political ends would be decided by the "Federation" meanwhile the autonomous states 
as they had been in the I 9th century would be converted into political agents of the 
central government. This would be the scheme that would last until 1989 - federalism 
came to be, more and more, a formal element of the liberal state. 
The second important theme outlined in the chapter is related to the creation, at the 
beginning of the century, of the bases for the exercise of a nearly absolute 
governmental dominion over the territory of Venezuela. The establishment of an 
army and the development of certain infrastructure for economic and military 
operations began to articulate the regions of the country, and this would also 
eliminate the tensions occasioned by the regional caudillos who, found themselves 
increasingly impeded in their affairs by an increasingly organized and numerous 
army. This element would come to be reinforced by oil exploration, and consequently 
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by the support of the North American oil companies, once they acquired domination 
over the Venezuelan market. 
The third theme worthy of note with reference to the political has to do with the 
vertiginous process of democratisation that occurred after the death of G6mez, 
through the strong social pressure which arose in response to his dictatorship and 
which immediately sought channels for the democratisation of the state. Organized 
resistance to the dictatorship had been clandestine, based around the political parties 
of the time, the oil workers unions and civil society, and after the death of G6mez in 
1935 there would continue for nearly a decade a regime of transition to democracy, 
led by military factions and classified by some authors as a "populist system of 
mobilization". In the later years of this decade the Democratic Action party was 
organized, consolidating itself with the Social Christian Party and the Communist 
Party. The period that began with the death of G6mez and ended with the overthrow 
of President M6dina has been called a period of mobilization, whereas that which 
ended with the fall of R6mulo Gallegos in 1948 was known as the Trienio Adeco 
(1945-1948). 
The Trienio had important consequences for the conciliatory populist democracy that 
was established in 1958, as well as for the manner in which the federal component of 
the liberal democratic state was implemented and the decentralization of state and 
municipal governments. The process of democratisation begun in 1945-1948 which 
implemented universal suffrage, instead of deepening the distribution of power to 
local and regional levels of government, reinforced the inherent centralist tendencies - 
not the centralist tendency of the I 9th century, however, but rather a new model which 
dominated in the long period of the Gomecista dictatorship of the 20'h century, where 
the federal component had no role to play. Moreover, the federal character that had 
previously been maintained by legislation was cancelled through the elimination of 
state judicial competence, in the democratic constitution of 1947 and through the 
introduction of the Situado Constitucional in an administratively decentralized 
manner. Political decentralization was also discussed and approved within fierce 
ideological confrontations in the Constituent of 1946-47, and some of the leaders of 
Democratic Action had always showed their reservations about implementation 
(Veldsquez 1997, p. 155). When the proposals for elections to governorships were 
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realized, which rather than enclosing within themselves all that was signified by 
political decentralization looked towards their antecedents in the constitution of 1864 
and the Federal Revolution, the "Adecos " refused to implement them. 
Democracy was restored in 1958 around the broad consensus a variety of political and 
social actors, and the most prominent point to mention here would be the formation of 
important utilitarian mechanisms that would stabilize representative democracy for 
more than 30 years. This also explains how the verticality of power could be 
maintained and deepened in this democracy of conciliation, without the necessity of 
implementing political decentralization and how, in spite of this, the stability of the 
regime was achieved. Supported by socio-political factors, conciliatory democracy 
recognized and gave attention to the plurality of minority and majority interests, 
guaranteed to powerful national and international sectors that their interests would not 
be threatened by the application of democratic rules. Moreover, this democracy 
assured control of the population, and at the same time trust in representative 
democracy was fortified. 
These utilitarian mechanisms counted for their implementation on the availability on 
the part of the state of oil profits, the use of which avoided conflicts antagonistic to 
the distributive processes so long as the redistribution of these same did not imply 
affecting any one sector in order to benefit other social sectors. But there were also 
only a limited number of organizations considered trustworthy that could be inserted 
in the state through mechanisms of a semi-corporative nature, which brought support 
to governments so long as they were capable of articulating diverse interests and 
processing their demands towards decision-making organizations. Bipartisan rule was 
implemented from the end of the 1960s, and a condition for the development of 
conciliation with centralism and without decentralization was that the number of 
political actors with the authority from the sectors they represented to reach 
agreement was relatively small. This scheme of power designed to achieve relatively 
stable government was, and had been from its very beginnings, incompatible with 
political decentralization. 
Political decentralization is a means of distributing power which (by its very nature) 
is accompanied by the multiplication and incorporation of new spaces of power and 
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decisions, implying in its turn a greater participation and mobilization of political 
actors. It was logical for the Venezuelan political elites of the period to suppose that 
the presence of multiple political actors would complicate political negotiations, and 
introduce elements of instability in the political system of conciliatory democracy, 
especially since they would not necessarily be under the control of party hegemonies. 
Such institutionalised instability might have come to pass if the naming of governors 
and mayors had been submitted to public scrutiny, given that this would have 
multiplied by the hundreds new spaces of decisions. Thus, the populist scheme of 
conciliation had a different mechanism at base that favoured the structuring of 
democracy through party elites, and which impeded the implementation of political 
decentralization because of the disadvantages it had for this scheme of power. 
Nevertheless, the leaders who supported the centralist party democracy, faced with 
political crisis, began to look behind them from 1984 onwards, and to promote from 
above a reform of the state that promised more participation. Some of the elements 
that had guaranteed the governability and stability of the democratic scheme of 1958 
had begun to change by the end of the 1970s, which led the principal political actors 
of the semi -corporative pact (CTV and Fedecdmaras) to reconsider purely 
administrative reform of the state. There had been a change in oil income to such an 
extent that the previous bonanza had almost ceased, and this had affected above all 
the payment of external debt, which grew rapidly with the interest payments agreed 
with creditors. In a parallel fashion the denunciatory policies towards the welfare state 
and against the political parties promoted by the multi-lateral organisms (the IMF, 
World Bank and IBD) began to provoke fractures in the image of the political system 
of democratic conciliation. 
This critique was adopted especially by the business sector, which drew up supporting 
documents and appeared from that time onwards in the company of groups of 
intellectuals and the inhabitants of urbanized sectors of Caracas, themselves 
organized around the neighbourhood associations and representing Venezuelan civil 
society. Nevertheless, criticism of the political parties also came from other sectors of 
the political and intellectual system, which came to constitute the counterpart in this 
debate over reform of the state that had previously been adopted. The debate re- 
opened ideas on the community of values and the normative orientations of 
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democracy, and the decentralization of state and local powers once again came under 
consideration. As in all processes where the interconnection between politics and the 
political is present, during this opportunity civil society played an important role. 
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Chapter V 
DEMOCRACYAND DECENTRALIZATION IN VENEZUELA 
1989-2002. 
Introduction 
As was indicated in the previous chapter, the democratic regime established in 
Venezuela from 1958 onwards was characterized by the widespread domination of 
the activities of political parties, and the observance of the Pacto de Punto Fijo, as a 
result of which the period from 1958-1989 is known as the 'Conciliatory Democracy, 
or the Centralist Party Democracy'. The political parties assumed a monopoly on 
participation and representation at all levels of the state and of society. This could 
have been considered necessary in order to initiate the process of democratization. 
However, with the passage of years, the parties were transformed into an apparatus of 
the leadership, alienated from the electors and exercising control over the will of the 
citizenry. As a result, the democratic process was itself weakened, so that to a great 
extent the crisis of Venezuelan democracy is the crisis of the political parties. 
At the end of the 1980s, the country was confronted by a crisis of govemability2s, and 
the govemment of the time put into operation a neo-liberal project of structural 
adjustment sponsored by the IMF. Notwithstanding this, the process of 
democratization appeared to awaken from its long period of stagnation, and the 
ensuing decade would bring more than a few surprises for institutional democracy. 
Many events of a particular and circumstantial nature would appear on the scene: the 
social protests and the armed institutional repression of February1989 as an 
28 The term crisis of governability is associated with the neo-liberal proposal sponsored by the 
multilateral institutions at the end of the 1980s. As Bobbio has suggested, these institutions tried to 
highlight the suppose incapacity of the democratic governments to control conveniently the conflicts 
that arise in the social and political context (Bobbio 1997(b), pp. 103-104). Notwithstanding, in 
Venezuela, the emergence of a pluralist, diverse civil society in the new hegemonic context suggests 
the necessity of replacing this terminology. As Morgan Quero (2000) has pointed out that the 
alternative could be the notion of governmental ity mentioned before in Chapter I and 111. 
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expression of the verticality of power, the redistribution and decentralization of 1989, 
the military coups of 1992 and the presidential destitution of 1993, fracturing of the 
traditional hegemony and the fragmentation of political parties. The quantitative and 
qualitative retreat of civil society in 1995, the blocs of refounded parties (the Polo 
Patri6tico of the MVR, PPT and the MAS and the Polo Democritico of Proyecto 
Venezuela, COPEI and AD) in 1998. 
Through such events, the closure of the decade would be characterized by the 
political phenomenon of the growth of a new hegemony and new constitutional bases 
that favoured citizen participation. The political sectors that took power in 1998 
proposed an alternative project to that of neo-liberalism, which sought to construct a 
participatory democracy of mobilization. In the new Constitution, more than 56 
articles were dedicated directly or indirectly to citizen participation, in contrast to the 
Constitution of 1961 that had supported the representative democracy of the parties. 
At the beginning of the 21't century, however, more precisely in April 2002, 
democracy would see itself menaced again by a coup detat. 
All of the above occurred principally within the field of the institutional struggle to 
re-establish governability and maintain hegemony. To begin with this struggle 
occurred within the institutionalised political forces of social democracy and the new 
neo-liberal tendencies which had been propelling their project within Venezuela from 
the end of the 1970s. From 1993 onwards the political frame began to change, and by 
the middle of 1998 the hegemonic struggle expanded to include emergent forces from 
the military sector, from civil society and from the old Venezuelan left. At the end of 
1998 a new hegemony was established in the country, in such a manner that in the 
period 1989-2000 there are three distinct moments: 
I)A phase of institutional struggle between the social-democratic and neo- 
liberal tendencies in the context of a crisis of governability and political 
decentralization (1989-1993). 
145 
2) A phase of diminished neo-liberal domination29 and the deepening of 
decentralization (1993 -1998). 
3) A phase of changes in party-political hegemony and of institutional changes 
(1999-2000) - This included amongst others a new constitutional text, new public 
powers, a widening of the rights of citizens and changes in the conformation of civil 
society. 
The intention of this chapter is to construct a scenario that will facilitate our 
understanding of these stages; through a consideration of democracy, participation in 
elections, civil society and political decentralization in Venezuela. As can be deduced 
from the antecedents that have already been outlined, this period reflects new 
political realities. That is to say that political decentralization from 1989 gave 
Venezuelan democracy certain features that were not present in the period of the 
centralized democracy of the parties. Now more recently with the new Constitution of 
1999, new elements are being incorporated into the principle of decentralization. 
These changes will inevitable have a notable impact upon the unfolding of the current 
process of democratization through the influence that civil society now exerts in 
ensuring that the decisive levels of power increase their reciprocity and their impact 
upon local politics. The progressive changes that have occurred have been surprising, 
above all in the articulation between the organizations of civil society and the 
structures of power over the past decade. 
Given these elements it is important to analyse what 
has happened, and what influence political decentralization has had on the democratic 
life of Venezuela during the recent process of democratisation, as well as how this 
dynamic is interwoven with the emergence of civil society with its quantitative and 
qualitative growth, and of course with the growth in citizen participation. This 
dynamic shows that the rise of civil society increased through the same measures that 
weakened the traditional party structure and this phenomenon appears to be the key to 
29 it is called diminished neoliberal domination because several measures of structural adjustment, 
such as privatization and IMF policies were implemented. 
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understand what has happened. The types of questions that need to be addressed in 
exploring these processes include: 
* What role has decentralization played in the breaking of the control the political 
parties exercised over civil society? 
How has civil society been drawn towards decentralization? 
How has citizen participation been promoted at the local level? 
* In what sense has the development of new movements and organizations of social 
resistance been advanced? 
V. 1 First stage: The institutional struggles between the social- 
democrat and neo-liberal tendencies in the context of the 
crisis of governability and political decentralization, 1989- 
1993 
The year 1989 was crucial in the history of Venezuela over the second half of the 
20th century. The importance of the events that took place show this clearly: the 
putting in operation of the programme of structural adjustment, the social uprising of 
February 27th and the first direct elections for governorships, mayors and municipal 
authorities. These events were mixed up with each other and acted to influence the 
new pathways which, conjointly, the political and politics would take in the national 
territory. 
At the beginning of the government of Carlos Andrds Pdrcz (in February of 1989) in 
the face of the strangulation of the rentier economy, macroeconomic adjustment 
policies were implemented which became known in Venezuela as the "Economic 
Packet". The Packet was adjusted to the requirements established by the multilateral 
organisms, which were intended to re-establish macroeconomic stability (Milward 
2000, pp. 33-34). Measures that would be implemented were announced immediately 
together with others of a more progressive application (but still over a relatively short 
period of time). They included decisions over exchange policy, the freeing of markets 
in goods and services, arrangements for the external debt, and decisions on fiscal 
policy. All of this was conducted under the tutelage of the IMF in order to obtain, 
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over a period of three years, the sum of around US$4,500 million (Kornblith 1998, 
P-9). 
The application of these measures had been delayed by Venezuela's party democracy 
for many years, but by the end of the 1980s the urgent need for financial resources 
meant that action could be delayed no longer. Nevertheless, the very level of 
adjustment required from accumulated pressures within Venezuelan society meant 
that the government could expect a strong reaction against the measures - naturally, 
these would come neither from the corporate entities, nor through direct routes from 
civil society. The parties had closed down the channels of expression available to 
civil society through their control of the central unions and neighbourhood 
associations, and this had hitherto acted as a guarantee of civic immobility. Perhaps it 
was for this reason that no social policy was outlined with which to alleviate the 
negative effects which could be expected to arise from the adjustments; moreover, the 
government were security in the results of the most recent presidential elections of 
1988. 
Whatever the expectations of the government, the violent mobilizations on February 
27th 1988 of a population disarticulated from the mechanisms of consensus surprised 
them. The mobilizations started with the sacking of approximately 1000 local 
business and industrial outlets in which nearly a million people took part in Caracas 
alone, and which spread rapidly to the other important cities of the country. For five 
days the government retaliated and attempted to repress the uprisings, causing more 
than 1,000 casualtieS 30(Coronil and Skuriski 199 1, p. 29 I). 
The impact of the urban revolt on the population in general and on the soldiers who 
took part in the repression, would have dramatic effects on political developments in 
the decade that followed. For Richard Gott (2000) this event marked the beginnings 
30 The "Caracazo" had major international repercussions, not only because of the gravity of the 
events themselves, but because of the relationship that these established with the policies of the IMF. A 
short while after the events in Venezuela, the inhabitants of the squatter salements in Argentina took 
to the streets of the cities of Rosario and Buenos Aires to confront the neo-liberal adjustment put in 
place by President Menem with looting and sacking (Medina 2001, p. 64). 
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of the contemporary history of Venezuela, and the beginnings of the end of the old 
regime. The population had taken to the streets in the same way as thirty years 
previously in January of 1958, when the dictatorship or Pdrez Jimdnez was 
overthrown under the leadership of the Junta Patriota. But this time, through accident, 
anarchism and leaderlessness, the populace sought only to demonstrate its discontent 
with a corrupt and bureaucratic government, with its mere facade of democracy (Gott 
2000, p. 45). 
In trying to explain these events, the reasons that surface are generally socio-political 
or socio-economic in type; very few are geopolitical. For example, Hernindez 
suggests that with the application of structural adjustment measures, diverse sectors 
of society found themselves with an even greater distance between their desires and 
the possibility of their satisfaction. It was this that led to the explosion of civil 
society. The belligerence of this explosion was symptomatic of various trends: the 
deterioration in quality of life for much of society, processes of modernization, and 
the awakening of a citizen consciousness (HernAndez 1993, p. 114). 
Nevertheless, there is another aspect that has not as yet been touched on in the 
analysis of these events. The social organization of civil society is spatial. In the 
smallest barrio or community, individuals organize themselves around their needs, 
conscious of their rights as citizens. Excluded groups in their own environment 
weave a tightly-woven mesh of ties of loyalty and solidarity. This was the space in 
which discussion took place. It was here that actions were planned around a natural 
leadership outside the formal structures of domination. And this geopolitical 
dimension acquires even more meaning, when it is realized that it is exactly such an 
interwoven mesh of actions and discourses that permits and guarantees an organized 
civil society. 
In the same way, the negative effects of the "Neo-liberal Packet", together with the 
loss of legitimacy of the political parties and the endemic corruption of the state 
apparatus, were later related to the two attempted military coups of 1992. Of these 
two attempted coups which had distinct ideological orientations, the first had been 
organized in the barracks by medium-ranking officers and, as such, had not particular 
commitment to the governments of AD. Moreover, it was related to sectors of civil 
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society and the emerging political parties of the left, strengthened by the 
decentralization of the elections of 1989. 
In the face of such circumstances the crisis of governability deepened. The 
government lost support when the political parties in Congress, including the party of 
the government and its own economic organizations, tried to distance themselves 
from the neo-liberal discourse. An attempt was made to convert the government and 
its neo-liberal measures into the parties responsible for the crisis. Later on, candidates 
for the presidency in 1993 would develop a counter-discourse that opposed to any 
agreement with the IMF that implied market-based policies (Garcia, G, and Roa, C. 
1997, p. 20). Nevertheless, two years later the government of Caldera would initiated 
the programme "Agenda Venezuela", in compliance with IMF instructions. 
Rey and Pab6n (2000) indicate that the crisis of governability in the period 1989- 
1992 was not produced by an excessive concentration of power in the government, 
but rather due to the fact that the government adopted neo-liberal policies which were 
rejected by the majority of the population. Since the 1970s an increasingly neo-liberal 
political current had been developing which, came to propose the reform of the 
Constitution of 1961 in order to free it from its populist, socialist burden. A further 
proposal was the drastic diminution of state and governmental power. This current, 
even though it was always in the minority and its adepts mainly in the upper and 
middle classes, influenced the policies of the second presidency of Pdrez (Rey and 
Pab6n 2000, p. 246). 
The crisis of February 27th 1989 and the military coups of 1992 shattered the 
institutional cement of the party democracy. The same 'democracy' which had been 
considered by Washington during many years to be a model for Latin America. Even 
the most deeply rooted convictions were weakened by these events, such as, the 
supposed popular passivity and the control of institutional ity over the military. The 
lack of trust the of the Venezuelan population in bipartisan democracy transformed 
itself into increasing levels of electoral abstention, Surveys undertaken in 1989 
revealed the retreat from an rejection of politics, parties and institutions such as 
congress and the system ofjudicial power (Upez, M. and Lander, L. 1999, p. 43). 
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Face by the significance and extent of these events, the leadership of the diverse 
corporate sectors were promote deep transformations in state-civil society relations. 
The unforeseen and explosive character of the 27th of February accelerated the 
putting into practice of some of the measures discussed and programmed by COPRE. 
By December of 1989, the first state governorship and mayoral elections had been 
held, and changes had been made to the suffrage laws. 
These measures had already been implemented in other Latin American countries 
where civil society rested on a stronger network of relationships and had different 
economic and socio-political heritages from that of oil-dependent Venezuela. 
Nevertheless, they put in action a socio-political and institutional trend of the 20th 
century. Confronted by a crisis of representation, they acted as a means whereby the 
state could maintain control (Velisquez 1998, p. 16). The direct elections of governor 
and mayors provoked change in the conduct of politics. 
V. 1.1 The beginnings of Political Decentralization: The First 
Governorship Elections of 1989 
In order to analyze the governorship elections of 1989, this section begins by 
observing the changes in the party system inside the states with the emergence of 
MAS (Movimiento al Socialismo) and the Causa R. These were two emergent 
minority parties of the left that won two governorships, MAS in the state of Aragua 
and the LCR in Bolivar, this latter located in the mining region of Guayana. In 
Carabobo a third new regional party called "Project Carabobo " triumphed in alliance 
with COPEI and MAS. This was linked to the industrial sectors of the region, and 
displaced the AD hegemony that had lasted for decades. In the state of Miranda (in 
the capital region) and the oil-wealthy state of Zulia, MAS participated in an alliance 
with COPEI (the social christian party). Aragua, Carabobo, Miranda and Zulia are 
located in the north-central and coastal regions, and have the highest percentages of 
the population on the electoral register (Table: 5.1). 
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'I able 5.1 Hections of 1989 - neA parties mnd their a Ilia nces, % %ote%-clccto)ra I pooo IaI ton 
Aragua NIIAS ýI o2 
Bolivar La Causa R 42 46 
Carabobo cope i-MAS-P. Carabobo 46 78 
Miranda Copei-MAS 44 1 () .; 
zti lia Cor)ei-MAS 39 if s 
Source: Conse. jo Supremo electoral (('Sf-. ) 
The summary of the elections of December 1989 shows that ol'20 governorships, AD 
achieved the majority in 11, COPEI in 6+ Proyecto Venezuela, MAS and LCR In 
one each (see the map of 1989). Under the centralized scheme all oftlic governors 
would have belonged to AD. However, in the ma Jority ofgovcrnorshIps won by AD, 
the winners were P6rez supporters, this helped to separate him even more froni the 
machinery of his party (Sanoja 1998, p. 160). 
The reading of these first direct and popular elections brings up a number ot'diff'erent 
characteristics. For one thing, there was a personalization and a localization of the 
vote in the state and municipal environment, and an opening ofnew political spaces 
for the minority parties and for the forniation ofnew oppositions. 
In terms of the number of political parties and organizations that participated in tile 
process were concerned, the states with the greatest number were Anzoýitegui with 
10, Carabobo with 10, Miranda with 15, Yaracuy with II and Zulia vvith 15, which 
was where the COPEI-MAS alliance predominated. In the rest of' tile states tile 
number oscillated between 4 and 9 new organizations and parties, Apurc, Barinas, 
Falc6n and Trqilllo had the least numbers. 
Another aspect arising from these elections was the high level of' abstention, 
indicating that these first governorship arid municipal elections did not create In tile 
electorate the "civic enthusiasin" that thev were supposed to. I Inill 1988 tile level of' 
abstention in national elections had been low, tile averagc level of'. 1h. -stention if) tile 
six previous elections had been 9.8% (Molina 1995, p. 30). From 1989 01INUI-LIS 
abstention began to convert itselfinto the dominating characteristic, above all in thc 
regional elections as will be sho"n in analysis later in this chapter, during the period 
ot'decentralization. 
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One of' the reasons behind the high abstention was the separation, in time, of' the 
Presidential elections from the regional - because Presidential tcndcd to influence the 
voting intentions of' the electorate. On the other hand. the regional elections were 
relatively new and the electoral procedures complicated: there were neý, % electoral 
system, changes in the laws relating to suffrage. spatial electoral units that changed 
From election to election, the existence of distinct types ot'election (govcrnor. mavor, 
councillors, parish councils), in some cases the electorate did not know the 
programmes of government of the candidates. These I'actors made the participation of' 
the electorate more diflicult. 
Whilst abstention at the national level reached 54.84% (Table: 5.2), at tile regional 
level it was even higher. The states of Miranda, Sucre. Carabobo, Lara Bolivar and 
the Federal District had the highest levels of abstention at 68.6%, whilst tile lowest 
figures were from the states of Delta Amacuro. Nueva Esparta, CoJedes, Falc6n, 
Barmas and Zulia. Those were regions where the bipartisan electoral machinerý 
remained dominant. 
'I able: S. - Abstention Fwnires: ( io\cmoi,, 
htp I lectiow, 1981) 
Dto I-edcral 68,0', o DLIta Arnacuro 4., -11 . 
Miranda t) 1,5% Nueva Esparta 1ý951111 
Bolivar 55,8% Cojedes 45.0". 
Sucre 55,5% Falc6n 45,4% 
Carabobo 55,5% Barinas 4 8,5 ',, ý 
Lara 57,4% zulia 49.371. 
National Total- 54.8% Natiom 
Iýourccý Conse. jo Suprcino I: lecloral 
An additional factor was that the direct elections for mayor (linked to local spaces of 
decision and to proportional representation personalised hý (lie selection of 
COLUICillors) had been completelv controlled by the traditional political parties. the 
AD and COPFI. In the whole country there %ýere 261) mayors selected, and the party 
ot'goverrimcnt (AD) achieved 151 mayora I ties, \\Iillst ('01111 got 105. N evert lie less, 
'it this level the process was beneficial to the two parties ofthe left as \\ell (NI., \S and 
I. C10 which obtained 10 and 2 mayoralties respectively. As \\ell, -, 
8.4"(, of tile 
candidates ran in coalitions, and diverse parties allied themselves in different 
combinations, ofwhich in only two cases was tile policy ofalliance decisive for the 
jil 
AD. The alliances in which COPEI took part were a determining factor in triumphs 
for 25 mayoralties, in 17 of which it participated in an alliance with the MAS 
(Kornblith 1998, pp. 49-52). The study of these alliances in the period of 
decentralization is an important key to an understanding of the fragmentation of the 
old party system during the formation of a new system of parties and the construction 
of a new hegemony. 
V. 1.2 The disarticulation of the Democratic pact of 1961 and the Second 
Governorship Elections of 1992 
The second direct elections for governorships, mayoralties and municipal councils of 
1992 were marked by the two attempted coup d'elats, the first in February led by the 
current President of the Republic, Hugo Chivez, and the second on the 27h of 
November a few days before the regional elections. Of these attempts, the coup that 
acquired notoriety in the political context was the first one. Despite the coup not 
achieving its proposed objectives, it aroused hope and enjoyed ample support from 
the sectors of the population which were demanding drastic solutions to the 
continuing deterioration of democracy and the poor performance of the government. 
The movement MBR 200 (Revolutionary Bolivarian Movement 200) conspired in the 
bosom of the armed forces to overthrow the government and to establish a 
constitutional assembly as the legitimate basis for a new regime. The result was the 
coup attempt of the 4 th of February 1992, directed by Chdvez and other medium- 
ranking officers but with the additional support of some civilian left-wing groups. 
Despite the failure of the coup, it had broad support, and it revealed various things: a) 
the existence of divisions inside the military, b) the presence of military alliances 
with civilian groupings, and c) the growing disenchantment with electoral 
democracy. Chdvez became the focus for these sentiments, as well as into the leader 
of the process undertaken. During his brief and memorable televised discourse in 
which he recognised the overthrow of the troops under his command "for now"31, left 
31 He spoke confidently, and without notes: 
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the promise of a movement which would grow and eventually triumph (Coronil 2000, 
p. 37). 
The 27 Ih of November produced another attempted military coup. Just as the 4 th 
February, however, the new uprising was an event foretold. Even the high command 
had warned at the beginning of that month that normality in the barracks was far from 
being realised and that there persisted a climate of barely-contained bad feeling. 
Moreover, the spectre of the social protests had broadened, both in terms of the 
sectors of the population that took part in them and in the new forms they had 
acquired, amongst which were the more spontaneous modes of action, such as the 
"Cacerolas "32 (The use by groups, protests or entire barrios and neighbourhoods of 
banging on pots and pans en masse to protest against the inaction of government) 
(Medina 2001, p. 90). 
"First I want to say 'good morning' to all the people of Venezuela, but this Bolivarian message is 
directed specifically to the courageous soldiers of the parachute regiment of Aragua and the tank 
regiment of Valencia. 
Comrades: unfortunately, for the moment, the objectives that we had set ourselves have not been 
achieved in the capital. That is to say that those of us here in Caracas have not been able to seize power. 
Where you are, you have performed well, but now is the time to rethink. New possibilities will arise 
again and the country will be able to move definitively towards a better future. 
So listen to what I have to say, listen to comandante ChAvez who is sending you this message, an4, 
please, think deeply. Lay down your arms, for in truth the objectives that we set out ourselves at a 
national level are not within our grasp. 
Comrades, listen to this message of solidarity. I am grateful for you loyalty. for your courage, and for 
your selfless generosity; before the country and before you, I alone shoulder the responsibility for this 
Bolivarian military uprising. Thank you. " (Gott 2000, p. p. 70-7 1). 
32 In the military pronouncement of 27'h Novemeber 1992 there had been agreement and disagreement 
between those who commanded the action and the imprisoned plotters. The depth of these 
disagreements still has not been clarified to date, but the rank of the military plotters had risen in 
relation to the "Comacates " of the 4 th of February. Once again, however, the military mobilization was 
insufficient and erratic, and for the second time the civilian population was left on the margins (Medina 
200 1. pp. 91-92). 
155 
1992 also saw demands for constitutional rel'orm return to a prominent place aniongst 
the demands ol'the civilian population. Congress took oil board tile demands ol'the 
citizenry, but the proposals of' the reformists were unable to 0VCl-COlllC tile OhStaCIC 
constituted by the impeachment retlerendum in congress (at that 1110111CIlt till. SjUridical 
procedure had initiated the removal of' President Carlos Andrýs llcrýz From tile 
presidency of the republic). In this way, the impossibility ol'reaching an agreement to 
overcome this obstacle converted the refercridurn into a symbolic representation of' 
the whole idea of constitutional ret'orm. 
Overall, this situation contributed to the weakening of' the AD party, and its 
subsequent losses in the elections of' 1992. Meanwhile the poljcý ot'alliatices bet"N'cen 
COPH and MAS reached a peak and the sectarianism of' tile LCR appeared to be 
unstoppable, COPE1 won II governorships (see the map of' 1992) and 20 
mayoralties, many of them through the support ot'MAS. AD saw its percentage ol'the 
vote diminish at the national level and in tile majority ot'the states by nearly 9"o, III 
comparison with 1989. C013EI saw its vote diminish in only flour states (AIIZOýItCgUl, 
Aragua. Lara y Sucre) and throughout the country sa-, % its % ote rise t'roill -11 -9')/'ý to 
35.4%; Zulia, Yaracuy, Carabobo, Wrida and Barinas being the areas of' greatest 
vote increase. One of the most interesting results of' these elections was the increase 
in the percentage of votes obtained by other parties such as the LCR and MAS in 
states such as Sucre, Aragua, Bolivar and the Federal District. 
!ýII(, lip. if 1 11 )It I I( , ýý 
III I-, ,IIýIII, II-,, ýI, 11 " 
Ap 4s 
Sucre 553 38,9 Caratmtx) . 
11 2 55o 
( iuArico 51 5 42,4 Mci ida 47 2 47 1 
Banna, s 51.1 46.1 Bannas 43 0 47 1 
National Fotal 31) 9 31 1 Natiomil lotal II () ;ý .1 
ý-m, c ( onsclo Suprcnio Flecloial (CS1 ) 
I ýihlc ') -4 ( "milpal 1"on of tile clcctolal tcý1111,, Of 1989 and hclýN ccil \1 \', '111d I(1, 
*\ r; I ý, tia 4S T'o So 2'! '. I )1o I cdcl. ll ,1". 
Stlac 20 -"k,. . 19,2111, lloll%al oý I" ý. 
Amazonas 7 9%ý 17.1 ki IIn 11 da 12 21, 
I )clta Amacuro 31 Ilo 33.1 Anzoategui Oo oo .1, " 
National Total 17 71ýý, 13 gll,,, Nat ional 'I otal 2 411. So". 
( oll, clo 1 lcc[r: ll « Sl ) 
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The process of' decentralization became orientated towards controlling the (feel) 
political crisis of' the period 1989-1992. This "as particularly noticcah1c in the 
importance given to the direct election of' governors and mayors \\ hich had been 
introduced after the civil uprising of' 1989, this sought to strengthen rcgional 
leaderships so as to dilute the conflicts of' governability. N evert lie less, control \ýas 
maintained by the party hegemony over traditional social democracy, even though (lie 
upsurge ot'new political actors and parties was prominent. 
In spite of the re-election of some governors in 1992. in general terms the high levels 
ofabstention were maintained. I lowever, owing to the effects ofthe opening ofncNv 
electoral spaces, the abstention level decreased by some 4'(') \vIth respect to flic 
previous elections. The electoral process of' 1989 had generated the high levels of 
abstention, whilst that of 1992 tended to produce more participation. 
I ah I c: 5.5, hs tention I: ii_, urcs: (iovernoi,, I ii I, I 1c, tiofiý of 1992 
Dfo. I cdcral 03 (Pli, Delta , \ma, tiro ;I-, ý 
Miranda 55, S% Amaimms iý, 'S"', 
Cajabobo 54.3% Nue% it Fspatin M, M". 
Apure 53.7% Coijecles 36.0% 
Zulia 53.2% Portuguesa 39 2% 
Sucre 51.9% Yaracu) 4o H% 
National Total: National Total 50 7% 
50 7016 
Sourcc Consclo Stlprcl I Io I. Icclora I (('. S I) 
Within the party svsteni, decentralization permitted emergent parties like LCR and 
Provccto Carabobo to take advantage of'regional and local arenas and break Into the 
Venezuelan political scenc, competing \. N'itll tile big parties. It also '1110\ked tile more 
established parties such as MAS succeeded III obtaining a greater regional and local 
presence (Amazonas, Aragua and Sucre), evcri though this was not repeated at tile 
national level. It also meant that AD and ('01111, the political parties of" traditional 
social democracy. and even MAS, wcrc made 11101-C LICI)CMICIlt Oil a SýSICIII Of 
alliances to protect their regional leadership. It \\as this kilter that partictilarl) 
displaycd the \, \cakncss that the larger parties \\erc beginning it) expericiicc". 
Fhe COPFI-MAS alliance had taken place in like states. Anloalepti, Barina%, Catabollo, I alcon 
and Monagas. 
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The elections for state governors and mayors provoked a rcgionalization and a 
municipalization of political life with particular characteristics, often vcry different 
from those that could be observed in the national environment and with profound 
implications for the new form of conceiving politics and democracy in Venezuela. 
This permitted the dilution and sectorization of social conflict, as reflected in the 
manner in which campaigns were structured and electoral circuits delimited, 
interrelating and utilising fragmenting mechanisms in the urban sectors. The new 
electoral system at the local and national levels had been made more complex. At the 
national level, the central power found itself confronted by a diversity of political 
actors, with which it would now have to negotiate and arrive at a consensus. 
On the other hand, the legitimacy of the system was strengthened by the 
representativeness demonstrated by the re-elected governors and mayors, because tile 
population were not resigned to simple choosing state and municipal authorities. The 
legitimacy won by the regional and municipal administrations had to put itself at tile 
service of the improvement of the quality of services. This can be verified by the 
tendencies towards the re-election of governors and mayors at the end of their terms 
of office, which might be a reflection of a high level of satisfaction of the 
communities with their local and regional leaders (PNUD-BM 1999, p. 19). In sonic 
cases, such as Carabobo and Aragua negotiations with the national government 
would never have resulted in an effective transference of the competencies of health 
and the protection of minors, without the constant pressure which was exerted by tile 
governors (De La Cruz 1995, pp. 10- 12). 
The mechanism for re-election foreseen by the', law also had an impact oil the system 
of parties, because it permitted the governors and mayors to be able to 'de-link' 
themselves more easily from the interests of the party clites. The law designated that 
local authorities had to give an account of themselves to their communities, and not 
to the party leadership. In this sense, the law provided for a greater political 
autonomy (Penfold 2000, p. 259). 
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The political crisis made the tasks assigned to these first regional and local authorities 
very difficult. On the other hand, relationships with the central power were very slow, 
complicated and, in some cases, non-existent; additionally many ministerial offices 
did not understand the mechanics of the new national regime, whereas others 
believed that they were only dealing with a passing phase. Moreover, owing to the 
political conflict, there had been no time for the regulation of the Organic Law of 
Decentralization and Transference of Competencies (Veldsquez 1998, p. 17). 
Civil society was beginning to awaken after 40 years under the control of the political 
parties. For example, community development organizations, which had numbered 
only 48 in the whole country during the centralist period up to 1988, doubled in 
number between 1989 and 1993. The greatest number of these organizations were 
located in the capital of the republic. (Socsal, 1999). Another example of the 
emergent social forces of this period was the growth of organizations dedicated to the 
protection of human rights after the social crisis of 27th February. Immediately 
following these events the civil organization COFAVIC had been constituted, which 
acted to co-ordinate the families of the victims. 
To conclude this section, it can be affirmed that the period 1989-1993 was a period of 
strong reactivation in the life of the country in all spheres: social, economic, military, 
judicial and electoral. The implementation of the structural adjustment programme, 
Ih the social crisis of February 27 , the two coup attempts, the 
impeachment of 
President Carlos Andrds Pdrez (itself an event without precedent in Venezuelan 
history), and the two sets of regional elections, all occurred in the space of a few 
years and were set in the framework of a retaking of govcmability but, this was to be 
within a new model with new actors, where the citizens themselves refused to be 
passive actors any longer. 
V. 2 Second Phase - Attenuated Neo-liberal domination and 
the Deepening of Decentralization: 1993-1998 
Given the presidential crisis of May 1993, in which President Carlos Andrds Pdrcz 
was impeached, the national congress agreed, in fulfilment of the prevailing 
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constitutional norms to designate a president who would complete the constituted 
period from 1989-1994. The new government considered that, over and above 
guaranteeing the realization of the general elections of 1993, it had to ensure the 
definitive shift from a centralised regime to a decentralised one and it made this 
proposal into national policy, following which it was necessary to assure the 
definitive consolidation of the process of democratisation (Velisquez 1998, p. 17). 
The state became pro-active in the matter, and the short government of Vcldsqucz 
accelerated and deepened the decentralizing dynamic through a number of measures: 
The designation of a high-ranking official within each ministry and 
autonomous institute to be in charge of aspects of decentralization linked to the areas 
of his/her office. 
The creation of intergovernmental mechanisms such as the Governmental 
Territorial Council (consisting of the president of the republic, ministers and 
governors), as a forum of discussion for the solution of problems related to the 
national and regional powers. 
The creation of the National Council of Mayors, consisting of the president, 
some ministers and one mayor from each state representing all the mayors of that 
state. 
The creation of the Council of Governments of the Metropolitan Area of 
Caracas. 
The acceleration and clarification of the transference of competencies to the 
states. 
The intervention of governors in the selection of national functionaries to 
ministries or autonomous institutes whose jurisdiction affects that governors' state, in 
cases where offices remain vacant. 
The creation of the National Commission for Decentralization, formed by 
ofricials from each ministry who were charged with decentralization in their 
respective area. 
The creation of Regional Councils of Government, formed by the governor 
and mayors of each state. 
The creation of the Intergovernmental Fund for Decentralization (FIDES). 
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The establishment of the allocation to states and municipalities of 30% of the 
total sum collected by VAT (Value Added Tax) (Salamanca 1995, p. 19). 
In other words, this imbued government with a vision and a systemic framework for 
decentralization policies, to create a juridical and institutional infrastructure with the 
aim of making policy organic and fluid. Decentralization continued to be impelled 
from above, but through pressure that came from the base sectors of society, it also 
acted as a means to guarantee the broadening of democracy. 
V. 2.1 The Fragmentation of the Party System 
The presidential elections of 1993 represented a significant rupture in the bipartisan 
dynamic of the Venezuelan political system because for the first time since 1958, a 
candidate (Rafael Caldera) not supported by the party machineries of AD or COPS 
achieved electoral victory. Although it was a very close victory, with only 30.45% of 
the votes and within a climate of high abstention rates of 40%. Additionally, for the 
first time since 1968 a candidate of the left, Andrds Veldsquez, obtained more than 
20% of the vote. The electoral force of AD and COPS, which in the elections of 
1988 had achieved 92.84% of the total votes, collapsed to levels without precedent, 
thus signifying the collapse of bipartisanship and the re-appearancc of fragmentation, 
or electoral multi-polarity. This occasion also marked the return of the worrying 
themes of electoral abstention and fraud. 
In the elections for congress, electoral fragmentation also made its presence known 
even though the domination by AD and COPS continued (Table: 5.6). These two 
parties continued to be respectively the first and second force in congress, but with a 
significantly reduced number of representatives than in past elections. The third most 
powerful faction in congress was the Convergencia (propcrly Convergencla-MAS) 
which comprised 24.4% of the total, the fourth was the LCR with 20.7%, whilst MAS 
came fifth with 10.9%. With such a panorama, it was natural that AD and COPEI 
renewed their pact, thereby accounting for 45.9% of congressional deputies between 
them. This was a very different situation to the accustomed one where the 
government could count on an absolute majority in both chambers, and where AD 
and COPEI between them could concentrate 80% of congressional positions. 
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Table: 5.6 Conloosition of Conp-ress in 1993 - "o Of I)CI)IIIies and scliatols 
CA Al 1 -12 (1 
MAS 108 24 
Causa R (LCR) 20.7 40 8 
Convergencia 13.6 26 146 
Others 9.0 5 80 (1 
Total 203 ro 
Source Consclo Supremo Flectotal (CSE) 
The change in the patterns of politico-electoral behaviour and preferences reflected 
the crisis that was running through the traditional party organizations and through 
them the fundamental bases ofthe socio-political systern. According to Kornblith, tile 
prognosis that these changes would produce original and iniportant tendencics can be 
divided into three central points: 
In the democratic arena there was a dramatic growth in ne,, % organizing 
options and a redefinition of the relations betNveen political parties. together 
with the appearance of new and difterent groupings \%-, thin civil soclet\. 
Outside ofthe democratic anibit there \, \-a. s a certain revaluing ofauthorjtý11-1ý111, 
militaristic or revolutionary options. 
In an intermediate zone between the other two, there \\as also a replanting of 
personalist options based in calls I'Or a plebiscite (Kornblith 1998, p. 179). 
In his reading ol' the process Korriblith, glimpsing what was happening lo\\ards the 
end of Caldera's government, saw tile deýelopmciit of' tile lllllitarý 
option together with the emergence oforganizations mthin civil socict\. 
In terms of' tile role played by the process of' decentralization, Molina Vega at'firnis 
that it generated the emergence of' a ne\\ political leadership which \\its largely 
autonomous 1rom the party beaurocracies, gI\cII that they enjoýcd kill-ccl public 
support. The importance of this was that It nourished the pci-sonaill ication of' politics. 
Already hy 1993), three ol'the of'ficial candidates owed their popular support to their 
perf'orniance as governors or mayors (Molina 1993), p. ) I ). 
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The constitutional period of President Caldera (1993-1998) started with a profound 
fiscal and financial crisis, which according to the reports of the Central Bank-, implied 
that for the year 1994 the injection of state resources into the banking system would 
be equivalent to ten percent of national income. The financial cost that this 
represented for the treasury severely limited the economic capacity of the country 
within an international context where the policies of the multilateral organizations 
towards the ý4on-West were hegemonic. Despite the fact that Caldem triumphed with 
explicit promises that he would pursue a model distinct from that promoted by the 
multilateral financial organizations, after two years of erratic attempts to dcfine an 
economic policy, he announced the implementation of the Venezuelan agenda a 
diminished version of the Gran Viraje of Carlos Andres Pdrez (L6pez y Lander 1999, 
p. 4 1) 
This new economic policy of economic adjustment and opening seemed to give a 
certain direction to the economy for a couple of years and opened up a possible path 
forward, it imploded, however, with the fall in oil prices in 1998 which ended the 
climate of optimism and accentuated the social crisis, inequality and poverty, causing 
radicalization of calls for a new political change. 
In the same vein as had occurred in the economy, the electoral promises of President 
Caldera were not kept. In the institutional sphere the continued deterioration of the 
principal institutions of the state and the resulting dcligitimation of the political 
system were not solved despite a certain climate of political peace. His electoral 
pledge to produce profound transformations in the powers of the state through 
constitutional reform was repeatedly postponed. One of the obstacles acting against 
progress on any profound reform initiative was the alliance the governmcnt made, 
although never in formal terms, with the AD party (who were the largest opposition 
group in the Congress), which was maintained throughout the term of office of the 
government. And AD were, of course, the defender of the status quo within the 
political system (L6pez and Lander 1999, p. 43) 
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V. 2.2 The Third Governors Elections 1995 
The third regional and local elections of' Deccnihcr 199ý closed the cycle of' re- 
election of the first governors and mayors who had been elected by the direct popular 
vote. There were legal restrictions which stopped a governor or a mayor putting 
themselves forward for a third period and many had been rc-clectcd in 1992. 
According to De la Cruz (1995) this first generation ot'go\, criiors and mayors had 
been forced to carry out a long struggle with central government to speed up the 
transf-er of competences (De la Cruz 1995, p. p. 10-12). These transferences relied 
upon the granting of new resources without which it was impossible to contemplate 
any sort of decentralization process. 
In 1995 the definitive structure of' the Intergovernmental Decentral izat loll Fund 
(FIDFS by its Spanish acronym) was established. This is an autonomous gox-crilillent 
service, affiliated to the Ministry of Interior Relations, whosc 1undanicntal mission is 
to give financial assistance to the processes of' decentralization and regional 
development. 
It was within this framework ofadvances in administrative decentralization %%Iilcll 
had permitted the financing of some regional leaderships, that the regional and 
municipal elections of' 1995 were held. COPFI pcrt*0rrncd vcry badly ill these 
elections and AD were able to will back nlLlCh OftllC Political Space Mitch they had 
lost. The Social democrat party won II go\ernorships (Aniazonas, Alizoategill, 
Apurc, Bolivar, Cojedes, GuJirlco, Wrida, Nionagas, Tiichlra and TrU. 11110), One In 
alliance with COPFL tile Delta Arnactiro territory and tile two ma\ orship., of' tile 
Fcderal District. It displaced Causa R in Bolivar and in the mziýorshlp of (lie 
1.1hertador municipality. Ill Amazonas, Anzoýitepii, \Mona,, as, I ýWhlra and ( ill, '11-[CO 
they made alliances with regional parties. 
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oroani/ational secretary in each state capital (Sanoýja 1998,1). 162). 
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On the other hand, this can also be considered as a very important stage in the 
evolution of decentralized democracy in Venezuela. With political decentralization, a 
lessening of the principal problems that confronted centralised democracy was 
achieved. As governability was gradually restored, the political parties achieved a 
degree of 're-legitimization'. Nevertheless, the traditional party system was wounded 
by the promotion of multi-partisanship or party fragmentation, and as a direct 
consequence, there arose new regional parties and actors that changed the co- 
relations of political power in the interior of the regional legislative organs of 
government. Additionally, economic decentralization advanced with the creation and 
implementation of normatives such as FIDES and the Law of Economic Assignations 
(LAE). 
Another aspect of great importance in this stage of decentralization from 1993 to 
1998, which is referred to here as the attenuated dominion of neo-liberalism, is the 
the importance of multi-lateral investment at state and municipal level. This invoked, 
for example, the human network which was structured between CORDIPLAN (the 
ministry for planning) and the ministry for home affairs, along with the multilateral 
lending banks (BID, the World Bank and the UNDP). The association of governors 
and the executive and co-executive organisms were key factors in the substantial 
improvement of leadership of the multi-lateral portfolio and its achievements. In this 
sense, it is appropriate to note that the theme of fulfilment and execution of multi- 
lateral projects passed into forming part of the agenda of the mayoral and 
governmental conventions (UNDP-WB-IDB 1999, p. 114). 
V. 2.3 Map of the Distribution of Resources from the Central Government 
to the States 1998 
1998 saw an important political period closes, that of bipartisanship and a phase of 
decentralization (1989-1998) Therefore, it is interesting to compare the spatial 
distribution of resources from central government to the states in this period of 
decentralization with that of centralism. 
A quick reading of the map of 1998 (Map: 5.4) shows a spatial pattern to the 
assignation of resources by the central government to the states (intergovernmcntal 
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transfcrS35), which is very similar to that during the period of centralism (see the map 
of 1987 in Chapter IV). This signifies that in the entire II years from 1987 to 1998, 
and in the 9 years since it was first decreed, decentralization in Venezuela had 
advanced very little in modifying the spatial pattern which privileged the Central- 
Northern-Coastal region to the detriment to the rest of the national territory. 
More concretely, for 1998 the same number of states remained (10), which in 1987 
had received assignations from the central government of between 4 and 12%. Only 
the Federal District and Zulia. received between 8 and 12%, whereas Miranda, which 
had been in this higher group, now fell into the second category. In this second 
category were Lara (Central-Western region), Carabobo, Aragua and Miranda 
(Central-Northern region), Anz6ategui and Monagas (North-Eastern region). It was in 
this last region that there arose a change in the spatial pattern of 1987, because the 
state of Sucre gave way to Monagas, which had improved its economic status through 
the advent of the 'Oil Openning'. Bolivar in the Guayana region also received 
assignations from the central government of between 4 and 12%. 
V. Z4 Multi-party Politics and the New Hegemony In 1998 
In the regional elections and those of the national congress that were held on 
November 6 1h 1998 the universally plural political representation that had been 
initiated in the elections of 1993 was accentuated. This juncture was to have a 
significant impact in the electoral history of Venezuela because it articulated the 
political actors of a non-neo-liberal persuasion around the so-called Patriotic Pole 
(PP). The Patriotic Pole, which had been constructed to support the candidature of 
Hugo Chivez Frias, was to become integrated with the Movimiento V RepOllca 
(MVR), the MAS and Patria Para Todos (the PPT, an offshoot of the LCR) as its 
principal allies, as well as other parties and sectors of organized civil society. 
35 Intergovernmental transfers refer to the Situado Constitucional, FIDES and the Law of Economic 
Spatial Assignments under the denomination of the consolidation of central governmental resources to 
the states. 
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The counterpart of the Polo Patri6tico would be represented by leaders who had 
risen from the process of political decentralisation which had begun in 1989: the 
candidature of Irene Sdez, who had been mayoress of one of the richest 
municipalities of Caracas and who had founded the Movimlento Con Irene, was one 
such. Another was the candidature of the ex-mayor of Caracas, Claudio Fermin, who 
had also been a presidential candidate for the AD party in alliance with the Partido 
Renovaci6n (an offshoot of the AD). Lastly, there was the ex-govemor of Carabobo, 
Henrique Salas R6mer, with the conversion of Proyecto Carabobo into Proyecto 
Venezuela. These different parties were to form the so-called Polo Democrdflco, 
which was of a neo-liberal character. 
According to Margarita L6pez Maya, an investigator of UCV (Central University of 
Venezuela), the candidature of Hugo Chivez Frias acted as a focus for the strongest 
resistance to the neo-liberal project. The rest of the candidates were emerging 
alternatives from the process of decentralization, which had been important in the 
formation of a new leadership which was more personalist and with distinctly 
caudiffista characteristics. Irene, Salas R6mer and Claudio Fermfn: arose from this 
route out of the politics of decentralization that were based around the personalities of 
the leaders whatever successful management experiences they were able to 
demonstrate (El Nacional, 21/12/97, pp. I- 16). 
This is confirmed by Vries writing in early 1998, "Venezuela has been atomized into 
multiple spaces of power, each of which aspire to be the focus for a new 
integrationist project. This project has penetrated more deeply with the advance of 
decentralization and the process of personalizing the vote. The same thing has 
happened in civil society, in the political parties and even in congress, where nobody 
now has an assured vote and all are therefore continually obliged to seek stratcgic 
alliances" (EI Nacional, 1/4/98). 
This process of atomisation was reflected in a series of important events, amongst 
which were: 
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a) A change in the ideological-personal paradigm of the principal leaders of the 
country, for example in the negotiations and alliances between Caldera and Teodoro 
Petkoff. 
b) The taking of power by the provinces within FEDECAMARAS (the 
federation of chambers of industry and commerce); 
C) The founding of the Movimiento Apertura by Carlos Andrds Pdrez, thus 
initiating the dismembering of social democracy; 
d) The aspirations of Salas R6mer, who had led COPEI, to stand as an 
independent candidate without party support; 
e) The division between the LCR and the PPT; 
f) The exit of Claudio Fermin from the AD in a dispute with the party president; 
g) The participation of Chavdz as a candidate for the MVR (Movement for the 
Fifth Republic); 
h) The transformation of the supreme electoral court into an organization which 
could adapt itself to this process of atornisation. 
These facts conditioned the electoral process of 1998. This political conflict the anti- 
party thesis and the anti-politics of Venezuela were to reach their maximum 
expression. The political importance of the party leaderships was continually 
reduced, as much through their rejection by the majority of people as through the 
confrontations within and between the apparatuses, fractures and divisions of the 
parties. In other words, the people were withdrawing their support for the "Pacto de 
Punto Fýo", and for bipartisanship, in such a way that electoral politics became 
orientated against the parties and gave rise to anti-party formulas. 
Moreover in perspective, the process was constituted as a dispute in which the 
fractionalising of the political world would be imposed. The atornization into 
multiple spaces of power had broken a pattern of socio-political organization which 
was symbolised by clientelism as an instrument of power and by the 'partyocracy' as 
a form of ideology. This rupture generated a profound confusion over which scheme 
would substitute for the previous model because of the imperative of findings a new 
social contract would allow for co-existence of the interests of each group. 
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In such circumstances, the elections of November Oh took place with wide electoral 
participation. The index of total active electoral participation was 54.4% (whereas in 
the elections of 1995 it had been only 46.1%), which represented an appreciable 
increase in participation. The closeness of the presidential elections made these 
elections more attractive because they were perceived as a type of mediation between 
the political forces of the candidates for the presidency. 
Two principal political forces emerged from the elections: the Polo Patri6tico (MVR, 
MAS and the PPT) and the AD. The AD and the MVR went on to became the two 
primary electoral forces in the country as a consequence of achieving together more 
than 43.2% of the valid votes for each legislative house. They were followed by 
Proyedo Venezuela with 12.28%, and COPS which fell to fourth place with 10.68% 
of the deputies. The national vote for the other parties for the lower house were: MAS 
8.72%, PPT 3.73%, LCR 3.09%, the Apertura 1.72%, the Convergencla 2.4% and 
Irene 1.48% (El Universal 11/9/98). These results indicated above all the plural 
character of the judgement of the electorate. 
In addition, a new composition in the framework of state governance arose from this 
elections. The principal political groupings that constituted the Polo Pairlofico (the 
MVP, PPT and the MAS) reached agreements to select communal candidates for the 
regional elections. As a result, the candidates for the PP succeeded in elections in 8 
states (Anzodtegui, Aragua, Barinas, Guirico, Lara, Portuguesa, Vargas y Zulia), and 
moreover the alliance achieved second place in 10 of the remaining 13 governorships 
(see the map of 1995). It has to be noted that, as the product of political 
decentralization, the number of regional political parties was greater in some states 
(Aragua, Anzodtegui, Nueva Esparta y Zulia: Table: 5.8) than others, indicating a 
new tendency towards regionalization in the party system. Additionally, there was 
also a tendency among different sectors of society to participate with a preference for 
parties that worked through non-governmental organizations, as could be observed in 
Aragua and Anzodtegui. 
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Table: 5.8 The Polo Patri6tico and ihe E 
AnzoAtegui MVR - I'll-[ 
Aragua MAS - MVR 
Barinas MVR - MAS 
GUArico MVR - PPT 
Lara MAS - MVR 
Portuguesa MAS - COPE[ 
Vargas MVR - MAS 
Zulia La Causa R- COPEI 
Source Consep Nacional Llectoral (CNL) 
PPT 
I'll k-C! '' .I,, ýIi;, 
.ý rai, Lm .I 
AnLomcgui 6 14 
Nueva Esparta 7 17 
Zulia 8 15 
Bolivar 2 to 
The AD party equalled the Polo Patri6tico in the number of governorships, winning 
in Amazonas, Apure, Bolivar, Cojedes, Wrida, Monagas, Sucre and Trujillo. 
Nevertheless, the notable reduction in its vote between 1995 (34.5%) and 1998 
(28.3%), and the fact that the AD lost control of 4 governorships, cast doubt on tile 
apparent success of the party. COPEI took control in Tdchira and in the Delta 
Amacuro in alliance with MERI (a regional party) and maintained the governorships 
of Miranda and Falc6n. COPEI also saw a reduction in its overall vote from 21.3% in 
1995 to 15.2% (Table: 5.9), nearly tying with MVR which achieved third place with 
14.3% of the total votes at the gubernatorial level. The incumbents were re-elected 
for the Convergencia in Yaracuy and Proyecto Venezýuela in Carabobo (Table: 5.10). 
I ahIc '9 UOTTIPýirl, O H (ý I thC R l>L1 It I Of' I 11C 
Amazonas 41,4% 45 71, o 
Apure 60.3% 5 3.0% 
Bolivar 4&5% 39 7% 
Cojedes 44.2% 46.7% 
Mdrida 44,6% 38.7% 
Monagas 45.1% 44.1% 
Sucre 40.4% 38.8% 
Trujillo 38.7% 41.9% 
National 34.5% 28.3% 
Total 
)urce C onwjo Nacional Electoral (CN F) 
lect 1011, oII 91)s and 1998 tic m Ceti (tic AD IT Ik I( () 
Delta Arnacuro 17,17". 11 
FaIc6n 36 4'ý'o 35ý5o'. 
Miranda 38.5% 37 41% 
Tichira 24.8% 39.1% 
National Total 21.3% 15.2% 
Anzomegui 0 W'o Lara 
Aragua 00% t) 0% Portuguesa 
Miranda 0.00/0 5.7% 
National Total 2.14% 6.0% National Ti 
Source Conscjo Nacional Electoral (CNF) 
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The results of the regional elections and those for the national congress led, in the 
brief space of a month, to the adversaries of the Polo Patri4tico constructing an 
alternative pole for the formation of a presidential campaign. They argued that two- 
thirds of the country had demonstrated themselves to be against the candidates and 
the proposals of Chdvez Frias, who, as the central theme of his programme of 
government, had adopted the idea of a profound reform of the state through a 
constitutional assembly (L6pez and Lander 1999, p. 47). As an alternative to this, 
Salas R6mer proposed radical change through the deepening and broadening of 
decentralization. Proyecto Venezuela, thereafter joined, the self-denominated Polo 
Democr6fico in alliance with the traditional bipartisan bloc some five days before the 
elections of the 6h of December, after a series of manoeuvrings and negotiations 
directly contradictory to party loyalties. 
Irrespective of these manoeuvrings, the electoral results of the 6h of December gave 
Chdvez Frias A wide margin of victory, winning in 18 of the 24 Federal entities. 
These results produced an accentuated polarization (96.1 %) in which the Polo 
P61riotico won more than 50% of the votes, whilst electoral participation increased 
by 9%, an increase in the total number of votes in the order of 1,103,703 (L6pez and 
Lander 1999, p. 48). 
V. 2.5 Civil Societ in a Decentralized Democracy y 
Notions of civil society and political decentralization began to achieve some force in 
the Venezuelan social and political context during the decade of the 1990s, to the 
extent that they revealed the distinctive place that political participation and 
decentralization would come to occupy in the constitution of 1999. The experimental 
changes that had taken place since the first years of the 1980s permitted civil society 
to begin to play an important role in the process of democratisation that began in 
1989. 
As was indicated in Chapter IV, civil society put the case of electoral reform as well 
as that of political autonomy from the spaces of municipal power and state power, in 
addition to the general questioning of the role of the political parties. Both projects 
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sought to modify the limits of the monopoly power that the parties exerted in the 
spaces of local power. The priority assigned by both sets of actors to political 
decentralization would modify the initial proposal of the multilateral organizations 
which had given greater importance to administrative decentralization. This process 
would culminate, as previously indicated, with the complete rupture of the social 
contract of 1961 and the construction of a far more participatory civil society. 
For this reason Virtuoso (1996) indicates that what was being produced in Venezuela 
was an investment in the conception and understanding of the project of society 
because the relationships between civil society and local or regional space deals with 
reconstructing revolving around a new conception of the public. In thus 
characterizing this investment and thereby emphasizing the importance of the local in 
politics, Virtuoso says that central planning from above to below has given place to 
localized planning from below to above (Virtuoso 1996, pp. 146-149). He does not, 
however, observe that the manner of conceiving the public and the local is also rooted 
in the political. As has been noted previously when touching on the account of the 
uprising of the 27 1h of February, the "El Caracazo". 
Allen (1999) commenting on Foucault, Arendt and others, has noted that power is 
produced by the joint action of people in demanding a common proposal. Power is 
rooted in mutual action and when it is not sustained in this manner, it disappears. 
Mobilization and association is the formation of a common will towards the 
enrichment of public life and the obtaining of benefits for all of the associated, 
especially in popular life. Public spaces are emplacements for collective mobilization, 
which is to say emplacements of power, where people use expressive resources to 
make their voices heard and which are not directed towards the pursuit of sectoral 
interests, but rather more towards the attainment of scenarios where all can be 
beneficiaries (Allen 1999, pp. 109-113). 
Venezuelan civil society had orientated its action towards improving the 
instrumentality of power and the pursuit of the benefits of sectoral and institutional 
interests and so forth, to the detriment of other individuals and spaces that were 
collectively less well organized. According to Levine (2002) civil society during the 
1980s was made up of groups that were organized on a national basis, as well as 
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numerous regional and local associationS36 (Levine 2002, p. 252). The most developed 
organizations of civil society and those with greatest power were the neighbourhood 
associations which had high levels of participation amongst the middle and the upper 
classes, both of which were seeking more access and space in the process of 
democratisation. 
Nevertheless, in the period of decentralized democracy mobilizations played a 
dominant role. According to L6pez Maya, in the eleven years between October 1989 
and September 2000 there were a total of 8,355 protests in the country which 
represented an average of two protests daily, including weekends and holidays. The 
data shows a tendency towards protest activities which peaked between the years of 
1991 and 1994 (corresponding to the political crisis resulting from the impeachment 
of President Pdrez), when the average was 2.75 protests daily. A further peak 
occurred during the first two years of the Chdvez administration between 1999 and 
2000, with a daily average of 2.8 protests (L6pez Maya 2002, p. 202). 
On the other hand, during the second government of Caldera the number of NGOs 
multiplied, along with multilateral financing of social development37. This implies 
36 A short list could include the following: human rights organizations, neighborhood associations, 
feminist and ecological groups, cooperatives, local church (including the new organizations of the 
Pentecostal and Evangelical churches), regional and local cultural associations (including literary 
groups, theatres, orchestras, musical groups, dance groups and folkloric associations), a wide range of 
non - governmental organizations (NGOs) involved in education, research of the provision of social 
services across the length and width of the country, political parties and local electoral movements, 
new business associations and private foundations, together with federations and other principal 
associations that promote co-ordination and common action between all of those mentioned above 
(Levine 2002, p. 252). 
37 According to the database of REVISA (the Venezuelan network of social information for action) 
there were 931 organizations working in the development of social programmes in 1999. The spatial 
distribution of all development organizations for 1999 shows the heaviest concentration in the 
following states: Zulia (167), Monagas (105), Federal District (93), Mdrida (68), Miranda and Lara 
(61). Followed by a middle group with the following distribution: Yaracuy (47), Portuguesa (40), 
Barinas (36), Gudrico, (35), Anzodtegui and Trujillo (31). Finally, those with the smallest numbers of 
organizations were: Sucre and Falc6n (27), Bolivar (23), Delta Amacuro (17), Carabobo (13), Nueva 
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that there were effectively two overlapping structures of civil society. The hegemonic 
change incorporated new forms of association in the political environment such as the 
Bolivarian movements or circles (which will be examined in more detail later on). In 
such a way a variety of forms of association can be distinguished in the social and 
political framework that has existed in Venezuela since the beginnings of the decade 
of the 90s. The only question that remains is whether all of these types of association 
supported a vertical form of the instrumentalization of power or, if on the contrary, 
they helped to reactivate the notion of public space. 
The reactivation of public space would imply that civil society, its social movements, 
groups and networks became bit by bit less tied to the state and the control of the 
political parties. Nevertheless, Levine (2002) indicates that Venezuelan civil society 
seems to be more inclined towards participation in political parties than in social 
movements per se. According to him, the legacy of 30 years of party intermediation 
had made the creation of an autonomous civil society problematic. Whilst it is 
doubtless true to say that civil society (and its component groups and networks) is 
actually far less tied to state and party control than before, it is in no sense of the 
word autonomous. These movements are still vulnerable to penetration and co-option 
by political parties competing for resources and space within the political system 
(Levine 2002, p. 260). 
V. 2.5.1 Movements of Opinion 
Opinion-forming movements of civil society during the decade of the 1990s had 
many resources. They were rooted in a general context within which there was an 
inclination towards organization which gave them sufficient flexibility and 
innovation. Moreover, there were among them audacious and creative leaders. All of 
this permitted a change of terrain and their re-emergence in other spaces, if they were 
defeated in one particular form (Levine and Crisp 1999, p. 17). Nevertheless, the 
majority of these civil society groups were centralized, with bases in the capital of the 
republic. 
Esparta (12), Aragua (11), Apure and Amazonas (10), Vargas (5) and Tichira (1) (SOCSAL, 
Portafolio Social, 1999). 
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One of the best examples of these middle class movements is Queremos Elegir (we 
want to choose). This was founded in 1991 by the promoters of the School of 
Neighbours (Escuela de Vecinos) and was orientated towards the promotion of 
electoral reform and citizen initiatives towards the strengthening of voter education. 
Their political programme was directed towards the promotion of the 
institutionalisation of personalized vote (uninominality) in the elections for offices of 
popular representation. 
The impact of these movements in recent political life has been notable and their 
influence over the creation of public opinion has been supported by the media which 
has effectively made them the representatives of civil society. The power of these 
movements, although it is not often recognised as a form of power, lies in their role 
as negotiator and generator of political incentives. The electoral alliances of 1998 
were characterized by the manoeuvrings of the Polo Democrdtico in pursuit of a 
separation of the state and municipal elections; in separating the elections they hoped 
to re-affirm control over local power, change the electoral panorama and obtain 
advantages over the Polo Patri6tico. One of the organizations of civil society that 
most demonstrated disagreement with this was Queremos Elegir. 
In the opinion of this movement, "to move these regional elections forward a few 
weeks puts this electoral level at the mercy of the interests involved in the 
relationships between candidates and parties. It would diminish the weight of the 
local and regional, and it would be tainted and determinably influenced by the 
presidential candidates campaigning at the local level. Moreover, it would ensure that 
the regional results would be used to seek favour for specific presidential options, 
which is far from desirable. It must be taken into account that the objectives are to 
simplify the organization of the process, to diminish the annual costs, to make voting 
and scrutiny simpler, to avoid the influence of the national over the regional and thus 
to consolidate the process of regional and municipal decentralization. (El Nacional, 
20/4/98)" Other organizations of Venezuelan civil society that present more or less 
the same characteristics are: 
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1) FUNDAPATRIA (Foundation for the Defence of the National Patrimony). 
This organization was created in 1995 and from the cultural, intellectual, artistic, 
scientific and economic sectors of the country. In 1998 the organization presented a 
document "Profile of the country and government for Venezuela", which had as its 
aim the orientation of the country towards the consolidation of sustainable 
development and growth. Both in terms of the economy as in social programmes. In 
principle the document supported political reform and re-affirmed the popular will 
over the state and the discrete organs of society (El Nacional 22/11/98). 
2) The CESAP group is one of the largest NGOs in Venezuela and at the 
moment is involved in more than 100 community projects in the popular sector. 
According to the president of this organization, the tendency of the social policy of 
the government is centralist and assistance-based. Decentralization is a vital element 
in making social policies effective and efficient, CESAP proposes community 
participation as an alternative that might evade the rupturing of the social fabric of 
society by contributing towards the creation of people capacity to generate changes 
and providing opportunities for them to develop their potential. Three basic units 
have to be reconstructed: The family, the school and the community (EI Nacional 
25/02/01). 
3) The Primero de Justicia group arose as an organization of the neo-liberal 
tendency of civil society and was composed by young people of around 30 years of 
age, so-called 'yuppies. This civil organization was founded in 1992 to promote the 
citizens right to justice. Organizations such as this, which appear in principle to 
constitute organizations of civil society, have in fact penetrated into the structure of 
political society. For the elections of 2000, for example Primero de Juslicia 
participated as a political organization presenting three candidates in the state of 
Miranda in the capital region. In these elections it won three mayoralties: Chacao, 
Baruta and Hatillo, which are areas of predominantly middle-class and upper-class 
inhabitants of the Federal District and it also won five seats in the national assembly 
(El Universal 1/12/00). 
4) PROVEA (Programa Venezolano de Acci6n y Educaci6n en Derechos 
Humanos) documents affairs related to human rights, and leads action and campaigns 
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about human rights. The Network of Support for Justice and Peace is an independent 
citizen movement that monitors human rights, above all at a local level. The point of 
departure during the 1990s for the creation and struggle of all these parties dedicated 
to the protection of human rights was the "El Caracazo" of the 27'h of February. 
Because of the magnitude and characteristics of this social mobilization described 
above, the security forces of the state had been given carte blanche to act in whatever 
way necessary to contain the uncontrollable mobilization that menaced private 
property, without the least fear of any consequences. In the immediate aftermath of 
these events the civil organization COFAVIC (Comite de Familiares de las Victimas 
del 27) was founded to aid the families of the victims. 
The great majority of the human rights organizationS38 appeared on the national scene 
in orden to defend the fundamental rights of citizens contained in the Constitution 
and the law. They denounce abuses and demand greater public and police 
responsibility, they are also concerned with the situation in prisons and the problems 
of public security as well. Other organizations have dedicated themselves to the 
problems associated with the transparency of the electoral processes, such as for 
example is the case with the Network of Watchers (Red de Yeedores) of the Andrds 
Bello Catholic University and the Network of National Observers (Red de 
Observadores Nacionales), which is comprised of among other organizations, 
Momento de la Gente (Moment of the People), Pro Calidad de Vida (For Quality of 
Life), Dale al Voto (Put It To the Vote) and Liderazgo y Visi6n (Leadership and 
Vision). 
38 For the year 1999, the database of REVISA (the Venezuelan Network of Social Information for 
Action) made a census of 48 organizations dedicated to civil and human rights. This represented 5.15% 
of the total of organizations dedicated to social development in Venezuela, of which 28 were created 
during the period of centralization (1989-1998). The spatial pattern of human and civil rights 
organizations is as follows: The states of Apure, Delta Amacuro, Falc6n, Sucre, Nueva Esparta, 
Tichira, Yaracuy and Vargas have none, the Federal District has 11, Zulia 10, Monagas 4, Lara, 
Miranda and Gudrico 3, Amazonas, Portuguesa, Barinas, Bolivar and Trujillo 2, Anzoltegui, Mdrida, 
Carabobo and Aragua 1. In Amazonas they are orientated towards the support of respect for indigenous 
rights (SOCSAL, Portafolio Social 1999). 
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V. 3 Third Stage - Institutional transformations and Change in 
Party Political Hegemony (1999-2000) 
As has been indicated previously, from 1998 onwards a new political force consisting 
broadly of the Polo Patri6tico, led by President Hugo Chdvez and with the MVR for 
its base, took power. The change of power took institutional ity as its guiding 
principle - respecting and maintaining all public rights and constitutional guarantees. 
This new political movement outlined, as a first stage, the hegemonic conduct of the 
Venezuelan state followed by the progressive promotion of changes to the other 
structures that comprised the political system. The political proposal has been that 
democracy continue, but that it should change its course through the proposal of a 
new social contract. 
This clearly showed the intentions of the new hegemonic movement to incorporate 
into the political debate the three most controversial points concerning the process of 
democratisation now under way in Latin America: 
* The defence of the welfare state against its neoliberal critics, 
* The debate over communitarianism and liberalism, and 
* The development of participatory democracy rather than the democracy of elites. 
These three points have been referred to in chapter I and, without doubt, they cover 
the expectations of the debate over the politics of the future and the process of 
democratisation. 
In order to energize the process of discussion between the different political actors, 
organized civil society and the new social movements, the new hegemonic bloc 
proposed a constituent assembly in order to reconstruct the republic. To this end a 
consultative referendum was called and a new Constitution was drawn up in 1999 
with the participation of civil society, groups of electors and individuals. A 
consensual referendum followed this, and later an election to re-legitimize the public 
powers, president, congress, governors and mayors. 
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V. 3.1 The New Context of the Mobilization of Democracy 
The process of democratisation expresses the relationships of power and in this sense 
is also the field of permanent resistance in the context of the diversity of civil society. 
This signifies that it is the generative source of conflicts which fundamentally revolve 
around discourses about the values of equality, liberty, collectively, solidarity, 
diversity and participation between social actors and the state. Social actors pursue 
the deepening of the content of these values through democratic mobilization in the 
terrain of civil society, so as to open new spaces of citizen articulation. 
Citizen associations will determine the discourse which achieves the bringing 
together, within its own environment, of the aspirations of civil society so far as 
democracy is concerned. When the power of mobilization is greater than "the law of 
government", this can lead to a process that can change democratic institutional ity 
(Morgan Quero 2002, pp. 72-75). Democratic institutionality is the contract between 
the sovereign and the delegates who come to represent its power. This is formally 
expressed in the Constitution and laws of a country. This institutionality rules and 
delimits political differences, as well as contemplating the rights that have been 
conquered by means of the resistance of civil society. Moreover, it assumes 
responsibilities, such as the norms of its own preservation and change, in a manner 
such that it would be possible to submit them to ongoing reform. 
Without a doubt these norms, rights and responsibilities are not always respected by 
governments, as happened in Venezuela with the demands of civil society for the 
reform of the Constitution of 1961. In spite of having lost much of their effectiveness, 
the articulation of the political actors around the original structures of conciliatory 
democracy meant that such demands had been postponed by all the governments 
since 1989. Nevertheless, with the wearing down of institutional ity and the 
constitution of a new contract opposed to that which had controlled the political 
system since 1958, the co-ordinates of the game were thrown over and the process of 
democratisation took another road. 
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In the Venezuelan case, the reform of political decentralization was initially 
implemented to strengthen democratic institutional ity and to resolve the lack of 
representativeness. However, the violent mobilizations of the population in 1989 
disarticulated the mechanisms of consent and the two coup attempts of 1992 
weakened the government so profoundly that the political and corporative elites, 
under renewed pressure from civil society, began discussions on constitutional 
reform. 
Komblith (1998) points out that constitutional reform was first outlined in 1992 and 
thereafter repeatedly postponed, in spite of the insistence of different sectors and 
personalities. There was agreement on the necessity of renovating the political system 
by means of constitutional reform, but this agreement could not count on sufficient 
force to modify the political framework in the direction proposed by the coup leaders 
(Komblith 1998, pp. 104-109). The discourse of the coup plotters of 4th February took 
constitutional reform as their 'battle-flag', and proposed the implementation of a 
constituent assembly that would give rise to the cancellation of the Constitution of 
1961. 
This context of the opening of spaces of power that had hitherto been closed to 
participation, of the drawing closer of citizens to their representatives, and of the 
rupture of the institutional pact, led to not only the fragmentation of parties and that 
which went with them, but also the emergence of public discussion and the 
mobilization of civil society. In public discussion resides that essential part of 
democracy which projects civil mobilization and induces a permanent presence of 
civil society in political decision-making. 
Civil society had manifested in different ways its lack of consent to the contract of 
conciliation of 1961. This was manifested through abstention and a refusal to allow 
the substitution of electoral bipartisanship for representative democracy. Civil society 
also proposed the revision of some of the terms of the contract without negating 
others, as happened with political decentralization in 1989. Finally, there was a 
demand for the devolution of delegated powers, or at least part of them, to popular 
sovereignty, as was the case with the constituent assembly of 1999. Mires states that 
devolution is the act where society constitutes itself as civil (Mires 1996, p. 145). 
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Whilst the old hegemony that still controlled the legislature continued to propose 
point-by-point reforms to the Constitution without rescinding the contract as a whole, 
the patriotic bloc demanded the devolution of powers. In every case, this came to 
signify that in the field of the social, a political space was arising which did not 
belong exclusively to the state, because it was returning to its legitimated 
representatives. 
V. 3.2 Hegemony and the Bolivarian Ideal 
From 1998, the bloc constituted by the main political parties, the AD and COPEI 
(who had been in power since 1958) and by other actors who appeared to be linked to 
them such as the Proyecto Venezuela, Apertura, and the Movimiento Renovaci6n, had 
been displaced from hegemonic control by a new bloc of parties, political 
organizations and social movements. 
The ideological concept that motivated the proposals for change of the new leaders 
was the Bolivarian republicanism represented by the MVR. It was this framework 
that distanced them from the ideologies that characterized the old hegemonic bloc. To 
this ideological matrix which represented the new hegemony was incorporated a 
socialist ideology, present in its system of values. This same ideology had been 
refuelled within the framework of the anti-institutional struggle during the period of 
decentralization The socialism a la Venozolana of the MAS, which had joined 
together with the PPT to form the new hegemonic bloc. Of the groups comprising the 
PPT, the principal force was the MVR, whilst other organizations and minor 
groupings located in the old Venezuelan left also came to form part of the 'patriotic' 
bloc. 
Carrera Damas indicates that Bolivarianism, or the socially active expression of the 
cult of Bolivar, had functioned since the 19" Century as sustenance and support of 
the national conscience, as an ideology of substitution. During that period it had 
attempted to compensate for the burgeoning institutionality that was revealed in the 
fractures within the structure of the state left by the struggle for independence (EI 
Nacional 3/4/00). Nevertheless, the Venezuelan political situation at the end of the 
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201h Century when this thinking was once again taken up was comprised of 
distinctive characteristics. The break-up of the principal ideological matrices (the 
social democrat and social Christian) as a result of the pre-eminence of renovated 
ideological postures such as neo-liberalism, and the Third Way, together with the fall 
of the socialist bloc, generated an ideological uncertainty that favoured the re-birth of 
previous paradigms. 
The Republic of Bolivar belongs to a political paradigm illustrative of the 181h 
Century, where society was conceived of as a moral body. This morality expressed 
itself through its institutions, through its laws and through the conduct of its 
governors. The morality of the republic converted its integrants into virtuous beings 
by means of education, and the reason and liberty of the individual were orientated 
under this morality of the social body (Franceschi 2000, p. 82). 
Why was this message, based on Bolivarian principles, understood by civil society? 
The relationship between these elements and a diagnosis of the political system could 
not be more evident. According to L6pez and Lander (2000), the population rejected 
the hegemonic experience of the AD and COPEI because of its corruption (L6pez and 
Lander 2000, pp. 22-23). The structure of the state collapsed fundamentally because 
of their moral corruption. The sovereignty of the people was substituted for party 
leaderships that made use of power to superimpose their interests over those of the 
majority, and the parties were transformed into mere apparatuses of their leaders, 
distanced from the electorate but exercising control over the will of the citizenry. 
This explains how it was that this concept of democracy set in motion an enormous 
distancing between the political institutions and the citizen. 
Such a degree of moral corruption impoverished civil society. The political leader 
ceased to work in its bosom and the citizen stopped trusting in the leader and in the 
institutions, rejecting politics as much as political agents. The citizen was 
progressively absent, abstaining completely from the political involvement and for 
these reasons, the convocation of the constituent assembly would have amongst its 
essential aspects the restitution to the republic of the lost ethics and honesty of its 
governors. 
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V. 3.3 The Factors Involved in Hegemonic Change 
Over and above the empirical evidence that has been shown throughout this chapter, 
other factors have contributed to this acceptance of change. Whilst, it is true that 
there was little in the Venezuelan political context that had suggested the emergence 
of a force with the capacity to displace the political elite that had been exercizing 
control over the apparatus of the state in such a definitive manner and in such a short 
space of time, this was made possible through a conjuncture of various factors. 
Elements of explanation of the new hegemony can be seen in at least three factors. 
Political decentralization was one of these, inasmuch as it progressively modified the 
control that had been exercised by the old hegemony over public powers. Moreover, 
the effects that electoral reform (the election of mayors, for instance) had on the inner 
structure of the political parties acted as another element that came to complement the 
redistribution of power, as did the impact of the coups detat and the role played by 
civil society in them. All of these factors acted as elements offorce majeure, above 
all upon the political system, disarticulating the old hegemony and at the same time 
exerting pressure for new forms of democratic participation. 
In relation to the first of these factors, there is no doubt that political decentralization 
served to promote the hegemony at the local level of a number of regional initiatives 
that have been described above. Proyecto Carabobo (who displaced the local 
political hegemony of AD in the state of Carabobo) were helped by the 
decentralization of services. Causa R, helped by decentralization of union struggles in 
the state of Bolivar, were able to overcome the control that AD had exercised over 
that region. Later this same political force broke the control of the hegemonic parties 
in the state of Zulia helped by the popularity of leaders of the 4h of February. In the 
state of Yaracuy also de Convergencia party took the place of the Social Christian, 
which it has maintained to this day. 
MAS, for its part, came to exercise hegemony in the state of Aragua y Lara, and later 
on came to control local power in Portuguesa, the Delta Amacuro and Sucre. The 
PPT controlled the mayoralty of Caracas in 1992-1995, the governorship of 
Anzodtegui and the newly created state of Vargas. In general terms and taking into 
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account that the political game favoured alliances, by 1998 the majority of the states 
in the country, where the greatest concentrations of population were, either were or 
had been controlled by the opposition to AD and COPEL This gives ample evidence 
of the role played by the decentralization of power in the total substitution of the 
traditional political hegemony. 
By another route, political decentralization reformulated the structure of the 
institutional struggle by forming new institutions that would act to exercise pressure 
on central power. More concretely this refers to the pressures exercised by local 
leaders towards greater financial autonomy in order to be able to satisfy the demands 
made by the community. This institutional pressure was channelled through the new 
Associations of Governors and those of the Mayors, created at the beginning of the 
decentralization process. However, because of the characteristics of financial 
dependency and limited income-generation possessed at the local level in Venezuela, 
the failure to fulfil the satisfaction of the necessities of service provision was directly 
translated, by means of these associations, to the central power, thus deepening the 
lack of trust of the community towards the party leaderships. 
In a similar fashion decentralization and the uninominality of the vote gave greater 
political autonomy on local leaders with respect to the party leaderships. The 
distribution of power, in a certain sense, broke the dependence of local leaders on the 
political elites, from the moment that continuity in the exercise of power depended 
more on this same leadership, than on that of the decisions that they were able to 
take. This greater independence also acted as an influence on the formation of new 
local political organizations, in many cases through the break-up of the hegemonic 
parties and their leadership and in other cases through the emergence of new leaders. 
The atomisation of the party system weakened the presence of the big parties in the 
organisms of direction and control of the state (in particular the national congress), as 
well as in the corporative associations and federations, as strategic alliances increased 
in order to reach agreement. 
The second major factor was the coup of 4" February, which even though it had been 
unable to achieve its military objectives, still represented a significant political 
triumph. A sense of opportunity grew in the leaders of the movement at a time when 
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the country recognised no leadership and a political vacuum had been nourished by 
voter abstention since the 1980s. Thus, developed simultaneously with the splits 
within the military forces that divided the upper hierarchy of officers, something 
which had never been easy for any other kind of movement to achieve. This all 
signified the beginning of the end for social democracy. 
The most significant contribution of the military movement was to give civil society 
a possible alternative for change, and to act as a re-vindication of political reality, 
particularly the right of dissent and the right to rebellion. Equally the movement 
revitalized a political discourse which had been suffocated; Jos6 Vicente Rangel 
signals that the elitist and stultified discourse of the centralist democracy was 
substituted for a more direct and populist discourse. The calling for the constituent 
assembly was an aggregating discourse that contributed to the homogenisation of 
public opinion, giving a direction to civil society. The notion of civil society as a 
public arena and as the primary environment for the expansion of democracy 
acquired a greater relevance from that point onwards. 
The fall of institutionality showed the little consistency that it had when confronted 
by the reactivation of the capacity for action of citizen associations, and the re- 
establishment of the public political sphere. This, in its turn, showed that power is 
located in that dimension in which individuals and groups form an image of their 
situation, and that civil society is the legitimate, real representative of political power. 
V. 3.4 The Constitution of 1999: Decentralization and Participation 
The Constitution of 1999 was the result of the constituent assembly called by 
President Hugo Chavdz, and of the decision of the Supreme Court of Justice to admit 
the possibility of realizing such a consultation by means of a consultative referendum 
for all citizens, after a prolonged dispute between the various political sectors. In the 
text of the Constitution that was approved, the theme of decentralization was brought 
up to date through the creation of an authentic federal state. It Also paid attention to 
aspects concerning the channels of citizen participation. The text also assumed, as 
never before, the progressive character of human rights and the idea that justice is 
located within a terrain of respect and propriety. 
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Decentralization had effectively achieved constitutional recognition, and the new 
political actors understood that in order to re-found the republic and to deepen 
democracy, it was necessary to accept decentralization as a constitutional mandate 
(Brewer Carias 2000, p. 10). Article 4 of this new Constitution indicated that the 
Bolivarian Republic, of Venezuela was a decentralized federal state formed by 
political entities themselves derived from the distribution of public power and would 
thus be directed by principles of "territorial integrity, co-operation, solidarity, 
assistence, subsidiarity and co-responsibility". The vertical division of the state 
persisted, but each level of government (national, state and municipal) possessed its 
own autonomy, organization and competencies, with territorial distribution and 
limitations. 
In Article 6 of the Constitution, reference was made to the national government and 
to the political entities of which it was composed, signalling that this "would always 
be democratic, participatory, elective, representative, decentralized, alternating, 
responsible, pluralist and subject to revocable mandates". Meanwhile, Section IV 
perceived decentralization as a national policy, summoned to deepen democracy by 
moving power closer to the people. 
The election of local authorities remained an established fact and their responsibilities 
were fixed. Moreover, mechanisms were established for social control over politics, 
such as referenda (including for the revocation of mandates) and citizen participation 
in public affairs. In relation to decentralization, bodies for negotiation, concertation 
and co-operation were created, such as the Federal Council of Government, the state 
planning councils for public policy and the local councils in the municipal 
environment. 
In relation to the financial autonomy of the states, a Hacienda Nblica Estadal was 
created, in accordance with Transitory Disposition Fourth, number 6, a law that 
would establish the taxes of which the financial division was to be composed, the 
mechanisms of application and the dispositions that would regulate it. Equally, the 
Constitutional Division was fixed at 20%, and the inter-governmental fund for 
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decentralization (FIDES) and the Law of Special Assignations were kept (EI 
Nacional 1999/812). 
This 'Magna Carta' also contained annotations concerning participatory democracy. 
Participation is privileged (both directly and indirectly) in 56 articles, those being 
related to sovereign decision-making and obligatory fulfilmcnt. This is in contrast to 
the Constitution of 1961, which provided greater support for representative 
democracy. Of all of the above-mentioned articles, the most prominent arc 62 and 70. 
In Article 62 it is the obligation of the state and the duty of society to facilitate the 
most favourable conditions for the participation of the people in the formation, 
execution and control of public affairs. For its part, Article 70 establishes what the 
means of participation and public protagonism arc to be in the exercise of 
sovereignty, calling for the celebration of citizen assemblies as one of the most 
important forms of participation, because of their interlinking character. 
V. 3.5 Social Networks and the Bolivarian Circles 
The projected vehicles for reinforcing the mechanisms of the organization of civil 
society during the period of the new hegemony are social networks. The primordial 
objective is the promotion of a new political culture which would permit access to 
democratic participation within the new republican institutional ity and the 
development of a system of networks that would cover all social systems and be 
capable of organizing, articulating and co-ordinating every component of society. 
According to their promoters, these social networks arc the expression of the social 
fabric which was beginning to be constructed and which would go on to constitute 
the primary form of organization of the state, over and above the govcrnmcntal 
structure of the ministries and other traditional public institutions. Tile projcct 
includes the construction of the schools network, the health nctwork, the nctwork for 
citizen security and for civil defence, the sporting and cultural network, that of 
alternative communication, the housing network and the network of consumption and 
production in co-operativcs. 
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The construction of these social networks has been initiated by the schools network 
linked to the National Educational Network (PEN), which had as its legal base 
Articles 62 and 70 concerning these political rights of citizens (referred to 
previously). It was also supported by the norms of the constitution of 1999 that 
promoted decentralization, particularly Article 184 and Ordinances I and 6. This 
Article permitted states and municipalities to decentralize their services and transfer 
their implementation to community organizations and organized neighbourhood 
groups. With these social networks, the combating of political bureaucratisation 
could be pursued, and government could be move closer to the people, under the 
premises of join and autonomous management. In the sense in which citizens would 
assume responsibility for public affairs, political society would be re-absorbed into 
civil society (Rey 2001, pp 283 and 287). 
The point of departure for the above process lies in the transformation of the 
governance of the schools designated by the Ministry of Education, into a general 
assembly that would be the maximum authority of each school. The assembly would 
be integrated by different community components (student collectives, teachers, 
parents and their representatives, administrators and workers, religious 
representatives, neighbourhood groups and associations, cultural and sporting groups, 
commercial and business sections and many more). The openings of these new spaces 
would be directed towards the formation, elaboration, planning and execution of 
local, parish, municipal, state and national policies, programmes plans and projects, 
but also towards the exercise of social control, itself strongly related to the values 
inherent in the concept of accountability, as well as the formation of the citizenry as 
takers of decisions. 
Through the medium of this change, the school is transformed into a fundamental 
element of local popular power and of the construction of a new political culture that 
is directed towards guaranteeing the irreversibility of the revolutionary, pacific and 
democratic process. Rey (2001) has noted, critically, that for the promoters of the 
PEN the school is considered as a space of cultural resistance and counter-hegemony 
which recognizes the fundamental role played by the ideological apparatuses, and 
particularly, the school in the struggle for hegemony. But Rey adds that this is 
contrary to the principles and values of the Constitution, which consecrated cultural 
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pluralism and the universality of thought. Moreover, through the novelty of the social 
networks the structure of constitutional powers foreseen in the Constitution of 1999 
would be reformed, inasmuch as what in reality would be attempted would be the 
creation of a new power that had not been foreseen by the Constitution (Rey 2001, 
pp. 280-288). 
Nevertheless, in the opinion of President Chdvez the government had to contribute, 
by means of its social policy, to the seeking of a way to organize popular expression, 
re-unifying and conscientizing the people and impelling a political project for the 
articulation of networks. Moreover, the organisms linked to social policies and their 
international financing, such as FONVIS39 should have as their objective, not only 
the material maintenance of the people, but also their organization. Lastly, political 
parties must be the expression, the channel of participation and the influence behind 
this popular organized movement, without hegemonic pretensions of their own. 
The emergence of the Bolivarian Circles proposed by President Chivez can be seen 
in this last sense. Nevertheless, this can be seen as veiled by a series of questions, 
because it is difficult to see whether the President proposes the formation of a new 
party, or whether he is promoting the idea that social movements should not be 
remote controlled from the centre. In the opinion of Garcia Ponce (El Nacional 
24/06/01) there is a difference from political parties because the Bolivarian Circles 
have a horizontal structure and an organization structured from below to above. This 
makes them different to the Patriotic Circles which are the nucleus of the MVR party, 
and the political foundation of the revolution. The Bolivarian Circles are in contrast a 
manifestation of social force in every arena, and a dynamic element of participatory 
democracy. 
FONVIS (The Venezuelan Social Investment Fund) was created in May 1990 with two 
purposes to contribute to improving the living standards of the population in situations of 
poverty in urban and rural areas and to help the process of decentralization. The strategy has 
been to strengthen the capacities of sub-national organizations through transfers of technical 
and financial resources. 
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18/01/01). The initiative came from the President of the republic and those who had 
led the movement, MBR 200, which had organized the military rising of February 
1992. The formation of these Circles was a fundamental part of the project of change 
of the "Bolivarian Revolution", and of the re-unification of the student, indigenous, 
peasant and women's movements together with the military movement which had 
been proposed by the President (El Nacional 12/12/99). 
The proposal is to create a local leadership as a result of the social programmes, co- 
ordinated and administrated by the army, which the government began with the so- 
called Plan Bolivar 2006. From the collective action deployed in the re-organization 
of community services, in which would participate many of its members and local 
organizations, it was hoped that there would remain a popular organization, from 
which might arise or empower itself a leadership. Additionally, in the case of 
spontaneous mobilizations or spontaneous outbreaks of social protest, local 
leadership might contribute to that which it was hoped to consolidate, so as to 
incorporate that leadership in the process of change and transformation. 
This complemented an idea of the links between the creation of Bolivarian 
Movements and the system of social networks. According to the promoters of the 
Bolivarian Circles, the association permitted the discussion of the problems of the 
community, and their channelling in order to seek solutions quickly. Nevertheless it 
would seem that the principal function was to constitute the primary structures of 
internal political, social, ideological and security organizations of the country, if the 
prominent participation of these Circles in the events related to the coup d'etat of 
April 2002 is observed. 
V. 4 National Sovereignty and the External Context in the New 
Hegemony 
Since the assumption of power by President Chdvez in 1999, he has invoked a thesis 
of sovereignty as re-vindication of the development of what he considers to be an 
independent foreign policy, invoking the principle of national self-determination 
contemplated by Article I of the Constitution of 1999. Of this policy, it is of interest 
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to underline at least two aspects: the opposition of the Venezuelan government to the 
policies of the IMF and against the "system of commerce manipulated by the 
corporations", which Chdvez criticizes incessantly as 'savage neo-liberalism', and the 
efforts of the Venezuelan government to strengthen the organization of the Oil 
Producing and Exporting Countries, OPEC. Both aspects are connected, because the 
long-term policy of Venezuela to reconstruct OPEC and re-install a regime of higher 
tariffs on oil must be seen in the context of the overwhelming imbalance in 
commercial relations overseen by the World Trade Organization (WTO). 
In relation to the first aspect, the Venezuelan President affirmed in the recent meeting 
of the presidents of the Americas in Monterrey (Mexico) that: 1) the model of the 
North had been, on many occasions, the cause of underdevelopment of the South and 
it was appropriate to decide on that occasion what kind of development was to be 
financed in future, 2) that the IMF was not the suitable tool for this battle for the lives 
of billions of people, and that furthermore its policies had been at times poisonous for 
the peoples of the South, and because of this the time had now come to revise them 
urgently, and lastly 3) that different treatment had to be meted out to distinct 
countries of the world according to their levels of development, and here he 
suggested the setting up of an International Humanitarian Fund. "The rich countries 
cannot carry on claiming billions of dollars daily in agricultural subsidies, and then 
demand of poor countries that they cease subsidizing their agriculture. This is not 
merely unjust, it is immoral" (El Nacional 22/03/02). 
The foreign policy of Venezuela operates under the consideration that it is also 
necessary that the countries of Latin America should previously guarantee their unity, 
before being incorporated into any Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (ALCA, 
by its initials in Spanish). This is a thesis shared by many politicians of the region, 
especially in countries such as Brazil. As has been indicated previously, since 1980 
the World Bank and the IMF have imposed a free-market agenda that is founded on 
ideas of free trade, 'flexible' labour laws, privatisation, the reduction of the state 
budget and the de-regulation of the economy. The existing Venezuelan government 
rejects the free trade agenda under the terms of the WTO, as much as it rejects the 
form of ALCA that the USA wants to expand to include the rest of the Americas in 
2005. 
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In relation to the second aspect, that of oil exportation policy, the government began 
to contact so-called strategic allies in the international ambit, in order to preserve the 
unity and interests of OPEC. These contacts had their origin in the visits by President 
Chdvcz to the heads of state of all member countries of the organization, including 
Libya, Iran and Iraq. Venezuela promised the countries of OPEC that it would 
comply with the sales quotas, as well as implementing a price-banding system for the 
exchange value of crude oil. 
The second OPEC summit that took place in Caracas in September of 2000 in 
recognition of the active role of Venezuela in the strengthening of OPEC, transmitted 
among other things its Report on the Future of Energy, proposing the creation of its 
own installations for new transport and energy technologies, with the aim of 
investing in the future of non-fossil combustibles. At the same time, the report 
recommended that member countries take advantage of the electronic bartering of hi- 
tech products. This policy would be viable in bilateral exchanges with clients lacking 
in funds and with low-price exportable products, as happened with the trade 
agreement between Venezuela and Cuba. 
The incorporation of Cuba into the scheme of hydrocarbon co-operation with Central 
America and the Caribbean through the medium of the Energy Agreement of Caracas 
in 2000, which acted to complement the Pact Of San Josd, is a part of this policy. 
According to the Pact Venezuela and Mexico would share the distribution of 160,000 
barrels daily to the smallest countries of the area under special payment conditions. 
Needless to say, the administration of the USA disapproved of the commercial 
relations between Venezuela and Cuba. 
To this policy of the defence of petrol prices and free commercial relations has to be 
added the proposal of the new Hydrocarbon Law, which raised the taxes on royalties 
of new exploration wells, from 16% to 30%, which also generated reaction from the 
giant multi-national Exxon Mobil and other operators. Exxon Mobil is the most 
important extractor of oil from Venezuela, and on approval of the above-mentioned 
law subsequently had to pay double on its explorations. The Law also acted towards 
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the control of the oil company PDVSA, which since 1975 had been state-controlled 
but at the service of foreign operators. 
Outlining a pathway to autonomy has represented a risk to the country since the 
beginning of the 20th Century, when relationships between the USA and Venezuela 
were complicated by the interventions of the oil companies. At the present time, 
according to the secretary of OPEC, the situation is fairly complicated. The 
dependency of the USA on oil is progressively increasing, and in the meantime 
Venezuela is the third largest supplier of oil to that country, which makes its political 
stability vital to any US administration. This explains the warning of the US of 
recourse to the Charter of Democracy of the OEA as a means of sanctioning the 
Venezuelan government if it violated freedom of expression or labour rights in 
Venezuela (El Nacional 13/04/02). 
To both of the two aspects discussed above can be added, on the one hand the vision 
represented by the Washington Consensus which sustains the orthodox view of 
industrial development, globalization and free trade, and on the other hand the Third 
World-ist vision under the slogan "Another World Is Possible", which seeks to put a 
brake on the power of global finance and improve the order of social justice. The 
government of Venezuela is branded with a strong socially democratic orientation, 
but in the eyes of the rest of the world it appears more radical. 
Much of this radicalism is interlaced with the discourse of the president and with the 
social reforms that the government is seeking to implement: the re-division of land to 
the dispossessed, growing investment in housing and infrastructure, as well as the 
control of import prices of subsistence goods. Nevertheless, because of the 
difficulties implied by trying to escape from the plan sketched out by the policies of 
the multi-lateral organisms, the new hegemony has also promoted policies of neo- 
liberal character, combining them with policies towards the control of prices, 
subsidies and protective measures. 
The revision of neo-liberal policies in the context of the democratisation of Latin 
America, as a consequence of the little social success that these have achieved in the 
region, serves as an explanation for the welfarist actions and programmes. 
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Nevertheless, the effects that these programmes have had on the interests of certain 
economic groups, as well as the general disposition of the government, have 
combined to generate opposition amongst the national and international elites. 
Medina (2001) is of the opinion that to understand the controversy surrounding the 
new hegemony, over and above the problems already referred to as regards oil, it is 
necessary to consider the juxtaposition of the idea of democracy within the neo- 
liberal parameters of the USA, and the "type of participatory, direct and plebiscitary 
democracy" which is currently being attempted in the country (Medina 2001, p. 88). 
Rodriguez Araque (El Nacional 18/4/02) refers to the manner in which the results of 
the discussions over the formation of government in 1998 led, in the political order, 
to a profound process of the democratisation of Venezuelan society, and in the 
economic order towards a productive economy. This last signified that the project 
would try and construct a proposal that would permit the articulation of the country 
so that it had advantages in the global economic system. This is to say that the project 
proposed maintaining the control of the oil industry in place of privatising it. This is 
an important point in understanding the political crisis besetting Venezuela at the 
beginning of the 201h century, in the global context. In the hegemonic struggle the 
neo-liberals can count on powerful interests, and the social democratic project on 
powerful sectors. 
The triumph of Chavdz created a series of expectations that, in part, were fulfilled 
and this gave to his movement a wide base of support that made the levels of social 
conflict tolerable, in spite of the criticism of the opposition. However, the levels of 
internal social conflict grew and the mobilization of the sectors of civil society 
opposed to the government of Chavdz began to demand the destitution of the 
president, supported by the Bush administration. In the meantime, other sectors of 
civil society, whether beneficiaries or not of the new hegemony, rejected these 
demands. 
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V. 5 Political Context and the Hegemonic Struggle 2001-2002 
The preceding commentary has shown that the Venezuelan social context was 
divided by the setting up of two distinct state projects. The first was the neo-liberal 
project which derived from the second presidency of Carlos Andres Pdrez in 1988, 
and which at that opportunity found strong international support and little internal 
support, and which at this time is supported by an opposition that itself can count on 
the support of only a few sectors of Venezuelan society. The other project, the 
Bolivarian of 1998, is an alternative that is antagonistic to that of the neo-liberals, and 
is supported by a diversity of sectors, the majority of them located in the broad 
impoverished social sector, following the leadership of the MVR. The active 
existence of both projects has polarized society, leading to confrontation between 
both sectors and increasing the levels of conflict. 
The fragmentation of the political parties has left a vacuum in the political space that, 
circumstantially, has been occupied by corporative organizations, such as the 
Venezuelan Workers Confederation (CTV), the Federation of Chambers of 
Commerce and Industry (FEDECAMARAS), the elite of the oil businesses of 
Venezuela (PDVSA) and other institutions, such as the armed forces, media groups 
and sectors of the church hierarchy. These organizations and institutions have, in 
parallel with their normal functions, transformed themselves into political 
organizations with aspirations to control the power of the state. 
In the conflictual circumstances at the beginning of the year 2002, the CTV and 
FEDECAMARAS signed the co-called 'Pact of Governability'. As on previous 
occasions the church acted as legitimator; in its opinion, these two organizations 
would not attempt to re-establish the democracy of conciliation, if not an institutional 
normality which could only become reality with the exit of Hugo Chdvez from the 
presidency. According to FEDECAMARAS this pact bore no relationship to the 
famous Punto Fyo Pact, and its elaboration was an effort to seek an escape from the 
crisis of governability. Meanwhile, for the president of the CTV, the document did 
not so much set out a facilitating agreement for the conduct of government, as try and 
establish an alliance for the transition of government. 
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At this point the government rejected the initiative of the CTV and 
FEDECAMARAS, with the assurance that there was no crisis of governability. 
Moreover, the government was not disposed towards a pact that bore a strong 
resemblance to the old model that had been abandoned with the presidential elections 
of 1998, even though those involved were not political parties. Nevertheless, after the 
events of the I 11h of April the government recognised that some kind of rectification 
would be necessary, and that the solution to the ungovernability would have to be in a 
dialogue between the opposition and the government, that would have to establish a 
minimum level of agreement. 
The agreement proposed by the opposition was exclusionary, because it denied any 
interweaving of popular participation, something that in the new environment created 
after 1998 would have been impossible to accept. One of the contributions to the 
process of democratisation that can be noted in favour of the new leadership, and 
which the opposition had been unable to achieve, is that it had mobilized 56% of the 
electorate in 1998 and 59% in 2000. Rangel expresses the belief that this mobilization 
of social differentiation, of the resentment that underlay the mentality of these 
popular sectors when confronted by the Venezuelan elite sectors, was a policy to feed 
the process of political change, the demand for a constituent assembly (El Nacional 
7/7/02). But it had also permitted the popular sectors to understand that they could 
form and active part of the politics of the country, and that they could participate in 
the formulation of policy. 
By the side of the sectors that defend the 'Revolution' organized in the Bolivarian 
Circles, there is the opposition that operates under the umbrella of the 'Democratic 
Co-ordinator', integrated principally by the middle and upper class of the capital of 
the republic. The Co-ordinator platform, according to one of its directors, Elias 
Santana, is an organization that circumstances and maturity have brought about. It is 
a space of articulation between some of the political parties and some groupings of 
civil society. This relationship has only existed for a brief period, and is in the 
process of formalizing its structure; it still has no capacity installed for the execution 
of centralized decision-making (El Nacional 15/7/02). The Democratic Co-ordination 
platform is integrated by the secretary-generals of 13 political parties, among them 
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AD, COPEI, the Proyectos Venezuela, MAS, Alianza Bravo Pueblo, Primero 
Juslicia, the Alianza Pro la Libertad, MIN, the Bandera Roja and the presidents of 
33 organizations of civil society, amongst them the Civic Alliance formed by 
Queremos Elegir, Movimiento Nulidad 10 11 and Ciudadania Activa, Asamblea de 
Ciudadanos, Pro Catia, the Red de Veedores, the Asamblea de Educacion, the 
Coordinadora de Lucha de Mujeres (MOUVE) and the Federation of Environmental 
Organizations of Venezuela, among others as well as the CTV and 
FEDECAMARAS. 
These political actors in principle centred their struggle on the demand for a 
revocatory referendum, and the possibility of a constitutional amendment to shorten 
the constitutional period of the presidency and latterly the demands were linked to the 
resignation of the president, and more recently towards the intervention of the OEA 
as a mediator in the national conflict. They appear to forget that the most important 
problem is how to recuperate the democratic spaces, and how this would translate 
itself into a solution to the problem of poverty, with the participation of all sectors. 
V. 5.1 Mobilization of Civil Society 2001-2002 
In the last months of the year 2001 the Chavista hegemony entered a political and 
social crisis with the old elites, the product of the approval of a conglomeration of 
laws contained in the Ley Habilitante, and which found its key point in the coup 
attempt of the I Vh of April 2002. 
In November of 2001 the 49 laws of the Ley Habilitante entered into effect, but many 
of these laws were not accepted by the opposition. The Federation of Commerce and 
Industry rejected the measures because it considered them outside democratic 
channels. The approval of these laws was not the product of a popular consultation, 
and moreover these laws generated insecurity and had an affect on the credit supply. 
The president argued however that the Hydrocarbons Law in particular would 
strengthen foreign investment. The laws that were the principal source of conflict 
were the Land Law, the Hydrocarbons Law and the Law of Water and Coastal Zones. 
These three laws were related to specific areas of interest of the national proprietors 
and foreign companies related to oil, tourism, hotels and agro-industry. 
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As a means of pressure, FEDECAMARAS called a civic stoppage on the I Oth of 
December 200 1, jointly with Conindustria Fedenaga, VeAmCham (the Venezuelan- 
American Chamber of Commerce and Industry), Cavecol (the Venezuelan- 
Colombian Chamber of Economic Integration). Later on the Workers' Federation of 
Venezuela (CTV) joined the stoppage, and thereby workers and management were 
together again, as they had been in 1958. Nevertheless, although it could count on the 
support of these sectors, internally FEDECAMARAS was divided; the sections of the 
states of Bolivar and Apure did not agree to the stoppage. 
The president challenged them to stop the country to see who had most support: "If 
the oligarchy or the people is sovereign. " He added, "They have never defended the 
interests of the people, they have always defended their oligarchic interests. This does 
not worry me at all. To the contrary, it shows me that we have taken the right road. " 
The same day as the stoppage the government promulgated the Land Law so as to 
initiate the "Agrarian revolution", assigning 12 million bolivares to this end. "This 
law has been questioned by different sectors of society and the oligarchs have 
demanded six months to implement it; but we have been waiting two hundred years, 
and I have decided not to wait another day. " 
The civic stoppage of the I Oth of December of 2001 strengthened the protests and the 
mobilizations paid for by the banking sector, the commercial and industrial sectors, 
backed by CTV and the press and television. These protests converted themselves 
into the daily business of the political life of the country. 
In the days following the stoppage of I O'h December, the National Electoral Council 
(CNE) declared the authorities of the CTV to be illegal. Another important incident 
was the protest of the followers of the MVR in front of the offices of the daily 
newspaper El Nacional, accusing them of lying in their news; this provoked a 
reaction from blocs of the press in their resorting to international arenas. However, 
the United States from the beginning maintained a carefully neutral stance, neither 
confirming or denying the responsibility of the Executive for the protests. 
200 
On the other hand organizations of civil society opposed to the government, in the 
same manner as their sympathisers, began street protests, cacerolazos, convoys and 
demonstrations. Thus, in the same day of the civic stoppage there were protests in 
front of the offices of FEDECAMARAS to reject the civic stoppage. On the 8"' of 
December the organization Fuerza Solidaria called a march demanding the 
resignation of the president. Another type of protest used by the opposition were the 
cacerolazos, each time the president addressed the country through the state-owned 
television company, or other state channels. 
The second public march of the opposition with the assistance of the political parties, 
groups of artists from the press and television and the Civic Alliance, was organized 
for a commemoration of the 23 rd of February, and according to the opposition 
250,000 people marched. The government sympathizers also made their feelings felt 
with a march and cacerolazos in the popular sectors. 
In the month of January 2002 the conflict with the church was intensified owing to 
the discourse of the Apostolic Nunciate to the Palace of Miraflores, in which he 
demanded that the government avoided radicalisation; the head of state considered 
this to be an attempted interference in political affairs. 
Another destabilizing element was the fracturing within the national armed forces, 
particularly at the higher level. During the few weeks previous to the coup, various 
colonels and captains made their discontent with the government public, by 
demanding the resignation of the president, and finally by taking part in the coup of 
I Vh April in making destitute the head of state. 
V. 5.1.2 The PDVSA-Govemment Conflict 
At the end of the month of February 2002 the executive designated a new executive 
for the PDVSA (the Venezuelan State petrol company), which nomination of a new 
general executive generated for the first time in the history of the business the public 
discontent of the majority of payroll employees. This was followed by cacerolazos, 
strikes and industrial discord and, under the banner of "Meritocracy yes, politicisation 
no", the employees of diverse sections of the business that had produced the greatest 
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quantity of earnings for Venezuela maintained its struggle for two months, 
culminating with their participation in the march of I 11h April, itself culminating a 
few hours later with the abrupt exit of the president of the republic. 
On its side the government maintained a firm position in relation to its power to 
nominate the newjunta directiva of the state company. The Minister for Energy and 
Mines said "the government is very clear about the complexity of the oil business, 
but we are conscious that PDVSA is a state business and it is necessary that it adapt 
itself to the Venezuelan political economy framework in a coherent form. " The 
comptroller general of the republic also said that the president of the republic had the 
right to choose members of the executive and the president of Venezuelan state 
companies. Threats were made by both sides, and the employees tried to paralyse 
business operations by operating a go-slow; on the 7h of April, the president 
announced on national state television that 7 senior members of management were to 
be fired and 12 more retired. On the I Ith of April the employees of PDVSA marched 
on the Miraflores Palaces conjointly with CTV, FEDECAMARAS and other sectors 
of civil society, to demand the resignation of the head of state. The marched was 
numbered at about half a million people, and culminated with the bloody events of 
the Puente Llaguno (the centre of the city of Caracas), where 18 people lost their 
lives. 
V. 6 The Civic-Military Coup and Counter-Coup 
It has already been noted that vertical models of power in the national environment 
counted on the communications media which obstruct the expansion of resistances to 
other spatial ambits (Munck 2000, p. 195). For this reason, for the social organization 
of resistance the distribution of local power signified a political gain. This 
consideration of Munck has distinct relevance in the light of the events that have been 
analysed. 
Britto Garcia (2002) indicates that the coup of 12 th April was a media organized 
coup. The communications media in the hands of the private anti-Chavista sector had 
increased their criticism of the government to such a point that national and 
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international analysts and other sectors of the population also considered that the 
coup was a media led coup. Venezuelan television played a unique role in agreeing 
with the military coup leaders, to the extent that they didn't transmit news of any pro- 
Chavez reactions in the streets, but instead showed US films, which is to say that the 
imposed a virtual stoppage. "They transmitted at nine in the morning deserted streets 
filmed in the early morning, commercial centres closed by their owners, and reduced 
Venezuela to some 2000 protesters who were supporters on the payroll of PDVSA. 
The US ambassador Shapiro and the representatives of the Venezuelan-American 
Chamber of Commerce converted themselves into stars by means of these 
transmissions. " (El Nacional 15/4/02) The middle and upper class public had to resort 
to watch international news broadcasts by satellite to find out what was going on; the 
television channels argued that they hadn't shown the mobilizations because they felt 
themselves threatened by partisans of the government. 
It was also a rebellion of mobiles; Venezuela has one of the highest rates of per capita 
mobile phone use40 in Latin America. In the evening a demonstration was called by 
word of mouth and the use of cell phones outside the palace of the government, as a 
demonstration of support for the president, at which about 100,000 people were 
present (Wilpert 2002). The coup as much as the counter-coup was mobilized by 
cellular phones without the use of a single tank, in spite of their showing as a 
warning. General Baduel headed this rebellion of the cellular phones by calling all 
the heads of garrisons by cellular phone, one by one. The garrisons of the whole 
country were put in agreement telephonically with the counter-coup. 
40 According to recent studies by the UNDP, the advance by Venezuela by four places in the Index of 
Human Development of the UN for 1999 is owing to the greater diffusion of Information Technology 
amongst the population. One example is access to the internet: the number of users has practically 
quadrupled in Venezuela from 0.34 to 1.2 per 1000, even though it is still a long way behind Uruguay, 
the country in the region with highest levels of access to the net (19.6 users per 1000). The study also 
underlines that the number of fixed line telephones has increased from 82 to 109 per 1000 people, and 
in the meanwhile the subscription figures for mobile phones increased from 87 to 149 per 1000 people 
(El Nacional 7/11/02). 
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During the coup national television channels were taken off the air and the other 
channels repeated the events of the organizers of the coup without any questions. 
They announced that Chavez had resigned and his cabinet had been removed from 
office. Moreover, they reported that all the victims of the I 11h of April belonged to 
the sector of civil society that supported the coup, and that they had been victims of 
the Bolivarian Circles controlled and financed by the president. 
The communications media and the opposition to the government had manipulated 
the notion of civil society. Because of the importance of the organized sectors of the 
neighbourhood associations of the urban area of Caracas, as well as the union and 
guild organizations amongst others, they ended up excluding from civil society the 
sectors organized in the barrios, as well as any other organization that was not 
identified with specific sectors of interest, in such a manner that when the media 
referred to civil society they always did it from this view. Only after the protests and 
the marches and counter-marches of the I Ith of April, when both sides were able to 
gauge their forces, did consciousness of the diversity and respect for the other appear, 
which is essential in the democratic system. 
The coup plotters committed various fundamental errors. They believed that they 
could ignore the other part of the coup coalition integrated by the CTV. Moreover 
they made no consideration of the opinion of the leaders of the political parties 
represented in the national assembly, which had been conducting a moderate 
opposition to the government. Secondly, they believed that President Chivez could 
not count on the support of the people, and they forgot the opinions of the governors 
and other sectors in the interior of the country. Thirdly, not all the sectors of the 
military were in agreement with the coup. 
In the first instance it was decided to integrate the military junta with representatives 
of FEDECAMARAS, the military, one member of each political party and the 
support of the television channels. Palast signalled that in reply to his question days 
later to Carmona, asking him who had given him the authority to self-declare himself 
president, the coup leader responded: "Civil society". By this he meant the bankers, 
the heads of the oil companies and the others who signed his declaration (Palast, The 
Observer, 12/7/02). 
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The new governing junta proceeded to dissolve the public powers: the national 
assembly, the supreme court of justice, the attorney general, the national electoral 
commission and all the governorships were all voided, and elections were to be called 
in a year. Moreover, the security bodies of the new regime began to jail functionaries 
of the old government and deputies of the MVR from the national assembly. All of 
this awoke a series of protests against the new regime by the partisans of the MVR, 
and also by those sectors of the opposition who were affected by the new measures, 
or who had been excluded from the new regime and had subsequently decided to 
withdraw their support from the new junta. 
On the other hand there had been confusion as to whether the president had actually 
resigned, and therefore the commanders of the tactical units of the army (battalions), 
once they heard the decrees of the transitional president, demanded from their 
generals that they conform the high command of the army to a tradition of respect for 
the constitutional ethos, and hours later they announced their refusal to recognise the 
defacto regime installed the day before. 
Elsewhere in nearly all of the barrios of Caracas there began spontaneous protests 
and disturbances in the days following the coup, in support of the government of 
Chdvez. The police were ordered to put down these expressions of resistance against 
the newjunta, and in the confrontations approximately 40 people died. 
In some states in the interior of the republic, governors loyal to Chdvez were removed 
from office, such as was the case with the governors of the state of Mdrida, and the 
state of Tdchira, who were ejected violently from their offices by security agents of 
the newly installed regime. But immediately came the reaction of other governors and 
of the population of these states; some governors refused to leave their offices, basing 
their refusal on their legitimation as a product of popular elections, as a rejection of 
the defacto regime, as happened with the governor of the state of Aragua, Didalco 
Bolivar who, together with RaCil Baduel, the commander of the Codazzi battalion 
which was based in this state, began to pressure for the restitution of institutional ity. 
The state of Aragua is considered to be in the vanguard of the process of 
decentralization in Venezuela, and in this case the political autonomy of local power 
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conquered by the process of decentralization played a decisive role in the 
recuperation of central power, once the governors rc-took control of the states, 
ratifying thereby their support for the president. 
Conclusions 
First: 
The direction taken by the process of democratisation would move it towards a more 
participatory democracy than before. The dependent context in which this transition 
unwrapped was the crisis of representation, and this would be changed for a 
dependent context of hegemonic struggle. This indicates the sense of the process and 
its incidence on the dependent context, which in the Venezuelan case was very 
dynamic. In this change of route political decentralization and civil society have 
played a very important role, and both have counted on the support of democratic 
institutionality in combination with other external elements, as in the case of multi- 
lateral financing. 
The direction proposed initially by the political actors, as can be appreciated later in 
the struggle for hegemony, was different from this. More specifically, they wanted to 
found a democracy in which civil society should be constituted as a support for the 
central state, and decentralization would continue down the route traced out by the 
multilateral financial organisms, even when their discourse alluded to local spaces 
and social capital. Nevertheless, political decentralization by devolution, as a 
component of governmentality (Slater 2002) has contributed to overcoming the 
framework of representative centralised democracy, and tipped the balance, at the end 
of the 1990s, towards a participatory democracy of mobilization. 
But this has also been made possible thanks to the occurrence of events, outside the 
control of politics, which impacted on the political context and modified the proposed 
route. Here we should be re-emphasize the events of 27 th February 1989 and 4 Ih 
February 1992, as facts which deserve to be studied geo-politically in greater depth 
and as an expression of the presence of the power of the people. Each of these in its 
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moment has had an influence on this course and has contributed to changing the route 
traced initially in 1989 with the implementation of the "Economic Package". These 
events, uncontrolled by the duly-constituted powers engendered the trend towards 
decentralization and acted to awaken civil society. In the second instance they re- 
articulated other elements present in the political system towards the formation of a 
new hegemony and achieving the road to the Constitutional Assembly of 1999. From 
the above, it can be noted that in order to change the route of the processes of 
democratizaiton towards participation, it was first necessary to form a new political 
discourse which gave flexibility, firstly to decentralization of the relationships of 
power that opened spaces for resistance and plurality, and as a consequence also to 
the development of civil society. 
Second: 
Venezuelan democracy has seen itself strengthened by political decentralization 
through devolution. Political decentralization permitted the overcoming of difficult 
moments in the continuity of the democratic regime, and the reinforcing of 
institutionality when confronted by the crisis of representation. Equally, it contributed 
to the disarticulation of the control exercised by the parties over civil society, as has 
been reiterated throughout the text. Nevertheless, the most important aspect 
contributed by the democratising process is having contributed to the fragmentation 
of the parties, and consequently to the atomisation of the party system, which has 
been demonstrated quantitatively and qualitatively. The fragmentation of the party 
system fed diversity, as well as diversifying public opinion and discussion in the 
heart of the political system. This without a doubt had an important effect on the 
development of civil society. 
The regional elections from 1989 to 2000 indicated the advance of the new neo- 
liberal project and on the other hand the substitution or transformation of social 
democracy. Meanwhile, like a wedge between these two blocks, the alternative 
project of the new hegemony that would emerge towards the end of the decade in 
1998 was being strengthened. The beginnings of the fragmentation of the parties 
began in the middle of the decade but concluded with the constitution of the Polo 
Patri4tico in 1998. The Polo PaIri6fico was not a party so much as the unifying of a 
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series of political identities that conserved their independence; these same constituent 
characteristics were maintained by the Polo Democr6tico, which represented the neo- 
liberal project. 
All of this makes manifest the way in which the new dependent context conformed 
itself in the hegemonic struggle. The other component is the political discourse and 
the unity of leadership; these aspects in particular marked the differences between the 
two poles, because whilst the Polo Patri6tico practiced a unity of leadership and a 
discourse that supported popular civil society, the other pole had no clear leadership 
to give drive to the project that they wanted to develop, and their discourse was a 
neo-liberalism already accepted in the economically powerful sector of civil society. 
Third. 
Civil society in the decade of the 90s itself developed fundamentally within a 
dependent context outlinelby the promotion of a neo-liberal ideology, the agents of 
which sought dominance over the national consciousness, through intervening more 
directly in the relationships between social actors. Nevertheless, in the period of the 
new hegemony the creation of new state and local institutions that were autonomous 
from the central powers had displaced the struggle for more democracy towards local 
spaces of power (state, municipal, parish, urban community, rural and indigenous 
spaces). 
These new actors now share the spaces of discussion and politics in the midst of a 
civil society in formation, and within the context of a non-centralist conception. Co- 
operation and participation have begun 1) to mark the guidelines of the relationship in 
the local spaces as factors tending towards an equilibrium of power, just as proposed 
in the PEN project, and 2) to play a central role in the construction, shared planning 
and control of spaces of power, and public spaces. Nevertheless, these processes are 
still very much in their initial stage. The reality is signalled by a pre-eminence of 
differences over equalities, now more than before. The conflict at the heart of civil 
society (2001-2002) in the process of the hegemonic struggle has raised a ferocious 
confrontation derived from the competition between antagonistic projects of the state, 
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that of the neo-liberals and that of the revolutionary and progressive project 
represented by the leadership currently in government. 
It may be suggested that civil society finds itself inevitably in a field of pressures and 
resistances from above and from below, but also at the same time in a field of 
discussion and dialogue in which diversity is indispensable. In this sense the presence 
of a pluralist, diverse civil society has also been a great support for the continuity of 
the democratic system, and its contribution to the democratic process has enriched the 
participatory proposal. Civil society has played a very important role in the 
framework of the hegemonic dispute. 
Fourth: 
One of the most important contributions of the new hegemony has been to give 
knowledge to civil society of an alternative for changing the representative 
democracy of elites that had dominated the political system, and in its' place to 
promote a more dynamic and socially more participatory democracy at local levels. 
Its' contribution has also been important in reclaiming political reality, with a more 
direct and popular discourse. 
The proposal concerning the constituent assembly was a coagulating discourse that 
contributed to the homogenisation of public opinion, and gave an orientation to civil 
society. Morgan Quero (2002, p. 77) maintains that governmentality is sustained by 
contract; this comes to constitute the theoretical base upon which it is possible to 
attain general principles of the art of government. Moreover, there is observable in 
basically similar terms a correspondence between governmentality and the principles 
now exposed by Flyvbjerg (see Chapter II), concerning the relationship between the 
dependent context and the process and synchronised plurality of forms of 
government, or decentralization of power. 
The constituent assembly marries political and legal arenas to propose new forms of 
organization which are closer to the people, and to drive the Constitution of new 
spaces of power for'democracy, as is demonstrated with the project of the social 
networks promoted by the new hegemony as the primary organizations of the state. 
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This would permit the continued presence of society in the political decisions beyond 
the co-active logic of the state and the presence of forms of representation of greater 
political efficiency, permitting the overcoming of the crisis of representation. 
The mobilization of civil society in the public arena as an expression of a mode of 
resistance may also be connected to the idea of governmentality; the expansion of 
mobilization acquires from then on greater relevance. In the struggle for hegemonic 
control, all of the members of civil society are fully transformed into social actors 
(Grybwsky 1997, pp. 20-22) and thus what is being dealt with is the constitution of 
movements of opinion that orientate the will of distinct social forces, in differentiated 
blocs. As has been previously indicated, each bloc in turn articulates an identity, with 
its protagonists and allies, which can be identified separately: the key in this 
definition is that articulation refers to a practice (Laclau and Mouffe 2001, pp. 93-97). 
This comes to signify that mobilization as a practical expression of the political, 
passes to constitute a primordial element of political action, and may arrive at the 
formation of new forms of representation. 
Fifth: 
The institutional restoration of the exercise of power, in 2002, shows that the 
promoters of the coup detat had no consistency when confronted by the re-activation 
of the capacity for action of the citizen associations, and the re-establishment of the 
public political sphere. The relationships of the dominion of Empire have returned to 
menace the sovereignty of the country. This in its turn shows that power is localised 
in whatever dimension that individuals and groups form themselves into an image of 
their situation and society. It also shows that civil society is the legitimate and real 
representative of public power and democratic action, the practice that articulates 
pubic opinion against all those mechanisms that offer resistance to the effective 
exercise of equality, liberty and social solidarity. 
In spite of the democratic process being interrupted for 48 hours in April of 2002, 
democracy was restored and defended by civil society. This shows that the notion of 
Venezuelan civil society diffused by some investigative organisms and 
communications media, that civil society is comprised solely of NGOs, business 
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organizations and the civil organizations of the middle and upper classes of the East 
of Caracas, is not the whole truth. The organizations of the popular sectors of the 
zones and barrios, which from 1989 onwards have begun to make themselves 
independent of the political parties and to support the new political project of the 
government of Chdvez, also belong to civil society. The concept of civil society 
which must be understood is one which is not just limited to the separation of civil 
society from the state, but one which also must consider the context of social 
relationships and the field in which the verticality of power is located. 
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Chapter VI 
Democratization in spaces of local power 
The Municipality Libertador in the State of M6fida: Parish of 
Osuna Rodriguez 
Introduction 
The objective of this chapter is to illustrate changes that have occurred at the local 
level with the application of political decentralization in terms of citizen participation. 
Civil society in Venezuela had been fighting for the incorporation of political 
decentralization and for greater participation in the political system. These demands 
came to occupy a significant place in discussions over the changes which would be 
introduced by the Presidential Commission for the Reform of the State of 1984. To 
this dispute between interests, was added the neo-liberal ideological proposals of the 
Washington Consensus, which alleged the necessity of "modernizing" the state 
administratively and guaranteeing governability. The discussion provoked 
confrontation between civil society and the political elites over the administration of 
government between 1983 and 1988. The latter attempted to draw support from the 
implementation of political decentralization, seeking thus to preserve its spaces and 
form of controlling power. Nevertheless, at the end of four years, consensus had been 
achieved and the project was partially approved in 1988. 
Reforms towards local decentralization in Venezuela could be considered, following 
the proposal of Cabrero (1996), as a process of devolution and as a democratic 
decentralization. The most significant force for decentralization in Venezuela has 
been located in the promotion of political autonomy and the fiscal strengthening of 
local government. The first stage was directed towards the strengthening of the 
opcnings for political participation at the local level and included the elections for 
governor and mayor of 1989 as well as at parish level in 1992. A second stage of 
administrative decentralization led to the implementation of the Organic Law of 
Decentralization and Transfer of Competencies of Public Powers in 1993 and the 
212 
political refonns which were inaugurated by the constitution of 1999 whose proposals 
for participatory democracy strengthened political decentralization. 
Parallel to this process of economic and political decentralization, the measures of 
structural adjustment which had been continuously postponed by the governments of 
COPEI and AD during the 1980s, were finally adopted in 1989. These measures 
brought a proposal for participation which substantially modified the predominant 
scheme of the conciliatory populist democracy of the welfare state. The neo-liberal 
reforms sought to discharge the state of the majority of its responsibilities in the 
resolution of conflicts and in attending to social demands. Civil society became 
incorporated into this process through the logic of social capital which attempted to 
transfer the state's responsibilities to it, thereby substantially altering the relationship 
between civil society and, at the same time, promoting the separation of two. 
In order to achieve such objectives, neo-liberal policies placed emphasis on local 
spaces. Local municipal power had many possibilities to contribute towards the 
process of democratization, because the proximity of governor to governed facilitated 
politics of participation and the sharing of power; in spite of the risk of clientelism. 
that might be provoked through this proximity. Nevertheless, the decentralization of 
social services to the local level has to be accompanied by the maintenance of at least 
part of the burden of these social policies at the national level, in order to 
counterweight the socio-economic differentiation between municipalities, through the 
regulation and redistribution of one part of public income (Castro 1996, p. 107). 
The process initiated by the Constitution of 1999, in underlining the constitutional 
importance of political decentralization, also alluded directly to the interaction 
between politics and the political. But not only this, it introduced principles that 
guaranteed that other forms of the organized expression of civil society, separate from 
the traditional political parties, could have access to the structures of participation. 
This was the case with social movements and other types of manifestation of the 
social sectors, who legitimately demanded to be an active part of the re-structuring of 
the powers of the state. Without a doubt, this also contributed to the development of a 
process of social mobilization and participation, which awoke and brought about 
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important changes in the form of that which is now understood and perceived as 
democratic participation for Venezuelans. 
It will be argued in this chapter that these new forms of seeing and valuing democracy 
are most accurately analyzed through the study or investigation of particular cases. 
Case studies imply underlining the specificity of those aspects related to the 
dependent context, especially those which affected, in an immediate manner, the 
existence of the individual and his/her family, the neighbourhood and the 
organizations interwoven around it. These relationships constitute an important 
element in the networks of power and in the connections of experience of individuals, 
from which they elaborate their dialogues and their political proposals. Nevertheless, 
in the democracy of conciliation, the public spaces of political actors were also 
connected with certain mechanisms of intermediation that the political parties 
employed, in order to control the organizations of civil society at a local level. 
According to Allen (1999), modes of power (such as manipulation and incentives) are 
combined in different ways inside the schemes of vertical domination of power, and 
act to limit participation. Nevertheless, the Venezuelan political system has modified 
its centralist scheme through political decentralization. The new hegemony in power 
has projected participatory democracy and this could lead to the possibility of 
changes in the intermediation of the two parties in civil society. This is an 
undertaking in which political decentralization and participation remain intimately 
connected with the problems of social values and power about which there is very 
little information and in which the experience of democratic participation in 
Venezuela is very recent. Moreover, the discussions undertaken in the previous 
chapters concerning the changes to the Venezuelan political system are insufficient to 
ensure that they have touched on the specific, individual relationships of power that 
affect the development of civil society as much as that of the new social movements. 
Nevertheless, in the consideration of the above ideas it is possible to ask how the 
local leaders and members of each community valued the democratic changes and 
how political decentralization has favoured local political initiatives. To this general 
question can be added other more specific ones: 
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- How do local actors think that political decentralization has contributed to the 
modification of the party system and political participation at the local level? 
How do the members of the community value the intervention of the opinion- 
forming groups and NGOs in the process of local democratization? 
- What do these actors think about the mechanisms of intervention (political 
clientelism) in the popular sectors of the municipality? 
- How transparent do they think that the conduct of leadership, the use of resources, 
and the process of satisfying community demands is? 
- What changes have they observed in the functioning of the neighbourhood 
committees? Have these given way to new participatory organizations? 
- In the context of the new hegemony the parish councils are elected and have a more 
active role. How do they exercise their legitimacy in relation to the municipal 
powers? 
- How do people participate through Parish councils, and how do they bring to 
fulfilment the planning of local demands? 
In order to address these questions, this chapter proposes: 
1) To configure the dependent context of the case study of the parish Osuna 
Rodriguez, to explore the evaluation of the process of decentralization by members of 
this community through interviews and enquiries. 
2) To observe the changes in the systems of representative participation in 
municipal elections (at parish council level and in the areas of party hierarchy, 
alliance and abstention). 
3) To observe the changes introduced by the new constitution of 1999 with 
respect to local levels of power. 
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V1.1 Theoretical and methodological antecedents for the study 
of local power 
As has been observed previously in Chapter V, political decentralization allowed for 
the emergence of new leaderships and contributed to the disarticulation and 
fragmentation of the institutes of representation and political parties, as well as their 
future re-grouping. In this, the political elite (with some reason) feared the loss of 
local spaces of power which had been controlled by political parties and the state 
bureaucracy and, therefore, obstructed the promotion of decentralization which was 
able to affect the relationships underlying hegemonic party domination. In the period 
of the democracy of conciliation, these elites blockaded the implementation of 
political decentralization from 1958 onwards, arguing that in this way the 
consolidation of democracy would be guaranteed. (see Chapter IV Conclusions). 
Conciliation between a limited number of political actors to ensure the control of the 
decision-making system was, however, incompatible with political decentralization. 
In the scheme of decentralised power, relationships of power are produced at all 
points of space, and through mobile and unequal interactions. Moreover, relationships 
of power must also be understood as relationships of resistance and, as such, part of 
power itself. The idea of multiple points of power-resistance is assimilated more 
clearly as an understanding of power originating from below, or from civil society. 
According to Bobbio (1997(a), p. 43), the political sphere should be comprehended in 
a much broader sense than it is normally is, that is, it should be seen as encompassing 
the whole of social life. There is not political decision which is not conditioned by 
that which occurs in civil society. 
Political decentralization is necessarily accompanied by the multiplication and 
incorporation of new spaces of power. Different voices with the power of decision 
making also arise themselves a result of changes in leadership, and greater 
participation and mobilization of political actors. This complicated the scheme of 
conciliation within the party democracy. In fact, the decentralization reforms 
generated a new dynamic in the party system at a local level and favoured the 
development and emergence of a new generation of leaders. The process of selection 
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of these local leaders has been described as the closest link between decentralization 
and the broadening of democracy. The experiences of local elections in Bolivia, 
Brazil, Colombia, Chile, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela since the 1980s demonstrates 
that decentralization can contribute to the creation of democratic political practices, 
with the apparition of new parties and social movements (Lalander 1999, p. 88). 
From 1978 onwards, with the promulgation of the Organic Law of Municipal 
Regimens that gave legal status and power to the neighbourhood associations, the first 
steps were taken towards political decentralization (de la Cruz 1995, pp. 5-17 cited in 
Lalander). From this point, the political system would begin to develop the 
mechanisms for accepting claims from civil society and progressively, these would be 
incorporated into the reform of the state. Local decentralization would appear then as 
a political decision, a measure which was impelled by COPRE in the context of the 
re-composition of the democracy of conciliation, not as a result of the actions of civil 
society political practices which sought to influence the verticality of power of the 
state and achieve a greater horizontality in power relations and, consequently, more 
democracy. 
The lack of clarity on this point is derived from the duality present in the concept of 
civil society. Of the two definitions of civil society espoused by Bobbio (1997), the 
most utilized by the neo-liberal multilateral organisms and as a consequence, the most 
frequently employed overall, has been that which underlines civil society as the 
sphere of social relations which are not regulated by the state. Meanwhile, the less 
commonly employed definition establishes political relationships between civil 
society and the state, and considers civil society as the place where conflicts arise and 
develop that the state has the obligation to resolve. This last definition of civil society 
is precisely that which permits the drawing of more direct conclusions with respect to 
relationships of power, the displacement of the communitarian political tendency 
referred to by Lechner (1996) and considerations on new hegemonies made by Brown 
(2000). Civil society can in this way be linked to those questions of power and values, 
which are important for the local community and also for the investigation of social 
phenomena as processes. 
217 
The development of civil society in Venezuela does not present the same 
characteristics as the development of European civil society, nor the same force that 
certain social movements have had in other countries of the American continent. The 
conimunitarian tendency (discussed in Chapter I) noted in the new social movements 
and the re-organization of society (in the function of the growth of renovated forms of 
collective action) has only begun to be prominent recently. Nevertheless, there exists 
an organized civil society in Venezuela, and even though its critical emergence has 
been linked to the neoliberal tendency this does not render it unimportant 
(furthermore not all groups are linked to this tendency throughout Venezuela). The 
characteristics of these organizations have been covered in previous chapters, 
therefore, it is not necessary to delve further into them here, but without doubt the 
development of the communitarian tendency in Venezuelan civil society would be 
more closely linked to this type of organization in the future, through the power status 
taken by the parish councils in the country at the root of the decentralization of 
power. 
Exactly for this reason, the most important point to underline is that the relationship 
between local political decentralization and civil society is to be found in the creation 
of conditions for the development of a new kind of civic associational activity and 
through the construction of public spaces which permit the re-valuing of new 
expectations and the meetings of the demands of social movements seeking to express 
themselves (Lechner 1996). This signifies that the creation and configuration of 
places for doing politics, and discussions about the problems referred to over power 
and values, would come to constitute a key point in the analysis of the process of 
democratization within which local spaces of power were experimenting, and trying 
to understand their limitations and the possibilities for their constitution. 
An aspect, outlined in chapter I, which is connected to the limitations upon the 
creation and conformation of public spaces in which to make the political, is the 
socio-political reality of Latin America and in particular the notable tenacity and 
persistence of the cultural structures of the Iberian tradition and their social behaviour 
which are essentially authoritarian, elitist, hierarchical, Catholic and corporative. This 
has ensured the perpetuation of the markedly centralist and clientelistic character of 
political structures in the region (Oropeza 1988, pp. 23-24). With respect to this 
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theme, Lalander (1999) has signalled the possibility of clientelistic behaviour 
occurring in decentralized government (Lalander 1999, p. 94). In the passing of power 
from central state control to the lowest territorial levels, governors and mayors would 
certainly be able to construct their bases of support through a clientelistic system 
which interchanged social and economic benefits for political support in local and 
regional elections. 
Clientelism is linked to corruption and other forms of interpersonal relationships. But 
in terms of the ideas which are being advanced here, our interest in clientelism lies in 
an understanding of it as a mode of power which de-mobilizes civil society and which 
is highly decentralised (Njaim 1988, p. 126), because it contributes to the development 
of "centres of power" in local spaces. This means that clientelism has a notable 
impact on the constitution of local dependent contexts and specifically, on the 
possibility of constituting relationships of communitarian association at the local 
level, as well as strengthening democratic participation. 
Hanes Rexene (1985) emphasizes that political clientelism, in principle, is the 
relationship between individuals of different statuses and resources, which once 
extended and woven in space form a network of strong vertical links (together with 
weak and insignificant horizontal linkages) making the recognition of communal 
interests between individuals difficult. As a consequence, it leads to the formation of 
local organizations. These networks form political branches, capable of 
complementing the functions of social welfare where the state is unable to provide 
protection of life, property and wealth. In Venezuela such forms of traditional 
clientelism. (individual) and corporative clientelism (networks) were promoted by 
groups related to the state during the populist conciliatory democracy particularly in 
areas of few resources. 
This permitted the incorporation of broad sectors into the political system through 
enormous networks composed of a multiplicity of smaller clientelistic networks (in 
their majority more of the traditional type than the corporative) that solved conflicts 
as that might arise (Hanes Rexene 1985, p. 1-28). However, the new type of 
socialization that result from the eruption of neo-liberal policies introduced through 
adjustment programmes was directed in local spaces towards the replacement of 
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clientelistic relationships by purely utilitarian 'horizontal' relationships. These were 
expressed in multiple and unstable utilitarian contracts negotiated case by case, and 
for a defined duration. As Njaim (1996, p. 139) notes, moreover, the neo-liberal form 
of association affected communitarian traditions created around the environment and 
the public goods of local spaces. 
In the same manner that power can be modified, interpreted or practiced through 
different routes, however, political clientelism could also be considered one of the 
manifestations of modes of power. Allen (1999) has identified, 'close' relationships of 
power, domination, coercion, authority, manipulation, seduction and incentives within 
the different modes of power employed by institutions. In order that the power of 
dominion be effective, it has to have maximum legality and this is achieved through 
constituted authority (Allen 1999, pp. 205-208). For this to occur, whereas domination 
is imposed through coercion, authority is a mode of power that is formally requested. 
It is an instrumental mode that can be used selectively in combination with other 
modes of power. When central power is distributed at other spatial levels of power 
(regional or local), it is modified by institutions employing different modes of power 
and different combinations of agreement over the proposed ends. This is because 
modes of power vary in terms of their particular reach or intensity. 
The clicntelist political practices employed by electoral candidates constitute a form 
of manipulation, since its offers depend on the victory of the candidate. Moreover, 
clientelism mediates mobilization and stimulates the contention of resistance amongst 
other factors. More precisely, from the perspective of Allen, it could be asserted that 
clicntelism is a form of manipulation of power, employed by the formed political 
system in order to contribute to the assurance of approval when the authority of 
central power is not completely effective. Institutions frequently employ these 
different modes of power. Clientelism is also a political practice that permits the 
extension of power over space. 
In such a manner, clientelism can be associated with the vertical structures of power 
that have predominated in Latin America. In the stage of the democracy of 
conciliation in Venezuela, clientelism was a form of power associated with authority. 
It legitimated relationships of power, every time that it was used to fix 'negotiations 
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and incentives' in the so-called utilitarian pacts between different actors of the 
political system (and between these and ordinary individuals). Nevertheless, whilst its 
importance has been highlighted through an understanding of the process of 
democratisation on the South American continent, it is interesting to see that it is not 
explicitly considered as another mode of power in the political theory of the west. 
V1.2 The Constitution of 1961 and the Municipality - The 
Organic Law of Municipal Regimens 
The Constitution of 1961 established the fundamental principles for the regulation of 
the municipality in Articles 25 to 34, and defines it as "the primary political unit of 
the municipality. " These principles were developed further in the Law of Municipal 
Regimens of 1978. This law was a law of consensus sanctioned 15 years after its first 
presentation to the national congress and after many debates between the political 
forces represented in that legislature (Congressional Debates, LORM 1989, p. 587). 
This law served to unify the twenty state laws that through transitory disposition of 
the constitution of 1961 had governed the spaces of local government. 
Nevertheless, this had not been contemplated by Article 27 of the Constitution of 
1961 which stated that, "The law may not establish a regimen for the organization, 
government and administration of the municipalities attending to the condition of the 
populace, economic development, geographic situation and other important factors. In 
all cases, the municipal organization will be democratic and will respond to the 
natural character of local government (Congressional Debates, LORM 1989, p. 585). " 
This article, which guaranteed the diversity of the organizations of the organs of local 
municipal government and the democratic character of the municipality, had thus 
been reduced to a simple electoral act. 
At the beginning of the year 1979, the government of President Carlos Andrds Perez 
introduced a project of partial reform of two articles, which was rejected by congress. 
Later this project was reformed partially in 1984 for the realization of the municipal 
elections of that year, followed by a more profound reform in 1988, of which only its 
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electoral aspect was put into operation, whilst the rest of it was postponed until the 
15th June 1989 by mandate of that same reformed law. 
By 1989 municipal politics had become discredited by their inefficiency and 
inoperacy. Local democracy had been reduced to the act of choosing councillors 
every 5 years and the forum that was supposed to have been developed through the 
so-called Open Councils (which had been consecrated in 1978 for the permanent 
linking of the municipal council and the civil associations and organizations) had not 
been translated into an expression of the community because of the interference of 
various party interests represented in the councils (Congressional Debates 1989, 
p. 586). 
Parish councils had not been seen as administrative units, but rather as a means of 
exercising representation of the latter through delegation. It would not be until 1989, 
when the inter-party accords were reached for the incorporation of the conditional 
election of members (according to Article 183) that they would become effective 
during the elections of 1992. In the bosom of congress a discussion was generated 
between the principal hegemonic parties (AD, COPEI and MAS) over the resistance 
of the first two to the incorporation of the reform of parish councils during the year of 
1989, so that an expectation outlined a long time ago could be fulfilled 
(Congressional Debates, LORM 1989, p. 618). 
By contrast, the municipalities were autonomous in choosing their authorities, in the 
leadership of their affairs and competences, and in the creation, collection and 
investment of their resources. Nevertheless the Organic Law of Municipal Regimen 
(LORM) of 1989 in Article 14 signals that the municipalities and other local entities 
would be governed by the constitution and by the LORM, as well as the other organic 
and ordinary laws applicable under the Constitution and, moreover, by the laws 
governing the legislative assemblies. From this point, in particular, it can be seen how 
intermediation in the functioning of local authorities was structured by the political 
parties. 
The most important (in terms of their impact at local levels) of the reforms to the 
LORM that occurred in 1989 were those that vindicated the central role of the 
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Municipality as a unit of political administration, that created the figure of the directly 
elected mayor, that fragmented large districts into autonomous municipal units of 
smaller sizes and that the recognized the demand for greater participation at a local 
level. In effect the political reforms permitted the creation of the municipality, 
delimiting its geographic space and its authority for the exercise of power at executive 
and legislative levels. To this authority they added the creation of the parish councils 
that permitted a greater proximity between the citizen and the municipal government. 
More specifically in relation to participation, the LORM recognized the right of the 
organized community (neighbourhood, guild, social, cultural and sporting 
organizations) to participate in diverse aspects of the local political process. This was 
expressed in terms of open councils of the municipal chamber for the consideration of 
affairs of local interest but also, as proposed by the community, through the 
implementation of the referendum as a means of consultation and voluntary 
neighbourhood commissions related to the functioning of public services (LORM 
Articles 171,175 and 180). 
In equal fashion, LORM established the neighbourhood organizations as semi- 
corporative organizations. This signified that each urban sector could only be 
officially represented by an association fulfilling certain legal prerequisites that 
allowed it to be recognized by local government as representative (LORM Articles 
172 and 173). The forms in which the political parties interpreted this type of 
neighbourhood semi-corporation (now they inserted and recognized neighbourhood 
authority) facilitated the intermediation and control of local power structures. This 
explains why the great majority of these associations maintained links with the 
political parties around their clientelistic relations. Even so, as has been demonstrated 
in Chapter V, there was no impediment to the growth of locally autonomous 
neighbourhood organizations. 
For this reason the Law of 1989 included a unique aside to Article 172: "The 
municipal council will maintain, onlyfor informational purposes, an updated archive 
of the neighbourhood associations legally constituted in their jurisdiction". This 
unique aside related to the interference of the political parties within the councils. 
Moreover, this aspect was submitted for reconsideration in congress by a senator of 
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the AD party so that the line "for informational purposes only" could be interpreted as 
a limit on the actions of neighbourhood associations, and not as a provision in their 
favour. This was particularly important given that the opinion of the associations was 
very powerful and would only grow more so in the future (Congressional Debates, 
LORM 1989, p. 616). 
Particularly interesting, however, was a reply from a senator of COPEI, " if we 
eliminate the unique aside and things remain as they were before Le. that Me council 
has to legalize the neighbourhood associations, then if we have a situation where a 
council is dominated by AD and it is considered that the neighbourhood association 
is dominated by COPEI, for example, or MAS, then the council would refuse to grant 
it legalization and would refuse to recognise it as a neighbourhood association, or 
the reverse... In order to avoid exactly this kind of problematic practice, it was 
established with great clarity that the municipal council will simply hold a register of 
an informative character" (Congressional Debates 1989, p. 616). It would appear 
from this, therefore, that the legislators were aware of the problem of party 
intermediation. 
V1.2.1 The Constitution of 1999 and Local Power 
According to the constitutional tradition of Venezuela organized by the federally 
organised state, the Constitution of 1999 in Article 136 establishes that "the public 
power is to be distributed between municipal, state and national powers". It 
complements this with the formula of collaboration or co-operation which is also 
picked up in Article 136 of the constitution, thus: "Each of the branches of the public 
power has its own functions, but the organs which are entrusted with their exercise 
shall collaborate amongst themselves towards the realization of the ends of the state. " 
One of the novelties of the present Constitution is its call for the participation of all 
citizens (Article 62) freely in public affairs, either directly or through the medium of 
their elected representatives, something which consolidates the idea of a political, 
democratic, representative, participatory system. Moreover the Constitution reports 
that the participation of the people in the formation, execution and control of public 
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leadership is the necessary medium for achieving the protagonism, that will guarantee 
its complete development (Brewer Carias 2000, p. 69). As a consequence, the state 
remains obliged to facilitate channels or means for this participation. 
The means or forms of participation of the people are enumerated in Article 70 of the 
constitution, as follows: 
* In the political: election for public offices, the referendum, the popular consultation, 
the revocation of mandates, legislative, constitutional and constituent initiatives, the 
open council and the assembly of citizens. 
* In the social and economic: the authorities for citizen attention, self-management, 
co-management, co-operatives in all their forms including those of a financial 
character, savings associations, communitarian businesses and other associative forms 
guided by the values of mutual co-operation and solidarity. 
For communal purposes, the call to participation is consecrated in Articles 55,168, 
182 and 184 concerning neighbourhood groups (Garay 2000, p. 13). 
In Article 168, municipalities constitute the primary political unit of national 
organization, enjoying juridical status and autonomy within the limits of the 
constitution and the law. Municipal autonomy is understood as 1) The election of 
municipal authorities, 2) the self-management of the materials of its competencies, 
and 3) the creation, collection and investment of income. The actions of the 
municipality in the environment of its competencies must be fulfilled incorporating 
citizen participation into the process of defining and executing public management, 
and into the control and evaluation of the results, in an effective, sufficient and 
opportune form, in conformity with the law (Garay 2000, p. 78). 
So far as decentralization of competencies from states and municipalities in favour of 
neighbourhood groups is concerned, Article 184 establishes open and flexible 
mechanisms so that states and municipalities may decentralise and transfer to 
communities and organized neighbourhood groups the services that these manage if 
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they have having previously demonstrated their capacity for implementing them, thus 
promoting: 
Participation in the management of services, 
Participation in the formulation of policy, 
Participation in the economy, 
Labour participation in public businesses, 
Co-operative and communal organization, 
New subjects for decentralization, and 
Participation in penitentiary management. 
This article applies the principle of democratisation of power expoused in Article 158. 
The states as much as the municipalities would have to transfer certain services to the 
neighbourhood groups in the areas of health, education, sports, environment, co- 
operatives, self-managing mechanisms, etc. Article 158 perceives decentralization as 
a national policy that must deepen democracy, bringing power closer to the people 
and creating better conditions, as much for the exercise of democracy as for lending 
itself to effective and efficacious conduct of state tasks (Garay 2000, p. 73). 
Undoubtedly the postulates of the Constitution of 1999 seek to deepen democracy 
with the creation of new subjects of decentralization which includes reaching out to 
the communities, barrios and neighbourhood groups. It deals with a process of 're- 
decentralization' which is impelled now, not from the central government (above) but 
rather from an epicentre in the autonomous levels of local or municipal government 
(below). In other words, the municipality has to be the focus of decentralization 
which must be directed towards below where the people, the parish, the community, 
and the neighbourhood are. It deals with the constitution of the subjects of 
decentralization, with its juridicial status and, by relating it to the relations between 
state and society, with the question of legitimacy (which requires bodies capable of 
planning, executing projects, administering resources, conducting monitoring and 
rendering accounts) (Debates of the Constitutional Assembly 11/2/99, p. 9). 
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V1.3 Case Study Area and Justification 
Many elements combine to give a sense of unity to a community. Traditions and 
cultural aspects play a very important role, as the institutions around which this social 
reality is formed. The city of Wrida, which is the location of the municipality of 
Libertador in the state of Mdrida and the parish Osuna Rodriguez are located on a 
terrace of the river Chama, in the central Venezuelan Andes, at 1800 meters above 
sea level (Photo-Mosaic 6.1). 
The Constitution of 1999 considered the state of Mdrida as part of the Western 
indigenous region (Seventh Transitory Disposition, Numeral 4). Nevertheless, since 
the end of the 1960s, technological diffusion has been incorporating new commercial 
practices and the region acquired a certain economic importance. Agriculture was 
orientated by preference towards a horticulture directed towards the markets of the 
centre of the country. Industrial activity has never been as important. The process of 
urbanization was initiated at the beginning of the 1970s, much later than other regions 
of the country and transformed a small city into a metropolitan area. The city has 
more or less the same characteristics as the principal cities of the Venezuelan Andes 
and its demographic growth has produced a population of approximately 232,614 
inhabitants. 
The Catholic Church and the University of the Andes are the two institutions that 
have dominated the course of development of the community. In reality, the 
characteristic that distinguishes this city from other Venezuelan cities is its quality of 
being a University City and hence also a site for tourism. Universities are an 
important component of Venezuelan political society but also of civil society. 
Moreover, they are the site of development for many civil organizations that are 
independent of the political parties. These include ecological or environmental 
movements, cultural groups, university and forest fire-brigades, mountain rescue 
groups, peace organizations and human rights organizations. In reality, a great part of 
civil society is linked to the university. I 
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The ecclesiastical hierarchy also has political importance. Wrida was a region 
controlled politically by COPEI Christian socialism up to the 1970s and more 
recently it played an important role in the hegemonic struggle between the parties. 
The Church has frequently been located on the side of those in opposition to the 
government of Chdvez. The Episcopal Conference of Venezuela is represented by the 
Archbishop of the city Education policy in particular has affected its interests. In 
addition the Church in Wrida is owner of the television network of the Andes and, as 
such, is a member of the chamber of commerce of press and television. It is also 
linked with NGOs connected to the areas of health and the co-operative movement, 
which opens political spaces for the church at a local level. 
On the other hand, it is noteworthy that this city and its inhabitants have a high level 
of social mobilization and of political response to the great events at a local or 
national level. As an illustration of this, one of the most important precedents to the 
events known as the 27 th of February (the El Caracazo) referred to in Chapter V took 
place in Mdrida in 1987. During this year a social revolt took place over the killing of 
a university student by a lawer. The protest extended to all of the neighbouring 
barrios in which students were joined by housewives, inhabitants of the barrios and 
workers of the city. There had been no precedent for this kind of stoppage in the 
entire country (Upez Maya 2002, p. 207). 
The previous section shows that the local dependent context presents a certain 
particularity to Venezuelan democracy. The area of the case study is located in the 
periphery of the country, where the social dynamic is dependent on centralized 
decisions, and on the oil rentier economy. The city is specifically a centre for 
services. There is only a slight presence of business sectors in comparison with other 
regions, which is one reason why the unions and other types of semi-corporative 
organizations are tied to the university. The university budget is for example greater 
than that of the state. As a corollary to this, it has greater potential to develop social 
movements in comparison with other Venezuelan cities, derived from the university 
cultural environment that dominates in the city. 
There are several reasons for choosing of the parish Osuna Rodriguez as a case study. 
Firstly, through the centre of investigations at the Exchequer of the Faculty of 
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Architecture of the University of the Andes, there has been an investigation of the 
parish under way for several years. This work has unfortunately not been directed 
towards areas such as an exploration of changes in values, but rather an evaluation 
and a restructuring of constructed space. The focus of this thesis will give a new 
orientation to the work conducted here. In second place, the study deals with one of 
the biggest popular parishes (in terms of population) in the municipality Libertador 
and it was in the main constructed by the public sector. It is a recently founded 
community. The first houses were handed over in 1974, and the greater part was 
constructed during the epoch of centralist democracy, and to a lesser degree during 
the period of decentralised democracy. During the centralist democracy, the 
adjudication of these houses was marked by strongly clientelistic relationships and 
these effects will be shown as part of the local dependent context. 
V1.3.1 Political Clientelism and Housing 
During the whole period of representative, conciliatory democracy and, above all 
during the period of abundant oil and financial wealth, the basic responsibility for 
attention to the needs of the population (and in particular services and housing) were 
under the direct charge of the public administration through the relevant public 
powers (ministers, state governors), the legislative powers (national congress and 
legislative assembly), and the municipal councils and, indirectly, through the political 
parties. 
Amongst the demands for services that the centralist state had to satisfy were the 
supply of electricity, health, housing, water, telephone services. The satisfaction of 
these necessities was always the object of programmatic proposals or propagandistic 
references in favour of the party attempting to claim the support of civil society (or as 
a means of criticism for incompliance, for the parties that found themselves in 
opposition). 
One of the social demands that has most impact on the electorate at voting time (or 
when called on to evaluate the actions of the government) is the construction and 
allocation of housing. Since the constitution of the National Institute of Housing 
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(called INAVI) in 1928, it had been the responsibility of the Venezuelan state to 
design housing solutions for the middle class and the social classes of lesser 
resources. In this way, housing came to constitute a political factor every time that it 
served the state to respond to those relationships between the sub-system of parties 
and whichever electoral sub-system that had greater impact over the conduct of the 
electors. 
The solutions proposed by the state as regards the deficiencies in these services 
always constituted a difficult obstacle for it, given the urban development dynamic 
that the country experienced (population growth, the inefficiency in the maintenance 
of installations, and administrative corruption). Nevertheless, for good or ill the state 
was obliged to answer to these claims. For their part, in the meantime, the political 
parties of the opposition encouraged civil society in the claiming or demanding of 
better services and housing from the executive and legislative powers, or similarly 
stimulating land invasions in the rural and urban areas as a manner in which to 
reinforce their clientelistic structure. 
The economic and institutional crisis experienced by the country from 1983 onwards 
modified this panorama substantially. For one thing, the state would be less and less 
able to resolve these problems on its own, it would see itself obliged to give up 
responsibility for these functions and to initiate privatisation policies of many basic 
services. It would develop new legislation and resort to the banks for the financing of 
the housing of the middle classes, promoting each time with less capacity the 
construction of housing for the poorer social classes. 
The collapse of public services in the urban regions made the clientelistic structure of 
the political parties exercising central administrative functions less profitable 
(because they were held responsible for this fall off). These party structures had 
traditionally been linked to the demands and expectations of pressure groups through 
their actions in government and their electoral campaigns. In the mean time those 
parties distanced from central government gained from this situational framework. 
The direct impact of this situation showed, as has been indicated in previous chapters, 
in a weakening of vote reflected in the high levels of abstention, the substantial 
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modifications in the structure of the party system and the implementation of reforms 
for the re-structuring of the state. 
V1.3.2 A specific case of Clientelism and control over neighbourhood 
associations of the Parish Osuna Rodriguez (Los Curos sector) 
For the purposes of this case study, three interviews were undertaken with members 
of the community of the Parish, in the months of December and January 2000-2001. 
These interviews were organised into three groups made up three people. The first 
interview was with members of the parish council, the second with the councillor who 
represented the parish in the municipal chamber and two members of the community, 
and the third with three members of the community (two of them ex-leaders of the 
same community). 
A table was elaborated so that the specific stages of urban development of the Los 
Curos sector could be presented as a continuous process. This table demonstrates the 
characteristics of type of housing, location of the sector, total number of houses 
constructed, and in which period of government. For the purposes of the thesis, the 
information of greatest interest is the date of adjudication of the properties. This data 
shows that the housing constructed by the state were adjudicated to the people 
selected by the parties in power at the time, especially during electoral campaigns or 
during the pre-electoral period. 
Table: 6.1 Statyes of Urb2niZ2tiOn of the Parish of Osuna RodriLuez 
Sector Type of 
Housing 
Total No. of Houses Date of Adjudication Government of 
Period 
01 -A Single family 644 May 1974 COPEI 
01 -B block 
02 block 29 blocks 1976 AD 
03 block 576 flats 1978 AD 
04 block 5 blocks 1983 COPE[ 
05 Single family 88 1982-83 COPEI 
06 Single family 71 1984 AD 
07-A Sin2le family 150 1985 AD 
08 Sinele family 28 1984 AD 
09 Single family 106 1988 AD 
1 10 1 Sinple family 49 1988 AD 
1 11 1 Single family 1990 AD 
k3uUI-9; C: INA VI-IVILKIL)A) 
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In this manner, during the bi-party era governments in turn kept tight control over 
determinate electoral spaces, or increased their following, and constitutional right to 
housing was manipulated and transformed into an expression of clientelistic power by 
the party of government. This practice was widely used by both AD and COPEI in the 
sector of Los Curos in the parish in question. In the interviews undertaken in the 
community, there are testimonies that act as confirmation that the delivery of these 
properties was coloured by this type of practice. 
In referring, for instance, to the opinions of the interviewees concerning the delivery 
of 644 properties of a single family type (Table No. 6.1) during the first mandate of 
Rafael Caldera in 1974, it is notable that the influence of the parties was primordial 
for access to certain constitutional rights which, according to the Constitution of 1961 
should have been guaranteed to the family: 
"At the beginning of this period of the initiation of the housing project with one lot of 
houses, it seemed that what influenced the procedure in some way was ifyou belonged to 
the party ofgovernment, because the parties made these lists. In the case of (for example) 
the beginning of the government of Rafael Caldera, all of the lists camefrom the COPEI 
party, they were sent to INAVI which was the institute that governed all of the 
construction of housing here in Los Curos. In the whole of Venezuela there wasn't any 
other institute, because it was a national institute and it was the onl one. OK, so for the y 
most part what I remember, (and those who I've talked with whove been here many 
years and who all know me) is that you had to go and get a letter of support from the 
party so that you could be given one. " 
Member of community A 
"I'm the son ofpeasantsfrom the villages of the South, and in 1973 when we arrivedfor 
the first time in Mjrida we had to find a family home. At that time they had opened a 
housing programme during the government of Rafael Caldera, who it was that made the 
first houses, and my mother was able to benefit, thanks to her having a brother who was 
the prefect of the southern villages, and who was a member of the party in power, and 
who gave her the house and therefore it was he, in a certain way, who intervened on her 
behat( " 
Member of community B 
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This practice was repeated by the new governments that alternated in power during 
the bi-party era. In the next periods of government of AD and COPEI between 1974 
and 1989, the state constructed and promoted the delivery of housing using similar 
clientelistic proceedings and practices: 
"In time the urbanization began to grow, and they made buildings that were more 
modern and that, in some way, obstructed what had been done by the governments that 
weren't of the same party as that in power, which was the social-democrat government of 
Carlos Andris P&ez. In 1976 they made 29 buildings to try in some way to distance 
themselves from the housing constructed in the previous government, and to obtain 
control of a parish which was growing and which was important. They used the same 
method, the people had to go and get direct supportfrom inside the party ofgovernment, 
through a letter ofrecommendation by which the person could obtain their housing. They 
tried to take into account some sectors so that, in a certain way, they could disguise the 
fact that none of the deliveries of apartments were being distributed democratically. This 
was disguised by allowing other institutions of the state to take part, such as the Police, 
the armedforces, the unions would send lists where there were included police, firemen. 
Some guild members askedfor instructions from the state. In the case of the National 
Institute ofSport they would send a list of trainers who had no housing. But above all, so 
far as these lists were concerned, they would 'cleanse' them to see who were of, or who 
belonged to their parties, and thereafter they would disguise the delivery of these 
apartments. " 
Member of community A 
But in spite of this manner of disguising the delivery of housing through institutions 
and unions, it is possible to see how organizations that did not belong to the AD and 
COPEI parties, such as the case of CUTEM (the Central Union of Workers of 
M6rida), a Marxist orientated union, were able to ensure that some of their members 
could take part in the property adjudication. Unions were strong organizations during 
the centralist period and CUTEM was a well-organised union which fought hard for 
the welfare of its members: 
"The mother of the interviewee lives in this sector and she's actually a Chavista, and 
when she was asked how she managed to get hold of her property, the reply was through 
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the CUTEM union. CUTEM had conventions with the Workers' Bank, and sought the 
security of its'workers through the use of the union. " 
President of the Parish Council 
The testimony, as it goes on, describes the case of the father of a family who arrived 
in the community having come from a state located in the south of the country, with a 
party affiliation other than that of the government in power. The clever way in which 
this person arranged himself housing shows how the clientelistic (string-pulling and 
corrupt) political relationships are interwoven throughout the length and breadth of 
the country. At that time, an order of the AD party in whatever part of the national 
territory was an order: 
" When I arrived here from the Amazonas I had papers for arranging my house to give to 
a certain man, andfrom there it went to the lists of the AD, and so the bloke in charge 
told me: "No, you're a COPEI man ", and then they put me on to the list at number 20. So 
I went off and celebrated with my wife and my children and when I came back the next 
day, the Monday, I wasn't on the list any more. So I went and argued andfought and all 
that, and they put me back on the list and I appeared then at number 13, and after all that 
carr)ý-on I go back the next day at three in the afternoon and I'm not on the list again, 
and then they called me, they had the contacts: ""at's going on is, that you're not in 
the party " and I said "So I don't have an right to a house, I'm not Venezuelan, and so y 
what about the Constitution? The right to work, the right to housing, to security, to 
defence and I don't know what else, I'm going to show you that I'm an ADeco, what 
arrogance! " And I called Amazonas to some ofmyfriends, to a top leader or the AD and 
he sent me a diploma where it said. ý "In recognition of Omar Patihofor services rendered 
in elevating Jaime Lusinchi to the presidency, signed and stamped by all the boys, as well 
as a blank receipt-book signed and stamped with seals and guarantees, Ifilled them in 
myselffor 800,300 bolivars; 800 bolivars at that time was the monthly salary of a 
professional; I signed them for 500for I don't know what, partyfinances, and then I went 
to see them again and I threw these things down on the desk as if they were real, but what 
it really is, is that I don't like to be pissed about. And myfriends, they'd really gone to 
town on this, the next day I had the key to my house, the next day Igot the house. " 
Member of community C 
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The construction of houses was renewed (two multi-family buildings were 
constructed in 2001) in the period of decentralized democracy of the new hegemony. 
In the opinion of members of the community the mechanics of delivery have changed 
and are considered on criteria of evaluation and assessing the rights of the family, and 
specifically those of women and of children: 
"In 2001 they made two buildings and it did seem as though here there had been no 
influence used, because in the same building there were ADecos, COPEI- COpefianos 
and Chavistas. I couldn't say if this was the line of the national government, but it 
certainly had a great influence that the person who was directing INA VI here was a 
person who tried in every way possible to help people who really needed it, respecting 
lists, taking into account who had more children; in the case of this apartment, say, she 
has four children, and so you can see that there are a lot of children here, in each 
building there are apartments that have 3 or 4 children, there are veryfew that have no 
children. All of a sudden there's only half of the "buddy-buddy" but the rest of the 
criteria are about the children, there's no other way, just necessity. 
Member of community D 
Vl. 3. Z I The Neighbourhood Associations and party intermediation 
As has been indicated previously in Chapter IV, the first neighbourhood associations 
in Venezuela date from 1936. They were, thereafter, constituted in every barrio in the 
country and were denominated as community councils. In 1961 there appeared in the 
urban areas of the middle classes and the upper-middle classes of Caracas 
neighbourhood organizations dedicated to controlling urban growth. In the low- 
income areas from 1965 onwards, service centres were created for public action that 
began to substitute for the community councils (Rivero 1995, pp. 4-6). This 
differentiation of spatial contexts caused the communal organizations of Venezuela to 
appear to present two faces in relation to their forms of struggle, demands and 
dependence, with respect to the political parties. Whilst the organizations of the urban 
areas were formed for resolving problems of urban deterioration, lack of resources 
directed their demands towards basic necessities (property titles for land, houses, 
public services) making these more susceptible to party 'intervention' owing to the 
control that these had over such demands. 
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From the middle of 1975 up to 1980 the activism and demands of the neighbourhoods 
for institutional reforms grew at the local level. As an indication of the growth and 
importance of the struggle of these associations, in 1978 congress approved the 
LORM in order to legalize them. The political parties felt threatened by these 
emergent alternatives, and in 1979 congress established a partial regulation that put in 
place mechanisms for controlling the creation and action of these parallel associations 
and federations, such as the Communal Integration (IC) organization of AD and the 
Federation of Neighbourhood Associations of COPEI for winning control of the 
neighbourhood movement (Rivero 1995, pp. 7-8). The pressures exerted by 
neighbourhoods for more democracy continued and in 1989 the Municipal Law of 
1979 was modified to include the election of mayors. The above-mentioned partial 
law was also modified to take into consideration local participation. 
These general antecedents draw closer to the question referred to in the introduction, 
concerning the neighbourhood associations that functioned during the centralist stage, 
and their change towards new forms of participation in the case of the Los Curos 
sector of the parish Osuna Rodriguez. In this particular case, the space of action for 
the associations was formed by six sectors represented in the following aerial 
photograph (photomosaic: 6.2). Of these sectors, the most representative have been 
selected in terms of interviewees form the neighbourhood councils: 
* The first council of neighbours that was legalized is that of sector 61 in 1986, called 
the Half Part. Later on, by community petition in 1990 a new sectorization was 
undertaken in which the Half Part was divided into two sectors: Albarregas F and 
sector 108. The boundaries of this space correspond to the housing of sector 01B and 
05, which were built during the goverrunent of Rafael Caldera and that of Luis 
Herrera Campins, both COPEI goverrunents. 
The council of neighbours of sector 6.3 ), called El Entable, was legalized in 1987 and 
corresponds to the single and multi-family dwellings of sectors 7-A, 7-B and 8, built 
during the social democrat government of Jaime Lusinchi. Their inhabitants in the 
majority came from being landless from previous incursions (San Eduardo, Barrio 
Negro Primero). 
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Stages of Urbanization of the Parish of Osuna Rodriguez 
Photomosaic 6.2 
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* Sector 62, the first area constructed in this zone was the third to legalize its council 
of neighbours and establish its boundaries. This sector was constructed in 1974, late 
on in the government of Rafael Caldera, and is denominated the Lower Part, 
corresponding to phase 01 -A. 
* Finally, sector Albarregas 60 in the upper part of the urbanization constituted its 
council of neighbours in 1991, in spaces 02 and 03 of the urbanization. This sector 
brings together the modem constructed buildings delivered during the presidency of 
Carlos Andr6s P6rez. 
In the first and the third case the associations of neighbours were controlled by 
COPEI until 1998, and in the second and fourth cases they were controlled by AD. 
This refers to the previously noted exposition concerning the control that the 
municipal councils had over the legalization of the neighbourhood organizations. In 
general terms, the interviews indicate that the associations of neighbours in this 
popular urbanization have always been controlled by the leaders of the local COPEI 
and AD parties. The other national and local parties have no strong leadership in this 
sector of the city, as has happened in other areas, but nevertheless, with the 
hegemonic rupture the MVR and local organizations (as will be shown later on) have 
entered to compete with these parties in the struggle for control of these 
organizations. In many cases this is why the local leaders of COPEI and AD have 
transferred their militancy to the new hegemony. 
The other aspect is the nearly precise coincidence between the boundaries of the 
sectors of the neighbourhood associations, and the boundaries of the different sectors 
built in each period of government. Thus with the case of the association of 
neighbours of sector 62, for example, which corresponds in a tailor-made fashion 
with the sectors 01A and 05, which were adjudicated in 1974 during the government 
of Rafael Caldera. Equally the coincidence between sectors 02,03 and 10 which were 
delivered during the government of Pdrez and Lusinchi, and the boundaries with the 
associations of neighbours of sector 60 (photomosaic: 6.3). 
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The opinion of the interviewees coincided with the above analysis in relation to the 
control exercised by the political parties over the neighbourhood associations in this 
parish: 
"This is a sector which has basically been ADeco or COPEIano the whole of its 
existence; for example, you see that when Luis Herrera commanded it was COPEIano, 
and when Carlos Andris arrived it was ADeco, similarly when Lusinchi won - when 
Caldera won the second time it began to change a bit. " 
Member of community A 
"With respect to the associations of neighbours, these were very strongly coloured by the 
leaders of the AD and COPEI, up to the point where these guys have remainedfour or 
five years and still they don't want to undergo the process ofre-legitimization, which is to 
say that they don't want any new elections. Ourselves, we aren't too happy with the idea 
of new elections because we don't want to carry on copying this model and raise up a 
load ofpeople from the MVR to propose two or three people ftom that movement who 
win, which would be easy because its the right time, but we don't believe we will because 
we don't want to carry on making the same mistake. We think that the space for 
decentralization and participation must be a lot broader, it has to be more democratic, 
where in reality any person who wants to participate, no matter if they be from COPEI or 
AD, or if they don't believe in any party, or if they're from MVR or whatever, so long as 
they want to participate and bring along their grain of sandfor the community, they 
should be welcome to do so. " 
Council Circuit 3 
This criterion is also reinforced by another testimony coming from a different sector 
indicated above, in which the term manipulation can be observed being used to 
describe the control that the political parties exercised over the neighbourhood 
associations. As has been indicated previously at the beginning of the chapter, from 
the viewpoint of Allen (1999) it can be asserted that clientelistic manipulation is a 
power relationship that employs politics to contribute to the assurance of approval, 
when the authority of the central power is not completely effective. According to 
Elias Santana, a national neighbourhood activist, the control of a neighbourhood 
association brought benefits to the party, giving it votes for the internal confrontations 
with existing leaders in promoting and permitting the exercise of their dominion over 
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the community. This gave them positions in groups opposed to the mayoralty, which 
could be used according to whatever was perceived to be the necessity of the party. 
Specifically, the mayors and their opposition, or other potential candidates from the 
platforms of the municipal governments or their parties, dedicated themselves to the 
task of building control. What the parties had done with guilds and syndicates, they 
tried to do with neighbourhood associations (Elias Santana, El Nacional, 2002). 
"With respect to the associations of neighbours, it's no secret to anybody that they have 
been used as a trampoline, and the same system is very similar to what they use when the 
elections arrive. Koever brings the most people from a specific party is the one who in 
practice is going to win in a pretty vertical structure, where two or three people assume 
all the responsibilities. And the same dynamic means that afterwards there remains only 
one person in charge, and that their work can be manipulated, they may have good 
intentions but become disillusioned. But the whole political business is very prejudiced, 
so to speak, if theyfollow the orders of the political party, if there's a social programme 
it's manipulated, here, we're going to give you a grant but you understand who you've 
got to vote for, we're going to give you a pension but you know who you've got to 
support, and so this part ofparticipation is very prejudicial, and a mediocre participation 
is manipulative, it's playing with hunger. " 
Member of community E 
V1.3.3 Organizations of civil society and participation in the parish 
The parish was founded in 1974, and in 1979 a community of the Claretian fathers 
arrived and began the construction of their church, with the support and participation 
of the neighbours, as a way in which to integrate themselves into the community. La 
Capilla (The Church) came to be the first conquest of the community. During the 
1980s three more, younger priests arrived who had different perspectives and who 
formed the ANCLA, which is an international social organization orientated towards 
youth organization, with a specific ethos of developing Christian ecclesiastical 
aptitudes as well as personal development. 
The 1980s were an epoch in which the community of Los Curos experienced a 
growth in ANCLA groups, which led to the formation of a co-ordinator of the groups, 
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managed by various organizations. In 1988 the Medra de la Paz, within which a 
health project had emerged because there were numbers of medical students at the 
university formed the idea of a neighbourhood centre for Los Curos In this centre 
they also had the idea of developing newspapers to circulate in the neighbourhood for 
the period of a year, as well as the Anti-Drug Attention Centre (TAICOA). 
The Cdtedra de la Paz is a civil organization financed which was by the University of 
the Andes from the beginning, and also by some foreign consulates. The mission of 
the Cathedral is "to promote the values and the potentials of the human being for 
community participation as a function of sustainable local development, under the 
precepts of education for peace in the popular sectors of the state". In the 
Municipality of Libertador it is one of the most important civil organizations, and a 
point of reference in the city for its achievements: 
"Right now, the Cdtedra de la Paz works along three basic lines; one is personal 
formation, they do every type of course, secretarial, computing, clothes-making and 
others. The second line is that after they've helpedpeople to develop themselves theyfind 
them credit so they can plan what they've learnt, which is to say, they can put into 
practice what they've learnt. For example, if you needed credit for a computer, they 
would try andfind you one with easy payments. Ifyou did a course on clothes making, 
they would try andfind you a sewing-machine. And the third andfinal line is trying to 
find workfor people - at the moment, this civil organization is 
financed by the British 
government. " 
Member of Community D 
One of the interviewees gave an account of the financing: 
"I asked the co-ordinator, who was called Walter Trejo, and he told me that the truth 
was that the English government had sent him 280 million bolivarsfrom England, and he 
didn't know what to do with it; he divided it up and he gave out some 300 credits and got 
them back, the people carried on paying and of the 200 and some coming back, converted 
them into 500, even though from experience here the people don't pay them back, OK 
then, if they're contributions from the government maybe things change. For me though 
really, this is perhaps the only NGO which is working here as a real mystery, they do 
thingsfor the kids and the church is very close to them. " 
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Member of Community A 
The relationship between international finance and the frontline assistance projects 
was also reflected in this interview, as being more influential now that the 
communitarian tendency with which this organization was begun, has really started to 
work: 
"The C6tedra de la Paz was born of a group ofyoung lads who were in the youth groups 
but stayed here, andftom the point-of-view offunctionality it works, but from another 
viewpoint they're ve? y assistentialist right now. They do a lot more than just talk about 
services, they share in this, although in education and other things they don't really mix 
much with the community. They have very exact plans, like the holiday plan for the kids, 
and discussion groups about AIDS, education for being parents, sexual stuff, which are 
important activities, but really what they lack in the community are friends, you realize 
that what they need is people acting in solidarity with them, to work with them in a way 
which is more thanjust goodplans. " 
Member of Community B 
From 1995 onwards, new organizations were created in the parish that had 
characteristics and aims very distinct from those formed in the previous decades. 
These organizations were directed towards the environment fundamentally as rescue 
organizations. Thus there were the Rescue Brigade Libertador, the Rescue Brigade 
Tulio Febres Cordero (which have now been working for some six years) and there is 
also the Ecological Brigade and the Sports Brigade Undor de Los Andes. According 
to the database of SOCSAL (1999) the state of Mdrida has a large number of social 
development organizations. Of a total of 931 organizations for the whole country, 68 
are located in Wrida, which is a total only exceeded by Zulia (167) Monagas (105) 
and the Federal District (93). 
Environmental organizations arc also numerous, being 10 in comparison with 28 for 
the Federal District and 25 in the state of Miranda. Without doubt this is due to the 
presence of the University, which has the only Faculty of Forest Sciences in the 
country and is the centre of development for environmental activities involving local 
and national co-operation, such as activism, environmental education, rescue groups, 
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forest fire-brigades, and so forth. Additionally, the state has some of the most 
important national parks in terms of plant and animal refuges, as well as ecological 
and topographic characteristics that make environmental activity a priority in the 
zone. 
But apart form these observations, in asking about changes from one decade to 
another in the orientation of the participation in movements and organizations, it must 
be realised that this is a community with basic problems still without resolution, and 
that there are various factors that are re-orientating these new organizations, not 
towards the promotion of diversification but rather more towards determinate sectors 
of participation which can be politically controlled or manipulated through their 
financing. 
The structural adjustment programmes which were implemented during the second 
govcnu-nent of Rafael Caldera (1994-1998) were implemented through the "Agenda 
Venezuela", through programmes such as the Pilot Programme of Support for the 
Political Initiatives of Civil Society (PAIS), which was designed in 1995 with the 
objective of creating and developing a pilot mechanism of public/private co- 
participation, and for the financing of projects and activities formulated and executed 
by organizations of civil society. In this context, so far as the environmental 
organizations are concerned, they are not as politically controversial, and therefore it 
is easier to find financing for them. 
Additionally, the practice of intermediation that the political parties had been 
exercising since the centralist period affected communitarian initiatives and their 
orientation and initial proposals, directing them towards forms more adjusted to the 
concept of social capital; these practices favoured the mediation and demobilization 
of civil society, impeding the building of relationships of communitarian association 
at the local level. 
The community of Osuna Rodriguez did not escape this type of problematic. The 
following account of a member of the community leaves it very clear that an 
organization, in this case a religious organization, latterly became controlled by the 
neighbourhood councils which passed as NGOs, in another type of assistentialism of 
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the 1990s. For the ends of the political parties, this type of organization was more 
convenient than having political and communitarian movements. This is shown in the 
change of a religious organization into the control of the ncighbourhood councils 
"There was something that happened to us with a health project when it was formed, 
because when we started it, it was supposed to be open for anybody, among them the 
neighbors and other people not linked to the church, and it started out like that but then 
others came along and took our places and we were left outside, because we understood 
things differently and our organization wasn't going to ask personal questions, but only 
tofightfor health itsej(, but they were organizing it and arrangedjuridical statusfor this 
health organization so that it got to the situation where they took over the organization 
for themselves, in fact by manipulation, and it's called the Socio-Sanitary Council, which 
they called it andfor which they named themselves to the council. 
But who took it over? Here, the neighbourhood associations are commanded by the 
council of neighbours. Johny began the project with a group of medical students from the 
barrio, and sadly they saw themselves being replaced by the neighbourhood associations, 
and now that they've been replaced Johny and his group have disappeared, and the 
Socio-Sanitary Council is commanded by the neighbourhood councils. And the other one, 
in the case of the Utedra de la Paz there was a project that was an agreement between 
three Christian organizations and a mountaineering group (the c6tedra group and the 
GUM), and when they gave out the positions, the GUM bloke took our name, which was 
more an existential than juridical name, because we ourselves didn't have juridical 
status, in fact no organization of ours had legal status because we worked for the 
common good, we came from the church, and we were more transparent than the other 
organizations, we had a lot ofcredibility in Los Curos, we were much respected. " 
Member of Community D 
V1.3.3.1 New forms of participation and decentralization in the 
Parish Osuna Rodriguez 
With the putting into operation of the new Constitution, practices of participation in 
the open councils were re-born which dated from the colonial period and which had 
enormous influence on the process of democratisation in the first half of the 191h 
century. As has been discussed previously in Chapter 3, the council represented the 
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city and was the location of autochthonous; political power. Also, at the end of the 
1980s with the reforms to the LORM in 1987 and 1989, the municipal council or 
chapter could call a referendum of electors of the parish or municipality, with the aim 
of consulting them about ordinances or other affairs of collective interest. 
Nevertheless, even with juridical status the municipal councils had never 
implemented popular consultation. In relation to this, it is interesting to analyze the 
change of mode of participation that began to occur in the parish, from 
neighbourhood councils controlled by the political parties to popular assemblies and 
horizontal schemes of organization at the district level. To continue with the 
interviewees: 
"One of the worries that had overwhelmed Johny and Cisar is the bit about what 
exactly is participation. In view of this situation one of the things that we wanted to 
implement here in JJ Osuna was, in spite of the fact that we have many 
organizations, here we're like everyone is in a separate parcel, and we don't look at 
JJ Osuna as a whole. A short while ago I belonged to a sporting association and I 
was only interested in the sporting aspect, because the other bit of it was the rescue 
section, which was interesting, but we don't actually sit round a table to discuss 
things, we have a dialogue about what could be going on in JJ Osuna in the next 
three, four, five years. And there are very good people in this organization, people 
who can think a hit further than just what the immediate thing is, and what action 
they want to take, and we've been getting together to try and work out a project ". 
Council Circuit 3 
In this case, two years ago a project of integrated urban development began with the 
Faculty of Architecture, which was a project of extending the University towards the 
community of JJ Osuna. The project had been presented to all of the relevant 
organizations at a local and national level. 
"In this area the problem of the vertical expansion of housing to solve the problem of 
overcrowdedfamilies was expressed along with the collapse in the level of services, the 
lack of green areas or even planningfor green areas. It is notjust about responding to 
families simply in terms of a space to live. The educational facilities are all nearly 
saturated, collapsing, and the government is not going to make a proposal to us that is 
integrated to give solutions to these problems. All of this willforce us to arrange a more 
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holistic project, over what exactly is the reality that we have here, and what it is we can 
actually do, and how we're going to bring it about. " 
According to the parish council, what is interesting is that this project has been 
discussed through the use of the assemblies: 
"More than thirty assemblies have been called in the different sectors ofJJ Osuna in two 
years. What's the mechanism? In general they send an invitation to the NGOs, they 
publicise them in the press, they make calls by the radio, send out written instructions 
with the time and place of the presentation of the project, they invite institutions that have 
set up shop in JJ Osuna, to the medical sector, educators. What's the attendance been 
like? There hasn't been a great deal of interest but it's mainly been leadership, or 
representation. People came from the educational institutes, health, but in one way or 
another they're people who want to bring their grain ofsand to the project. The project is 
in a diagnostic phase, and it could be realized to solve the problems of vertical growth, of 
green spaces, educational institutes and other institutions. " 
The criticism of the opposition to the manner in which local politics is conducted in 
relation to these assemblies and open councils permits observation of the projects 
practices and modes of interposing participation into the actual management. They 
question the sectarianism of the MVR and they identify it with manipulatory practices 
that obstruct opinion and the formation of leadership. This could be interpreted as an 
expression of verticality of power emanating from the relationship between central 
government and local government, and the mediation of party politics: 
"What it is with the open councils, is that the MVR is the one with the power, and it 
believes it's the only one with the right to give opinions or to request work, and no-one's 
allowed to ask why without problems. When a person speaks this way in the name of the 
government and says: because we're the revolutionaries, then there's always someone 
from the neighbourhood leadership who goes "what are you talking about, being a 
revolutionary, you're ADeco, you're COPEIano, you're from the Convergencia " and 
theyform a ruckus and so the object and the aims of the meeting aren't realized because 
they want to manipulate the council, for it to hear what they say, but they give the rest of 
us no opportunity. " 
Member of Community C 
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Nevertheless, the parish councillor explained in detail the development of new 
schemes of horizontal participation, which are different from those that have 
traditionally been propelled by the parties and where the members of the community 
can achieve a greater degree of social integration and political conscientization, for 
the strengthening of democracy. This is an aspect worth underlining now that 
decentralization is understood as a practice revolving around the people, more than a 
decision of central and local power, or a legal mandate. Further to this, he considers 
that this political practice, contrary to the manipulative forms of political clientelism, 
is essential in order to be able to speak of a true decentralization which it still has not 
been possible to achieve (above all at the neighbourhood level, at the schools and in 
other spaces of communal association): 
"We are working on a new model that isn't vertical, that's much more horizontal and 
where we're going to apply by districts. That is to say, the Negro Primero sector is made 
up of districts, we get together as families and explain the whole process, and what 
participation really is, something really transcendental, and that this isn't simply a 
problem just for the parish councils, of the counsellors, of the mayor, or of the governor 
or the president but rather that we definitely have to all get involved ourselves, and that 
there are problems that we can solve at the family level. For example, that we live 
together in these six districts and we have problems over getting rid of the rubbish, at a 
time that isn't convenient and in receptacles that aren't adequate. There isn't really a 
space where we can say something about where to throw it but this we can solve at the 
level ofthese sixfamilies. 
There're other solutions that the parish council can perform or the municipal council, the 
regional and national government, but also each one of us. We're going to say it like this, 
each has a responsibility and what we want is that everyone becomes aware of the 
process that we're living through. Definitely we can't resolve all our problems, but the 
organizations and the proposals that comefrom the community are going to be a lot more 
feasible in resolving the problems of the community. This is what has brought us to where 
we're recognising marvellous proposals from within our own community. One of them in 
the last few months, is where adults volunteer to prepare food, others deliver it building 
by building, or house by house, or deliver a little flier that says where the operative is 
going to be. And the stuff that they don't use, they recover it and then take it back to the 
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C6tedra de la Paz so that they can recycle part of it. So, we can see that definitely the 
decentralization models aren't a question of what's in the constitution, or in the LORM, 
but rather the fact we have to make it practical, which is to say go and talk. Like Jhony 
says, who's more than just a councillor, he's aftiend, he says there are no more political 
colours, only a series ofproblems that we have and if we don't get together and solve 
these problems then they're going to get much worse. They're going to be much more 
difficult in the coming days, the comingyears. " 
There are also opinions from electors where participation is the key to having a true 
process of decentralization, above all at the neighbourhood and harrio level, and who 
consider that Venezuelan society still hasn't arrived at that stage. 
"Participation is an integral form so that people feel that they're being considered- 
participation and decentralization. But I think that we're at the first stage. A first 
theoretical stage: "ere are we? How do we do this? what is it that we want? Today 
everything that's beingplanned isjust theoreticaL There's nothing in practice. You can't 
really talk about decentralization. Firstly this is because there's no real consciousness of 
it in the country and clientelism has been made into a cultural model, a custom of 
governments, since Guzm6n Blanco and before. Guzm6n Blanco designed his parties on 
a clientelistic base andftom then on the whole thingjust got more profound which is 
what we see in the mechanisms that we're showing with the new communitarian 
organizations; trying to decentralise, and that's what they've put into our heads is what 
is clientelism, and trying to construct new organizations with proposals for the future, as 
a real accompaniment to the communities. We believe that if we can't get past this we 
can't speak ofdecentralization, or anything. So participation is the key. " 
Member of community E 
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V1.4 The context of the hegemonic struggle in the Libertador 
Municipality., and opinions on decentralization and 
participation in the spatial environment of the parish 
The context of the hegemonic struggle at the local level has been defined by the 
framework of the 'mega-elections' of 200041, now that the Constitution of 1999, in 
contrast to that of 1961, has opened new spaces for participation at the parish level, 
moving decentralization closer to the communal environment of the barrios and the 
neighbourhood. 
The spatial political units of the lower hierarchy, established by the LORM, are the 
parishes. In Chapter IV of this law (Article 32) they are defined in the following 
manner, "Parishes are demarcations of a local character, within the territory of the 
municipality, created with the objective of decentralizing the municipal 
administration, promoting citizen participation and the betterment of local public 
services. " According to Brewer Carias (2000) this has as its final end the guarantee of 
the principle of co-responsibility in public management and the development of self- 
management processes in the administration and control of state and municipal public 
services (Brewer Carias 2000, p. 327). But in the context of the hegemonic struggle 
they have also generated conflicts at the local level by the interference that local 
governments impose at the point of distribution of the resources, which have to be 
assigned to the parishes according to the 1999 Constitution, and which form part of 
the decisions that have to be taken by the new local planning counciJ42. 
41 They are called mega-elections (July 2000) because in a single electoral act they relegitimated all 
levels of political powers following the promulgation of the 1999 Constitution. These were: the 
President of the Republic, the Latin American Parliament, the Andean Parliament, the Deputies of the 
National Assembly, the State Governors, the Deputies of the Legislative Councils and the Mayors. The 
Municipalities in terms of their Parish Councils and Councils were held six months later in December 
2000. Never before such complicated elections been held in Venezuela with so many distinct scats or 
electoral spaces. 
42 Article 182 created the Local Council of Public Planning presided over by the Mayor or Mayoress 
and composed of councilors, the Presidents of the Parish Councils and representatives of the 
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The important thing now, however, is that the people are informed in their disposition 
to participate in the control of the administration of public resources, and to 
collaborate in local management, as has been detected in the opinions expressed by 
members of the community in this chapter. 
V1.4.1 Elections of the parish councils in 2000 and their antecedents in 
1992 and 1995 
In the elections for parish councils of 1992 12 political organizations participated, 
including the national parties (AD, COPEI, MAS, NGD, OPINA, LCR, URD, MEP, 
ORA) and three local political groupings, the UVI (Independent Neighbourhood 
Unity), EPAP (The People To Power) and the PL. 
The hierarchy of parties and alliances for the parish shows that AD and COPEI 
controlled the political space in the municipality. The 15 parishes of the Municipality 
of Libertador, COPEI occupied first place in 10 parishes with over 36% of the vote, 
reaching 49.57% of the vote in the parish of Lasso de La Vega. Whilst, in its turn the 
AD won in the five remaining parishes, 3 in the urban environment (Domingo Pefia 
with 36.5% of the vote, Jacinto Plaza with 44.4% and Juan Rodriguez Sudrez with 
41.2%) and 2 in the rural environment (Parish Gonzalo Pic6n Febres and El Morro). 
neighborhood associations and other sectors of organized society - according to the dispositions 
established by the law (Garay, 2000: 82). 
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Table: 6.2 Hierarchv of F)arties and alliances (Parish Councils 1992 
Parishes First place party Second place party Third place party 
Arias COPEI 33.1% AD 33.7% MAS 16.2% 
Sagrario COPE] 40.2% AD 31.8% UVI 9.8% 
Milla COPEI 41.8% A5 33.8% LIVI 9.5% 
El Llano COPEI 37.4% AD 35.5% UVI 10.8% 
Juan Rodriguez S AD 41.2% COPEI 35.6% MAS 8.3% 
Jacinto Plaza AD 44.4% COPEI 41.1% UVI 8.2% 
Domingo Pefia COPEI 37.7% AD 36.5% UVI 14.4% 
Gonzalo Pic6n F. AD COPEI UVI 
Osuna Rodriguez COPEI 42.1% AD 32.6% MAS - UVI 5.6% 
Lasso de Is Vega COPEI 49.5% AD 26.5% UVI 6.6% 
Carracciolo Parm COPEI 36.6% LIVI 25.5% AD 22.9% 
Mariano Pic6n S. COPEI 43.9% AD 34.4% MAS 7.24% 
Antonio Soinetti D COPE[ 37.6% AD 32.9% UVI 7.75% 
Source: Statistical data of the Alberto Camevali Popular University 
Independent Neighbourhood Unity occupied third place in 9 parishes: Antonio 
Spinetti Dini, Domingo Pefia, El Llano, Jacinto Plaza, Lasso de la Vega, Milla, Osuna 
Rodriguez, Sagrario and Gonzalo Pic6n Febres, with votes totalling between 14.4% 
and 6.6%. MAS came third in 5 parishes (Arias 16.2%, Juark Rodriguez SuArez 8.3%, 
and in Osuna Rodriguez and in El Morro equal to UVI with 5.1 %) It is worth pointing 
out that for the UVI it was the first time they had participated in the state elections 
and it displaced MAS as the third political force in the municipality. In these 
municipal elections the mayoralty once again remained in the hands of COPS. 
For 1995, at the level of municipality there participated in Libertador 14 political 
organizations, grouped in the following manner: AD, COPEL OPINA, ORA, MAS, 
MEP, PCV, Convergencia and the LCR, augmented by local parties or organizations 
such as U, MIO (Independent Organized Movement) FM (Mdrida Force) and the UVI 
which were all new (with the exception of UVI which had already participated as an 
organization in the previous elections). 
This time the political space of the Libertador municipality at the urban parish level 
was completely controlled by AD. AD won with more than 33% of the total of votes. 
COPEI occupied second place with 23 % of the vote, followed by the Convergencia 
in third place in the majority of parishes. It is worth noting that the Convergencia (the 
party that appeared for the first time in the presidential elections of 1993) reached 
third position at parish level and displaced MAS and the UVI. In 1995 the mayor 
favoured in the final results was from the AD which is to say that the parishes and the 
mayoralty belonged to the same party. If a comparison is made between these results 
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and those of the parish council elections of 2000 in the Libertador municipality, then 
an important change in the system of parties presents itself. 
In the electoral system that applied in 2000 three members were elected by law for 
each parish, 2 by the uninominal system, which is to say 60%, and the other member 
by the list system of 40%. In the year 2000 the municipality was made up of 15 
parishes, 2 of them eminently rural (EI Morro and los Nevados). The results of the 
uninominal system by parish were as follows: 
Tahlo- 6A tliprnrehwnfnnrtip- nnd allianreq-nnriqh eminrik 20fifl- 
Parishes First place p arty Second place party Third place party 
Arias MVR-MAS 25.3% MVR-MAS 24.6% AD-Copei 16% 
Sagrario AD-Copei 25.4% MVR-MAS 24.3% MVR-MAS 24.1% 
Mills MVR-MAS 302% MVR-MAS 28.5% AD-Copei 769% 
El Llano MVR-MAS 25.2% MVR-MAS 24.12% AD 20.49% 
Juan Rodriguez S MVR-MAS 26.5% MVR-MAS 25.8% AD-Copei 21.1% 
Jacinto Plaza MVR-MAS 25.77% MVR-MAS 25.07% AD-Copei 23.04% 
Domingo Pefis MVR-MAS 28.5% MVR-MAS 26.4% AD-Co ei 182% 
Gonzalo Pic6n F. MVR-MAS 31.2% MVR-MAS 30.6% AD-Copei 19.3% 
Osuns Rodriguez MVR-MAS 21.8% MVR-MAS 21.7% AD-Copei 19.5% 
Lasso de In Vega MVR-MAS 26.08% AD-Copei 240% MVR-MAS 23.5% 
Carracciolo Parrs MVR MAS 24.47% MVR-MAS m 23.3% pei 1.3% 
Mariano Pic6n S. AD-Copei 269% 
t: 
AAýCopei 26.16% MVR-MAS 22.80% 
Antonio Spinetti D MVR-MAS 294% 1 MVR-MAS 28.5% AD-Copei 20.3% 
Source: Consejo Nacional Electoral (CNE) 
In all of the parishes, with the exception of the Parish Mariano Pic6n Salas and the 
Parish of Sagrario, the MVR-MAS alliance obtained first and second place. Third 
place was frequently taken by the AD-COPEI alliance. Only in the Parish of Mariano 
Pic6n Salas did the AD-COPEI alliance win the two representatives, and one 
representative in the Sagrario parish. The percentage of valid votes varied between 
21% in the Parish of Osuna Rodriguez and 31% in the Parish of Gonzalo Pic6n 
Febres. 
Tikhle! 6-4- Tntn I vntincF- shopntinn- Nn- vifnsirtipc sinel esindid2tpc- Parkh enunril- lllfffl- 
Parish Total Voting Abstention No of Parties No. ofCandidates 
Arias 1892 23,9% 6010 760% 10 5 4 12 
Sagrario 1053 22.0% 3730 77.9% 4 2 0 6 
Millil 2443 17,8% 11216 82.1% 11 5 0 6 
El Llano 1928 205% 7461 794% 11 4 0 7 
Juan Rodriguez S 2112 206% 9117 79.3% 4 1 2 7 
Jacinto Plaza 2820 27.9% 7263 72.0% 10 4 1 8 
Domingo Pefis 3860 22.3% 13430 77.6% 5 3 0 8 
Gonzalo Pic6n F. 994 33,3% 1989 666% 4 2 0 5 
Osuns Rodriguez 2394 28.6% 5949 71.3% 4 5 0 6 
Lasso de In Vega 996 22.3% 3453 77.6% 4 3 1 9 
Carracciolo Parra 1 2050 21.13% 7653 788% 4 3 0 7 
Mariano Pic6n S. 1614 25.3% 4763 74.6% 4 2 0 6 
Antonio Spinetti D 3136 23.7% 10088 762% 7 2 0 7 
bource: Uonsejo Nacional Electoral (UNt) 
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The average for abstention in the 13 parishes was 76%, and the average number of 
candidates was 7. The Parish Osuna Rodriguez was the parish which showed the 
highest degree of electoral participation with 28.6%, whilst the lowest level of 
participation was in the Parish of Milla with 17.8%. The results from the list system 
by parish are the following: 
- .. -- . -. .. ----L.. L. I.. # .. I. #. - P-;. h 
? Ann 
Parishes First p lace party Second place party Third place pa rty 
Arias MVR 55.1% AD 35.9% MAS 3.2% 
Sagrario AD 464% MVR 43.2% MAS 7.29% 
Milla MVR 54.2% AD 29.5% Copci 3.9% 
El Llano MVR 45.6% AD 37.8% MHM 68% 
Juan Rodrieuez S MVR 50.0% AD 40.3% Covei 60% 
Jacinto Plazit MVR 52.6% AD 39.9% Copei 2.5% 
Domingo Pefis MVR 556% AD 33.7% Copei 4.2% 
Gonzalo Pic6n F. MVR 58.4% AD 36.8% Copei 2.4% 
Osuns Rodriguez MVR 46.1% AD 37.2% Vecinos en A 4 9% 
Lasso de In Vega MVR- 51.5% AD 42.3% Copei 2.9% 
Carracciolo Parra MVR 47.9% AD 40.0% 1 Amigos Con S 4.0% 
Mariano Pic6n S. AD 49.3% tMVR 44.7% Copei 3 0% 
Antonio Spinetti D MVR 51.4% AD 34.4% MAS 121/--J 
Source: Consejo Nacional tlectoral tt-LNvj 
The MVR was adjudicated a member of the parish council in 10 out of 12 parishes, 
and AD occupied first place in only 2 parishes (Sagrario and Mariano Pic6n Salas, 
with 46 and 49% of the votes respectively). The MVR got the highest vote in Gonzalo 
Pic6n, with 5 8.4%, and the lowest in Osuna Rodriguez with 46.1 %. Second place was 
controlled by AD in the ten parishes in which the MVR won. Third place presents a 
more multi-party panorama with mainly new organizations with the exception of 
COPEI and MAS. In the parishes of El Llano, Osuna Rodriguez and Caracciolo Parra 
local organizations emerged: the Meridan Humanitarian Movement (MHM), Forward 
Neighbours, and Friends with Simonsi, who won between 4 and 7% of the vote as 
new movements. The presence of the AD in second place in II parishes with 
percentages of between 29% and 44% of the vote indicated a still-strong presence of 
this party in the local life of the municipality. In addition they remain in command of 
the municipality since the mayor-elect for the period 2002-2003 is from AD. 
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Ir. hl. - f. A T. t. 1 f.. #.. -t. .. A rpo; ctprpfi n*rtipc- nsri%h elpetiant WIM 
Parishes Number of voters Abstention Registered 
parties: 
National 
Regional 
Arias 1892 23,9% 6010 76,0% 4 1 
Snuario 1053 22.0% 3730 77,9% 4 0 
Mills 2443 17,8% 11216 82,1% 9 7 
El Llano 1928 20,5% 7461 79,4% 5 4 
Juan Rodriguez S 2112 20,6% 8117 79,3% 4 0 
Jacinto Plaza 2820 27,9% 7263 72,0% 10 6 
Domingo Pefis 3860 223% 13430 77,6% 4 3 
Gonzalo Pic6a 994 33: 3% 1989 66,6% 4 1 
Osuna Rodriguez 2394 28,6%- 5949 71,3% 4 6 
Lasso de la Vega 996 22,3% 3453 77,6% 3 3 
Carracciolo Parra 2050 21,1% 76 *5 78 , 8% 4 3 
Mariano Pic6n 1614 25,3% 4763 74,6% 4 3 
Antonio Spinetti 3136 23,7% 10088 76,2% 8 3 
Source: Consejo Nacional Electoral (UNE) 
But abstention was the real winner in these elections, given that the average rate of 
abstention in the 13 parishes was 76%, juxtaposed to the low level of participation of 
23 %. It is well known that in proportion to the manner by which electoral 
participation is circumscribed, abstention is high, but in Venezuela abstention had 
never reached such high levels, especially if comparison is made with the parish 
clections of 1992 and 1995. 
The reasons for this phenomenon can be found in the following arguments: a) the 
temporal separation (six months) of the municipal and parish council elections and 
those of the governorship and mayoralty which on previous occasions have been done 
as a single package; b) Electoral 'intoxication', that is to say, the process of having 6 
sets of elections in two years: regional, presidential, referendums, constituent 
assembly and the 'mega-elections' of July 2000 where all public powers were re- 
legitimised. All of this combined to create an atmosphere of electoral apathy, as well 
as a preference for voting in the elections for positions of high power. This was 
augmented by the comparatively brief life of the regional elections as a consequence 
of the recent nature of the process of decentralization. It has been suggested that 
authorities elected under such low levels of participation cannot be considered very 
legitimate. There is a suggestion that 'Chavismo' was unable to arouse and convince 
the electorate as it had been successful in doing previously, because it is the 
presidential figure and not the followers which had activated the vote of the MVR. 
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In observing the data it is possible to see that the parishes with greater participation 
are Gonzalo Pic6n (33.3%), Osuna Rodriguez (28.6%) and Jacinto Plaza (27.9%). 
These are parishes whose inhabitants have a relatively low level of socio-economic 
position, and which moreover are zones where the residential structure is of public 
origin, allied to a tendency in the case of Osuna Rodriguez and Jacinto Plaza towards 
a greater diversity in the system of local Parties and alliances. This would appear to 
indicate that the population feels it necessary to organize through its own bodies, so 
as to guarantee the satisfaction of basic demands. 
A counterpart to this electoral behaviour are the parishes of Juan Rodriguez Sudrez 
and Milla with high figures of abstention at 82% and 79%. Juan Rodriguez Sudrez, 
for example, is a parish in which an urban structure of uni-family residences 
predominates, with a population belonging to the middle and upper-middle classes of 
the municipality. It is also a parish where the party structure is more in accord with 
the national party structure. The absence of local parties might appear to indicate, in a 
certain sense, that the demands of this population are heard and resolved directly by 
the organisms of local government, and that their political struggle is easier and 
expedited through the influence of their social condition. 
In conclusion, the elections for parish councils of the municipality Libertador during 
the year 2000, through the nominative system and the voting list, gave to the MVR 
total control in II parishes, and in the remaining two the AD triumphed. In such a 
manner the Thavista' hegemony was imposed at this level. In contrast to the 
elections of 1992 and 1995, however, in which the members of the parish councils 
and the mayor all belonged to the same party; this time the mayor is from the AD. 
254 
V1.4.2 Conflicts of power between the mayoralty and the 
parish councils 
As has been show from the description of the electoral results of 2000, at the local 
level the mayoralty was controlled by leaders of the old AD hegemony, and the parish 
councils by leaders of the MVR. Furthermore, given the opinions of this emergent 
leadership concerning the necessary horizontality of relationships of power, it is not 
difficult to understand the level of conflict that soon began to energise municipal 
politics. 
One case that will illustrate the conflict present in the community was the taking of 
the mayoralty of the municipality Libertador in May of 2001. For the first time in the 
history of this municipality the communities organized themselves to claim their 
rights through the parish councils. The mayoralty had not fulfilled the assignation of 
the budget and, furthermore, was refusing the constitutional mandate to form a local 
planning council, which had come to be an important step in the achieving of an 
active political and administrative democratisation and participation of the 
community in the exercise of local power. 
Documents drawn up by the parish councils argued that the mayor was acting outside 
the laW43, and was affecting the interests of the community by taking unilateral 
decisions for the convenience of his party without considering the opinion of the 
43 At the times leaflets were circulated suggesting that the Mayor was acting illegally in the following 
ways. 
- The Mayor was acting outside the law because 
- He increase the transport fare without consulting the people. 
- He had not installed the Council of Public Planning. 
- He smothered the Municipal Chamber + the Parish Councils 
- He moved funds destined for social works in the Municipality 
- He increased bureaucracy affecting the overall budget. 
- He did not complete the ordinances. 
- Environmental and visual pollution had all increase. 
- The city was abandoned, dirty and not look after. 
- He did not present minutes or accounts of his activities. 
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citizens and violating municipal ordinances. It may be doubtful whether this conflict 
was per se an expression of the hegemonic struggle, but it does reflect the initiation of 
a change from the political conduct that had underlain the framework characterising 
decentralization by devolution, when the control of the parish councils was in the 
hands of the hegemony of the traditional parties (1992-1995). It also came to 
represent the beginning of new forms of resistance to the verticality of power, which 
had previously been absent from the political context. 
The citizenry were now no longer interested in the improvement of services such as 
the ornamentation of the city (or the conditioning of sidewalks and parapets and 
streets), which had reflected the alliance between local powers and regional 
construction businesses. Because of this one interviewee speaks contemptuously: 
"They called on the mayors of the IV Republic and the existingABC (sidewalks, parapets 
and ditches), which is to say because they hadn't given any air to the most important 
problems. The existing mayor of the municipality hadn't even seen FIDES (the 
intergovernmental fund for decentralization) or FONVIS (the social investment fund), 
and so at a level of the co-ordination of the parish councils of the municipality it was that 
they had been able to get funds for doing the works necessary in the parish through 
FIDES and FONVIS, in spite of the fact that the parish councils were supposed to get 
20% of the municipal division. It was the regional government which had done all the 
improvements in the city, the mayor did nothing, for example the installation offences for 
the signalling system was financed by the national government; they hadn't completed 
the works. " 
President of the parish council 
The parishes had re-animated the political context of the municipalities and in the 
opinion of the leaders they were going to play a very important role in the new 
dimension that they brought to political decentralization. Nevertheless, the main 
problem continued to be the mentality of the old leaders over a form of governing that 
was remote from the people: 
"With respect to the parish councils, they're going to play a transcendental role in what 
decentralisation is, but because they were won by the MVR, let's say that the mayor 
hasn't given any supportfor them to address some of the problems of the community in 
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an effective and efflicacious manner. nen the parish councils were originally created, 
they were like a trampoline, they were simply spaces conquered by leaders of a political 
party, so that they could drive them down the party line and nothing more. Today the 
parish councils are at a constitutional level, now they have insitutionality, but sadly here 
the mayor is from the AD and so the council has only had a little, let's say, he's given 
nothing, hasn't respected anything and hasn't implemented anythingfor the council to be 
able to work effectively. " 
Councillor of Circuit 3 
V1.5 Appreciation of democracy.. decentralization and 
participation in the parish of Osuna Rodriguez and the parish 
Juan Rodriguez Smirez 
The intention of this section is to refer to the results of a small sample, of a survey 
realized during the mega-elections of 2000, in which it is sought to detect opinions on 
decentralization and participation in the parish of Osuna Rodriguez, and then to 
compare it with the parish Juan Rodriguez Su6xez, a parish adjoining the former in the 
same section of the city, but which presents different characteristics from the former. 
Furthermore, for these elections both parishes formed the same electoral circuit: 
Electoral Circuit No. 3 of the Libertador municipality, which chooses a councillor for 
the municipal chamber. 
The parish of Juan Rodriguez Sudrez expanded outwards during the 1970s from a 
centre denominated merely 'The Parish', which dated from the 19'h century and in the 
rural part of which large fields of sugar cane belonging to the oligarchy were situated, 
in a part that was later urbanized. The residential structure of the parish is 
predominantly uni-family habitations, designed and constructed by the private sector 
and with an urban infrastructure of better quality than many other residential areas 
(see photo-mosaic: 6.1). 
In the case of Osuna Rodriguez 8 people were interviewed and in Juan Rodriguez 
Sudrez 10, on the same day as the elections took place, which is to say with the 
intention of living the political experience in vivo. The inquiry on participation was 
divided into two blocks of questions, one concerning political participation in parties 
257 
and participation in movements and NGOs, and the other block concerning 
decentralization at the local level. To these blocks were added at the beginning some 
general information about the interviewee (age, location and activities) and as a 
conclusion some evaluations about decentralization and democracy. Open questions 
were formulated such as: "Do you consider that we are in a true decentralized 
democracy? - Why? - What would be required so that the country could move 
forward to a true decentralized democracy? " 
Conceming the first block of questions44, the survey showed that: 
Citizens in general have a high level of information about, and interest in, 
national electoral politics and also in local electoral politics, even though this is not 
reflected in a desire to be a member or militant in political parties. In this latter, in the 
case of Juan Rodriguez Sudrez this was not comprehensive, but in the case of Osuna 
R. the majority responded negatively, however there was an affirmative response 
which would appear to reflect the clientelistic tendency of this community. 
There exists an advanced democratic tendency, and the intention to vote was 
directed towards the change of actual democratic conditions. 
The participatory and practical relationship with parties is inverted; when one 
is a member of a party generally one is not a member of an NGO, and vice-versa; this 
would appear to be expressive of a civic culture. When the question is put if the 
person knows of or would like to take part in an NGO, they response is always 
affirmative. In this last question there were differences to be found between the 
parishes; in the parish of lowest socio-economic status there is an affirmative 
response as a whole, whereas in that of the higher socio-economic status only the 
majority responded affirmatively, which has a certain logic given that the majority of 
NGOs are directed towards low-resource communities. In so far as diversity, or area 
44 Amongst the questions of the first block were: 
Do you discuss politics? 2. Do you attend to rallies? 3. Do you follow programmes on public opinion? 
4. Do you intend to vote? 5. Are you a militant with in any political party? 6. Are you thinking about 
joining a political party? 7. What has motivated you to vote or not to vote in this occasion? 8. Do you 
belong to an NGO? 9. Do you know of any NGOs? 10. Would you like to participate in a social 
movement or an NGO? 
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of work, of the organizations of civil society is concerned, there are also differences; 
in the parish of 0. Rodriguez there is more thematic variation, environmental, 
religious, neighbourhood and cultural, whereas in the parish of Juan Rodriguez 
Suirez, the community is more commonly affiliated to guild-type organizations 
(Figure: 6.1 and 6.2). 
Concerning the second block of questionS45: 
-The interest in the elections for local government is always high, but the perception 
that is held of them is not always the best. 
-When asked if in agreement with the way in which services are provided, the answer 
is always no. Nevertheless, there is a certain recognition that public services have 
improved since the community was able to elect its own authorities, and all are in 
agreement with participating to improve them through organizations of the civil 
society and NGOs. But the perceptions are different between the two parishes; in the 
case of Osuna Rodriguez where the socio-economic statues is generally low, the more 
positive affirmation refers to basic services such as sports, transport, housing and 
sources of employment. In the parish of Juan Rodriguez Sudrez the valorisation refers 
more often to traffic, security, health and housing infrastructure. In other words, even 
though the economic, social and political crisis has affected every social sector, it is 
also still true that the parish of Juan Rodriguez Sudrez depends less on the political 
parties than the popular sectors of Osuna R., insofar as services and sources of 
employment are concerned. 
As far as the administration of resources on the part of local government goes, 
the interviewees of Osuna Rodriguez all responded negatively, whereas in the other 
parish among the higher socio-economic levels, the response was more divided: 4 
negatives, 3 positives and 3 no replies; the 3 without replies differentiated between 
45 Among the second block of questions were: I. Will you vote for candidates in all of the diferent 
elections? 2. Since the community has directly elected its authorities (governors, mayor, councillors) in 
which of the followings areas have you noticed improvements (health, education, transport, 
employment, housing, sport) 3. What do you think of the management of local government: 
satisfactory, average, unsatisfactory. 4. Do you think that the governor and the mayor administer 
resources effectively?. 
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the governor administering the resources which was good, and the mayor, who was 
not good. The reasons for this were the alleged diversion of funds towards other ends. 
Nevertheless, to verify the results of the enquiry, they were then cross-referenced 
with the information from interviews done in December of 2001, with the Councillor 
of Municipal Chamber No. 3, where he was asked about the role of the mayor and his 
responses to problems of the community, what demands had been answered, and 
which parish has been paid attention to the most, he replied the following: 
"They've listened more to Los Curos (parish of Osuna R. ), precisely because they're a bit 
more organized, there are more needs which are beyond the local organisms, and the 
struggle is a bit more intense. This year (2001) what 'oxygenated' local government was 
the national government through FIDES and through the LAE, as well as through 
FONDUR and through OCEPRE, where they got more than 4000 million bolivarsfor the 
municipality of Libertador. 63 million bolivars arrived through FIDESfor the parish of 
Osuna R, for a sewage reclamation unit, and set up a covered pitch in the sector which 
arrivedfrom regional and national government through FIDES. " 
This opinion was contradicted by an inhabitant of the parish Osuna R: 
"You see, a while ago in Los Curos something very unpleasant happened to us, when they 
were planning the council sessions: what did the mayor do? He called his co- 
religionaries, and shared out the credits to his fellow party members. I don't share the 
opinion of Hugo (the councillor), I differ from his opinion, that all of a sudden the 
attention of the mayor is better towards Los Curos than towards Ju6n Rodriguez Swirez, 
because he hasn't listened with attention, but of course he's come to hear us! He hasn't 
done anything, what he's done is to take moneyftom FIDES, and he's chucked us little 
drinks of warm water; that's not attention in its truest magnitude, and it hasn't been. And 
so how should we think about decentralization ifpeople like the mayor, this gentleman, 
and including people in our own party who are accustomed to behaving like this, people 
who if they get into government produce exactly the same situation; retention offunds, 
creating moneyfor other things and there's no transparency. " 
Question: "In the case of the parish of Juan Rodriguez Sudrez, which are the sectors 
(health, traffic) for which requests are made, and for which something is received? " 
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"Let's say that, even in the most powerful sectors of the parish, generally the housing 
construction services have collapsed, whereas some of the house are 20 or 30 years old, 
the roads are all obstructed and the tubing through which the drinking-water runs is also 
obstructed, and things like that, this is where there's greatest demand, and also security, 
they want securitypoints because ofthe question ofthe insecurity in which they live. " 
Question: "Concretely, what have they given to the Parish J. R. Sudrez? " 
"In the parish some resources came through FIDESfor the Cultural Centre, which cost 
some 45 million bolivars in the Casco de la Plaza where the Prefecture is, they put a 
secondfloor on it and they're going to put all of the cultural organizations residing in the 
parish in it, and some pavement in the La Candelaria section. " 
Question: "Are the neighbourhood associations working? " 
"There are neighbourhood associations hut the participation is much more timid than in 
Osuna R, you find associations where there are only 2 or 3 people all the time, trying to 
lookfor solutions, knocking on the door of other organizations, talking to the mayor. The 
NGOs that are strongest are the sporting and the cultural ones, the one that does the 
foothall and the one that does dancing. " 
Concerning the valorisation of democracy and decentralization: 
Valorisations of decentralization and democracy are concerned mainly with 
accusations of lack of relationships between governors and governed, the control of 
central power over local power and the lack of participation. When they are asked 
what they could do about this, the majority propose more participation, more 
autonomy and less corruption. But there are very marked differences between the two 
parishes, so far as the road to follow to achieve these things is concerned. In spite of 
this there is a block in both parishes that considers there to be no truly decentralized 
democracy right now, and the low-resource parish considers that this might be 
achieved through citizen participation; Juan Rodriguez Suirez recommends that this 
is a problem of better management of resources and of obtaining more autonomy - 
two very distinct manners of seeing the political. I 
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Conclusions 
The process of Venezuelan decentralization has converted local municipal spaces and 
their organs of goverm-nent into the principal channels for the aggregation of interests. 
According to both Constitution of 1961 and that of 1999, the municipality and the 
parish are the primary instances of the state immediately closest to individuals, to 
their problems and aspirations as well as their organized expression. Furthermore the 
importance acquired by the organizations of civil society and particularly 
neighbourhood groups, as legal intermediaries of the citizen in an emergent 
democracy, have had the impact of making the state pay more attention to their 
demands. The political parties and the organizations associated with them continue to 
be important, but the current tendency is to give more recognition to civil society. 
Decentralization has been important in bringing the notion of civil society closer to 
the life of the city. 
This case study of Wrida has allowed as to get close to the local particularity of 
community and neighbourhood spaces, which is where civil society in reality 
develops its practices, its dialogues as well as its different interpretations and forms of 
participation. The neighbourhood has been understood as the smallest unit that a 
municipality uses in its distribution of services etc. As a result, the neighbourhood can 
be seen a an important area for the playing out of social relationships, where different 
forms of relationships of power and resistance interact. 
One aspect to underline in relation to this context of relationships is the change 
produced by the Constitution of 1999 in creating new spaces for participation, such as 
the local planning council and the revocatory referendum, as well as the proposal to 
incorporate the new subjects of decentralization into a Law of Participation. The 
postulates of the Constitution of 1999 sought to deepen democracy with the creation 
of new subjects of decentralization even down to the community, barrio and school 
parents' association and representatives' levels. It dealt with a process of re- 
decentralization which is now impelled, not from central government (above), but 
rather horizontally from the autonomous levels of local or municipal government 
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(below). In other words, the municipality, together with the social movements and the 
community must be the focus of decentralization. 
In spite of the influence that neo-liberal policies have had over the country, 
constitutional rights to housing continue to be protected by the state. However, the 
employment of clientelistic practices related to these rights seems to be changing; in 
the stage of decentralized democracy of the new hegemony (2001 onwards) the 
criteria of valorisation privileges the rights of the family, of women and children. In 
another sense, the interviewees have underlined that the initiative must have come 
from the official of the responsible institution for the assignation of housing, and do 
not establish any relationship with the presence of a social movement (be it feminist 
or human rights-based), which might have motivated this change. 
In relation to the neighbourhood associations and party intermediation, changes seems 
to be related to the presence of the new hegemony which has modified the control that 
the AD and COPEI maintained over determinate local electoral spaces. Nevertheless, 
the valorisation of these democratic practices shows that there is also a new 
conception of politics within an emergent leadership that is beginning to co-ordinate 
local spaces. In this discourse, spaces of political decentralization and participation 
remain closely linked to the process of democratisation and the community, 
distancing themselves from vertical and manipulatable neighbourhood organizations. 
In relation to the organizations of civil society and participation in the parish of 
Osuna Rodriguez, in the 1990s there has been a change in ideological orientation of 
the movements and organizations away from the communitarian and towards the 
assistential and sectorized. This is linked to the programmes of structural adjustment 
in their version of 'Agenda Venezuela', applied conjointly with the PAIS 
organization mentioned above, during the second government of Rafael Caldera 
(1994-1998). The objective was to create social capital and develop pilot mechanisms 
for public/private co-participation, in order to finance projects and activities that 
would be formulated and executed by organizations of civil society. In such a sense, 
environmental organizations were not politically controversial and as a result found it 
easier to attract funding. 
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Furthermore, the intermediation of financing by the international organisms and the 
influence that the traditional political parties still have, generate apathy, uncertainty 
and incredulity in civil society over the future of the organizations with a community 
base. The stated aims of both types of organization is to develop a-critical assistential 
organizations, and not political and communitarian social movements. This has had 
an impact, for example, on communitarian organizations of religious orientation, 
which have lost their space for development by being controlled by the 
neighbourhood councils, and have begun to reconstitute themselves as NGOs of an 
assistentialist type typical of the 1990s. 
Another change underlined by the local analysis is the participation of the community 
in open chapters and assemblies. Moreover, the parish councils now have a more 
active role and are channelling the demands of the community. In addition, the 
neighbourhood councils controlled by the political parties are ceding place to the 
popular assemblies and schemes of horizontal organization at the district level. 
Conflicts of power are observable between the spatial level of the parish council and 
that of the mayoralty, which are obstructing and retarding the solving of problems of 
the community. 
By way of a conclusion to the comparison between parishes it is possible to indicate 
the follo%%ing tendencies: 
As has been observed in the treatment of the previous chapters, in Venezuelan 
society there has been progressively articulated since 1983 a rejection of the political 
parties. In spite of this, the survey outlined above has shown a greater inclination to 
participate in political parties in the most clientelistic space (the parish Osuna R. ), 
than in the less clientelistic space (the parish Rodriguez Sudrez). If it is true that the 
crisis has affected both spaces, it is no less true that the social sectors of the less 
clientelistic environment now depend less on the political parties than the clientelistic 
sectors. 
The new political situation generated by the hegemonic change in the political 
system has awoken greater expectations in the social sectors of lowest resources, than 
in the middle sectors of society, which have yet to be convinced. Electoral 
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participation and the incorporation of communal organizations is greater, and the 
same thing is true of NGOs; this would appear to indicate the tendency of civil 
society towards constituting itself as a new agent of change. 
In relation to the process of decentralization, the questionnaires as much as the 
interviews undertaken with members of the community have affirmed that a true 
decentralized democracy does not yet exist in the municipality, and this is owing 
above all to a lack of priorities and transparency in the management of resources, 
which are not fulfilling the satisfaction of demands. In relation to this, it must be 
understood that it is necessary to introduce new political practices that are linked to 
decentralization in order to widen the horizontality of relationships of power within 
communities, including the fact that decentralization must be understood as a political 
practice, more than a decision linked to the central organisms of the state, or an 
agreement between parties. 
Lastly, it is interesting to appreciate the way in which individuals in their 
dialogues have been interweaving the relationships of the modes of power assimilated 
in the theories of the west, and their own modes of power that are practiced in the 
dependent context where they develop their social and political relations. In this 
sense, the relationships between manipulation, which is one of the modes of power 
underlined by Allen, and clientelism, can be observed. Even though in the dialogues 
(and in their practices) both modes of power appear, in some cases they give the 
impression that clientelism is to be understood as a form of manipulation. This is also 
observable when individuals relate manipulation with another political practice, 
sectarianism of individuals and organizations, but in other cases clientelism appears 
as a mode of power which has its own, different characteristics. In all cases, what 
appears to be the situation is that there is a total recognition that clientelism is an 
obstacle for the development of horizontal relationships of power, and a limitation for 
communitarian association. 
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CHAPTER Vil 
CONCLUSIONS 
The objectives and research questions of this thesis which were set out in Chapter 11 
linked to concerned the most important aspects of the relationships between 
decentralization and the process of democratisation in Venezuela and, more 
specifically, how relationships of democratic power have been modified and how 
decentralization has intervened in this process. This led to a focus upon the links 
between political decentralization and the process of democratisation over the period 
1989-2000, and its impact upon the spaces of local power and upon the experience 
and practice of politics of individuals in the neighbourhood community. 
To meet the goals of this research and elucidate its central objectives and questions, 
the investigation followed a political approach towards decentralization linked to 
relationships of power. This is why the thesis only considers the technical aspects of 
decentralization at an informative level. Modern politics are spatial politics, and this 
requires the development of a new vision within the field of the social sciences. An 
understanding of the relations within the scheme of the spatiality of power, together 
with a consideration of the dependent context and political practice or action, permit 
the formation of a vision that puts the socio-historical process together with the 
experiences of the individual. 
An image of the distribution of relationships of power and resistance as an infinity of 
points, allows us to understand the articulations of power and space from a double 
perspective: on the one hand, it suggests that power is de-centrally distributed and this 
infers a new manner of understanding the dynamics of the process of democratisation. 
On the other hand, it suggests that power is practiced and, as a consequence, is all 
around and between us, rather than being located in a centre, or 'enclosed' within the 
individual. The contributions of this thesis are therefore orientating by nature, in the 
sense that previous models of the spatiality of the relationships of power only took 
into consideration binary schemes, and did not make these differences explicit. 
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As a consequence, the first task that had to be undertaken in order to understand the 
relationship between decentralization and democratisation was a detailed outlining of 
the process of territorial formation and the formation of the Venezuelan state. Without 
the establishment of these two historical aspects it would have been nearly impossible 
to relate the study to the current process of democratisation with its renewed vision. 
Based on this premise, a re-reading of Venezuelan history in order to re-organize a 
perspective on territoriality and the decentralization of power founded in the thematic 
of the spatiality of power was of vital importance. 
However, one of the greatest limitations encountered in this thesis was that the 
majority of socio-political and historical studies have been more interested in the 
interrelationships woven by economic variables, in order to give a response to social 
and political problems, and far less in the themes relating power and space. This 
suggests the necessity of putting more of an obligation in this area of investigation 
onto the social sciences. 
Over and above this limitation, it was a priority to establish the connection between 
the formation of the state and its territorial form. The defining event was the political 
programme of the Constitution of 1864 that gave continuity to the project of the 
liberal state, debated in 1811, and which first imposed the federalist doctrine. This 
was the moment of greatest democratisation of the 19'h century. Later, its 
reformulation in the 20th century would serve as the base of the project of the state of 
representative democracy which began in 1945, indicating the meaning of the 
tendency towards the deepening of political democracy in the country. 
In a different vein, one aspect that was to impart specificity to Venezuelan 
territoriality was that provincial identity and diversity preceded national identity, this 
is a key point for the initiation of any attempt at interpreting the spatiality of power in 
Venezuela. The centrality of the state continues to be based upon the political division 
of territory which was constructed almost entirely in the first half of the 19'h century 
over the spatial fragmentation present since colonial days. Diversity had generated 
very specific forms of political and cultural cohabitation, which inevitably 
conditioned the distribution of power. 
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It should come as no surprise, therefore, that the combination of centralism and 
federalism became a constant during the I 9th century, whilst during the 20th century 
the centralist state would predominate until 1989 (the details of these themes have 
been discussed in their respective chapters). Nevertheless, the new context of 
centralism and decentralization created by liberal democracy permits a comparison of 
at least two aspects that could be of interest in orientating future research. These 
aspects are strongly inter-related, and linked to the presence of contexts signalled by 
proccsscs of democratisation. 
The arrangement of a pact of power between the central administration and other 
levels of government is an aspect that links space and power. The scheme of pacts 
between regional caudillos (1870-1888) that led to centralism, for instance, 
strengthened centralism with the support of the provinces. Meanwhile, in the 20 'h 
century liberal democracy had the intention of strengthening state and local 
government so as to re-organize the national administration and its institutions. By 
comparing the scheme of power of the I 9th century with that generated currently by 
liberal democracy, it is possible to derive a series of questions that permit us to think 
more deeply about the problems of the spatiality of power from a viewpoint much 
closer to Latin American reality. 
In the scheme of the 19th century, the power of the caudillos preceded the 
establishment of central power. The political and social context was marked by a 
species of decentralized power, or local centralism, where central power did not 
control everything and saw itself obligated to make pacts. This combination of power 
was interrupted by the dictatorship at the beginning of the 20th century and from then 
on the centrality of the state was the dominant scheme. The democratic experiment of 
1947 would distance itself from political decentralization, in favour of administrative 
de-concentration. This route would be taken again in 1958, but it would be 
accompanied by a corporative scheme for the distribution of power. Administrative 
deconcentration came to be the form of distributing economic power that 
corresponded with the scheme of corporative power. All of this led to the control by 
the central administration over local power that was exactly the opposite of that which 
had occurred in the 19'h century. 
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This without doubt was to have an important effect on the mentality, or 
instrumentalization for governance, of the leaders that emerged from the generation 
of 28. The central administration were to promote administrative de-concentration 
from above until 1989. From that date forward, a political decentralization was 
proposed which came to modify the vertical scheme with new forms of relationships 
between the different levels of power. However, when the effects of political 
decentralization had an impact upon the verticality of power and promoted new forms 
of social democratisation, parallel to the greater autonomy and management capacity 
of regional and local government, the political system reacted with other practices, or 
'instrumentalized' other modes of power. 
This connects with a second aspect; the continued way in which the dictatorship and 
its foreign supporters tried to obstruct every outbreak of demands for more social 
democracy, paralysing the process of democratisation and installing de facto 
governments. This theme seems to have been of no interest to western political 
theory, although without doubt these interventions are recurrent phenomena in non- 
western countries. This occurred with the restoration of presidential elections in 
Venezuela through the universal, direct and secret vote, the establishment of 
municipal autonomy (in the Constitution of 1893) and with the emergence of new 
democratising tendencies at the end of the I 9th century. It can also be seen in the 
phase of continuity of the process of democratisation, which has been referred to as 
the democracy of mobilization, as well as in the democratic experiment of 1947 and, 
lastly, in the process of democratisation and mobilization initiated with the 
Constitution of 1999 and the hegernonic struggle. 
It is important to observe this last aspect when trying to appreciate the impacts of 
political decentralization and the change of hegemony. It is not possible to completely 
understand these specific types of change in power relations through a binary 
domination-resistance diagram of power relations. This is related to a sense of 
democratisation as process, and to how the effects of political decentralization are 
articulated by civil society. 
The resistance of civil society to the renunciation of its constitutional rights in April 
2002 and the support given to the governors when confronted by the demands for 
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their resignation by the de facto government, gives ample evidence that political 
decentralization strengthens democratic solutions. The mobilization of civil society 
and its resistance against the interim government played a decisive role in the 
restitution of the political autonomy of local government, which had been achieved 
through the process of decentralization, and in the legitimacy of the local powers that 
had demonstrated their support for the president. 
During the period of representative democracy, referred to above as the 'democracy 
of conciliation', in which civil society was subordinated to the political parties, the 
situation had been quite different. In this project, the organizations of civil society had 
rapidly become controlled by the political parties even where their original formation 
had not been promoted by the party leaderships. In this way, the verticality of power, 
achieved through the intermediary of party centralism, was also repeated at the level 
of civil society. The political parties during this period were progressively strangling 
the pronunciation of the plurality of the social context, and concentrating all of their 
political activity in electoral representation and the vote. Meanwhile, the potential for 
resistance and mobilization in civil society was buried by the manipulative practices 
of political clientelism. 
In the middle of the 1980s, liberal democracy announced its presence and began to 
have an impact on the specificity of national space, and the context of social and 
political relationships became marked by the introduction of structural adjustment 
measures, as well as new forms and techniques for governance that were channelled 
through the medium of a proposed reform of the state. Both measures came to signify 
the impact of the relationships of global dominion over territoriality and sovereignty. 
The structural adjustment measures had an imposed economic character through the 
employment of the 'economic package' that the government of Carlos Andrds P6rez 
agreed in February of 1989. The reform of the state was, however, subjected to a 
context of power relations which gave rise to a scenario of opposing opinions in the 
heart of the commission for the reform of the state and a mobilization of resistance 
within civil society in February of 1989. 
On one side, as has been shown above, the institutional space open for the discussion 
of the reform of the state was essentially constituted by two discourses: a) The 
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opinions of a business sector that considered the welfare state to be incompatible with 
the development of initiative and private enterprise, and b) opinions that criticised 
more openly the weakness of the state when confronted by economically powerful 
groups, and the control that the political parties exercised over civil society. These 
last proposals promoted the principle of decentralization in order to augment the 
efficiency of the state in the provision of services to communities. 
Nevertheless, it was the positions most closely linked to the universal strategies of 
liberal democracy that from the start accompanied the proposed reforms: 
1) A critique of the welfare state as being unable to give positive responses to the 
demands of communities, and the promotion of efficient democratic 
government with a minimal state and privatisation. 
2) The articulation of an anti-bureaucratic discourse which attempted to project 
the new parties of liberal democracy and the new political initiatives as the 
unique legitimate representatives of civil society. 
3) The economic decentralization of public services by de-concentration, 
directed at reinforcing the position of local government so that, by gaining 
greater administrative control, they might achieve greater efficiency than the 
national levcl. 
4) More recently, the recipe of building social capital and equality of opportunity 
in order to attack the problems of inequality across the continent. This 
discourse brings together different cultural, political and economic aspects, 
binding them within social participation networks and new initiatives for 
social co-operation including the social movements, presenting them as a 
route for the projection of the values of liberal democracy on civil society. 
This set of ideas, with the support of Venezuela's major economic groups and 
international co-operation, progressively achieved a political space in the process of 
democratic decentralization that began in 1989, but not in pursuit of more democracy 
for the people, but rather to reinforce the power of the elites in strengthening even 
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more the power of the business organizations and individual businesses. As Parekh 
(1992) underlined, this signifies that in actuality liberal democracy gives more 
importance to the liberalism component than to the democratic component 
On the other hand, the measures of adjustment encountered strong resistance from 
Venezuelan civil society and most particularly from the popular sectors of the central 
region of the country. There are two points that can be considered in relation to this 
mobilization of the 27 Ih of February, designated as the beginning of the end of the old 
regime by Gott (2000). Without doubt this event was an expression of the conflict 
generated by the deepening of socio-economic inequalities, but it was also an 
expression of the rejection of the verticality of power derived from the montage of 
neo-liberal policies aimed at minimizing the state. The mobilization not only acted to 
alter the political context, but it also added to pressure for the implementation of a 
political decentralization that the hegemonic parties did not want. 
This issue merits being studied further in the future from the perspective of 
geopolitics, within a sense of territoriality, as an expression of the place where power 
is localised and regionalized. This is an aspect that has not been considered when 
these and similar events are analysed. What this thesis has sought to underline is that 
such events have a spatial dimension that permits the discovery, in a complex 
situation of conflictual relationships of power, of the presence of power everywhere. 
From this view, liberal democracy has been unable to achieve completely its 
intentions, because the majority of people resisted the implementation of its economic 
and political measures. After the coup attempts in 1992, with the advance of political 
decentralization and the process of party fragmentation, civil society began to support 
other forms of alternative government and regional Icaderships which might promote 
formulas of greater participation. This suggests that the process of democratisation 
can also give rise to a democracy which is closer to the people. Pickvance (1997) has 
put both aspects at the centre of the debate on democracy To change the nature of the 
processes of democratisation towards greater participation requires the formation of a 
new political discourse that gives flexibility to relationships of power and opens 
spaces for resistance, plurality and, as a consequence, for the further development of 
civil society. 
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According to Bobbio (1997), the point of contact between democracy and liberalism 
is in universal suffrage. But he does not give importance to the vote and political 
representation, considering that the process of democratisation goes more towards 
social democracy than towards political democracy. This leads to his well-known 
diagram of ascending power (or the political) and descending power (or politics: 
Bobbio 1986). Social democracy is linked to the ascending power which acquires its 
importance from the social relationships where the individual is considered in the 
diversity of their status and specific roles. This favours the articulatory dynamic and 
the assembling of different social practices and dialogues, and comes to explain the 
coincidence in this new phase of democratisation of multiple spaces, voices and social 
movements for the conducting of politics and the dynamic of social change. 
From all of this it is possible to conclude that the problem of the achievement of more 
democracy, rather than more liberalism, cannot ignore the significance of the opening 
of new spaces where the people can exercise democratic practices and relationships of 
power, separated from the relationships of dominion. This takes us to the heart of 
decentralization, to an autonomy of decision-making which, taking into account the 
diversity of the social context, formulates new democratic practices independent of 
the subordination of the agencies of central power. From this is derived the proposal 
of forms of democratic participation removed from the manipulative or clientelistic 
practices of the elites. This is the point that links political decentralization with the 
new forms of participation and the emergence of civil society in the present day. 
The focus upon the spatiality of power permits an approximation of the effects that 
political decentralization has upon participation. To begin, we can observe that 
political decentralization through devolution should improve the taking of decisions 
by ascending power. Meanwhile, from the perspective of the decentralization of 
liberal democracy, participation is a facilitating instrument for the planning and 
execution of projects at the local level. Nevertheless, in situating the two essential 
interpretations that sustain the debate concerning political decentralization within the 
schems of the relations of power proposed by Allen, three additional aspects can be 
extracted: 
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0 Firstly that the "new" social reforms and decentralization are clearly 
developed in an interweaving of the relationships of power centred on and 
within a diagram of the mobilizing power of the resources of individuals. This 
superimposition of diagrams of power creates difficulties in distinguishing the 
pre-eminence that the binary relations of centred power have in these reforms. 
This allows the political and ideological proposals of the reforms to be 
discharged and extended over a wide space of relationships of power, without 
raising the least suspicions. 
Secondly the operations of the multilateral entities are supported in the 
diagram of relationships of power for the mobilization of resources and social 
capital, and NGOs are preferred for the realization of their operations. For 
such institutions, NGOs are synonymous with civil society. 
Thirdly that within the tendency of the non-western vision of political 
decentralization, even where this is situated in the formulation of a diagram of 
the relationships of power, the conceptual elaboration is still weak and needs 
to be more explicit. Meanwhile, the western vision of decentralization does 
not conceive of the possibility of the development of political decentralization 
as independent of administrative decentralization, but rather as its result. This 
critique is directed explicitly against the diagram of the generator of practices 
and the notion of political decentralization. 
These points of view approximate the discussion on democracy and decentralization 
in the period of decentralized democracy (1989-1998) in Venezuela, because both 
tendencies towards decentralization had co-existed, even though their effects carried 
contrary meanings. On the one hand, liberal democracy orientated decentralization 
towards the promotion of a new leadership linked to the elites who held economic 
power, to the reorganization of the political parties, and towards the development of 
the NGOs and social capital, as well as other institutions, as has been verified in this 
study, at the state and local levels. On the other hand, political decentralization 
contributed to the fragmentation and weakening of the hegemonic parties and, as a 
consequence, to the strengthening of mobilizations, participation and the new political 
culture of the people. These aspects would become enmeshed in the phase of the 
process of democratisation inaugurated by the Constitution of 1999. 
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At the end of the 1990s the process of democratisation took another direction. From a 
centralist democracy it moved towards a democracy of mobilization and participation. 
In this change of route decentralization and civil society have played a very important 
role. Political decentralization, through the direct election of governors, mayors and 
parish councils, opened new spaces of participation and autonomy and defined the 
route for the new hegemonic struggle. There are at least four elements within the 
arguments for visualizing the impact of political decentralization on the construction 
of the new hegemony: 
1) Political decentralization (together with the effects that the electoral reforms 
had inside the political parties, the political pressure of the 4 th of February and 
the role played by civil society) has acted as a component of force upon the 
whole political system. Concretely, this has contributed to disarticulating the 
old hegemony and, at the same time, to exercising pressure for new forms of 
democratic participation. The articulation of these elements has altered, 
progressively, the power that the old hegemony exerted over the state and its 
institutions and in the control over state and municipal spaces of power. 
2) Political decentralisation has strengthened the hegemony of several state and 
municipal initiatives. The most relevant cases have been mentioned in 
previous chapters: the first effects were shown by Proyecto Carabobo, 
promoting the decentralization of services in the state of Carabobo, and by 
Causa R's support of the democratisation of the syndicalist struggles in the 
state of Bolivar. More recently, La Causa R and the popularity of the leaders 
of the 4 th of February uprising achieved control of the state of Zulia. 
Meanwhile, the Convergencia replaced the Social Christians in the state of 
Yaracuy. For its part the MAS came to exercise a type of hegemony in the 
state of Aragua y Lara, whilst later on it also controlled local power in 
Portuguesa, Delta Amacuro and Sucre. The PPT between 1992 and 1995 came 
to control the Alcaldia of Caracas, the governorship of Anzodtegui and the 
new state of Vargas. All of the above is without even considering the details 
of all of the possible alliances of the political game. During 1998 the ma ority 
of the states in the country, within which were concentrated the greatest 
quantities of the population, either were, or had been, controlled by opposition 
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to the hegemonic parties of AD and COPEL All of these cases were the results 
of the effects that political decentralization had upon the vertical controls of 
power. They show the importance that local powers came to represent in the 
formation and the supremacy of the new hegemonic tendencies. 
3) Another of the effects of political decentralization was in the reformulation of 
the institutional struggle. Institutional pressure, in the Venezuelan case, began 
to be exercised by local powers towards the achievement of greater financial 
autonomy or simply for the satisfaction of community demands. This was 
channelled through the new governors and mayors associations. Meanwhile, 
the characteristics of financial dependence and the reduced capacity for the 
generation of income at the local levels made it Possible that non-compliance 
in the satisfaction of service provision was translated directly, by means of 
such associations, to the central power. This in turn had the effect of 
deepening the unhappiness of the communities with respect to the party 
ctipulas. 
4) In a similar fashion, political decentralization and the uninominality of the 
vote increased the pressures exerted by local leaders for greater political 
autonomy from the traditional party leaderships. The distribution of power to 
a certain degree began to fracture the dependency of local leadership upon the 
political elites of the centre from the moment that it became clear that 
continuity in the exercise of power depended more upon that local leadership 
than the 6pulas. This greater independence would have an impact on the 
formation of new local political organizations, in many cases through with a 
breaking free from the parties and their leadership and, in other cases, through 
the emergence of new leaders. As a consequence, the integrating agents of the 
old hegemony were weakened by the atomisation that multiplied the spaces of 
power and, with these, there was an unavoidable growth in the number of 
strategic alliances needed to achieve agreements at the levels of the national 
congress, and between the political parties and the civil associations and 
federations. 
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For its part, the attempted coup of the 4'h of February gave evidence that the contract 
guaranteeing the permanence of the democracy of conciliation had arrived at an end, 
and this had a direct impact on national public opinion, as well as the emergence of 
another possible route. This is to say, the most significant contributions of the 4'h of 
February was that it contributed to the re-vindication of the political act, or the right 
of resistance, that is an element of the relationships of power and which the political 
parties, by means of clientelistic manipulation, had immobilized. At the same time, it 
vindicated the political discourse by substituting the project less political-ideological 
discourse of the elites for a more direct and popular discourse that connected the 
leaders with the people. That is to say that the new discourse was accompanied by the 
theme of the constituent assembly which contributed to the homogenisation of public 
opinion and gave it a political orientation towards the individual. 
Something else that is important to point out is that, as a result of all of these 
processes, political decentralization seems to have encountered more conditions for 
impelling social democratisation in the new dependent context generated by the 
hegemonic struggle. This, as is common to social phenomena, could not have been 
foreseen before the disentangling of the hegemonic struggle. It is precisely in the 
formation of this scenario where political decentralization makes its greatest 
contributions in reinforcing the mechanisms of the organization of society through its 
social networks, such as is the case with the implementation of the schools network 
linked to the Educational Project and the Bolivarian Circles studied in Chapter V. 
Without doubt this project was related to the linking of ascending power and the 
diversity of status and the specific roles of the individual. It also finds its legal basis 
in the political rights of the citizen and in the constitutional norms that promote 
political decentralization. This point could in the future initiate an interesting 
discussion concerning the relationships between the new Venezuelan hegemony and 
its project of social democracy. 
Nevertheless, a comparison of this process with the opinion of the spokespeople of 
the multilateral financial organizations reveals an opposing understanding. According 
to these organizations, political decentralization by itself does not contribute to the 
stimulation of participation and political practices that help the development of a 
democratic culture. These sources inform us that all citizens, by being contributors, 
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have the right of opinion over the destination of their taxes, from which are derived 
their arguments for linking decentralization and democracy. This chain of ideas, 
presented as a universal truth, has nevertheless a markedly exclusionary character. 
This supposed support for fiscal or administrative decentralization remains linked to the 
elite and bestows exclusive rights to those sectors of civil society with greatest 
economic resources. In the spatial context, it directs its resources towards those states 
with the greatest comparative advantages and with the greatest concentration of the 
population. This is a fact which is clearly present in Venezuela today and which 
contrasts with the map of social inequalities, above all after the application of the 
structural adjustment measures. The most characteristic feature of the Venezuelan 
social situation during 1997, eight years after the implementation of decentralization, 
was the deepening of the process of impoverishment of the population, which is one of 
the most worrying and potentially most explosive aspects of our reality. The growth in 
extreme poverty rates passed from 19.72% in 1990 to 21.74% in 1997, and society, 
rather than becoming more diverse, seems to be segmenting into very unequal and 
segregated strands and divisions. 
The transference of resources and competences from the central government through 
the Situado Constitucional, the intergovernmental fund for decentralization (FIDES) 
and from the Law of Special Assignations is of little help to those states in which the 
levels of extreme poverty are increasing. The comparison of poverty indexes from the 
year 1997 (Map: 7.1) with the consolidation of resources of the year 1998 shows that 
those states with transferences of between 0 and 4% for the consolidation of resources 
are those states with the highest levels of extreme poverty: Amazonas, Delta 
Amacuro, Apure, Gudrico and Portuguesa. This can be attributed to the presence of 
the markedly exclusive character that the administrative decentralization has had in 
orienting privileges to determinate points in space and to determinate sectors of the 
population. 
Nevertheless, the obtaining of a better distribution of resources is a problem that 
could be resolved directly through political decentralization through the promotion of 
the horizontality of ascending power. This implies the opening of new spaces for the 
discussion of community problems and the development of political practices which 
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could lead to a greater equilibrium in spatial relationships of power, breaking away 
from vertical control. This suggests that the fundamental difference between the two 
conceptions of decentralization and democracy relates to their effects upon the new 
political culture of the individual and the development and strengthening of social 
movements. This does not signify that the state ceases in its functions of contributing 
to the resolution of problems in the community. This is another aspect that liberal 
democracy has presented as a universal truth, and which it has manipulated to confect 
the dichotomy between local powers and the national state. But about quite how the 
wider relations between the state and civil society might be conceived, and through 
what types of practices they might be instrumentalized, we can say little about the 
specific Venezuelan case, except for the references that have already been mentioned. 
This would be a point of interest for future investigations. 
Nevertheless, the democratic experience is extremely valuable for understanding how 
manipulative practices obstruct the advance of civil society. In the welfare state, 
democracy has the capacity to give attention at different levels to a diversity of 
interests and moreover, to stabilize representative democracy. This is, however, 
conditioned upon a deepening of the verticality of power and without the necessity of 
implementing political decentralization. In its place forms of intermediation by civil 
society were instrumentalized. The references for the explanation of these aspects are 
generally economic; the so-called 'utilitarian mechanisms' linked to the oil rentier 
economy and the bipartisanship linked to a reduced number of semi-corporative 
organisations. Both articulate diverse interests and process their demands towards 
organisms of decision with the aim of avoiding conflicts in the distribution of 
resources. 
This is also the viewpoint from which political clientelism has generally been 
analysed, which has scarcely ever been associated with the spatiality of power. As a 
consequence, an aspect that it is important to underline now, is that of the notion of 
manipulation as a mode of power within the literature on the spatiality of power, and 
the relationship that can be established between that notion and that of political 
clientelism. This is a relationship that has not been present in Western political 
theory, in spite of the importance that it has for understanding the Latin American 
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political context. It is a relationship that articulates directly with the dialogues 
established in this work. 
Clientelism is a mode of power that contributes to the extension of vertical power 
over space. It is a political practice of domination that contributes to the development 
of "centres of power" directed at the control and de-mobilization of organizations of 
civil society at the local level. Or, in the words of Allen (1999) it could be said that 
clientelism is a form of manipulation of power that employs politics to contribute 
towards the assurance of approval, when the authority of central power is not 
completely effective; said that is to say that political clientelism is a manifestation of 
the modes of power in Latin America. 
In the dialogues that were undertaken within the community of Osuna Rodriguez, 
references and concrete cases were found that demonstrated the manner in which the 
parties of bipartisanship manipulated and instrumentalized different forms of control 
over individuals, and the effects that this had upon the organizations of civil society. 
References were also found to the new types of practices that were introduced by the 
liberal democracy in local spaces in order to replace clientelism. These "purely 
utilitarian" relationships were expressed by multiple and unstable contracts, 
negotiated case by case and of definite duration. The modification of the rules of the 
democratic game which have been contained in the project of participatory 
democracy approved in the popular referendum in Venezuela in 1999, could lead to 
new thinking on the possibility of change in the intermediation of the political parties 
within civil society, or whether this has simply been placed displaced towards the 
state and municipal levels of government. Nevertheless, the experience of 
participatory democracy in Venezuela is very recent. Moreover the appreciations 
expressed in this work in the preceding chapters about the changes within the 
Venezuelan political system, are not sufficient to assure that they have also touched 
on specific relationships of power, like clientelism, which have had so much affect on 
the development of the new social movements. 
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UNIVERSIDAD DE LOS ANDES 
UNWERSIDAD DE LOUGHBOROUGH (INGIATERRA) 
TESIS DE DOCTORADO: DEMOCRACIA Y DESCENTRALIZACION EN VENEZUELA 
GEOGRAFA: YUBHU ARAGORT SOLORZANO 
ENCUESTA SOME PARTICIPACION POLITICA 
MEGAELECCIONES 2000 - CIUDAD DE MERIDA 
1. QUE EDAD TIENE USTED: 
_ 
AROS. 
2. EN QUE SECTOR DE LA CIUDAD VIVE: 
3. ESTA TRABAJANDO. si NO 
4. A QUE SE DEDICA: 
S. USTEDPARTICIPO EN EL PERIODO PRE-ELECTORAL DE ALGUNA DE ESTAS MANERAS: 
5.1 HA DISCUTIDO SOME POLITICA. si NO 
5.2 HA ASISTIDO ALGUN MITIN POLITICO. si NO 
5.3 HA SIDO RADIO-OYENTE 0 TELEVIDENTE DE PROGRAMAS DE OPINION POLITICA. 
si NO 
5.4 IU PARTICIPADO DE ALGUNA OTRA MANERA: 
6. PEENSA VOTAM si NO 
7. SIEMPRE HA VOTADO. si NO 
S. QUE LO HA MOTIVADO A VOTAR 0 NQ VOTAR ESTA OCASION. 
9. MILITA EN PARTIDOS POLIUCOS. sl NO 
9.1 PIENSA SER MEEMBRO DE ALGUN PARTIDO EN EL FUTURO. 
sl NO 
10. PERTENECE A ORGANIZACIONES NO GUBERNAMENTALES. 
sl NO 
(si responde si continuar) 
( si responde no pasar a 11) 
10.1 A CUAL DE ESTAS: 
-AMBIENTAIASTA 
-RELIGIOSA 
-CULTURAL 
-DEPORTIVA 
-SINDICATOS 
-GREMIOS PROFESIONALES 
-VECINOS 
10.2 DESDE CUANDO: 
-MAS DE 5 AROS 
-ENTRE, 5Y2 ASOS 
-MENOS DE 1 AROS 
11. TIENE CONOCIMIENTO DE ALGUNAS DE ESTAS ORGANIZACIONES: SI NO 
-AMBIENTALISTA 
-RELIGIOSA 
-CULTURAL 
-DEPORTIVA 
-VECINOS 
-OTRAS 
11.1 LE GUSTARIA PARTICIEPAR. SI NO 
12. USTED VA A SELECCIONAR CANDIDATOS A TODOS LOS CARGOS. ST NO 
( si responde no pasar a 12.1; si responde si, pasar a la 13) 
12.1 A CUALES DE ESTOS Y POR QUE? 
-PRESIDENTE DE LA REPUBLICA. 
-PARLAMENTO LATINOAMERICANO. 
-PARLAMENTO ANDINO. 
-GOBERNADOR DE ESTADO. 
-DIPUTADO A LA ASAMBLEA NACIONAL 
-DIPUTADO AL CONSEJO LEGISLATIVO. 
-ALCALDE 
-CONCEJALES. 
13. CONOCE LOS CANDIDATOS A GOBERNADOR, ALCALDE Y DIPUTADOS AL CONSEJO 
LEGISLATIVO Y SUS PROGRAMS DE GOBIERNO. si NO 
14. DESDE QUE LA COMUNIDAD ELIGE DIRECTAMENTE EL GOBERNADOP" EL ALCALDE Y 
LOS CONCEJALES EN CUAL DE LAS DE LAS SIGUIENTES AREAS DE SERVICIO JIA NOTADO 
USTED MEJORIAS: 
-SALUD 
-VIVIENDA 
-VIALIDAD 
-EMPLEO 
-EDUCACION 
-DEPORTF, 
-TRANSPORTE 
-NINGUNO 
15. COMO SE SIENTE USTED CON LA GESTION DE LOS GOBERNANTES LOCALES. 
-SATISFECHO 
-MEDIANAMENTE SATISFECHO 
-INSATISFECHO 
16. CREE USTED QUE El GOBERNADOR Y EL ALCALDE ADMINISTRAN BIEN LOS RECURSOS 
ECONOMICOS. sl NO 
DIGA PORQUE: 
NO 
16.1 USTED ESTARIA DE ACUERDO EN PARTICIPAR A TRAVES DE ALGUNA ONG EN LA 
PLANIFICACION, CONTROL Y EJECUCION DE LOS RECURSOS ECONOMICOS. 
SI NO 
17. USTED CONSIDERA QUE ESTAMOS EN UNA VERDADERA DEMOCRACIA 
DESCENTRALIZADA. SI NO 
DIGA PORQUE: 
IMQUE SE REQUERERIA PARA QUE EL PAIS PUEDA ADELANTAR UNA VERDADERA 
DEMOCRACIA DESCENTRALIZADA. 
OBSERVACIONES. 
MERIDA 30 DE JULIO DEL 2.000 
